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SESSION SIX March 8, 2001
VADM. NATHMAN: This Court is now back in
session. Counsel.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Let the record reflect that
all members, parties and counsel are again present. Bailiff,
would you recall Rear Admiral Griffiths.
Admiral would you retake your seat in the witness box,
sir, and I remind you you're still under oath.
THE WITNESS: Understand.
CAPT. MACDONALD: At this time I'd like the
following video tape marked as the next exhibit in order.
THE CLERK: This will be marked as Exhibit 38.
CAPT. MACDONALD: As a prelude to showing the
video, this is a video taken by the U.S. Coast Guard on the
afternoon of 9 February as they proceeded out to assist in the
search and rescue effort of the Ehime-Maru.
Commander Harrison.
VADM. NATHMAN: Everyone in this Court
understands, this is not necessarily something we want to do
or is easy for members of the Court or the parties. And I
understand that, so I think what we'll do is we've already
heard evidence of the sea conditions. We already understand
the physics, I believe, of a submarine in terms of its hull
shape and its amount of hull area that's out of the water and
I think what we're going to watch the video for is a
validation of that testimony and we're going to watch it for a
period of time that is sufficient to make sure we understand
that and I think we're not going to watch any more, okay?
Let's go ahead and put in the tape.
Gotta turn the lights down before you do that, okay?
VADM. NATHMAN: Okay. You can turn it off. As
the President I'll just mention what notice in this is a
fairly good validation of the amount of water over the bow of
the ship and going over the sail and significant amount and
you can see how much water, it's white and blue over the top
and the back of the sail and you know that's a significant
amount of water going over the top of the ship in the vicinity
of the hatch area that Admiral Griffiths described.
Any comments on that? All right.
(Video tape played.)
CAPT. MACDONALD: Admiral, I have one final
question of Admiral Griffiths.
Q Sir, how long did USS Greeneville spend at search and
rescue station?
A All night. She stayed until the next morning searching,
and then reported in at 10:00 o'clock, local.
Q Mr. President, that's all the questions that I have.
VADM. NATHMAN: Okay.
Admiral Sullivan -- excuse me, Admiral Stone any
questions?
RDML STONE: Just one, sir.
Q Admiral Griffiths, in reading through your preliminary
investigation and also your testimony it's fairly clear in my
mind at least that the Greeneville did a very professional job
throughout the SAR effort. I'd like to ask a question. I
think it's fair to say that from what I read and from what
I've heard that there was absolutely no difference in the
approach that Greeneville took to the SAR effort, and those
actions that were executed were the same as they would have
been if in fact those were Greeneville sailors that were
missing or in the water. Is that your evaluation as well?
A Absolutely.
Q That's all I had. Thank you.
RADM SULLIVAN: Admiral, I just had one
question.
Q Will you please describe for us what types of rescue
gear the submarine of this class has on board?
A Yes, sir. Unfortunately it's minimal. They have, I
believe, two rafts on board and they have individual life
vests and escape devices for the crew members if they are
stricken and under water trying to get to the surface from a
relatively shallow bottom condition.
They have life rings, they have first aid equipment.
They have of course a fairly robust communications suite.
They have the ladder that they put over the sail. They have
individual tethers that they could attach to swimmers, and I
believe the ship probably has about four swimmers. That would
be the -- that would be the allowance for a typical attack
submarine.
And so they could swim out in a calmer sea and bring
somebody back, attached to them and then bring them up on deck
if they could open the hatches. And -- and not a lot more
than that.
They don't have boats, for example. They don't have an
arrangement where they could bring somebody from the water
straight to the sail top and bring 'em down through the bridge
where it's higher above the surface. That arrangement, other
than that ladder that was swinging doesn't exist. And I think
that's a deficiency of the submarine force today that we need
to work on.
Q Would that be particularly applicable if someone is
injured, say a back injury or leg injury trying to get 'em up
a sail?
A Absolutely. That would be a nightmare because the --
even for a person who's healthy, an able bodied male
individual, adult, would have a difficult time getting up that
sail, up that ladder in seas swinging. It would be
impossible, next to impossible for an injured person to make
it. And this is a challenge we need to think about in the
submarine force, how do we come up with ways to solve this in
the future.
