As deputy head of the Soviet General Staff from 1979-84, Valentin Varennikov was a key planner of the Soviet Union's strategy in Afghanistan. He was named commander-in-chief of land forces and deputy minister of defense in August 1991 -- the same month that he joined forces with the plotters of a coup against former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. After the coup failed, Varennikov was arrested and tried for treason, but he was acquitted by the Russian Supreme Court in 1994. A year later, he became a member of the State Duma. Varennikov was interviewed for COLD WAR in August 1997. The excerpts below have been translated from Russian.

On Soviet interests in Afghanistan:

The strategic importance of Afghanistan, both regional and global, can be explained first of all by the fact that the country was an immediate neighbor of our state, and each neighboring state was treated by us in a special way. There was a special approach to the neighboring states. First of all, we wanted our relations to be good neighborly relations. But in terms of the late Seventies and early Eighties, that country to some extent had special importance. The fact is that that was a period of acute Cold War, and consequently the country could be a buffer against our enemies that were beyond Afghanistan -- primarily Pakistan, which was completely allied with American policy. And in the late Seventies there had also been a revolution in Iran, and it was obvious that the events couldn't help but influence Afghanistan. And it was important for us to keep Afghanistan as a good neighbor.

In the Cold War conditions, the United States of America of course believed that their presence in all parts of the world, and especially in the areas that were close to the Soviet border, was in their national interest. And of course that included Afghanistan. And for the United States, that region was especially dangerous in the sense that it negatively affected the American position in Iran. As a result of the revolution, as is known, the Americans had to withdraw from Iran, and that's why the U.S.A. set themselves the task of making up for the losses at the expense of Afghanistan. That's my personal conviction. ...

We had exact data to the effect that the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America was immediately involved in that area. And speaking about the further events, I have to say directly that with the help of that organization, the United States managed to establish a good infrastructure on the territory of Pakistan, in order to prepare the opposition forces that went to the territory of Afghanistan and acted against the government -- and in my opinion, against the people as well.

We had a suspicion that [Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah] Amin was connected to the CIA, and I can't say that it was groundless. ... I have to say that Amin was a person who ... was the cause of a lot of passions and controversy. A lot of people were against including him into the Central Committee. Why? Many people said because he studied in the United States -- but that was not so important. Most importantly, some people insisted that he had connections [with the CIA]. And if we look at all his further actions, we'll see that they were aimed not at stabilizing the situation in the country, not at making a good gesture towards the Soviet Union, but at covering his true intentions by slogans that seemed to express the interests of Afghanistan. In fact, his actions were aimed at something else. They created the situations whereby the Soviet Union had to take extraordinary measures. And running ahead, I have to say that one of those situations was the murder of [Afghan President Nur Mohammed] Taraki. ... The assassination of Taraki became very important, because it worsened [our] attitude towards Amin; one wondered about his relations to the United States, and he started playing games with the American representatives, and we were very concerned.

On the Soviets' decision to invade Afghanistan:

[The invasion] was supported first of all by Brezhnev ... [partly] because of Taraki's murder. ... According to [Nikolai] Ogarkov, who was head of the General Staff, more than once he saw Brezhnev speaking in a very agitated way about Amin having acted very badly, and saying that the cruel murder of the general secretary [Taraki] and his comrade couldn't be allowed. It was a very savage act, in our opinion; and apart from that, Amin not only killed Taraki, but what was worse, he didn't meet Brezhnev's proposals halfway. Brezhnev used to write to him that he had to make peace with Taraki and prevent the breakup of the Party, but Amin acted contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union. And in whose interests? Here we could suspect him of ties with the CIA. ...

And Brezhnev was supported, and even pushed, to his decision by the Minister of Defense, Ustinov. Also, Andropov, the head of the KGB, expressed his suspicions about Amin being connected to the CIA, and about Amin's attitude toward the [Afghan] people and the possibility of terrorism. As to Gromyko, he kept silent most of the time, and the General Staff more than once expressed a negative position through Ogarkov, at the same meetings in the meeting room of the Politburo. But when the decision was made, then the General Staff had to arrange for the intervention. ...

