9/11: Osama bin Laden’s spectacular miscalculation

Updated 9:43 AM EDT, Mon September 12, 2016
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Story highlights

For Osama bin Laden, September 11 was a great tactical victory but a huge strategic failure, writes Peter Bergen

15 years later, US still embroiled in the Mideast, despite bin Laden's aim of reducing American involvement, he says

The mistake made by George W. Bush in launching the Iraq War also looms large, Bergen says

Editor’s Note: Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. He is the author of “United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists.” For more analysis of the jihadist threat today read this paper by Peter Bergen.

CNN —  

Like the attack on Pearl Harbor, another hinge event in American history, 9/11 was a great tactical victory for America’s enemies. But in both these cases the tactical success of the attacks was not matched by strategic victories. Quite the reverse.

The Japanese scored an important victory at Pearl Harbor, but the attack pulled the United States into World War II and four years later Japan was in ruins, utterly defeated.

Similarly, al Qaeda’s attacks coming out of the azure-blue sky 15 years ago, on Tuesday morning September 11, 2001, were a great shock to Americans and, indeed, to much of the world: Almost 3,000 dead; many hundreds of billions of dollars of damage to the US economy, and the shock of the world’s only superpower being taken on by a relatively small terrorist group, al Qaeda. Not since the British had burned down the White House in 1814 almost two centuries earlier had America’s enemies succeeded in attacking the continental United States.

For so long the two great oceans of the Atlantic and the Pacific had protected America from its enemies, but no more.

Yet, for all their tactical success the 9/11 attacks failed strategically and, in the end, achieved precisely the opposite of what Osama bin Laden had intended.

There are, of course, differences between the post-World War II era and the post 9/11 era. The long-term aftermath of Pearl Harbor was not only a decisive Allied victory in the war but also decades of American leadership and dominance.

After its initial success in Afghanistan following 9/11, victory was not decisive for the United States. Instead, American forces continued to be at war with a number of shadowy jihadist groups, most recently ISIS, and this now seems like a quasi-permanent state of affairs that could persist well beyond the next presidency.

When Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force immediately after the 9/11 attacks, no one could have imagined this authorization would continue to be the basis for American wars that persist a decade and a half later.

Bin Laden’s hope

Osama bin Laden fervently hoped that attacking the United States would create pressure on American leaders to reduce their support for Middle Eastern regimes. Bin Laden believed that without that American support the Arab regimes would collapse and would be replaced by Taliban-style rulers.

In particular, bin Laden wanted to put pressure on the United States to pull its troops out of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, bin Laden’s principal political goal was to overthrow the Saudi royal family.

On a video that was released four weeks after 9/11, bin Laden made his first public statement since the attacks on New York and Washington, saying “neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad [Saudi Arabia].”

The video was poorly timed, as it came out on October 7, 2001, the same day the United States began its air campaign against Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan.

Two months later the Taliban was completely routed from Afghanistan and within another couple of weeks those key members of al Qaeda who had survived the intense American airstrikes were fleeing to neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

Gambling on weakness

Bin Laden disastrously misjudged the likely American response to the 9/11 attacks because he labored under the delusion that the United States was weak. In his first television interview on CNN in 1997, bin Laden claimed the United States was a paper tiger, pointing to the American withdrawals from Vietnam in the early 1970s, Lebanon in the early 1980s and from Somalia in 1993 as evidence of the United States’ waning power. Bin Laden told CNN, “The US still thinks and brags that it has this kind of power even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut … and Somalia.”

Bizarrely, bin Laden believed that al Qaeda’s attacks on New York and Washington would result in an American withdrawal from the Middle East. Instead, the United States quickly toppled the Taliban and al Qaeda – “the base” in Arabic – lost the best base it had ever had in Afghanistan.

In the years after the 9/11 attacks the United States not only did not reduce its influence in the Middle East, but it also established or added to massive bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. And, of course, it also occupied both Afghanistan and Iraq. Bin Laden’s tactical victory on 9/11 turned out to be a spectacular strategic flop.

Since 9/11 the CIA has eliminated many dozens of al Qaeda’s leaders in drone strikes. The CIA also provided the leads that eventually led to the death of bin Laden, when US Navy SEALs raided his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda has not been able to strike the United States again after 9/11.

A letter written by an al Qaeda member nine months after 9/11 that was addressed to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational commander of the September 11 attacks, gives a sense of how much the attacks had backfired: “Consider all the fatal and successive disasters that have afflicted us during a period of no more than six months. … Today we are experiencing one setback after another and have gone from misfortune to disaster.”

Strategic disaster

In 2004 Abu Musab al Suri, a Syrian jihadist who had known bin Laden since the late 1980s, released on the Internet a history of the jihadist movement in which he described the strategic disaster that had engulfed the Taliban and al Qaeda a