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Unofficial transcript: Day 3, Session 8

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SESSION 8    MARCH 7, 2001   3:40 p.m.

A     Okay.   

Q     And I believe the other one, I have to check, Petty 
Officer Harris.  The chief of the watch.   

A     Okay.  

Q     I believe so.   
      And I'm not a hundred percent sure on that one but I 
know Reyes is.   

A     Okay.  I know I wasn't aware of that.  

Q     Sir, I'd like to turn your attention to enclosure 34 of 
your preliminary inquiry.   

A     Okay.  
      Enclosure 34 is the document that determines maximum 
periscope range.   

A     Yes.  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Counsel, I think we'll pull that 
out so -- we'll help you with the lights.  Go ahead and back 
it up just a little bit here.  Back up your display, please.  
There you go.  Go ahead.   

      I think everybody can read that.
      
BY MR. STONE:  

Q     This morning you talked about the height of the 
periscope in a trough?  

A     Yes.  

Q     This is the equation that discusses that, is that not 
true?  

A     It looks like it.  

Q     Okay.   

A     I don't have it memorized, but I assume it is.  

Q     Now, sir, you described -- your conclusions on enclosure 
34 state that the maximum detection to be -- of the Ehime-Maru 
to be roughly around two thousand yards?  

A     I recall that the -- for all these periations (sic.)   
That would be the minimum of the maximum detection ranges, 
yes.  There's a large number of them here, and that's as low 
as it gets.  

Q     Now, -- and you used this term that maximum detection 
range of two thousand yards in your finding on 8D, the third 
little dot and E to say that the periscope search was 
inadequate due to the sea state, is that correct?  

A     I'm sorry, where is H, D and E and so forth.  

Q     Those are in your findings of fact?  

A     Okay.  Hold on a second.  

              UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:  Is this enclosure 34?
              
              MR. STONE:  That's my diagram.  We'll have to 
mark that as the next exhibit.   

              THE WITNESS:  Yes, I'm with you now.
              
              MR. STONE:  Okay.   

Q     Now, are you aware that there are a number of flaws and 
assumptions in your chart that was prepared for you by about 
it Commander Hutton?  

A     No.  

Q     Well, first the information that was provided you use 
six, eight and 10 feet as --  

A     Yes.  

Q     -- the wave height.  Now, you had testified earlier that 
you got eight and 10 feet from watching -- from viewing 
videos, is that correct?  

A     Eight to 10 feet actually was the range of the METOC 
(phonetic) buoy two hundred miles away from the collision.  I 
also wanted to bring a lower wave height in to try to mess -- 
measure the METOC buoy data with estimates that were a little 
lower than that from many of the witnesses.  And then I 
finally used the video displays that CNN provided and others 
on NTV that we were able to see to a -- to become comfortable 
at six to 10 feet as a logical boundary of what I was looking 
at.  So, it was kind of a include of all those sources, I 
thought these were pretty good boundary conditions to make the 
calculations from.  

Q     Okay.   
      Sir, I think it's easier if I just show you the part of 
the enclosure that talks about, when you're dealing with swell 
height with regards to this, it's this one.   

A     Okay.   

Q     If you could look at that.  Is it true that that says 
that the swell height for METOC buoy 003 at the time of the 
collision was actually only 5.7.  It's part of the enclosure, 
34?  

A     This is actually part of the enclosure 35, I think.  At 
least this is marked as 35.

Q     I stand corrected.   

A     This collision would have occurred on the 9th almost 
midnight zulu going into the 10th, correct.  

Q     Yes, sir.   

A     We're talking roughly eight feet, the way I read this 
graph.   Looking up from here.   

Q     Does that not say about 5.75, sir?  

A     These are separated by less than an hour and this is up 
here to over eight, so -- you know, it's pretty variable.  

Q     Yes, sir.   

A     I'd say that's six to eight is how I'd call that.  

Q     Okay.   

