Unofficial transcript: Day 4, Session 2
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Feb 21, 1994
SESSION 2 MARCH 8, 2001 8:40 a.m.
Q Now, you talked yesterday about -- you mentioned again
today that as you gained experience on the periscope you
become more efficient at operating the periscope and using it
in a most effective manner. Is it your experience that ODs,
as they gain experience are more quickly able to assess what's
happening around them to determine what should be done and
what should be questioned?
A Well, in general yes. A typical officer will grow in
proficiency as he gains experience.
Q Now, in this case there's evidence that Commanding
Officer told the Officer of the Deck he wanted to be at
periscope depth in five minutes, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Now, based upon your investigation, your experience, did
that affect Lt. Coen's ability, I won't say ability, but the
degree of forceful back up he was able to provide the
Commanding Officer in coming to PD?
A I think that a Commanding Officer telling a young
Officer of the Deck something like that would influence the
manner in which the young Officer of the Deck would execute
his duties. I think the young Officer of the Deck would get
the impression that he needed to operate with great alacrity,
maybe more than he's used to.
Q In -- regarding the issue of coming to periscope depth
in five minutes, I think the first day you testified -- you
said that the Officer of the Deck, that was in his statement,
the Commanding Officer told him to come to periscope depth in
five minutes so that's what he wanted to do.
I'd like you to take a look at enclosure three to your
investigation.
A For Lt. Coen's statement?
Q Actually, sir, it's the XO's.
A Okay.
CAPT. MACDONALD: For the record may I ask what
exhibit --
MR. FILBERT: I'm sorry, this is Exhibit 1.
Q I'd like you to look at the first page, the second large
paragraph there and to yourself read the first sentence.
A When completed with angles and rudders, is that the
statement?
Q Yes, sir.
A When completed with angles/rudders overheard CO tell
Officer of the Deck make preps for periscope depth, want to be
at periscope depth in five minutes. I guess that's an
important word, "want". Doesn't imply do it, that's the
desires of the CO which is a less directive influence than "do
it."
Q I understand that, but would that indicate to you, then,
that at least the XO also heard this five minutes in relation
to periscope depth?
A That was my belief after reading the statement.
Q Sir, you talked at several times during your testimony
about the length of time the periscope search was done in
relation to not being able to see the Japanese vessel.
Looking at the facts of what happened, what was the -- what
was the event that determined the length of time the ship was
at periscope depth and doing periscope searches?
A Well, the functional end of the periscope depth period
was the Commanding Officer ordering emergency deep. Clearly
the process that lead to that is that the Commanding Officer
had determined his periscope search had achieved its purpose.
Q So, as -- I think you said before that that is an order
which is really unquestionable, it has to be done?
A Yes. I believe when the CO gives that order, that
defines the end of the periscope depth period very
definitively.
MR. FILBERT: May I have just one moment, sir?
Sir, I don't have any other questions. Thank you.
VADM. NATHMAN: Counsel.
CAPT. MACDONALD: We'll now proceed to Mr.
Gittins.
MR. GITTINS: I just have a couple of brief
follow up questions. (Inaudible) on this particular area.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Mr. President, what I would
propose is that we proceed with redirect by the members and
then we go ahead and give counsel for the parties the
opportunity to cross examine again.
MR. GITTINS: Very well, I didn't know we were
going to go redirect back on these issues.
VADM. NATHMAN: We intend to redirect on some
issues.
MR. GITTINS: Very well, sir. Thank you.
VADM. NATHMAN: Is that acceptable?
MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir.
VADM. NATHMAN: Let's go ahead.
Admiral Griffiths, we'll proceed to redirect questions
from the members.
EXAMINATION BY RDML STONE:
Q Good morning, Admiral. I'll be addressing five areas.
Chief of Staff's role on board Greeneville, the watch bill on
board Greeneville, the watch station requirements on the boat,
operational risk management on board the boat, and best
judgment of a Commanding Officer and how that relates to
responsibilities and accountability of Commanding Officer's in
U.S. Warships.
The first topic of the Chief of Staff, the Court has not
yet heard testimony from Rear Admiral Admiral Konetzni
regarding the duties and responsibilities of Captain
Brandhubber on 9 February. And therefore further assessment
is required to determine whether the Chief of Staff was
actually serving as senior officer present, or senior officer
present afloat both of which had distinct responsibility in
the Navy regs, or whether he was serving as a senior embark
passenger.
Do you agree, Admiral Griffiths, that further
investigation by the Court is required in this area.
A Yes, I do.
Q Do you agree that, regardless of the responsibilities of
Captain Brandhubber on 9 February, that they in no way
relieved the Commanding Officer of Greeneville of his unique
responsibilities and accountability for the Greeneville's
actions on 9 February in ensuring safe operations?
A I do agree with that.
Q The next topic, with regard to the Greeneville watch
bill. The Greeneville watch bill was addressed yesterday by
LCDR stone, and an impression was perhaps made that this
document is not as important to this investigation since it
was not specifically delineated as a document required to be
produced following the collision. I want to take a moment to
talk about this document and its role on board our U.S. Navy
ships and submarines. It is not an insignificant document.
The watch bill is one of the first documents that an
investigator would want to see after an accident, for the
following reasons: It is a signed and dated document,
submitted usually by the senior watch officer or the chief of
the boat, reviewed by the Executive Officer, and often
approved directly by the CO, the Commanding Officer unless
designated to the Executive Officer to approve.
It contains the name of the watch station and is
annotated to reflect qualification levels such as fully
qualified or under instruction.
We all learned as junior officers that an unsigned watch
bill meant next to nothing. They are strong and they are
indeed proposals without signature. The signed dated version
is the one that counts, and the approving signature is where
one goes to determine accountability on our ships.
These signed watch bills are retained on board our ships
and submarines and are particular higher interest to our
Commanding Officers and our Executive Officers. Not being
able to produce a signed watch bill is unusual. It is not the
norm or the standard for our Navy.
Admiral Griffiths, would you agree that a signed and
dated watch bill for 9 February is indeed an important
document to this investigation?
A I agree.
Q With regard to watch station requirements which were
also discussed yesterday, qualified watch standards are a
crucial underpinning and are indeed the foundation of how we
operate our ships and submarines at sea. Two out of three
qualified watchstanders or three out of four qualified
watchstanders is not the standard. The number of qualified
watchstanders is not a suggestion to the Commanding Officer,
it is in fact a requirement in order to ensure our ship's and
subs operate safely. Commanding officers that deviate from
that requirement put their ships at added risk.
Do you agree, Admiral Griffiths, that meticulous
attention to detail in the proper assignment of qualified
watchstanders in accordance with existing directives is
crucial to safe operations at sea?
A I do agree.
Q My next topic is going to take a few minutes because it
is very important.
Yesterday we heard Mr. Gittins talk about how the
Commanding Officer of Greeneville stressed three themes on
board the boat: Safety, efficiency and back up. It was then
mentioned that these three themes are related to the Navy's
requirement for operational risk management.
This, in my mind, is a critical aspect of this inquiry.
And my point will be that these themes are just words, they
are just rhetoric unless they are translated into actions by
the Commanding Officer.
Which brings me to the events of 9 February, in the
collision between Ehime-Maru and Greeneville which resulted in
the deaths of nine people.