I just envision, if this had been a thousand miles from
land and say it was a Greeneville crew member who happened to
go over board, for whatever reason, or the Greeneville
stumbled upon a maritime disaster a thousand miles from land
where Greeneville is the only relief available in seas like
this and it may be two hours before darkness and the time it
would take to respond from a thousand miles away, I'm not sure
how we'd solve that problem today.
Q Will you please describe for the board the medical
capability on board a submarine of this class?
A Yes, sir.
An attack submarine has a very highly qualified
independent duty Corps man. This is an enlisted sailor,
probably on average an E-6 Petty Officer, could be an E-5 or a
Chief Petty Officer, very, very intelligent and highly trained
individual, but not a doctor not capable routinely of
performing for example operations at sea. He could do so in a
crisis, but his main function is to stabilize routine injuries
and if there's something severe that happens to get advice
from shore and stabilize the individual until a medivac could
be effected whereby either an airplane, helicopter or a boat
can come and transfer the injured party to a more robust
hospital facility.
Q And my final question. Given that sea state didn't look
all that bad, obviously the waves were washing over the main
deck, in your experience how often are individuals put on the
main deck in the open ocean from a submarine of this class?
A It would be rarely done, because of the risk. Not only
the risk to the individuals, but also the risk of flooding and
fires and so forth down in the hatch, and particularly the
risk of trying to recover somebody should they go in the
water. Even with the life harnesses, if you're attached to
the travel along the deck and to your life ring, if you're in
the water just the physical contact against the hull from the
waves can render -- we've had people killed in that fashion,
even though tethered. And I'm talking sailors, not civilian
victims.
So, it's very hazardous.
Q Okay. Thank you.
VADM. NATHMAN: Admiral, maybe you can discuss
for me a little bit to help me understand this too. It deals
with the Captain's response on a couple things I think he was
balancing here. It would be good for me to understand this,
for the Court to understand.
The Captain was obviously, from what I've heard, is he
was balancing the wave conditions in particular against his
capabilities that he had, and then he was also balancing, I
assume, but I'd like you to talk a little bit about this,
about what he knew was on the way in terms of the Coast Guard
help.
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you get there, I think we've established, but you
can -- if you want to add anything to this, we've established
the concerns about the waves, and what they do particularly
for these type of life vests and your ability to get people on
board. I'm understanding, I think I understand in terms of
capabilities that on a scale of one to ten he's -- or zero to
ten, sounds to me like the ship, under the direction of the
sea is somewhere between a nine or a ten in terms of using its
capability.
I want to make sure I understand that, because it's
going to come back to a larger question. And then balance
that knowing what the Coast Guard or other support or SAR
agencies would provide for. Comments?
A Yes, sir. The ship did about all it could do is my
judgment, a nine or a ten is an appropriate grade. And
especially in light of the fact that they knew early on that
capable help was en rout promptly that would safely effect the
removal of the victims from the life raft to larger vessels to
bring back to port.
He knew, the Captain knew that help was minutes away. I
think it actually took an hour after the accident for it to
arrive on scene, although the helicopter was there I think in
30 minutes or so, to help make the arrival of the boats more
efficient and effective. And that's very good time.
And proven -- it proved to be time that was put to good
use to effectively rescue everybody from the rafts.
So, that was one part of the equation, the CO knew that
help was immediately at hand and could count on it, and it
would be safe and effective.
And on the other hand he had all the risk of trying to
do something with his ownership beyond help the monitor
vector, and so he was spring loaded to put his people in the
water to save a life, but bearing the need to do that he was
saving the lives of his own divers and not further endangering
those in the rafts by trying to bring them alongside. So I
think it was a pretty clear and appropriate decision he made.
I would have made the same one, and you know, I had the luxury
of hindsight to evaluate it, I'd still make the same one he
did.
Q I'll go back to that same balance of decisions you have
to make as a Commanding Officer. You talked about the real
concern of having a -- I'm not sure what these life rafts look
like, but they look like they're somewhat of a round hull or a
little bit of a keel on 'em or something?
A Ehime-Maru's?
Q Yes.
A I believe they were flat bottom but they had a tent roof
to provide shelter to the inhabitants above the water line.
Q But they're not water (inaudible)being at all?
A No.
Q So the tendency to tip as you described is a very real
concern, logically it would happen on the hull of that
submarine and then you create an injury if that occurs. And I
think then the real concern is, and I -- maybe you can comment
on it, if you create an injury then the ability of the
Greeneville to provide assistance --
A Injury or worse, because once they're spilled into the
water they don't have life jackets, they may drown, they may
be injured and drowned, or they may be rescued. Those are the
range of options, but the huge risk of the first two happening
is there.