A     And of course that was not at the exact location of the 
collision, so there's some subjectivity in how we make this 
assessment.  I looked to try to just bound reasonable amounts, 
but if the height was less you would be able to see more for a 
given scope exposure, and if the height was actually less than 
the boundaries I've established in here, it would be less of 
an impediment to the CO to see farther.  

Q     And with a less of a sea state it would be less for the 
Executive Officer to be aware of how bad the sea state was, is 
that also true?  

      If the sea state was less than the Executive Officer 
would have no reason to question the Commanding Officer 
looking through the scope, is that also true?  

A     I'd say there's matters of degree, less reason.  But of 
course his statement was he wished the CO has broached, and so 
that's really what I was keying on, not the -- you know, when 
I went through this table I was trying to explain how a good 
skipper experienced on the scope would not see a target at two 
thousand yards away.  So I was looking for reasons to help try 
to explain that.   

      When I dealt this table I was not trying to use it as a 
metric to try to determine if the XO should have intervened.  
To my mind when the -- not intervened, but when the XO said he 
was uncomfortable with the CO not broaching, I took that at 
face value, that the XO was uncomfortable.  

Q     And now since that time, sir, you have learned that 
there's inconsistencies in the individuals that took -- that 
wrote down the statements with regards to what exactly the 
Executive Officer said regarding a broached look?  

A     Recognizing I've said I have faith in the people who 
generated these statements doing a good job, I think the Court 
should look at the rougher data, the raw data and perhaps 
re-evaluate whether these statements are accurate.   

Q     Sir, and they -- they'll certainly be made exhibits.   
      Now, with regards to the data on your chart, sir, using 
six, eight and 10 feet, and the fact that it was two hundred 
nautical miles away from the collision site, are you aware 
that LCDR Hutton did not use any scientific formula for 
weather patterns to try to input swell length or wave height 
back to the crash -- to the collision site?  

A     You mean get it scientifically transposed from two 
hundred miles away?  

Q     Get his best guess.  He did not do that, are you aware?  

A     No.  

Q     Okay.   
      But would you also admit that there are at least -- 
there are scientific formulas in which he could have done 
that?  

A     I would not be surprised to know that.   
      And frankly, if there are more scientific ways to do all 
of this analysis, that's good work for the Court to still look 
at doing.   

Q     Also, sir, I -- I'd also like to make the point that -- 
that this formula that LCDR Hutton used came directly out of 
the submarine publication, Submarine Tactics.
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Counsel, is this going to be an 
exhibit?
              MR. STONE:  Yes, I do have a copy of it.  
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Let's start cleaning up here.  
Counsel and the Court, let's make sure we get these things 
marked as an exhibit.   

              THE CLERK:  This will be marked as Exhibit 45.   
              
BY MR. STONE:

Q     LCDR Hutton took this diagram, and this document using 
this formula, knowing what you know, sir, about the height --  

A     Well, this says the divisor should be 2 L, not one half 
L.  

Q     Correct, sir.  But when you look at -- and that's my 
point, he did the math wrong, sir, because if we're judging 
the periscope here in the mid trough to determine the 
(inaudible) an angle, you must bisect L in the half point, is 
that correct?  

A     Yes.  

Q     And so all of this data on 34 is wrong because he 
applied the wrong formula, is that correct?  

A     You're saying he did not -- he did not apply this 
formula.  

Q     He applied that formula exactly, sir, which is 2 L 
instead of one half L, which makes this -- the entire 
enclosure 34, if it's accurate, off by a factor of 4, is that 
not correct?  

A     Yes, if that was in fact the error made, that would be a 
factor of four.  

Q     Thank you, sir.   

A     And again, I think the recalculation should be run 
through.  
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Counsel, are you done with the 
overhead?
              MR. STONE:  Yes, sir.  
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Could you turn it off, please.   
BY MR. STONE:  

Q     Also, one last question, sir, with regards to this 
equation.  It also assumed a nine second -- sir, did you have 
any indications with regards to there not being any wave slap 
or swell height prior to your writing your preliminary 
inquiry?  