Admiral Griffiths, you have testified that a
significantly large number of the Greeneville crew was left
ashore, which included key qualified watchstanders such as
sonarmen. You have told us about an important display unit
that was out of commission, which significantly reduced the
situational awareness of those in the control room.
We are also now aware that not all the positions in
sonar were manned with the appropriate and required
qualifications. You advised us about what, in your
professional judgment, were actions that could have been taken
to decrease risks, such as broaching the boat, thus elevating
the periscope height of eye, and thus increasing the chance of
contact detection, or spending more time in the periscope
scope, thereby also increasing the chance for contact
detection, or spending more time on the target motion analysis
legs to increase contact clarity, and also provide an enhanced
bearing for visual detection through the periscope.
These are all risk mitigators that were not fully taken
advantage of by the Greeneville.
Of additional concerns is of course the fact that
visitors were placed or allowed by the ship into positions
that reduced the overall situational awareness, and also
impaired the flow of information between watchstanders in the
control room. This was a self-imposed additional risk factor.
We in command have all been there. We know it is up to us to
make sure visitors are positioned in such a way as to allow
our key watchstanders to effectively do their jobs?
We are given command to ensure this happens. Failure to
do so means additional risk to our operations.
Additionally, Admiral Griffiths, your testimony did not
reveal the existence of a command climate, or key people
stepped forward and stated freely and vocally when they
thought the improper procedures were being used or safety was
being jeopardized, which is a key cornerstone of operational
risk management.
I therefore ask you, sir, in your opinion, do you agree
that the events of 9 February on Greeneville are reflective of
a command that actually increased its risks while conducting
these underway operations, rather than minimize and reduce
those risks in accordance with the spirit and intent of the
Navy's operation allege risk management philosophy?
A I think I would have to do further investigation to be
confident in my answer. I did, after all, only spend three
days. So, for example, my comments about the environment on
the ship and the conduciveness of watchstanders to back up the
Commanding Officer, I'm not confident I really know the truth
there.
I only had kind of an inkling, and I'm looking for
inklings in my three day investigation.
So, to some degree, some of the areas that you dcite
require further investigation before I could confidently say
the ship did something wrong, or didn't.
In some of the other areas that you cited in that very
concise summary, I do agree that the ship made some mistakes,
and perhaps mistakes in judgment. But again, the devil is in
the detail and I didn't get to the full level of detail on who
was on board and who wasn't. Were the qualified people within
the lifelines of the ship that day, had they put them in the
right place or not. I didn't quite get that far.
So, I will give you a qualified I agree, but I think I
need, or the Court needs more study before it makes a final
opinion in those areas.
Q Thank you. And the last area I'd like to address deals
with responsibility and accountability of a Commanding Officer
in the United States Navy. Mr. Gittins mentioned a number of
times yesterday that the Commanding Officer of Greeneville
took actions based on his best judgment.
I think it is important to talk about this term best
judgment for a while. Admiral Griffiths, you are a former
Captain of the U.S. Navy warship as is Vice Admiral Nathman,
Rear Admiral Sullivan, and myself. Would you not agree that
command at sea is a very unique and special responsibility?
A I certainly agree with that.
Q Would you also agree that one of the aspects that makes
it special is that when you are in command you are making
crucial decisions, and that people's lives are often dependent
on those decisions being correct?
A I agree.
Q Now, whether an officer is in command of a submarine
under the north pole or an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic,
(inaudible) or he is in fact commanding a submarine conducting
an underway for visitor demonstrations, the Commanding Officer
is fully responsible and accountable for his ship and crew.
Admiral, would you agree to that?
A Yes.
Q The Navy provides its commanding officers with the
ingredients deed needed to do their jobs, a wardroom and crew,
advanced high tech equipment, applicable training and
procedures to ensure safe operations and war fighting
proficiency.
It is then the Commanding Officer's responsibility to
form these ingredients into an effective team and properly
execute assigned missions. Admiral, do you agree with that
statement?
A I agree.
Q Admiral Griffiths, now we come to an important point
about the phrase "best judgment of the Commanding Officer".
Because lives are at stake, we hold our Commanding Officers to
a very high stand. A CO's best judgement does not necessarily
mean that that action conducted by him was prudent. A CO's
best judgment does not necessarily mean the action conducted
by him was safe. A CO's best judgment does not necessarily
mean the action conducted by him was satisfactory or correct.
I make these points because in the profession we are in of
commanding U.S. Warships, the Commanding Officer's best
judgment, or his good intentions is not the metric by which we
measure or judge.
In peace time operations where lives are at stake, it is
the outcomes based on prudent, safe and correct actions that
serve as the basis by which our commanding officers are judged
and held accountable. That is why command at sea is so
precious, why it is so challenging, why those who had command
cherish the concept of accountable acts, for not only their
own actions as Commanding Officer, but also for the actions of
those it was their responsibility to have properly organized
and trained.
Admiral Griffiths, I myself have not yet reached a
conclusion regarding the Commanding Officer Greeneville's
actions on 9 February, because I've not yet heard all the
testimony and reviewed all the facts of the incident. I am
therefore not yet able to affix responsibility or
accountability. However, I thought it would be very important
and useful to the Court to provide comment on the term being
used, best judgment of the Commanding Officer as it relates to
what those of us who have had command view as our
responsibility during peace time to conduct safe, prudent and
correct operations at sea, and to be held fully accountable
for those operations.
Admiral, as a former Commanding Officer, I would welcome
any comments you might have on the subject of the
responsibility and accountability of command.
A All right, Admiral, I'll give it my best shot. I -- I
laid awake for a month now at night thinking about this issue,
thinking about Commander Waddle who is no doubt doing the same
thing.
The -- Commander Waddle would never have been in command
of Greeneville without having been placed in a position to
test these very issues and have succeeded on countless times
prior to the collision. And so we have an individual who
commands similar, although more junior individuals of similar
ilk, who have similar aspirations on the Greeneville. And he
had a bad day where some mistakes were made, from what I can
tell so far, that accountability is an issue to examine.
I think that he went through several steps. The ship
went through several steps under his guidance that attempted
to meet the appropriate requirements in order to maintain safe
operations throughout that day.
And in my hindsight position, which is a lot easier
position to have than to be going through it on the day of the
collision with the ship, I found that there were no real steps
missing, that the steps were just not quite far along the
distance you would like that measure to be taken. But the
measure was taken, and it's an accretion of these small
deficiencies and the length of these measures that added up
with some terrible misfortune to culminate in a condition
where we now have these accountability issues and this tragedy
to examine.
So, I understand what you're saying. I don't see any of
these single measures as egregiously abused or missed or
discounted, yet I see a number of them that fall just short of
where you would want the gold to be, and they happen to add up
in a very worst case way. So we in the aggregate have a
collision.
And that's what's so challenging about this case. You
have a ship that does operate well, that has that history of
professionalism and excellence. You have clearly qualified
and excellent people who intend to do well, mean to do well in
their positions of responsibility on the ship, and yet you
have this tragedy for perhaps because of this accretion of
subtle measures not completely taken. And so this is a
challenging case.
But I'm sure that in the end of the day the Court will
come to appropriate conclusions based on further review of the
evidence.
RDML STONE: Thank you, Admiral. I have no
further questions.
BY RADM SULLIVAN:
Q Good morning, Admiral.
A Morning, sir.
