Karen Brutents was a specialist in Third World affairs on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He was interviewed for this episode of COLD WAR in August 1997.

On Soviet involvement in the Middle East:

[We became involved] for geopolitical reasons and geostrategic reasons. The Middle East almost bordered our southern republics, and that's why we were keen that there shouldn't be a strong military presence of our adversaries in that area, and at the same time there shouldn't be serious outbursts of military tension. That was one reason. The second reason was our general concept of support for national liberation movements. We thought that the Arabs, who were seeking to get rid of a colonial or any other type of dependence, were conducting a just war, and we were true to the theory that we had been adhering to from the start. There was a third, irrational, reason which was the following: there was a struggle of two superpowers in the Sixties ... and it was a roulette. Some of the Soviet Union's actions, from my point of view, did not look rational enough in terms of this game that was acquiring an autonomous meaning. Sometimes the question was not what the stake was, but the theory was not to yield an inch to the adversary. As opponents, we were worthy of each other. ...

If some of the Soviet leadership's actions were careless, it wasn't through adventurism but because they were not competent enough. They had a peculiar motive not to do anything that would lead to a direct military confrontation with the West. A game of force, yes, but nothing more than that. At the same time the Soviet leadership were very sensitive to the situation in the Middle East, and there was a faction among the military, but also among the Soviet leadership, who took whatever was happening in the Middle East as a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Mind you, at that time there were a lot of people amongst the Soviet military leadership who had survived [World War II], with all its horrors, and they had a certain clock clicking inside them which said: "Never again." And that was the standpoint with which they were approaching the situation in the Middle East.

On Soviet support for Arab nations in the Middle East:

The Egyptians and Syrians said they needed strategic parity with Israel, which also shows this crazy lottery of the two superpowers. They used to say, "If that amount of weaponry is supplied to Israel [by the United States], we want the same amount, of the same quality." The Arab leaders always said that at the talks -- not just the clerks, but the leaders. "We are not going to attack Israel, but we have to be as strong as Israel is." That was the formula of strategic parity. They didn't actually say "parity," but they said "strategic equality." Their demands [on us] were various and substantial, but they were never fully met -- maybe partly for purely economic reasons, because it was quite difficult to satisfy them completely, but they were primarily strategic and political considerations. No one in the Soviet leadership, as far as I know, made a stake on military confrontation in the Middle East. ...

In general, the understanding of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries is rather primitive -- for example, the relations between the Soviet Union and Nasser's Egypt. Somehow, if those countries developed friendly relations with the Soviet Union, it seemed to be that the Soviet Union was controlling those countries. That is a stereotype, but in fact it meant a misunderstanding of both Nasser's personality and the personality of the Arabs in general or of that period of time. The Arab countries, and Egypt first of all, had achieved independence for the first time in history, and do you think they expelled the British from the Suez Canal, reached independence and expelled English military advisers, in order to fall under the control of the Soviet Union?

Then about Nasser's personality: Nasser was a convinced Arab nationalist; he was a very independent person. ... Nasser was zealously devoted to the cause of the Arab world, and he was a sincere friend of the Soviet Union. I see two reasons for that. The first [is] the unfriendly attitude of the West. But secondly, he saw in the Soviet Union a force who was sincerely trying to help Egypt get liberated. And he was right: we indeed tried to help Egypt, not out of altruism, but also because it was weakening the position of the West. Nasser thought that the Soviet Union was a reliable friend. That was it, and there was nothing besides that. He never accepted a single recommendation of the Soviet Union that ran contrary to his convictions. ...

The Soviet Union fully counted on the political settlement of [Arab-Israeli] issue[s]. We always tried to convene a Geneva conference. ... The Soviet Union's policy of political settlement did not change for a quarter of a century. ... The reason was simple. We are not going to speak about moral issues -- let's set them aside; I'm not trying to prove that the Soviet Union was pursuing some very good objectives. Let's be pragmatic. First of all, the fact of the matter was that the area, very close to the U.S.S.R., which was stuffed with weaponry, constituted a great risk in terms of things flaring up. There was a point when the Americans, not without a certain attempt at provocation, kept all their nuclear forces on military alert, in a state of high defense, and that was very dangerous. So we didn't want to solve the problem in a military way. And then later we realized that the Arabs were not capable of that, in their condition. In a military sense, Israel was superior.