Q What appreciation did the Captain -- could you term that
for me, the Captain's appreciation what the Coast Guard was
sending? The Captain knew he had a helicopter on the way, he
probably knew that within fifteen or ten minutes. Any -- he
knew a helicopter would be out there very quickly that could
recover individuals, and -- any idea of when the Captain
understood he had a boat underway?
In other words, those people had to be rescued, but
given the weather conditions it wasn't extremely hot, it
wasn't extremely cold, the water temperature survival times
and rafts, that goes again to balance. And I want to
understand that. Do you want to comment on that?
A All those factors would argue that he made the right
decision to hold off putting his people in the water. He knew
the help was coming quickly in the form of boats, not just an
aircraft. The water was warm, relatively, and so it was not
lethal in the temperature of the water for the emergent times
of the victims.
There was -- incidentally a significant point I did not
yet raise, the ship made attempts to converse with the
inhabitants of the life rafts, but there was a sizeable
language barrier. Neither side seemed to have multiple
language skills, and so they could not converse in a common
language. And this almost just caused confusion in the minds
of the victims after the fact through the NTSB we heard that
they wondered what they were trying to tell them from the
bridge of the submarine.
Of course what they were trying to ask is are you all
right and can we do anything, do you need immediate assistance
to -- and that sort of (inaudible) existed in an ability to
communicate because of a language barrier. And that further
disuaded the Captain from putting divers in the water because
he didn't think he had good enough information to send them in
based on the language barrier. So that was another issue
there.
But he decided nevertheless if there was someone in the
water, but not in the raft, language barrier or not his divers
were going in. And so they were prepared to do that.
Q Okay. With this language barrier, and the ability to
look at this with hindsight, were there any members of the
Ehime-Maru that ran a life raft or -- (inaudible) seems to be
the description, they were all in a life raft, were there any
of them that were at some risk, high risk without immediate
medical assistance, and was that able to be communicated or
not be able to be communicated?
A The ship tried to determine that, and that was a valid
-- I asked the question in the interview, this is of Captain
Brandhubber how did you know you didn't have to do something
extraordinary early on in first aid to save a life inside a
raft, and the ship was trying to solve that, but the language
barrier impeded it and they were using their observation
techniques, their ability to observe the demeanor of the
people in the rafts. They did not see human body language
that would indicate that was warranted. They were trying to
judge from the facial expressions and the body language of the
people in the raft if there was someone to that level of
distress, and they did not feel there was.
And so they were trying to, in ways that human judge
others to make those determinations absent the ability to
converse.
Q These observations that would only come I assume from
two areas, they had come from the bridge?
A Yes.
Q I'm not sure what standards up (inaudible), or the other
part of it would be from the periscope, and I assume, but
maybe you might want to explain. I think you said they're
looking for evidence of trauma or evidence of immediate
assistance, an universal sign language, arm waving or -- or
waving or whatever it might be. Any comments on that?
A They were doing two things with the periscopes which of
course gives much closer magnification than eyesight from the
bridge or binoculars. Although we're not talking long ranges,
we're within a hundred, two hundred, three hundred yards of
these rafts in general. But the periscope was trying to look
for people not yet in the rafts who needed to be rescued, and
that was their primary focus, as I understand it. And
secondly, they were looking in the rafts and -- although only
at each end of the raft they could look in because otherwise
it was this roofed area. But they were trying to help make
this determination, is there somebody in the raft who is in
medical extremis.
Now, in hindsight there was one person who had ingested
a lot of diesel water, diesel fumes or diesel oil in the
water, and was in some distress. The judgment was made by the
way that they could observe that that distress was not such
that the person needed immediate care to survive. And so that
-- those were the focus goals of the people on the periscope,
in addition to looking for the help in arriving vessels and so
forth and not have collisions, and this went on well into the
darkness hours.
Number one periscope, my understanding is, does not have
enhance -- light enhanced system, a intense fire system like
number two periscope does, so it's less effective on a dark
night to search than number two periscope is.
So they -- they kept number two periscope manned
continuously and used the light intense fire mode as they
could to further look for people in the water to make that
search very diligent.