Q I'd like to build on Admiral Stone's discussion of best
judgment and drill down a little bit into the particulars that
you were able to gather in your investigation of the
Greeneville collision.
Yesterday the counsel of Commander Waddle discussed in
great detail, and quite eloquently what a CO's best judgment
is all about in the execution of his duties. He discussed the
need for us as the Navy to give that CO the latitude to
exercise his best judgment.
In your opinion, do you believe that the Navy and our
submarine force strongly support that position of trusting our
COs to exercise their best judgment?
A Absolutely, Admiral. We go out on independent
operations with full confidence that those COs will be
professional and successful. We trust them.
Q Thank you.
What I'd like to do now is examine this a little
further, and to look at, in my opinion or what I feel is the
foundation to allow the CO to make those sound judgments, to
exercise his best judgment.
In your opinion, and with your long experience at sea
and your experience at sea as a Commanding Officer, can you
give me what you feel are the basic tenets that underpin the
foundation to allow a Commanding Officer to make best
judgments? Not only best judgment, but are good judgments?
A One of the fundamental parts of that is that we give him
the requisite training and experience. So, first of all, he
has had a great deal of effort done, the Navy has expended to
train him, provide him formal and informal education, to give
him the prerequisite knowledge and qualifications. And that
includes experience on sea tours. There are no shortcuts to
command. Commander Waddle did not skip XO or skip department
head or skip junior officer time at sea, he had to do that or
he wouldn't go to command. So that's the first tenets.
The second tenet is that you have to have demonstrated
on your -- excuse me, your tenancy through the ranks as
documented in your fitness reports that you exercise
appropriate judgment, and that you have exercised appropriate
interpersonal skills with subordinates and peers and seniors,
so that you're able to get the maximum out of your crew, and
that you could get them to perform to the level that we
require Commanding Officers to have the crews perform. So
you've demonstrated the leadership and the interpersonal
skills, capabilities up to that point in your career to be
given command, and that's the formal documentation in your
record.
And then thirdly you need to show through preparations
for deployments and underways to your chain of command that
you operate a ship in a way that shouldn't view that
confidence in your abilities. That you are able to take your
crew and go through challenging hurdles, examinations and
inspections once you're in command that only ships that are
being properly run would do well in, such as the Greeneville,
as demonstrated under Commander Waddle.
So, you have to have kind of walked the talk once you're
in command. I can go into a lot more detail, Admiral, but I
think those are the basic tenets.
Q Thank you.
Would you also consider that when you talk about a
ship's performance, that the standards -- the standards are
used are part of the underpinning would be what established
guidance there is to operate your ship, what procedural
documentation or direction is provided by the chain of
command, and even what our qualification standards are on our
ship, would you -- or would it be fair to comment that those
are fairly universal across our submarine force?
A Yes, it would be fair to comment that they are
universal. And they are high standards.
Q So, when we as a Commanding Officers make these
judgments, we're making the judgments based on a foundation of
information, procedural guidance and so forth that provides
the tools we have to make those judgments; would that be
correct?
A Yes, sir. The guidelines that are in writing that
govern how we operate our submarines are -- have been
developed and bled, if you will, over the long haul. And we
have confidence that they are good guidance and good
standards, and we would expect our ships to routinely follow
them. And they should depart from them at their peril.
Q You mentioned departing from those procedures. Wouldn't
it be fair to say in your opinion that because we operate with
standard procedures that a crew of the submarine can
anticipate the needs of the Commanding Officer, anticipate
information that he will need because they've been schooled on
a given procedure?
A Absolutely. Forward thinking, looking around the corner
is what we try to instill in all our crew so that they
anticipate the needs, they anticipate the events and the needs
of the Captain and the Officer of the Deck for that event and
are there proactive in providing information in a timely
fashion when it's needed or is critical.
Q So would you call that forceful back up?
A I would.
Q Now, as a Commanding Officer certainly every one of us
who has had the privilege of being a Commanding Officer have
had to operate, if you will, outside the norm to accomplish a
mission, to use our best judgment.
When you do that, as you alluded to, do you take an
added risk that your crew cannot anticipate your needs or
provide you that forceful back up on occasion?
A Yes, sir. And I think appropriate analogy would be when
I was going through prospective Commanding Officer's school,
my class was, and this is in the curriculum, had a lesson that
was emphasized to us and they used an example of a submarine
that had had a grounding, and the issue was that the
Commanding Officer had, for whatever reason, become totally in
charge and had not recognized the inherent risks that when he
does that his crew is in a position to not easily advise him
to change his course, if you will. And so the recommendation
to us was if you're going to be in a situation where you
become the Commanding Officer, or where you take the bridge or
where you do something where you have an unusually directive
position that you would normally stand back from as Commanding
Officer, that you need to put something in place to keep you
honest, because nobody's perfect.
And so that general concept is you need your crew to
back you up, and ever the more so when you become officially,
quote, on watch, like the Commanding Officer on an approach
and attack.
Q Would it be fair to say that, if you will, it's a
two-way street. The CO backs up his crew and his crew backs
up the CO?
A Yes, sir. And before I get too uncomfortable here, I
just want to say, these are areas that I think the Court does
need to pursue. I'm not comfortable I have a good feel for
that on Greeneville, one way or the other.
Q And I agree. And certainly speaking for myself there's
plenty more to look at to be able to come to any of those
conclusions.
With that said I'd like to take a few minutes to examine
the foundation that existed on Greeneville on the day of the
incident, and look at some of the underpinnings that the crew
is expected to operate with. And I'll -- I'd like to walk
through some of these and get your opinions.
A Sir.
Q Commander Harrison, will you please have the court
reporter mark the next exhibit.
What I'm asking to be marked is a letter of promulgation
covering NWP naval war far publication, three attack, 13 ten.
This is --
THE CLERK: It will be marked as Exhibit 35,
sir.
RADM SULLIVAN: This is a letter of promulgate
(indiscernible) 13 formerly NWP 777 (indiscernible).
Q Admiral, this NWP governs the use of the periscope, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q After you've had a chance to look at this for a second,
would you please read the first sentence of paragraph two for
the Court?
A NWP 77 provides operational philosophy and employment
guidance for electromagnetic and optical sensors installed in
submarines.
Q In your opinion what does the word guidance mean in this
context?
A Guidance means areas the best advice we can give you on
the issue, and you should probably follow it, but you do have
the authority to depart from it if circumstances warrant. But
it's a good default way to do things if you don't have a
better way to do it.
Q So, in other words, if -- it might be considered the
submarine force's collective best judgment on how to operate a
submarine?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why isn't this information a directive in nature? Why
is it guidance?
A Because the Navy for two hundred years or more has
always reserved the ultimate decision-making for the
Commanding Officer, and that's what we pay 'em to do and
that's why it's a special job because no written guidance ever
supersedes his best judgment.
RADM SULLIVAN: Commander Harrison, will you
please bring out the next exhibit to the court reporter.
THE CLERK: It will be marked as Exhibit 36.
BY RADM SULLIVAN:
Q What I've asked to enter into evidence is a portion of
NWP 3-13-10, it deals with employment of periscope.
Admiral, yesterday Commander Waddle's counsel read
paragraph one three two entitled initial search at periscope
depth as guidance for how to use -- or how to conduct a search
at periscope depth.
To refresh our memories will you please reread that
section to the Court?
A The entire paragraph, sir?