A     Wave slap, yes.  There were statements that said 
basically that this -- the optics were out of the waves, so 
not being slapped over by water.  Obscuring the vision.  

Q     If waves are not obscuring the vision then it would be 
potentially or likely that periscope I  may have been able to 
see to the horizon?  

A     Yes, I thought about that.  The -- there's two types of 
obscuring; swells in the way of your line of sight, or 
actually you're under water.  And I'm more confident the 
latter was not the case from the statements than the former 
based on my reading of the interview statements.   

      So, you know, not having swells in the way with these 
depth order and the swells that were reported, you know, it's 
not logical that they wouldn't occasionally be in the way.   

      But the being under water I don't think was a problem 
based on the interviews that I've heard.   

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Counsel, have you finished this 
discussion on the formula?

              MR. STONE:  Yes, I have.  
              
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Because I'm interested in 
something.  You made the point that it's a factor of four off.

              MR. STONE:  Yes, sir.  
              
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Is what I assume.  Let me ask 
Admiral Griffiths a point, then.   

Q     How does that affect the enclosure when you have got a 
factor of four now, does that go to the ranges that we're 
going to talk were in the enclosure?  

A     It implies you can see farther than the table shows, and 
therefore the -- the efforts the ship went through were less 
hampered by these considerations than the table shows.  

Q     Okay.  

A     So that's something for the Court to resolve.  

Q     Just based on the formula alone, we've got a factor of 
four in terms of a range calculation that we've showed, we'd 
expect the ship to be able to see that day?  

A     Yes.  

Q     I just want to make sure that's clear.  

A     That's clear.  And that needs to be resolved.  There may 
be a problem in that enclosure.
BY MR. STONE:  

Q     And sir, if the scope was above the swell, none of this 
discussion would even apply because you'd have an unobstructed 
view?  

A     Right.  

Q     Okay.   
      And if you have an unobstructed view of a 71 foot mast  
head sail, you're looking at roughly about 18 thousand yards 
off the line of sight?  

A     Yes, although my experience is you don't see small 
contacts that far away, so that's the theoretical answer.  

Q     And if you brought down, as you did, sir, to about 50 
feet down the mast head, you're looking still at about eight, 
little over eight nautical miles?  

A     Yeah.  I think I used 55.4 feet is the assessment.  I 
didn't have this exact information earlier today.  From this 
table we used 55.4 feet from the water line to the top of the 
mast, and 32 feet to the top of the black striped stack, and 
23.4 feet to the top of the bridge, and that was just based on 
scaling from what we saw from the diagram and a kind of an 
input from the -- I believe from the master on the water line 
where the ship would be -- what the ship's laying condition.  

Q     Sir, I'm not going to ask you to guess any more, and 
actually attached to the enclosure that the members will have 
there's actually the line of sight, distance to the horizon 
diagram.   

A     Okay.  

Q     So we don't even have to --  
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Help me out here, we've been 
talking about 25 feet.  We've been talking about making sure 
there was something you could see.  I think there was a 
discussion earlier about a mast and being able to see the mast 
and we -- Admiral Griffiths took us into a discussion of 
getting down to the top of the bridge and the structure that 
you're more likely to see, so based on that height what kind 
of distance are you talking about?

              MR. STONE:  Sir, as the nautical mile distance 
at 70 feet is 9.8 miles, or a 50 foot is 8.3 miles.  For 30 
feet it's 6.4 nautical miles.  For 20 feet is 5.2 nautical 
miles.  For 10 feet it is 3.7 nautical miles.  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  I got it.   
              
              THE WITNESS:  You know, we have to kind of come 
back to ground truth though.  The ship was a mile away, we 
know that, approximately a mile away at this point in time and 
it wasn't seen, we know at least, one, it was somewhere in the 
optical view, theoretically, from where the scope was looking.  
We know the scope wasn't broken and we know we had a good 
periscope operator.

