Unofficial transcript: Day 4, Session 3
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SESSION 3 -- DAY 4
MORNING SESSION March 8, 2001 10:45 a.m.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel before we
get into re-cross examination, I think it's important
--
CAPT MACDONALD: Let me announce --
VADM NATHMAN: Yes, please.
CAPT MACDONALD: Let the record
reflect that all members, parties, and counsel are
all present. I remind everyone to speak slowly and
into the microphones, Mr. President.
VADM NATHMAN: I want the parties to
understand, I want the counsel to understand that we
think it's important that -- and we believe it's very
important for the counsel and the parties and the
court to understand that the members are still in the
discovery phase of facts.
I believe you saw in the members redirect, our
open concerns about the many factors that may have
contributed to the events of the Greenville on 9
February. After four days the members feel a lot
like Adm Griffiths, that we still have many avenues
to investigate. I think it's important for you to
understand that. Okay.
We'll proceed now to re-cross examination.
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Counsel for Commander Waddle.
Adm Griffiths, if you would re-take your seat
in the witness box, and again I would remind you you
are under oath.
THE WITNESS: I understand.
VADM NATHMAN: Admiral we were
about to proceed into cross-examination for the
counsel for parties and counsel for Commander Waddle
will lead with his re-cross.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. GITTINS:
Q Sir, I would like to first start to ask you
questions that came up during Cmdr Filbert's
questions to you on behalf of Lt j.g. Coen.
He asked you, Lt Cmdr Filbert asked you, sir,
the question about FT1 Seacrest's performance on 9
February. And I believe you said that FT1 Seacrest
should have told the captain or OOD or both that the
S13, Sierra 13 range had been updated to 4,000
yards.
A Yes, I did say that.
Q That is one of those places where a forceful
call may be required for safety of ship, wouldn't you
agree?
A Yes.
Q Would you also agree that your investigation
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uncovered that that did not happen?
A I would.
Q Would you agree, sir, that had that call been
made, it is probable that this accident would not
have occurred?
A I would go beyond that. I am certain it
wouldn't have occurred. It was a key piece of data.
And if I can, at the point where the commanding
officer told the officer of the deck to go to
periscope depth, the officer of the deck was
obviously focused on the periscope, but I really
think at that point the commanding officer had also
made a determination he had the information he needed
to safely go to periscope depth.
So he was also focused now on getting ready to
take the periscope because I am sure he would have,
as I would have to really verify the look, and at
that point it would have taken an oral report more
likely than the CO breaking that concentration to go
look at the fire control system.
So that oral report should have come to both of
those individuals, and had they not received it, they
probably would have not known that information.
Q Sir, concerning the officer of the deck's
experience as an officer of the deck, counsel asked
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you about a statement that was attributed to
Commander Waddle that is contained in the results of
interview that were prepared after Commander Waddle's
interview, and that Enclosure 2 to the Preliminary
Inquiry, page 4, it's the very last paragraph
attributed to Commander Waddle.
A Page 4 of Enclosure 2.
Concerning the OOD Lt j.g. Coen, Commander
Waddle stated he was a newly qualified OOD and that
he regularly had to tell him what to do.
Q First of all, sir, you were questioned about
results of interviews yesterday. You didn't actually
conduct the interview of Commander Waddle, did you?
A No, I asked to interview Commander Waddle and
he declined.
Q And that was on advice of counsel?
A Absolutely.
Q Commander Waddle had been interviewed by Capt
Byus, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Along with Lt Cmdr Harrison, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Sir, are you aware that neither Capt Byus'
notes nor Lt Cmdr Harrison's notes contain anything
remotely looking like that statement, "Concerning the
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OOD Lt j.g. Coen Commander Waddle stated he was a
newly qualified OOD and that he regularly had to tell
him what to do."
A Not unless -- however, I know that Cmdr Byus
pedigreed that statement, so in his mind, he felt
that he heard it from Commander Waddle in some form
that made this statement an accurate repetition, but
if it's not in the written notes, it's not in the
written notes.
Q Yes, sir. Capt Byus took nine pages of notes,
sir, and there is nothing remotely that resembles
that in those notes, are you aware of that?
A I do now.
Q Yes, sir.