Q Yes.
A Initial search at periscope depth. As soon as the head
window breaks the surface, at least three 360 degree sweeps of
approximately eight seconds per sweep should be made in low
power, trained near the horizon to quickly determine the
status of close contacts or nearby floating objects.
This initial search is intended to defend against
imminent collision and is not intended as a complete horizon
search.
If a collision hazard is observed, emergency deep should
be ordered and the periscope lowered. If safe operation is
indicated, the announcement no close contacts should be made.
Q Okay.
There's a little bit more on the next --
A I'm sorry. Following the initial surface search several
rapid low power sweeps at maximum head prism elevation and
several more sweeps at 35 to 40 degree elevation should be
made to detect the presence of aircraft.
Q Now, Admiral, I'll ask you to read the very next
paragraph's instruction, paragraph 1.3.3 entitled continuous
vision search.
A Continuous visual search. Continuous search commences
as soon as it is determined that safe periscope depth
operations are possible. The recommended process for
continuous search is as follows: A 360 degree horizon sweep
in low power. A 90 degree quadrant horizon search in high six
times power. Another 360 degree low power sweep. A high
power search of the next 90 degree sector, and so on. Each
step in this process should be done slowly, approximately 45
seconds per sweep. A periodic high al. basin search is only
necessary if the regular continuous search has been
interrupted for more than 1.5 minutes.
Q Okay. Thank you.
I'd like now to introduce another -- another exhibit,
Court Exhibit 1 entitled Greeneville Commanding Officer
standing orders number six.
Q Admiral, if you could, will you please read the first
sentences from the paragraph in section 0615, paragraphs fox
trot and hotel entitled ascent to periscope depth?
A If I can first ask if there is any issues of
classification for me reading from this?
Q No, there isn't. This has been cleared by the Court
security officer.
A Would you repeat again, Admiral, the cite and paragraph
you want me to read from?
Q Paragraph 0615, sections fox trot and hotel.
A Fox trot. Conduct an initial low power search per
reference B for close surface contacts. Report no close
contacts after the low power search if that is the case. Do
not report no close contacts until completion of a 360 degree
low power search of the horizon.
In the event of a close contact, announce emergency
deep. Mentally determine the safety range at which you must
go deep to avoid detection or collision. A useful thumb rule
in these situations is one in low, time to go, or four and
high, time to fly.
In other words, a typical warship with mast head height
of one hundred feet would be two thousand yards if it's sub
tended one division in low power and it would be prudent to go
deep to avoid collision should the target sink toward
unexpectedly. Note, fishing vessels and trollers usually have
a mast head height of 30 to 50 feet, using the one in low
thumb rule above for a 30 foot mast head height troller may
not be appropriate technique, since range will be too close,
parentheses, six hundred yards for one division, low power for
30 head mast height in parenthesis.
After a good initial safety sweep change depth to the
deepest tactically useable depth and reduce speed to the
minimum allowable or desirable for the tactical situation.
You must be proficient at maintaining depth control at
periscope depth at sea state plus two knots.
And did you say also G, Admiral?
Q Now, down to H, please.
A I'm sorry. Conduct a periscope search following the
guidance of reference B. At night or during reduced
visibility refrain from using the TV camera as it reduced
light insensity by 60 percent. At night use the image intense
fire to pick up faint lights. Ensure a qualified night
adapted periscope operator is standing by prior to its use and
turn over the periscope search to him after you have used the
image intense fire. Do not use the image intense fire on the
objects that are back lit as this will prove ineffective.
Q Okay. Thank you.
For the Court, can you cite what reference B is that's
listed on the front of the standing order?
A It is NWP 1-13.10 submarine electrical --
electronic/optic sensor employment manual, which is the new
nomenclature for the NWP 77 that I've just cited.
Q Okay. Thank you. Now, Admiral, in your opinion does
these dsentences in the standing order direct the Officer of
the Deck to perform both an initial search at periscope depth
and a continuous visual search per NWP guidance?
A It does.
Q So, again, just to make sure I'm not confused, is not
sufficient to just conduct an initial search when you go to
periscope depth, that the NWP we just discussed provides
guidance in both the CO's -- both the NWP and the CO's
standing orders direct the Officer of the Deck to conduct both
these types of searches, is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q Okay. Thank you.
I'd like to move to another area. This is dealing with
the CEP plot, contact evaluation plot.
Yesterday the counsel for Commander Waddle focused on
the fact that ownership's maneuvers were continuously plotted
on the CEP. Was contact information tingly plotted on the
CEP?
A No.
Q Is it -- is this plot, the CEP, in maintaining this
plot, is contact data supposed to be continuously maintained?
A Yes.
Q I'd like to -- you already have it over there I guess.
Admiral, if you look at the CO's standing orders for
periscope depth operations, the one you have in your hands,
order number six, you go to section 0630 entitled contact
reporting. Please read paragraph one, focusing on the second
sentence. What does it say?
A The second sentence in paragraph 0630 paragraph A 1 says
the contact evaluation plot will be maintained continuously.
And it goes on to say while at periscope depth contact reports
will be made in accordance with Article 225 as amplified by
paragraph A below. And then it goes on to amplify that.
Q Okay. Thank you.
In the plot that USS Greeneville had on the afternoon of
9 February, where only on-course maneuvers plotted
consistently, contacts were not plotted continuously, what is
the value of that plot to contact management?
A There were periods where the contacts were plotted
continuously on the CEP, but unfortunately not in that hour
prior to the collision. The value is zero if it only has
ownership's course on it.
Q In your opinion how hard would it be for a ship that's
capable as the Greeneville to maintain her CEP plot when she
had a total of three surface contacts?
A I think that's in the easy category as far as a scale of
easy to hard based on the type -- number of contacts ships are
trained to manage.
Q As we've testified, or you have testified a number of
times with the AVSDU, the sonar repeater not working, would
you have expected the Commanding Officer or the Executive
Officer, or the Officer of the Deck to have relied more
heavily than normal on the CEP as a contact management tool?
A Yes, I do. Also I think that's appropriate. And also
the fire control system.
Q I realize this is somewhat speculation, but would you
have thought potentially you might have stationed a second
fire control man to maintain the plot as a sole function, or
possibly stationed a ship's contact coordinator to assist the
FTOW in the performance of his duties?
A I don't think it's logical to have expected they would
have stationed a contact coordinator in the submerged
condition. I just haven't seen that generally done.
I do think it's logical to have expected them to augment
the watch as needed to meet the standards.
Q You have mentioned that, for a good portion of an hour
prior to the collision that contact information was not
plotted on this plot.
If one of the individuals I previously mentioned, the
CO, XO or Officer of the Deck were using it as a contact
management tool, would you have expected them to have
corrected the fact that it wasn't being maintained,
considering the caliber of officers that they are?
A Yes.
Q Would you have expected them to, at a minimum, counsel
the FTOW about the problem of not maintaining this plot, or
ask the PD's assistance to maintain this plot?
A Yes, I would.
Q How hard is it for sonar to track three surface
contacts?
A That's, again easy on the easy to hard range.
Q How hard is it for a typical FTOW of the watch to solve
the solutions for three surface contacts?
A That's closer to the middle of the easy to hard scale if
he's got to come up with refined solutions and he's doing it
all alone. So it's about an average amount of challenge.