      So, in looking at additional factors of why the ship did 
not detect the Ehime-Maru visually, what I was trying to do is 
show the Court in the preliminary report all the factors that 
could hinder the ability of the CO to see that ship, and sea 
state and swell height may have been incorrectly calculated 
but it is a factor when you're operating with your head window 
within four feet of the surface of six to eight foot swells.  
And the haze and so forth.  So, --

BY MR. STONE:  

Q     Would you agree with me then, sir, it's a factor for 
those individuals that look through the scope, and not for 
those that did not look through the scope?  

A     No.  I think it's an also -- I think an issue of general 
ship safety, and I know the Executive Officer is also worried 
about ship safety.  I don't think he said, gee, I wish we had 
broached if he didn't really mean that, and I know the reason 
he said that is it gives you a higher look.  I can tell you in 
my career, I've never done this emergency blow evolution 
without broaching first, ever, because that gives you your 
best look.

              RDML STONE:  Point for the Commander Stone.  For 
clarification you were making commentary concerning the 
assessment of what the actual swell and sea state was at this 
time.

              MR. STONE:  Yes, sir.  
              
              RDML STONE:  Very shortly after the collision 
the Greeneville was on the surface and was able to get a very 
good look at what that sea state was like, and in fact it was 
to the extent that the boat was unable to open the forward 
hatch and put people on up there.  Was there some confusion 
you believe on what that sea state was actually like?  It 
seems they had an eyeball view on that, that reenforces how 
bad it was.  
              MR. STONE:  Sir, I certainly have a theory.  I 
don't know if I'm allowed to say it in the point that I'll now 
be testifying.  But submarines are round, swells roll up 
submarines much easier than they do destroyers, and little 
waves can actually cause the forward hatches not to be opened.  
So, I guess I just testified.   

              RDML STONE:  I was looking at trying to capture 
the point you were trying to make.  I realize where you were 
going with that and we'll be able to look at what the records 
show for the sea state as evaluated by the Commanding Officer 
after the boat was on the surface and what was recorded in the 
log to ascertain what those were.  Thank you.

              MR. STONE:  Yes, sir.   

Q     Sir, on your very first day of testimony you had stated 
that this position of the Executive Officer is pursuant to the 
sar.  Could you elaborate a little bit on that, please?  

A     Well, actually I'm not sure you'll find this diagram in 
print anywhere other than where you're looking at it.  We drew 
from the (inaudible) an experience to create the diagram.  It 
was intended to be a simplified functional diagram to show the 
full audience here of how the submarine watch bill really 
works.  And so we put the XO in there, who have course is not 
on watch, per se, ever, unless the CO makes him a command duty 
officer which is not the case here.  But the dotted line shows 
that it's less than a formal watch responsibility that is 
being indicated here, unlike all the others.  Of course the CO 
is obviously not technically on watch either, but all the 
other individuals here they're lines -- they are 
watchstanders, the CO and XO are unique in that -- in their 
relationship to watchstanders.  

Q     And I guess my only point on this is that as a non 
watchstander, he's not automatically in the chain of reporting 
from potentially ship's control, contact management, 
navigations that go to the Officer of the Deck and then up to 
the Commanding Officer?  

A     You're right, he's not automatically in that.   

Q     I'm not saying that he's still not Executive Officer, 
which --  

A     Me neither.  

Q     -- which carries something of its own.   

A     I'm with you so far here.  

Q     Sure.   
              MR. STONE:  If I could have just a minute, sir.   
              VADM. NATHMAN:  Certainly.   
      Counsel, you're going to have to turn the lights down.   
BY MR. STONE:  

Q     Sir, when you first looked and said that this six degree 
bearing rate was very noticeable, and your --  

A     It was noticeable to me in hindsight.   

Q     And this is based on a previously unrefined sonar band, 
the initial closure rate?  