A But I think it's fair to say -- and this is a
fairly important issue -- what was recorded from the
interviews with regard to the handwritten notes and
what ended up in the typed versions that I received,
and again, it was a very deliberate process in the
people who were doing this -- Byus, Harrison, and
their administrative help if they used it -- to come
up with this being their best recollection.
And so when they turned these over to me,
that's what they felt these were.
Q Yes, sir.
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A The written notes didn't literally record every
word said.
Q Yes, sir. As you just indicated the notes and
the results of interview are the best recollections
of second-hand information about what Commander
Waddle may have said immediately after the accident,
would you agree with that, sir?
A Second-hand to me sir.
Q Would you agree, sir, that it would have been
beneficial to you and likely beneficial to this
hearing to hear from Commander Waddle personally
about what he actually believed, what he actually saw
and what he actually did, and why he did it in this
hearing?
A I think that would be of great value.
Q Concerning the testimony that Commander Waddle
-- you were questioned about the XOs results of
interview, and to paraphrase what was said in the
interview, the CO told the OD that he wants to be at
periscope depth in five minutes.
Q Do you remember the testimony about that,
sir?
A Yes.
Q It is appropriate training for a OOD, and it is
an appropriate for an OOD for the CO to give him a
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task and a time to accomplish it in to develop that
officer's ability to operate under pressure; isn't
that true, sir?
A Yes.
Q Such orders to do a task and given a time to do
them can help an OOD to learn to be efficient and to
do things right and efficiently, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q And with the CO on the bridge, that would have
afforded the commanding officer the opportunity to
watch the officer of the deck perform that evolution
and to evaluate his performance, correct, sir?
A With the CO in the con, in the control room
with the OD, yes.
Q And in fact, Commander Waddle was in the CONN
in the control room during the entire evolution from
the elevation of the vessel to 150 feet through the
emergency blow maneuver, correct, sir?
A That's right.
I think he left sonar and stayed in control
thereafter when they were in the baffle clearing
portion -- and on out.
Q Would you agree, sir, that United States Navy
Regulations provide that the commanding officer, in
this case, Commander Waddle, is ultimately
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responsible for the safe operation of his vessel?
A Yes.
Q To your knowledge, did Commander Waddle -- has
Commander Waddle at any time tried to shirk his
responsibility for his conduct during the cruise of 9
February 2001?
A No, I -- I think Commander Waddle is a very
stand-up individual and did I am sure his duty and
can I go back to this point with the officer of the
deck because I think it's appropriate for the court.
I, as the commanding officer, had a range of
officer of the decks in my ward room in proficiency
and experience level, and I had some who did need, as
Commander Waddle felt he needed to do with Mr. Coen,
give time constraints to, because he needed to train
them to be more efficient, and be able to combine
both proficiency and alacrity, which is the ultimate
goal is to have the best of both traits.
And I understand that Commander Waddle may have
needed to do that more with some officers than
others, and I have a feeling from the interviews that
he felt he needed to do that in this stage of Lt
Coen's career. And so I understand that. And that
is a factor here.
Q In fact, sir, wouldn't you agree that Commander
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Waddle's performance with respect to his OOD on 9
February 2001 are indications that he was concerned
about the development of Lt j.g. Coen and his
appropriate development as an officer of the deck?
A I don't know how I can put that in a longer
term perspective. I think in the execution of
routine operations by Mr. Coen, Commander Waddle felt
that at this stage in Mr. Coen's career, he needed
close supervision, perhaps more than the normal
officer of the deck because of his characteristic of
being deliberate and his newness to the qualified
ranks of ODs on board. But I don't know if I can
truly characterize projecting ahead for his career
how much of that concern was, as opposed to just
instructive engagement in the near-term. In other
words, I am not saying that he was commenting the
ultimate potential of Mr. Coen one way or the other.
I don't have data on that.
Q Yes, sir. But Commander Waddle was -- had left
the OOD in that position of OOD, and had not assumed
the CONN, correct, sir?
A Yes.
Q And that is indicative of a training evolution
rather than taking the OOD out of the loop, wouldn't
you agree, sir -- helping the OOD to be trained?
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A It certainly could be seen in that light.