Similarly on the bridge when it became dark, they had
night vision goggles in the form of binoculars that are
similar type of system, and they were using them periodically
to also enhance the search for swimmers.
And I'm rambling now.
Q Let me help you in a couple areas. The --
(indiscernible) for the SAR, so they are the unit at the
scene, they become the SAR coordinator for a period of time.
How long do they act in the capacity of SAR coordinator?
A Admiral, good question. I know there was -- one of the
interview statements I believe it was from the either the
engineer or the Captain XO that commented on that. They were
officially relieved fairly early on as SAR coordinator on the
scene once the Coast Guard boat arrived.
Q Okay.
A And -- I don't remember that time. It was maybe an hour
into the casualty.
Q Okay. There was a hand off from SAR coordinator?
A Yes, sir. And they were basically asked to stand off at
that point so that they wouldn't endanger the picking up of
the survivors.
Q And then Greeneville participated in the SAR efforts but
not as a coordinator?
A Correct.
Q And when Greeneville left the scene of the SAR, they had
been properly relieved?
A Yes, they were directed to enter port and that was the
next morning.
Q Okay. So there was a turn over of both their duties and
their assistance then in terms of the SAR?
A She was directed when to stop searching and head into
port because clearly at that point there were other assets out
there searching that were more efficient than the Greeneville
searching, and Greeneville was damaged and we had an
investigation to start and so forth.
Q Yes.
Many of the other units, you may not know this or not,
but -- we'll look into this, but the other units that arrived
had night capability with them, the helicopters and the Coast
Guard units had night capability. We're going to talk to the
Coast Guard, but do you know?
A I don't know, sir.
Q Okay.
I will assume there was, they typically act in that role
day and night, both clear and other capabilities, goggles.
I'm real certain of that.
You made comment to us earlier that, this will be my
last question, you made comment to us that as a Court we
should look at the capabilities of U.S. submarines, and I
assume you meant the class, particularly the 88 -- excuse me,
the class of the Greeneville as a SSN?
A Yes, sir.
Q And potentially those lessons will be applied to other
submarines in the United States. Among areas that we could
improve or make recommendations to improve, I'm thinking of
things that we may do as a Court. We could get into some
highly technical areas, but what we can do is with the power
that we bring as a Court is to insist to the right authorities
that they review the SAR capabilities and -- is that what you
thought was a good role for the Court?
A Yes, exactly. I think you should use your power as a
Court to motivate the Navy to use whatever resources it takes
to work hard in this area to make us more inherently capable.
Q Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
Counsel for Commander Waddle.
MR. GITTINS: Sir, I don't have many questions.
I'm sure you appreciate that.
VADM. NATHMAN: Counsel for Lieutenant Pfeifer.
MR. GITTINS: No, I don't have many.
VADM. NATHMAN: I'm sorry, I thought you said
any. I apologize, sir.
EXAMINATION BY MR. GITTINS:
Q Sir, it would be fair to say that the collision was a
shocking event to the Captain and to the crew?
A Yes, sir.
Q And immediately after the collision you determined that
Commander Waddle made an observation through the periscope, is
that fair, sir?
A Yes.
Q And he saw the people in the water and the Ehime-Maru
sinking?
A Yes.
Q You would agree with me, would you not, that that would
be a very shocking event for a Commanding Officer?
A I can't even imagine.
Q And notwithstanding that immediate shock, Commander
Waddle undertook the appropriate actions that we would expect
of a professional naval officer under those circumstances?
A Absolutely.
Q You indicated that Commanding Officer was prepared to
put divers in the water in the event people in the water were
in extremis or even in rafts were in extremis, is that fair,
sir?
A Yes.
Q The divers that are on board the USS Greeneville, sir,
they're not rescue swimmers, correct?
A Correct.
Q They're mission divers that provide security for the
ship, check the screw, things like that, correct sir?
A That's correct. They're lesser capable or trained than
a rescue swimmer would be.
Q They're not the equivalent of, for example, a Coast
Guard rescue swimmer that jumps from a helicopter to rescue
someone in the ocean?
A It may occasionally be individually they are that
capable, but that's not the requirements and that's not
generally how we train or what we expect of them.
Q And that's not the training that the divers had on board
Greeneville, is that true, sir?
A That's correct. To my understanding they received a
lesser amount of training, standard SSN's divers would get.
Q So, with respect to the operation that might have
included putting divers in the water, that would have been a
risky operation for those divers, correct sir?