On the objective of the invasion:

I wouldn't say that the introduction of troops was in any way connected with [removing Amin], although getting rid of Amin was also considered important. The most important reason to move troops was to stabilize the situation in the main areas of the country: in the capital, around the capital, and in the provincial centers. We supposed that when our troops were stationed there, their very presence would stabilize the situation. We were not planning to engage in any combat actions. ...

We had set ourselves the task of turning Afghanistan into a stable, friendly country, and as a result we got an erupting volcano. We didn't set ourselves the task of conquering anyone: we wanted to stabilize the situation through our presence and help the warring parties to reconcile and stop the fighting. We wanted to station the garrisons in the main populated areas without engaging in combat activities. But my opinion is that, not without the participation of the CIA, certain forces provoked us -- I mean the Afghan rebel forces, because they would attack us, they would kill our soldiers, they killed our military advisers. The first such attack happened in the 20th artillery regiment: all the military advisers were very cruelly murdered, quartered, shot, and mutilated. And it provoked an appropriate reaction because we had to fight back against those who were killing us. And it became like a snowball: provocation, retaliation, and on and on and on. And that wave swept across the whole country. ...

I have to disappoint everyone by saying that we never set ourselves with a task of carrying out offensive operations, destroying anyone or conquering anyone. Our actions were a retaliation against the rebels: the rebels attacked us, and we had to fight back and destroy the rebel bands. ...

I would not draw any analogies between our actions in Afghanistan and the American actions in Vietnam. There was no similarity in objectives or methods, nor were the results similar. We didn't set ourselves the task of exterminating, conquering, or occupying. We set ourselves the objective of stabilizing the situation, and we didn't use any weapons of mass destruction. We didn't set ourselves the task of conquering anyplace. But of course, when the rebels attacked us, we had to fight back. Nevertheless, I wouldn't draw any similarities. As to the results of our stay, sometimes people say, "You left Afghanistan without conquering it." But it was not our purpose. Of course, we could have conquered Afghanistan, we could have squashed it completely -- if we had increased our army three- or five-fold. We could do the same as the Americans in Vietnam. But it was not our purpose.

On the Mujahedeen's use of U.S.-supplied missiles:

I have to say that the Stinger is a good weapon. I first saw a Stinger in action in April Ô85, in Kunar. In the course of military operations, Stingers were fired against our planes. We captured several Stingers and studied them. It was a good weapon, which affected our aviation tactics: our combat and cargo planes began to operate at altitudes that couldn't be achieved by the Stingers, and the helicopters flew at very low altitudes. The range of the Stinger is very narrow. But it did affect our tactics. We also equipped our aircraft with heat traps to which the Stinger warhead reacted. As for the statement that the Stinger was a crucial factor and the reason for introducing it was that it would force us to leave Afghanistan, that was only a cover for the real reason: the Americans wanted us to become trapped in Afghanistan, and they did all they could to keep us there as long as possible, because that would do more harm to the Soviet Union.

When the Stingers first appeared, they were important, but later they stopped being important. As far as various cargo transportations were concerned, we carried cargo only at night, and as for the military air operations, we performed them at altitudes that were not achievable by the Stingers. Therefore, it was practically neutralized and did not affect us much. I say this not because I am a military man, but I'm speaking from an objective position, because I spent four and a half years in Afghanistan. Some months after the Stingers were introduced, we literally neutralized their effect.

On the lessons of Afghanistan:

The first thing I have to say about the lessons that Afghanistan taught us is that you can't wage war against the people. Secondly, you always have to find ways to approach and to come to an agreement with the opposite side. ...

Of course, now that many years have passed, we're all very good at giving our opinions with the benefit of hindsight and saying what was good and what bad. That's natural. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that my views are that all historical events have to be seen through contemporary eyes, I have to say that we should have refrained from introducing our troops into Afghanistan. But of course, the actions of Amin and the games that he played with the Americans cast a shadow on Amin himself. But I'd like to look at that from other positions. I don't think he would have been allowed by the people to exterminate them. The Afghans are very determined, very decisive people; they could have taken measures against him, as against a tyrant, and then Afghanistan wouldn't have been in such a deplorable state as it is now. Everything has been demolished there, and the oppression is [still] going on. Now the Afghan people remember the Soviet presence with gratitude: They miss the time when the Soviet soldiers were there, because they used to help with food and ensure order, and they miss the presence of the Soviets. ... But if we hadn't introduced troops, Afghanistan would have been in a different condition now.