I am sure that when this officer of the deck
had the watch, Commander Waddle used every
opportunity he could to constructively train the
officer of the deck.
Q That would be the kind of conduct you would
expect of a competent commanding officer?
A Absolutely, sir.
Q I believe it was Rear Admr Stone, sir, and I am
going to start with his questions now.
He initially discussed Capt Brandhuber and his
presence on board USS Greenville on 9 February.
As we just discussed, Commander Waddle as the
captain of the vessel, was responsible ultimately for
the safe operation of the vessel?
A Yes.
Q And that's pursuant to United States Navy
regulations, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Although it's still to be determined the
specific role of the Capt Brandhuber may have been
in, whether pursuant to United States Navy
regulations or otherwise by assumption of command in
an acting capacity.
You would agree that Capt Brandhuber if he saw
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an unsafe situation would have a duty to bring that
to the attention of the captain, would you not, sir?
A I do.
Q To your knowledge, Capt Brandhuber did not take
issue with anything that Commander Waddle did during
the performance of the DV cruise of 9 February 2001,
isn't that accurate, sir?
A You mean, until they board again or up to the
point of collision?
Q Up to the point of collision, sir.
A That's accurate. And I am not implying that he
did take exception afterwards. But it would be -- I
would have to put the question in new light after the
collision, because he did have a more after role in
helping the ship communicate and surface, and so
forth.
Q Rear Admiral Stone also asked you about the
watch bill, sir, and obviously the missing watch bill
is a document that this court needs to have.
And I don't profess to be a ship driver, sir,
but I solemnly will do my best with this.
The watch bill was prepared by someone, not the
commanding officer, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q And the person who prepares the watch bill, and
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those persons who review it who are aware of the
capabilities of the personnel also are responsible
for ensuring that properly qualified personnel are
put in the appropriate stations during watch, would
you agree with that, sir?
A The whole chain of command is responsible for
making sure that the right qualified people are on
watch.
Q Yes, sir. On a watch bill on board a naval
vessel when an individual is unqualified and
under-instruction, how is that indicated, properly
indicated, on a watch bill?
A Well, you have a range of administrative
options. That is not specified by higher authority.
But it must be clear that they are not the fully
qualified watch that they have some under-instruction
role, and a number of administrative means can be
used to do that.
Q One of those administrative means and probably
one of the most common is to put behind the person's
name, a U/I, would you agree, sir?
A Certainly it's common.
Q And that indicates "under-instruction" correct,
sir?
A Correct.
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Q Unless the commanding officer actually knew of
a person's individual qualifications, unless
"under-instruction" was indicated, the commanding
officer reviewing a watch bill would have no way to
know of the status of the individual who is assigned
to that watch, correct, sir?
A No, that's not correct.
Q Tell me why it's not correct.
A These are small ships, and the captains tend to
be very intimately familiar with the crew's rate of
progress, individually, as well as collectively.
Commander Waddle strikes me as a captain who
would have an above-average knowledge of that because
he was very engaged with his people with his crew,
and my guess is he would rival the exec for personal
knowledge of the level of qualification of everyone
on board, and it would be despite administrative
processes.
Q And that would be an assumption you would make
based on what you know Commander Waddle and his
competence to date?
A And my experience to date.
Q Yes, sir. With respect to safety efficiency
and backup, Commander Waddle's three principles, I
asked you -- you were questioned about it by Rear
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Admiral Stone, and there was the suggestion made that
those are just words or rhetoric unless it was
translated into action.
You did not have an appropriate opportunity to
determine whether or not those three words are simply
rhetoric on board USS Greenville or whether those
things were translated into action on a daily basis
by Commander Waddle and his crew, isn't that correct,
sir?
A I didn't know that those were the words that
described his philosophy until testimony started, so
clearly, I did not focus on that, other than that as
it may indirectly relate to the looking at standards
as I did address them in my investigation of three
short days. And that is a fruitful area for the
court to examine further.
Q Yes, sir. You responded to a number of
questions by Rear Admiral Stone, sir, concerning a
commanding officer's best judgment.
Sir, would you -- a commanding officer -- I
will ask if you agree with this statement, sir.