A I think it would be a very risky operation for the
divers, as well as who they were going after.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, you talked a little bit about the problems with
bringing alongside rubber rafts alongside a 688 class
submarine. The hull treatment on a 688 class is a rubberized
hull treatment, isn't that true sir?
A It is.
Q And the rafts that were in the water were rubberized or
rubber rafts; correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q And one of the problems that you were aware of in your
experience as a highly qualified submariner is that those --
that rubberized coating can very easily catch a rubber raft
and flip it over, correct?
A Absolutely.
Q It happens to highly trained and experienced SEAL teams
when they embark and disembark from SSN 688 class submarines,
correct sir?
A Correct.
Q So it was reasonable for Commander Waddle not to make
efforts to bring the rafts alongside, sir?
A Absolutely. That would have endangered the people in
the rafts. That was good judgment in my opinion.
I think he tried very hard to do the next best thing
which is to get close to the rafts without touching them, to
best observe them and render assistance if something changed
and a raft flipped or a person in it was dying of a wound or
that sort of thing.
Q Sir. Commander Waddle had both periscopes manned for
periscope watches?
A Yes.
Q And he himself took the bridge?
A I think he probably -- I'm not sure he was there
continuously.
Q Yes, sir.
A But at least for some period, yes. I think initially.
Q Posted an OOD and a lookout?
A Yes.
Q And the OOD was one of the senior officers on the
vessel?
A Yes.
Q A Lieutenant Commander?
A Lieutenant Commander.
Q He had two divers on the bridge ready to go if there was
need for them, correct?
A Absolutely. They were there right at the start and I
think he later sent them below to standby, because the bridge
is so confined.
Q Yes, sir.
So, is there anything that you can think of that
Commander Waddle, given the situation he was in, could have
done more than he did?
A No.
Q In your interview with the Chief of Staff, Captain
Brandhubber, he indicated that he recognized the potential
stress and shock of the event of the collision on Commander
Waddle; correct, sir?
A Yes.
Q And it was based on his evaluation he believed that
Commander Waddle was capable and should continue the SAR
rescue effort after the accident, correct sir?
A Absolutely. He said that specifically to me.
Q That's all I have, sir.
VADM. NATHMAN: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer?
CDR WOOLSTON: No questions, sir.
VADM. NATHMAN: Counsel for Mr. Coen?
MR. FILBERT: No questions.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Sir, at this time I need to
warn Admiral Griffiths.
Admiral, you are directed not to discuss your testimony
in this case with anyone other than a member of the Court,
parties thereto, or counsel.
You will not allow any witness in this case to talk to
you about the testimony he or she has given, or which he or
she intends to give.
If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to
talk to you about your testimony in this case, you should make
the circumstances known to the counsel originally calling you
as a witness.
Do you understand that, sir?
THE WITNESS: I do.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Sir, that's all we have.
VADM. NATHMAN: Admiral, before you step down, I
think the Court appreciates your testimony for what seems like
probably a long time, but it's been a full four days for you.
You've had to recall a lot of facts, we -- we all find, even
though you're a very senior officer in the U.S. Navy you have
a very high technical competence. We found your testimony to
be very compelling.
You don't have all the facts, you didn't have the
opportunity to get all the facts because you did what you were
asked to do is conduct a preliminary investigation, and we
think given the time constraints that you have, that your
thoroughness has helped the Court to guide the Court in areas
that we need to go look.
We take your recommendations, your points you made
yesterday about other areas that we ought to look at very
seriously and I think you will find that the Court will go
down those paths the most comprehensive way that it can.
But I do appreciate what I think has been very
straightforward, compelling and sightful evidence and
testimony for the members and I'm sure for the counsels and
for the parties. And I can't tell you how personally I am
satisfied to have an officer of your caliber take us through
these events so we have at the beginning of the understanding
about how thorough we need to be to understand what happened
on the Greeneville on the 9th of February.
Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
CAPT. MACDONALD: You're excused, sir.
Mr. President, at this time the Court calls Captain Tom
Kyle to the stand.
VADM. NATHMAN: Very well.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Sir, for the information of
the Court, parties and counsel, Captain Kyle will be
testifying about validating the reconstruction efforts that
we've seen to try to reconstruct the tracks of the Ehime-Maru
and the Greeneville, and he will also testify about his
actions as acting Chief of Staff of SUBPAC on the afternoon of
9 February.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Capt. Kyle, would you please
stand in the witness box, face me and raise your right hand to
be sworn.