Q How hard is it for an Officer of the Deck, even an
inexperienced Officer of the Deck, or in the case of the
Commanding Officer an experienced submarine officer to
maintain -- maintain situational awareness in the situation
with three surface contacts?
A That should be well within the norm for their abilities.
Q So, in your opinion, the contact situation that we know
after reconstruction that existed on the afternoon of 9
February it should not have been that taxing or overly
confusing, is that correct?
A The function of time is very important here. Obviously
if you gravely abbreviate the amount of time, all of these
watchstanders have to do those tasks, then it becomes taxing
and challenging. But given the requisite time, no, it should
not have been taxing and challenging.
Q Okay.
I'm going to shift gears again slightly, Admiral.
Admiral, in your opinion, do you consider a ship sonar
search plan as being required to optimize sonar search
performance?
A I do.
Q Are you aware that Greeneville Commanding Officer's
standing order number five requires a sonar search point for
every underway?
A I was not aware of that, but I certainly would have
expected it. And I'm not surprised.
Q In past testimony you stated that you were unable or you
did not ever see a search plan, is that correct?
A Yes. But in fairness I did not attempt to either. It
may have been provided and I just didn't get through viewing
it, or maybe we didn't ask for it, or -- so there's a time
element here too in the way I was investigating. Frankly I
just did not have time to look at that.
Q So, none of your interviews revealed lack of a sonar
search plan?
A I cannot comment one way or the other on a search plan.
RADM SULLIVAN: Mr. President, I agree with what
Admiral Griffiths is saying and the importance of the search
plan. I'd ask if we could get our counsel to --
VADM. NATHMAN: Counsel of the Court, go back to
the ship and specifically ask for the product. I'm not sure.
Is that a document? What does it look like? It's a --
RADM SULLIVAN: I think it can be in various
forms. I'm sure --
VADM. NATHMAN: The ship will know what it is,
so ask the boat.
CAPT. MACDONALD: I'll contact the acting
Commanding Officer, officer.
CDR WOOLSTON: Sir, my understanding of the
squadron (inaudible).
VADM. NATHMAN: You might want to check.
There's a couple things (indiscernible). We'll look.
RADM SULLIVAN: I only mention it because I
think it's an important document that I need to do my
deliberations.
Q Admiral, in former -- or prior testimony we discussed in
great detail the fact that a sonarman under instruction watch
was functioning as a work shear operator in sonar. Isn't one
of the principal functions of the -- of that particular watch
the classification function sonar contacts such as identifying
screw configuration, turn count, type of vessel?
A Absolutely.
Q In my review of your investigation, Exhibit 1, of the
submarine sonar logs, I notice a number of things that I'd
like to just have you comment on. First, nearly all the
contacts gained during the morning watch were classified
in significant detail by the sonar watch; however, the last
classification of any contact occurred at local time 11:49
with contact Sierra 11.
In the afternoon there were no classifications of new
contacts Sierra 12, 13 or 14, other than simple reference to
surface contact.
Would you expect a qualified proficient sonar
watchstander to be able to classify at least some if not all
of these surface contacts, in your opinion?
A I -- they certainly should have been able to attempt to
do so. There are some contacts that are difficult even though
they're surface, and make a lot of noise, difficult to
classify. And so there may have been acoustic reasons why the
targets weren't cooperating in that regard, but the operators
to answer your question, yes. I would have expected them to
be able to classify at least some of those contacts,
especially in that span of time.
Q In your experience since at this point I haven't seen a
watch call, when is typically a change in watch done on a
submarine? About what time of day?
A About 11:30 to 12:00, somewhere in that time frame. The
plan of the day had a watch relief specified around that time.
I can't remember exactly the time.
Q Okay.
A 12:30. Somewhere -- 11:30 or 12:30, in that range.
Q Admiral, I'd like to just shift to that plan of the day,
which is part of your preliminary inquiry also.
I notice when I read it, a couple things that I'd just
like you to comment on. First, I notice the ship's delinquent
list, could you explain what a typical submarine delinquent
list is? What the purpose of that is.
A Yes, sir. The watch stations on the ship, across the
whole ship, the under instruction watches are provided a goal
date to qualify, and their progress is measured incrementally
towards that goal of complete qualifications, and as they
would perhaps fall behind interim goals, they're considered
delinquent and for whatever reason, and the ship requires them
to put extra time into qualifying. In other words, some of
their discretionary time is devoted to further qualification
efforts to get 'em back on to the pace.
Q I notice that approximately 14 people that six of them
were sonarmen, and Seaman Rhodes (phonetic), who I believe was
the sonar watch under instruction during the time of the
collision is on there twice, once -- once for passive broad
band operator, I believe, and another time I'm not sure what
it's for. In your investigation were you able to take the
time and figure out his actual qualification status as far as
delinquency and how far behind he was?
A No, sir, I wasn't.
Q Admiral, I'm almost done here, I just have a couple more
things. If you could please refer to the CO's standing order
number six, paragraph 0610 entitled clear (indiscernible)..
Admiral, could you read that first paragraph for us?
A Stay on course at 150 feet until there is enough data on
the AVSDU in the time bearing mode on the mark 81-2 displays.
Excuse me. To determine actual bearing rate and the direction
of relative motion, parentheses, about three minutes.
Q Okay.
In your reconstructive track, Admiral, how long was the
USS Greeneville at 150 feet on that first TMA leg?
A Approximately two minutes.
Q At 150 feet?
A There may have been some depth change portion at the
start of that two minutes. And the two minutes is approximate
also.
Q All right.
Admiral Griffiths, you stated earlier about --
concerning the loss of the AVSDU and the visits to sonar by
both the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer to
compensate for that loss, and in your opinion that wasn't --
you did not feel that was enough to maintain situational
awareness. What other things would you have expected or
possibly could have been solutions to the loss of having that
vital piece of equipment?
A It may have been adequate for the CO and the XO's
situational awareness because they were mobile, they had the
picture in control as well as sonar, but the -- I don't think
it would have been adequate for the Officer of the Deck, for
example, for his situational awareness. Because he wasn't
able to go into sonar with the same degree of mobility.
Well, I guess the first thing that I would have done is
that I would have made target motion analysis events more
deliberate, more lengthy, more discerning, more emphasized.
The use of the fire control system in conjunction with sonar
would need to be emphasized even more than before, because I
don't have the picture of sonar that I'm constantly looking
at.
So, I would pay more time looking at the fire control
system than normal, and perhaps augment the watch, or slow
things down, or both.
Q Okay. Thank you. One last area here.
Counsel, could you put -- bring the chart over for the
Admiral to view.
A If I could just go further. I think -- I would have
been very uncomfortable as the Officer of the Deck or the
Commanding Officer to know that I didn't have a fully
qualified watch in sonar when I was able to oversee them less
because the Officer of the Deck and I did not have this
display in control. So, I would have considered upping the
level of experience in sonar, providing those -- that raw data
to the fire control system. So when I say augment the watch,
it's sonar and/or fire control watch. Of course you mentioned
the CEP already.
Q Admiral, could you take a look at this chart and just
familiarize yourself with the operational area of penguin
bank, or pelican bank is located?
Based on your knowledge where the ship was operating,
how far away roughly was shoal water based on their depth of
operations?
A I would say they're about five miles from shoal water.
That's rough. Four to five miles.