A commanding officer is required to exercise
his good judgment based on the circumstances as he
understands them, the facts that he understands them
at the time when operating his vessel -- would you
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agree with that, sir?
A I would agree with that.
Q When talking about the accountability of
commanding officer, sir, the Navy takes -- I am not
sure if it's pride -- but the Navy is diligent in
examining accidents that may happen at sea and
otherwise, would you agree with that, sir?
A I would.
Q For example, the USS Vincennes shot down a
Iranian airliner several years ago that resulted in
lost life of all personnel on board that airline, do
you have a recollection of that event, sir?
A I do.
Q It's a very traumatic event for the Navy, isn't
that true?
A Yes.
Q Captain Richard Rogers was the commanding
officer on that vessel, isn't that correct, sir?
A That's my recollection.
Q Captain Rogers as the commanding officer who
ultimately was responsible for the firing of the
missle was responsible as commanding officer of that
vessel, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q More recently, a few weeks ago, the USS Cole
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had a terrorist attack in which 17 sailors were
killed on board that ship.
Are you aware of that sir?
A Yes.
Q Cmdr Curt Leppold who was the commanding
officer of that ship was responsible for that ship as
the commanding officer pursuant to to United States
Navy regulations, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Sir, you have uncovered no evidence during your
investigation that commanding officer of the USS
Greenville, Commander Waddle, was either
intentionally ignorant of the true circumstances on
the 9th of February or acted in a way so as to make
himself ignorant of those circumstances, are you?
A No, I am not aware of any circumstances that
would lead to that conclusion.
Q You have no evidence and you uncovered none
during your investigation that the commanding officer
of the USS Greenville, Commander Waddle intended to
operate the USS Greenville unsafely, would you agree
with that?
A Of course.
Q In fact all of the evidence you uncovered
indicated that Commander Waddle intended to operate
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his vessel safely and to avoid a collision, wouldn't
you agree with that, sir?
A Of course.
Q Would you also agree with me, sir, that
evaluating the commanding officer's best judgment is
not simply a function of retrospective review?
A It's not just that.
Q Would you agree that in evaluating a
commander's judgment, you must place yourself in the
position the commanding officer was in with the
information that was available to him and known by
him to judge his decisions at the time?
A You need to do that to have the fullest
appreciation of why he did what he did.
Q In evaluating a commanding officer's judgment,
you must review the circumstances, the entire
circumstances surrounding an event, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q The commanding officer's understanding of the
situation?
A Correct.
Q The commanding officer's experience, knowledge,
and training?
A All those things.
Q When you responded to Rear Admiral Stone's
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questions about accountability, sir, would you agree
with me that accountability and responsibility as a
commanding officer does not necessarily equate to
criminal liability for an accident?
A I would agree with that. It does not
necessarily equate.
Q In your investigation, sir, did you find any
evidence that Commander Waddle acted criminally
negligently in the operation of his vessel?
A In my opinion, he was not criminally
negligent.
Q Thank you sir.
Sir, when assessing a contact, evaluating a
contact, would you agree with me that -- and I'm
talking about Exhibit 7 -- that the commanding
officer is not required to ignore all the data on
that target that the ship possesses?
A Did you want to use the word "ignore" there?
Q I'm sorry, sir. Let me ask the question
again.
A Okay.
Q Sir, with respect to Contact S 13, would you
agree with me that Commander Waddle was entitled to
rely on the data that he was aware of for contact
Sierra 13 in the hour -- that had been generated in
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the hour prior to the movement to take to 150 feet?
Q Let me see if I understand the question.
Q Yes, sir.
A I think it's an important one. I think you are
asking me, is he required to personally observe and
learn of the individual components of data that are
going on all around him on the ship, in order to
independently construct the same opinion or
conclusion that it's safe to proceed to the next step
that perhaps the officer of the deck and
watchstanders have reached.
And to the degree his time and resources allow
him to do so the prudent skipper would do as much of
that as he could, but it should be recognized a lot
of that he doesn't have the time to do.
Q Yes, sir.
A And so my guess is Commander Waddle, like any
good skipper, would do as much of this on his own as
a backup, and an independent check as he could, but
that obviously, he would not be able to do it all
that's why we have the subordinate watchstanders,
they are disbursed, and their qualifications and
tasks are to feed that to the outside deck and the
captain, so he's certainly not required to
independently go do all of those subordinate
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watchstander functions, ultimately the judgment of
how much he does and what it takes for him to be
personally satisfied with the advice he's getting is
up to him.