(the Witness was duly sworn.)
CAPT. MACDONALD: Please be seated, sir.
EXAMINATION BY CAPT. MACDONALD:
Q Captain, would you please tell us your name, spelling
your last name for the record?
A My name is Captain Thomas Kyle, spelled K-Y-L-E.
Q What is your rank, sir?
A Captain, United States Navy.
Q And would you tell the Court what your current duty
assignment is?
A I'm assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for tactics
and training at the Commander Submarine Force U.S. Pacific
Fleet.
Q Is that known as the N7 department?
A Yes, it is.
Q How long, Captain, have you served at come SUBPAC in the
N7 department?
A I've been there roughly two and a half years.
Q Would you please tell us with a your duties and
responsibilities are?
A I am the department head responsible for development of
submarine tactics, valuation of new tactics, and I also
oversee the at sea and formal schools training for the
submarine force in the Pacific. I'm also in charge of
overseeing all weapons, logistics issues for submarine weapons
in the Pacific.
Q Captain, if you could work backwards for us, and please
describe your previous duty assignments and responsibilities
associated with those duty assignments.
A As I said, I've had this assignment for about two and a
half years. Prior to this I was assigned as the commander
submarine squadron one here at Pearl Harbor. I had under my
responsibility as many as 14 submarines, and as few as maybe
eight. I was responsible in that job for the training,
readiness and material condition of the submarines assigned to
my squadron. As such spent a lot of time riding the
submarines, observing their operations.
Prior to that assignment I was in that assignment for
two years.
Prior to that assignment I was prospective Commanding
Officer, instructor for the Commander Submarine Force U.S.
Pacific Fleet. There are two such instructors, one in the
Pacific, one in the Atlantic. And my duties in that role --
in that job were to train, specifically train officers going
to command of submarines on tactics and leadership skills.
That was also a two year assignment.
Prior to that assignment I was on the SUBPAC --
Submarine Force Pacific tactical readiness evaluation team as
a senior inspector, and as such conducted about 50 to 60
tactical readiness evaluations of submarines and pre overhaul
-- pre overseas movements certifications where we go out and
evaluate the proficiency of the crews and operating the
submarine in a tactical proficiency.
Before that I was in command of USS Puffer in San Diego
for three years.
Q Sir, how many years have you been qualified in
submarines?
A I've been qualified for about 24 years, 1977.
Q And how much of that time has been in an at sea
operation environment?
A Since 1977 -- well, I was an operational environment
when I qualified. Of my 27 years in the Navy, 20, roughly 25
or 24 years have been in operational assignments.
Q Captain, I'd like to try to focus now on your current
duties as the N7 at COMSUBPAC.
Do you supervise a division, or unit within the N7
department that specializes in submarine track reconstruction?
A Yes, I do. As part of my tactical development and
analysis function I have a team of individuals who are -- who
whose specific assignment is to reconstruct naval exercises,
submarine exercises and discern lessons learned out of at sea
operations.
I also supervise the at sea tactical training and
assessment group, and they also do an underway reconstruction
capability, or exercise evaluation, reconstruction and
dissemination project for the ships at sea. So there's two
different branches that do this type of work.
Q What division is that in your department?
A The former, the dedicated tactical analysis group is
N72, works in the N72 group and the other one is the N70
group.
Q Did both the N72 and N70 groups participate in the
reconstruction of the Ehime-Maru and USS Greeneville tracks?
A Yes, they did.
Q And could you describe the general make up of those two
divisions and the experience levels of the individuals that
comprise it?
A Yes, I can. The N72 group, the tactical analysis group
are comprised of civilian employees of the Navy that have been
working in this function, I can't even begin to estimate,
probably 15 or 16 years. They are highly skilled at what they
do. They're very detailed in their reconstruction work. They
have a series of tools that they use to do that reconstruction
that will help them in that process, computer-based skills and
tools, as well as a good understanding of submarine tactics in
order to understand -- to put the right context in the
reconstruction products.
I have a great deal of confidence in their ability.