Q In your experience as a Commanding Officer of a
submarine, would you have an overriding consideration or
desire to stay in the situation they were in, to stay away
from that shoal water? Is five miles a significant distance
for the navigation capabilities of this submarine, or a
submarine of this class?
A I would feel less comfortable than if I was in the
middle of the ocean. But these are accurate NAV suites on
these submarines, and five miles is a healthy distance and my
NAV uncertainty would be much, much smaller than that. So
while I would not dismiss it and I would be mindful of it
throughout the underway, I would not be petrified of operating
there, including the test depth and at high speeds.
Q So I assume that's why you felt during your television
that it was -- navigation wasn't a real significant
consideration for actions taken during the surfacing
evolution?
A Yes, sir. And also of course it was not a navigation
tragedy. It wasn't a grounding or something of that nature
where navigation would be the focus. So I kind of used a
course lens, looked at navigation and said I don't see any
major problems there, and they stayed within their assigned
area, didn't approach shoal water dangerously, so I -- and the
buoy was also -- there's the buoy down here that they were
also mindful of on their NAV picture and took steps to avoid.
So, at that point I no longer considered navigation --
Q Okay. Thank you.
A -- kind of a process of elimination, triage.
Q Admiral, I've reviewed the plan of the day of 9
February, which is the only information I can find for the
agenda for this embarkation of visitors. I noticed that the
event of emergency deep is not listed as a scheduled event.
In your investigation was this training evolution of
emergency deep was it run in an ad hoc fashion solely by the
Commanding Officer, or was there any notification of the drill
provided to the Executive Officer or any other members of the
ship's company which is the normal practice for a submarine
conducting training drills?
A I think it's fair to say I have no doubt one way or the
other on that issue. I would expect the CO and the XO to have
already had this plan discussed in advance, and there may have
been others brought into the quarterly. These can be run
unannounced by the CO at his -- at his option, and it still
has training value.
So, this is kind of a unique drill where I might take
exception that the routine is to do all the drill planning in
advance and so forth. This is one of the few drills that I've
seen submarines run with, that is basically ad hoc, and you
don't lose too much training value as long as the people are
in the right watch stations to experience it. At least to a
degree.
I know you -- you do like to have observers stationed
and get comments, but this is a relatively easy drill to do,
submarines do it routinely. Many submarines do it at least
once a watch when in transit to get the training level up.
And again, I need to remind everyone, this was a drill that
also helped the ship achieve its goal of quickly getting down
and quickly emergency blowing before the surface picture would
decay.
So, in summary, Admiral, I think the CO was well within
limits here, even if he had told no one to do this.
Q But to comment, or would you comment on the training
value with monitors at least some people observing the drill,
what does that do for the training value of the drill?
A If you have station monitors then you have impartial
factual observers of what people do, and then you measure that
versus what they should have done, and you come up with
constructive criticisms, lessons learned and promulgate them
and you get the most training value by approaching a drill in
that fashion.
Q Again, in your experience, both as an XO and a
Commanding Officer, Commadore, and a group commander, is it
very often that Comannding Officer runs drills without at
least notifying his number two?
A No, that would be a real unusual case.
Again, that may have happened here, I just don't know.
Q Is it unusual to run that type of drill without
notifying a senior rider embarked, such as Chief of Staff?
A Yes, that would also be unusual, and I don't know
whether that happened either.
Q All right.
One final question, Mr. President.
When it comes to the Executive Officer's duties, what
would you characterize the XO's principal duty as second
command, second senior officer on board the submarine?
A His principal duty is fund mentally to run the ship, so
that the CO is able to have the freedom to think the lost I
thoughts that the CO's should think on broader issues than the
mechanics of running the ship.
But, perhaps if you want to say what's the most
important thing he does, the most important thing he does is
he in every way backs up the Commanding Officer.
Q Does he -- you feel he backs up the crew too?
A I think they're synonymous. These are close knit
integral units, CO and crew, and backing one up means backing
the other up.
Q When you say backing up, what does that really mean? It
could mean a lot of different things to a lot of people. In
your opinion what is forceful back up, what does that mean?
A That means being the devil's advocate for the Commanding
Officer's decisions, and providing him the foil of the
alternative options, the downsides to what he's choosing to do
so that you're not just making him feel better about the
decisions he's already decided to make, but that you're
perpetually providing him constructive other sides of the
coin, and making suggestions to make even better decisions, or
better policies or better approaches.
And this runs the gamut from rudder rotors, split second
operational issues to broad long-term approaches to policy,
like what do we want to -- where do we want to move this ship
and crew over the next year, and everything in between. It's
really all encompassing, and it's a -- it's a continuum of
responsibility while they're serving together.
Q Thank you. I have no more questions.
VADM. NATHMAN: Admiral Ozawa, did Admiral
Sullivan cover your questions?
RADM OZAWA: Yes, he covered all my questions.
I have no more questions.
EXAMINATION BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q Admiral Griffiths, I'd like to cover a couple area, the
I'd like to go back to Admiral Sullivan's point. I'd like to
cover the role of the Executive Officer and some of his
duties, I'd also like to get into what I consider the command,
the performance of the command on the 9th of February, and
specifically the role of the Commanding Officer and the
performance of the command and how he characterizes and how he
sends strong signals to his crew about what he's going to do.
Let's go to the Executive Officer first and after we do
this we'll recess and I think this will be the end of our
redirect.
Q The Executive Officer, I think we've describing in
general terms as Mr. back up, Mr. clean up for the CO, but I
believe the Executive Officer has some very good functions,
functions that he's supposed to inform the Commanding Officer
of significant issues or matters within the command, would you
agree?
A Yes, sir.
Q He's supposed to make sure the command is organized,
that things are running efficiently for the Commanding Officer
who should be really worried I think about operational matters
and long-term planning, so we have the Executive Officer
consistently out there making sure the command is organized
day-to-day to support the CO's view of how his command is
going to be utilized?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay.
That he has what I would call -- he's out there to make
sure that the performance of the crew and their duties is
professional and that they're well-trained, would you agree?
A I would.
Q And I also think he's responsible for the conduct and
the way the crew looks, their personal appearance, their
ability, their conduct ashore and the good order and
discipline of the crew, would you agree?
A Yes, sir.
Q So I find some things interesting here. The Executive
Officer I believe a proves the plan of the day on the USS
Greeneville?
A Yes, sir.
Q So it kind of goes to Admiral Sullivan's point as to the
ad hocness of this emergency dive. I wonder if the XO was
ever sync of this emergency dive. Was it reflected in the
plan of the day? You've already indicated the Commanding
Officer has every right to use this as a drill to make sure
its people are trained because there's an opportunity here,
but was the XO inadvertently miss sync or was the XO -- did he
seek this information out? Was he surprised in your view by
the emergency dive?
A I really do not know.
Q Okay.
A That's something for the Court to look at. I have no
doubt.
Q All right.
On that same POD, then, which the XO signs it shows crew
members that are delinquent in their qualifications, so when
he signs that he would be aware, I think the crew on
Greeneville is around 150?
A Approximately.
Q Okay.
So, that's a fairly significant number of men. We've
all had commands of that size, or in some cases larger, we
don't always know everyone, but my expectations were the XO
would know the men fairly well and so when he signs the POD he
would note what men are delinquent and he would know almost by
name or certainly by face in some case the men that are
delinquent on that list?