On the Six-Day War:

American and Israeli writers tried to prove that the Soviet Union blessed, so to speak, the events that led to the Six-Day War. In her memoirs, Golda Meir writes that the Soviet Union blessed the [war plans of Egyptian] Defense Minister, [Sham] Badran, but that's absolutely wrong. I don't know how much is propaganda and how much is ignorance. On May 23, 1967, Badran, the Minister of Defense, arrived in Moscow. He brought Nasser's message, and on the same day he was received by Kosygin on behalf of the Soviet leadership. ... Apart from delivering the message, Badran said that Israel was concentrating its forces on the border with Syria and there were some preparations taking place on the outskirts of Egypt, and that Egypt couldn't stay indifferent in that situation, and in view of the military necessity, they were going to deliver a preventive strike.

Kosygin did not hold any consultations, and his position was very negative. He said that it would be taken by the whole world as an aggression and the Soviet Union could not support this. The talks went on for three days, through the 24th and 25th. On the 24th, Badran was still making his case; but on the 25th, when he received new directives from Nasser, he said that "Without the approval of the Soviet friends, we are not going deliver the strike -- although we would like to." And after that he left. There is a version that the [Soviet] Minister of Defense, Marshal [Andrei] Grechko, said to Badran on the airfield, "We are going to stick with you in any situation," which meant that we were supporting them. But that doesn't hold any water for their theory. In Egypt, in 1972, I saw Grechko banging his fist on the table and saying, "We shall never fail you!" But the Soviet political leadership clearly said [otherwise] to Nasser. ...

Before the Six-Day War, the reaction of the Soviet leadership was absolutely negative. ... The general policy of the Soviet Union was to avoid military confrontation in the Middle East, because the Middle East was near us, and any military conflict there was fraught with danger of conflict with America, and we didn't want this. Another matter is that both sides in fact were pursuing the strategy of controlled tension. The Soviet Union and America, supplying arms to their friends, did not want these weapons to be used.

Of course we regretted [the Israeli victory]. It was not only a partial defeat of the Arabs, but we also saw it as a defeat for the Soviet Union. The only thing the Soviet Union could do was to prevent a total defeat. It wasn't a pleasant surprise for the Soviet Union at all, but it was a fact, and in general that war changed a lot on the Middle Eastern scenario, and it was a turning point in a sense because it bared the military weakness of the Arabs. Sometimes our military were in the following mood: they used to say that the Arabs were no fighters.

On the Yom Kippur (or October) War:

After the Egyptian and Syrian attack, there were no special feelings in Moscow, as far as I know. There was a sense that it was an adventure. Because they had a better picture than in 1967 about the real balance of forces in the Middle East. There was no time for emotions, because soon the Israeli breakthrough took place and it took about a day only -- and after that all the efforts of the Soviet Union were aimed at stopping the conflict and bringing the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations to achieve that fragile armistice. We realized that the road to Tel Aviv lay through Washington and the United Nations. ...

Our peacemaking efforts, which helped save or protect Egypt and Syria from heavier military failures or complete destruction, worked for our prestige. But at the same time this war, which emphasized and proved the military superiority of Israel on the one hand, and on the other hand contributed to their further alienation from us, weakened the position of the Soviet Union. ...

I think that those events affected the process of détente unfavorably, in the sense that they strengthened the mistrust of the Soviet Union towards the United States; maybe mutual distrust -- although I think the role of the United States at that time was more negative than the role of the Soviet Union.

On Soviet strategy in the Third World:

There exists a very common notion that there was what the Americans called a "master plan" to take over the Third World and that all the individual operations were part of that strategy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, that wasn't so. I can guarantee that. I understand why such opinions appear. Putting aside the propaganda, that is the attempt to demonize the enemy. And secondly, regarding our scientists and politicians, that is attributing to the leadership more intellectual abilities than they in fact have, and presenting the matter as if things are all planned and calculated -- whereas in fact, the leadershipÕs actions include a lot of zig-zags and chance and improvisations.

I never heard of any "plan," and never took part in the discussion of anything like that. It doesn't mean that from time to time we didn't discuss the policy of the Soviet Union in a particular area. ... The Third World was the main place of struggle of the two superpowers. In Europe, the borders were frozen and expansion of any kind was impossible -- [conflict] would have meant another World War. Where could the free hunting take place? In the place where there were still opportunities, where there was prey, to put it crudely. That was the Third World, and each of the sides tried not to miss their chance. ...