Q I am not sure that was the question to the
question I asked.
A I'm sorry if I missed the question.
Q That's not the problem here. I think what you
said is probably answer to one of my questions, but
with respect to target or contact Sierra 13 -- I am
discussing Exhibit 7 -- there is information that
would be of benefit to the commanding officer in this
data that was compiled between 12:30 and 1320, would
you agree with that, sir?
A Yes. It has a value to him.
Q And the commanding officer in making his
decisions is not required to disregard the data that
had been compiled from target Sierra 13 between 12:30
and 13 -- it looks like 25, sir, when they made the
turn.
A Not only not required it, would be imprudent
for him to disregard it.
Q Sir, do you have Exhibit 34 in front of you?
A What is Exhibit 34? No, I do not.
Q It's the USS Greenville fire control documents.
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For the record, the bailiff is retrieving
Exhibit 34 for the witness.
I'll come back to that, sir, I'm missing one
document. So the commanding officer's standing
orders at the end of your testimony today, you
indicated that -- at the end of your redirect
testimony today -- you indicated that the commanding
officer is permitted to deviate from his standing
orders because he wrote the standing orders?
A Certainly he is.
Q And Rear Admiral Sullivan discussed with you
Section 610 of the standing orders. Do you have
those in front of you, sir?
A No.
Q Bailiff, help me out with that, please.
It's Exhibit 37.
Exhibit 1, sir, do you have Exhibit 1 in front
of you, it would be Enclosure 7 to your
investigation. I apologize, sir.
A My enclosure 7 is here, but it's a summary of
an interview with Seacrest. That's Enclosure 7 to
the initial report.
Q Standing Order 0610.
A Let me work on that here for a second.
Okay, I am at 0610.
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Q Rear Adm Sullivan asked you about paragraph 1
of Standing Order 0610, sir?
A Yes.
Q And the indication there is that the clear
baffles -- to stay on force at 150 feet until there
is enough data on the AVSDU -- to determine actual
bearing right and the direction of relative motion,
about three minutes, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q It doesn't require a three-minute wait, do you
agree with that, sir?
A Yes.
Q The Mark 81 Tack 2 Display (phon.), is the
display the fire control technicians display; is that
true, sir?
A It's one of those.
Q Could we have the control room chart, please?
A Yes.
Q The Mark 81 Tack 2 is one of the displays
here?
A It's this one in particular that the ship would
be using for time bearing display in general as they
are practiced.
Q Yes, sir.
A The second from the forward-most of the four
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consoles there.
Q Yes, sir. With respect to the clearing
baffles, sir, 610.2 requires that the officer of the
deck "ensure that sonar contacts on the right are
drawing right, and those on the left are drawing
left, or that they are drawing astern whenever
possible."
Sir, would you agree with me that this solution
on Exhibit 7 is an indication of an opening
solution?
A Yes.
Q And that would comply -- the commanding officer
and the officer of the deck believe that that contact
Sierra 13 was an opening contact, that that would
comply with the standing order.
A For that contact, yes. And further, I think
that the information that the CO had for contacts at
this time for all the contacts would indicate that he
chose a course that met this condition, except there
was perhaps one contact in the northwest, which would
have been in the baffles. And he may have previously
determined that that was distant. But it was not
being seen on sonar at the time. I don't know if it
was either Sierra 12 or Sierra 14.
Q Sierra 12, probably, sir.
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A Okay. So I think the CO felt he was complying
with this general guidance in going to periscope
depth on 120, as far as course selection.
Q Assuming for a moment and this is the
assumption -- that the commanding officer was aware
of this solution for Sierra 13 on Exhibit 7, it was
reasonable for him to come to periscope depth as we
just discussed, correct, sir, and it complied with
his standing order?
A From what he knew, yes.
Q Sir, you were asked some questions about
Exhibit 36, which is the periscope employment -- the
excerpt from a doctrinal publication.
Sir, are you aware that NWP 55.42 is the recent
version of that publication which is dated October
1999?