A Yes, he would know them. So would the Captain, they
would know them.
Q All right. The Executive Officer has a role in the
approval of the watch bill. My understanding is on the
Greeneville the Commanding Officer signs the watch bill, but
the XO has -- in organizing the ship he has a responsibility
to make sure that the watch bill is correct, and if there's a
member on that watch bill that's delinquent and under -- and
not qualified, that I -- you would expect some compensation on
the watch bill before it ever went to the Commanding Officer
about compensation or a response, anyway, out of the Executive
Officer to that man that was not qualified or under
instruction or delinquent on the watch bill?
A Yes, sir. But let me make sure I don't create a
misconception. The issue of delinquency may be slightly a
misperceived here. It is a measure of the pace that a person
is qualifying, but it does not really comment on the person's
inabilities or proficiency. It's an indirect measure of that,
and it's the fact that he's qualified or under instruction is
really to me what counts here.
Q Exactly. In fact I agree with those comments. I see it
as an alertment, there's an opportunity here because you know
the individuals, you -- there's an alertment here to the fact
that he's under instruction, and it should be elevated because
of the XO's knowledge when he signed the POD, and then saw, I
assume, a parallel document of the watch bill with the same
name.
The Executive Officer is responsible for training, not
only to make sure that people progressing properly so he's got
an interest in who's under instruction, he's got an interest
in who's delinquent, and he -- I'm not sure how often
Executive Officer of a submarine takes these reports, but
there's typically a monthly training report for the boat about
the progress of the crew?
A Yes. And I would guess that the -- it's a weekly event
to determine delinquency status.
Q Okay.
So the XO would be involved in the decision to leave a
significant number of the crew ashore for simulator training
as described by the counsel for I believe Commander Waddle
yesterday, that he would be engaged and he would be part of
that decision.
In fact, he probably would be the over arching member of
the crew to make that decision about the numbers. To your
knowledge did he keep the Commanding Officer sync of the
number and the quality in the sense of rating qualification
that was going to go ashore for training?
A I didn't have time to pursue that communications between
the two on that issue.
Q Okay.
A My assumption is both were aware of the trade offs and
who they left on the beach.
Q Okay.
I want to move into one last area and then we'll recess.
I would like to talk about some -- because I'm kind of
confused here. I'm not quite sure there's a lot of conflict
for me right now about where this command really was that day,
because we've heard a lot of testimony about the
aggressiveness, the knowledge, the forthrightness, what I
would call the operational efficiency of this Commanding
Officer. But on the other hand I see things that look like
he's violating his own standing orders. It confuses me when
things like that happen, and so I'm not sure. So I'd like to
go through some measures here, things that I'm seeing right
now. You can comment, Admiral Griffiths, where ever you want
to to make sure I understand, or you can just say you see it
the same way, or you can make whatever comment you want.
What I'm looking at here is a measure of what I would
call the performance of the command in terms of is it -- is it
disciplined, is it -- is it to standard, or inside that
discipline does it border from highly disciplined to
sloppiness in some cases.
We heard yesterday about a comment about a six foot
difference for the depth of the ship. I'm not sure where that
was coming from, but it seems to me like a submarine would be
really concerned about its actual depth in the water,
particularly when it comes to controlling periscope height, is
that true?
A Absolutely.
Q So if you have a six foot delta out there running around
because you have a new standard of measurement, whatever it
was. I don't know what it was, I need to know more about it,
as described for counsel for Commander Waddle because you have
a digital or a -- an electronic measurement of depth, keel
depth and you have a mechanical measurement of keel depth for
a submarine.
So, if you have a six foot delta out there running
around, did you see that reconciled anywhere on the ship? Was
it reconciled in the logs? Was it reconciled in the -- in a
temporary standing order? Was the Officer of the Deck -- was
anyone aware of this, that they used it in terms of their
actual procedures or operations that day?
A I did not have time, frankly I didn't even realize there
was that disparity until I was in testimony, it didn't become
uncovered during my investigation. I thought it was much
smaller error. That is a much larger error. If that's the
case I'm sure the ship has that as an issue to fix. The
standard approach for a difference from reality that large
would be to use a formal process to place an out of
calibration, we call it an orange sticker because it happens
to be a little orange sticker and you place the delta on there
from truth so that the operators can routinely see what the
real issue, and that's one option and I didn't have time to
pursue whether they did that or not.
Q Okay. But I take your point. Six feet is a big deal.
A It's a lot.
Q It is a big deal. There ought to be some placard, some
notification, some modifications of the sense that there's
something -- there's a difference of depth out there that the
watchstander should be aware of, even if they knew the ship
backwards and forward, because you have people that aren't
qualified and since it's a big deal I would expect to see some
sort of -- and I'd like to find this out, I'd like the counsel
of the Court to ask the boat about this, to find out what was
done about that six foot delta?
A And also when it was found, because it was as they were
getting underway it would be like the AVSDU, you know, last
minute material issue, we'll fix it when we get back to port
as opposed to why are they living with this.
Q I'm confused about what I thought would be adequate
compensation for the loss of the AVSDU. I mean, this seems to
be like its a significant instrument and display for the
control of the ship by two men that will control the ship and
that is if you stand up there on the periscope platform and
you want to know what your sonar information is at a glance
while you're doing other things for both the Officer of the
Deck and anyone else who has the periscope, including the
Commanding Officer, that if you've lost this display the
compensation that I understand right now appears to be more
frequent visits to sonar, and to me that doesn't quite, from
what I've heard so far in testimony, that seems to be like a
relatively poor level of compensation for the loss that I
don't see any additional watchstanders in place. Do you share
that concern?
A Yes, sir. As I listed in the investigation, I think
that was not adequately compensated for. You -- the range of
compensation in my opinion should have been more than the ship
chose to take.
Q So then this box additive, you see a loss of an
important display and then you see a poorly maintained CEP, or
where for the last hour there's no contact information on the
CEP. And it says to me, wait a minute, this is a high
standard, right? The Commanding Officer will use that
frequently, the Officer of the Deck would use it all the time.
So what does it tell the crew? If the CEP is not properly
maintained about how important that display is to the control
of the ship, does it imply that it's not important any more?
It seems to me that was a very important piece of information
that wasn't available to the Officer of the Deck or the
Commanding Officer.
A The CEP is an important plot and it was not maintained
well for that last hour, and that was a standard not being
met.
Q What does that say about the Officer of the Deck or the
Commanding Officer in terms of the standard that they are
carrying out that day? This is an important instrument, or a
display, and it's not maintained properly. Okay. Because I
-- I assume -- I'm assuming a little bit that the Fire Control
Technician officer is quite busy and in some cases physically
use that comment, it was physical to actually get to it. What
does that -- is that a strong signal to the rest of the crew
that the standards that normally apply don't apply today in
control?
A Well, I don't know how general to make the lesson this
was emanating throughout the ship, but I think that the
Officer of the Deck, the XO and the Captain should not have
tolerated that plot not being maintained. Obviously that was
a standard not being met, and on that occasion they were not
meeting it, and that's not the standard.
Q Okay.
A It was a valuable -- it could have been of true value
today.