Of course there were new opportunities in the Seventies for advancement in the Third World. The Third World was a miserable place in those years. Why? Because the two super-powers were fighting each other in the territories of the Third World and the Third World was suffering from the effects of that clash. Somebody once said that when two elephants are either making love or fighting, the grass perishes. And when the Third World countries became the hotbed of struggle, they suffered, and often that struggle was not for a particular country but in that country.

In Africa, believe me, there were no serious economic interests; not even political interests, speaking seriously, that the Soviet Union had in Africa. But nevertheless, the Soviet Union got involved up to its ears in that struggle. The struggle was not FOR Africa, as a lot of people think, but it was IN Africa. That also happened in Angola; Angola became one of those areas. It was very unlucky that a small country became one of the key points of that struggle, and it suffered a great deal from that, because the armed struggle that went on for two decades was the gift, so to speak, of the two superpowers to Angola.

On Soviet involvement in Angola:

The Soviet Union, I'm fully convinced, was involved in Angola not on the basis of any plan, but it got involved spontaneously, deeper and deeper, despite its national interests. ...

The government of Angola made an appeal to the international community -- that is, to the Yugoslavs and to the Cubans; they didn't appeal to us, because they knew our position was very moderate. The Cubans responded. ... We didn't know that the Cubans were coming to rescue the Angolans. ... It wasn't welcomed in Moscow: it was received without enthusiasm, for a number of reasons: it seemed to be a risky and adventurous action; [it] created conditions for American retaliation; [and] they felt embarrassed about the fact that the Cubans turned out to be more decisive than we were. But when the Cubans were already in Angola, we got involved step-by-step, because the Cubans needed food and weapons. And we found ourselves involved up to our ears in Angola, although we were not planning on it.

The Cubans did all this completely independently from us. ... Fidel Castro wasn't one to obey orders. The Soviet leaders never managed to make him do so. They were acting independently, [for] two reasons, in my opinion. First of all, revolutionary vigor -- to help the national liberation movement. And secondly, it was a matter of prestige. The Cubans showed their authority in the Third World, their leading role. ...

The Cubans moved into Angola and they started to turn to us with requests. Of course we started helping them. ... [At first] the aid was very small and allowed them to expand their possibilities of publishing propaganda and training personnel. That was all; there wasn't any big material help that we were giving them. [But] our material expenditure in Angola grew, of course, as we immersed ourselves deeper into Angolan affairs. The Cubans came and took an active part in their military actions, and providing them with weapons and food gradually became our responsibility. Even though the Cubans were using their own weapons, we were making up for what they were losing in Africa through our deliveries to Cuba. And it went on for quite a long time. We were also giving economic aid to Angola itself. Our advisers and the Cuban advisers were training Angolan armed forces. It all ran up to quite a big amount. ...

And that's how one of the most stupid actions in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union started. The Soviet involvement cost the Soviet Union dearly, financially. What did we seek in Angola? They were very rich: gas, oil, diamonds -- but we didn't get anything from them. We sat there, protecting them from the South Africans, and at the same time the Americans were pumping their oil in Cabinda, we were draining ourselves of our own blood.

On Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa:

We got to the Horn of Africa by chance. Each superpower was trying to use all the chances that were turning up; and the Soviet Union had a lot of such opportunities, because all that part of the world was in the post-colonial period: there were a lot of clashes and a natural process of throwing off the colonial past. And it turned out that the Americans were often supporting the old European states, and we were on the side of the newly-emerging regimes who were throwing off the past. That's what happened in the Horn of Africa. ...

The Soviet Union did not control the situation in Ethiopia. ... Relations between countries are not built in that way. If we had been able to control [leftist Ethiopian leader] Mengistu [Haile Mariam] and what he was doing in Ethiopia, his fate would have been different -- because as far as internal and external policy is concerned, we used to tell him that he was carrying out a destructive policy. I met him three times, and I took messages to him which clearly said: "Stop that war in Eritrea." But we failed to persuade him. ...

Our mistake, if you like, was that we got involved in Ethiopia at all. In the first place, it wasn't in our national interests. And our second mistake was that when we did get involved in Ethiopia, we took a long time to persuade him, and we kept supplying him with arms. We should have realized the vain nature of those attempts earlier. ...

There can be no doubt that the events in Angola and later in the Horn of Africa undermined détente; and later, Afghanistan crowned that matter.