A I am now.
Q The letter that you were shown about NWP 77 is
dated May 1985, does that ring a bell, sir?
A That doesn't mean the letter is not applicable
any longer. But yes, I am aware. It's not unusual
to have revisions to the manual, but these letters
are still germane in the front piece of the book.
Q Yes, sir. Let me ask you, sir.
We talked yesterday at some length about the
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initial search at periscope depth and you responded
to questions from Lt. j.g. Coen's counsel about
that.
You would agree, sir, that the initial search
at periscope depth was completed in compliance with
either NWP 3, Tack 13.10 on the commanding officer's
standing orders, would you not?
A Yes, I would agree.
Q Admiral Sullivan asked you questions about
continuous visual search, and that document, quote,
gives a recommended process. Is that fair, sir?
A Yes.
Q When a process is recommended, deviation from
that recommended process is appropriate based on
circumstances, wouldn't you agree, sir?
A If the judge of the CO is that deviation is
appropriate, then yes.
Q The deviation that we know of in this case is
that Commander Waddle did not perform a detailed
sector search in sectors which did not have sonar
contacts, would you agree with that, sir?
A Yes.
Q Commander Waddle focused his visual search, his
detailed visual search, in the area of probable
contacts and threat to vessel.
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Would you agree with that, sir?
A If you key on sonar alone, yes, sir.
Q At the time Commander Waddle took the periscope
there was also ongoing a ESM defensive search, would
you agree with that, sir?
A Yes.
Q Rear Adm Sullivan also asked you about the
portion of the first paragraph that indicates,
following the initial surface search several rapid
low power sweeps at maximum head prism elevation and
several more sweeps at 35 to 40 degrees elevation
should be made to protect the aircraft.
Would you agree with me that that process was
not required under the circumstances?
A Yes, I would. The air search is not germane to
what the Greenville was doing at that moment, sir.
Q What the searches performed by Greenville on 9
February 2001 were meant to do were to identify
potential hazards to the vessel, correct, sir?
Surface hazards?
A Yes, for the time frame of the -- until
completing the emergency blow.
Q Yes, sir. An air search would be something
that would be done with respect to a mission
requirement when stealth was required.
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A Correct.
Q And the continuous visual search that -- well,
the search that Commander Waddle performed, while not
continuous, was a visual search to clear the area in
which he believed threats to the vessel -- hazards to
the vessel existed based on the information he had,
would you agree with that, sir?
A Mostly. Here is where I would disagree.
Q Yes, sir.
A He's keying on sonar contacts and these are
contacts that sonar will find because they put out
enough noise in the water. There are other kinds of
contacts out there, and if you don't do a complete
visual search at high power, you are not optimizing
your chances to see all contacts as opposed to the
contacts that are likely to be detected on sonar,
which is a subset of contacts.
Q Yes, sir. And in this case, Commander Waddle
did perform a low-power search 360 degrees, to the
best of your knowledge, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q And Lt j.g. Coen performed three low-power
searches through 360 degrees, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q And you are not aware of any non-sonar contacts
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that were in the area at the time Greenville
conducted the EMBT blow, correct, sir?
A With hindsight, I could say there were not.
I would not have known that at the time,
without looking.
Q Yes, sir. Among the factors that Commander
Waddle may have, could have, and should have factored
into his calculus was the known density of shipping
in the area, wouldn't you agree, sir?
A Certainly.
Q And as we discussed yesterday, this was a
low-density shipping area, correct?
A Correct. Low doesn't imply none, however.
MR. GITTINS: Indeed, sir, indeed.
VADM NATHMAN: It's 11:20. I know
you are into points you want to make right now, and I
am willing to extend into our normal lunch time. I
am not sure where you are in terms of the amount of
time you want to complete.
MR. GITTINS: I probably have
another half an hour here.
VADM NATHMAN: It's your call. We
can recess now, and we can proceed at the normal time
--
MR. GITTINS: I think this would be
Page 111
an appropriate time, and I appreciate the fact that
you are going to give me the opportunity to
deliberate, sir.
VADM NATHMAN: This court is in
recess until 12:30.
Choose a session: Day 1, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 2, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
Day 3, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 4, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
Day 5, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
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