The other group, the one in the N70 group, the at sea
training group are comprised of naval officers with
considerable experience. When I mentioned my background, when
I said I was on the tactical readiness evaluation team, that's
the same group that I was on back in the early '90s. They go
to sea regularly and evaluate ship's performance. They have
developed -- excuse me, and have developed a computer-based
program that enables them to reconstruct or demonstrate to the
ships that they're evaluating what has happened in the
exercise they just completed so they can use that product to
enhance the training that's being done at sea.
Q Sir, do both of these teams report directly to you?
A Yes, they do.
Q And do you personally get involved in the reconstruction
efforts?
A Personally in the sense of actually doing the
reconstruction per se, putting the dots on -- no, I don't. I
do go through a process of looking at the results. I may pose
further questions for evaluation, like more incites, but I
don't get involved in the detailed entering of data or
plotting the tracks or anything like that.
Q Captain, you're aware of the collision that occurred
between the Greeneville and the Ehime-Maru on the 9th of
February?
A Yes, I am.
Q And were the N70 and N72 teams that you just described,
were they involved in the track reconstruction?
A Yes, they were. They were assigned to do that
independently. They were -- I wanted independent products so
they did not collaborate in their effort. They used some of
the same data, but came to independent conclusions and then we
brought them together after the -- after they were done with
their products.
Q Sir, to your knowledge is there -- the reconstructions
that were done, was that information shared with the Rear
Admiral Griffiths, the Preliminary Investigative Officer?
A I don't know that directly. I was also assigned as the
Navy's representative to the National Transportation Safety
Board investigation of this accident, and it was a conscious
decision to try to maintain separation between those two
investigations, again for standpoint of -- from the standpoint
of independence.
And, as a result, although I did converse with Admiral
Griffiths during this investigation, we did not share details
of how each one was going.
I do believe, what I do know is that he had access to
some of the same data that we used in our reconstruction, but
not a complete picture. Some of this information and the data
became presented in a more useable fashion after he was near
completing, or had completed his investigation. He was on a
very tight time line. He had to complete his preliminary
investigation in a couple days.
We've had the benefit of more time to gather the data,
decipher what we can understand and do a more complete product
since then.
Q And, Captain, were you initially assigned to support the
NTSB effort at reconstructing the tracks of the two ships?
A Yes, I was. The NTSB investigation works on a party
system, there were three parties named, the Navy, the Coast
Guard, the Japanese owners of the vessel. As such, as one of
the parties I was representing one of the parties, I brought
as -- basically as a subject matter expert brought information
to the NTSB investigation, and basically pushed ahead the --
their investigation as one of the parties of the NTSB.
Q Captain, I'd like you to tell the Court, if you would,
the kinds of data that you went out and collected to support
the reconstruction effort. How did you go about doing that?
A Again, primarily it was in the context and in the order
directed by the investigator in charge of the NTSB. So,
initially we focused on statements from the Japanese crew and
students. At the same time we gathered the data we could from
the ship.
I know that the ship board data, the Greeneville's data
was basically taken off the ship and -- in support of Admiral
Griffiths's investigation and sequestered, basically wrapped
up and put aside. A copy of all that data was made for the
NTSB investigation.
Several days into the NTSB process we gathered that data
together, opened it open, we looked at the sonar logs, fire
control logs. We interviewed all the participants, the main
players on the ships, the Commanding Officer, the Executive
Officer, Officer of the Deck, sonar operators, fire control
operators. A good list of the ship's company. We did
investigate the data recorded in the sonar logger at some
depth, and that has really formed the principal data on which
the reconstruction is -- reconstruction product is based.
Q Let me stop you right there, sir. Commander Harrison,
can we have the sonar logger data files marked as the next
Court exhibit in order?
THE CLERK: This will be marked as Exhibit 39.
CAPT. MACDONALD: I believe copies of the sonar
logger data files have been provided to the parties and
counsel for the parties.
Q Captain, how did the sonar logger data files aid in the
reconstruction of the collision?
A Well, we found that this is really our first -- our
first reconstruction using this product. This sonar data
logger is a recent addition to ship's equipment. We are in
the process of modernizing our sonar suites on our submarines
and throughout the Navy, Pacific and Atlantic, really
upgrading the processors and modernizing the equipment from
bringing 'em up a couple decades as a matter of fact of the
one of the products that came with this modernization packet
was this data logger facility and we have never used this
before. This happens to be the first first time we've had an
opportunity to reconstruct any event using this information,
and we found that it's -- it's particularly useful.
Q Why is that, sir?
(See next Reporter's Transcript.)
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