Q I know we talked a lot about the sonarmen under
instruction and the lack of oversight, it kind of goes to the
POD issue for me. It goes to the issue for the watch bill
which I still want to see a signed copy of. It goes to the
fact that, you know, he was under instruction sometimes, but
not all the time. It seems to me this goes to another part
that I see in terms of what I would call the discipline of the
command that day, and that's the lack of information being
passed by watchstanders to the Officer of the Deck in that
chain of operational control that you showed on the board the
other day, that I don't see that information being passed
particularly during critical periods of time.
A Well, Admiral, I -- I need to throw up a caution flag
here. We haven't talked about the things that were happening
correctly between sonar and control, the reports from the
supervisor on contacts. I think that was generally happening,
or else I would have commented on it as a problem in my
report.
So, the fact that we have less than the full
qualification we would like on both consoles, at least one --
on one console sonar is a factor. How important that factor
is I -- I really don't know, as I testified earlier, did that
play a role in them being less aware of sonar? I don't know.
But it certainly set them up to be one more obstacle in the
way of doing it the best they could have.
Q Well, I see this as a couple ways right now, 'cause I'm
still trying to figure this out. I don't see critical
information being passed, and I'm not so sure sometimes if
that information was even available to the watchstander,
because it seems to me like time here is one of the factors.
The time wasn't there for them to develop their own
situational awareness of their particular function, and
therefore were not passing significant points of information
like the right six or the fact that they thought they had a
contact close aboard. There's a sense in my view right now
that this timing issue is going to be very important here
because the watchstanders weren't able to build in their own
way their own professional confidence that they had an issue
to make it available to the Officer of the Deck?
A I strongly agree with you on this issue. The issue of
time frame. The shorter you make everything happen, no matter
how diligent the subordinate watchstanders are, the less they
will be able to pass, the less opportunity they'll have to
pass information or any notice that it is critical information
to pass. And I do think that is a threat that's run through
this last -- well, certainly since the completion of the high
speed turns until the collision, that is a central issue is
the an abbreviation of the steps so that developing and then
passing information on the critical issues, the critical
parameters was not fully allowed to develop.
Q Okay.
Well, this kind of goes again to standards. The reason
why it's not fully developed, in my understanding right now
after Admiral Sullivan's review, we have the Commanding
Officer and the Officer of the Deck both violating the
Commanding Officer's standing orders about length of time at
the 150 feet and length of time to built TMA and length of
time to -- at periscope depth or preparing to go to periscope
depth. So I'm seeing that right now as a violation of their
own standards or their own standing orders; would you agree?
A I would agree, except I want to make just one caveat,
that the Commanding Officer, when he direct things, you make
the assumption he knows his standing orders, he wrote 'em and
he signed 'em, and he's still choosing to deviate, so
therefore that's what he wants. And so when you say he's
violating his standing orders, he's the one person on board
who has the authority to violate 'em and that's not a real
violation.
For everybody else it is, and -- but he's the guy
directing the deviation, so this is a great area to look at in
testimony with the Commanding Officer.
Q I agree with your comments, Admiral, that the Commanding
Officer has a right to modify his own standing orders any time
he needs to because he thinks he understands what's going on,
but I don't see the basis for that understanding yet, 'cause I
don't see the information being passed. I don't find the
evidence right now of that information being passed to make
those decisions to change his own -- not to violate, because I
don't think the CO does violate his standing orders. I agree
with you. I think when he chooses not to be inside of his own
guidelines for -- as a guideline for the Commanding Officer.
But the fact that it's done at critical times, building
of situational awareness prior to going to periscope depth and
then it's done at a critical time at periscope depth and
they're done consecutively is what I find a little bit
confusing right now?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Some slopiness that I -- I just wonder sometimes.
My understanding was that APLOC (phonetic) was a race?
A That's correct, Admiral. And my -- my sense is it was a
race because they are operating in one small area and
frequently the track comes back on itself, and there's no way
to make it distinguished if you don't erase the previous
history to make the new track appear and that was the story of
why it was erased is they were in a small area for a long
period of time so it made sense on the current position they
would erase previous data. That's routine. I think that's
the reason it was erased, and I wouldn't call that sloppy.
Q Okay.
A Except that now they have a legal record.
Q Of a collision?
A The Quarter Master doesn't immediately think of that.
Q Wiping it off and putting a new one up. I think what
you're suggesting here is in the sar that was very important
to have good location, et cetera, and that was critical data?
A And they're staying in a small area.
Q And you've got do do -- he's trying to get out of the
way. I wonder, it just makes me wonder about well you just
had a collision and there's a -- there's ability in sense, you
know, you have some significant event that you want to make
sure the logs are right. You don't want to be admin at this
time, but you certainly want the ship paying attention to
details on some of those things because it does help
reconstruct and it's of value to the Commanding Officers, it's
of value to the Quarter Master of the watch, it's a value to
the XO. It's a value to -- to leaders of the watch teams
inside maneuvering as an example.
My sense was that they probably should have made -- I'm
not sure about, it's a conflict of whether it was discipline
or not. There's some other things I still want to see that
watch bill signed and I still want to see that acoustic search
plan, and my understanding of the sonar search plan, the issue
-- how -- how do you view the lack of the -- it's acoustic,
was it the acoustic tape? Work tape. Is that an issue?
A Did that help cause the collision, no, but is that -- is
that an indicator of poor standards being maintained in sonar?
Yes. That tape should be running when the ship is underway,
submerged, and it's not just a mission focus tape, it's
intended to be run all the time, and that is a standards
issue. It didn't cause the collision, but it's a sign post.
Q One of the things that interest me and I think we'll
have to learn a lot more about this one, is the comment made
about the fact that the ship was using a waterfront practice I
think is the way it was characterized for watchstanding, that
somehow the boats on this water front have adapted a standard
for watchstanding, I think that was a comment made by counsel
for Commander Waddle, about particularly sonar watch. And it
seems to me like that standard should apply to the weapons
configuration of the boats, the fire control configuration of
the boat or the sonar configuration of the boat and not just
some waterfront standard. Am I confused on this point?
A If the counsel was trying to allude that all the ships
really don't have two qualified operators if they're ARCI
sonar Busy 1 ships all the time, and that therefore that's
become a custom practice on the waterfront to have fewer than
the required watchstanders, I just don't believe that. I
mean, that I cannot fathom. If that's really what the whole
waterfront is doing then that's a widespread problem and that
doesn't make it right on any individual ship, if that's what
they're alluding to. I don't know. I indicated I would be
shocked if that was the case. That would be a door in where
the standard should be.
Q Would you agree that the COs accepting more and more
risk as he -- as he -- as that particular operations those
days did not allow his watchstanders the time to build their
situational awareness or their competent picture at their
watchstations?
A I think that's central to the story here, that this
abbreviated time frame makes everything harder, no matter how
good you are are. And that's one of the central themes I see
as relevant. And I don't know why -- I called it artificial
urgency, and you know, maybe the ship was planning to be late
coming back. If that was the case then why the urgency for
some other reason. You know, I think the abbreviated time
frame made it harder for everybody to do their job well.
Q One last question. We've all heard the comment from
yesterday from counsel and we heard the comments today and
questions today from Admiral Stone on best judgment. Using
best judgment based on poor or flawed or inaccurate data
doesn't mean that the use of that best judgment eliminates
risk or in an absolute sense is good judgment or is prudent,
would you agree with that?
A That's a very generic discussion, but yes.
Q Okay.
This Court is in recess for the next 20 minutes.
(Recess taken.)
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