A     Yes.  

Q     Now, what's been put up here as was alluded to in the 
court today is we're going to have a new expanded time bearing 
chart that's going to look very similar to this, what do these 
green lines here, if the course changes, have changed, doesn't 
it obscure this line, the ability to read this six degree 
bearing rate change?  

A     I'm not overly familiar with solder (phonetic)  
recording systems, so I'm not aware of whether or not they 
truly visually blank out the bearings, and so you're not able 
to see what the bearings are during this turn.   

      If this is a -- if this is a contact evaluation plot 
type of annotation, this shaded area would indicate a period 
where the ship is changing course.   

Q     Yes, sir.   

A     And you would not physically lose an ability to track 
where the varies are, they would just be less reliable during 
the turn, but you would still see them.  So is that what 
you're trying to show here?   

Q     But you would not necessarily lose your measure bearing 
rate?  

A     Correct.  You would not measure during the term because 
the formulas don't work.   

Q     Officer, could we have this exhibit marked next in 
order.  

A     If your point is there's even less data than life is 
even shorter than what I thought it was I would grant you that 
from what this appears to be, that it is an even shorter data 
leg that looks like a minute, which makes it a less useful TMA 
leg and gives it less time to see that high bearing rate.  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Excuse me, before we proceed.  
Do you have a paper copy?   

              THE WITNESS:  And my point -- we'll use this as 
a substitute, it's not completely colored right.  

              CAPT. MACDONALD:  If it isn't exact, when you're 
done we'll mark this as the next exhibit in order.  

              THE CLERK:  Exhibit 27.  
              
              CAPT. MACDONALD:  Please provide the Court a 
copy.  

              MR. STONE:  Yes, sir.   
              
              THE WITNESS:  If I can, see, the point I would 
like to make, the shorter this bearing -- the shorter this leg 
gets the worse the story is on how the ship conducted TMA, 
because although they had less chance to see the high bearing 
rate, I'm sure they didn't see it.l  I know they would have 
reacted if they did, but again the whole point I was trying to 
make along with my testimony is the legs were not sufficient 
in duration or length or numbers to be good TMA.  And this 
would indicate that case even more strongly.  

Q     This also from those individuals that are using trip 
fliers potentially come to a different conclusion regarding 
this high bearing rate, is that not true?  

A     I don't know what you mean by that.   

Q     I'll probably save that for argument.   

A     I don't think anybody recognized the high bearing rate 
situation, sonar, fire control, officers, period, because I'm 
sure any of them or all of them would have used that 
information to great good, had they recognized it.  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Before you turn that off, 
counsel, let me make sure I understand this.   

      You show a cross hatched area that, unlike this previous 
diagram we've been using the implication to me is that how the 
crossed hatch area eliminates the ability to view contact 
data, sonar contact data?  Or is that correct?  

              MR. STONE:  So, it does not eliminate what's 
coming in, but because of the submarine (inaudible) the 
ability of people in sonar necessarily judge exactly what it 
is.  
              VADM. NATHMAN:  That's my conclusion too.  I 
just wanted to make sure it's clear.  You showed the cross 
hatch over that data now so you can't see it.  

              MR. STONE:  No, sir.  
              
              VADM. NATHMAN:  It's not reliable in terms of 
evaluation of a drift rate, and therefore ability to see what 
the contact is actually doing in terms of potential course and 
speed.  

              MR. STONE:  That is also my understanding.  That 
might --  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Okay.   
              
              THE WITNESS:  I'll just refer back to the XO's 
initial interview statement.  He was -- he implied discomfort 
with the amount of time on legs, the amount of TMA, and this 
would be an example of why I could see why he felt that way.   

              CAPT. MACDONALD:  Are you done with the power 
point slide?   

              MR. STONE:  Yes, sir.   
      Sir, may I have just a minute?  I think I have a lot of 
duplicate from this morning.  

Q     Sir, I just have a couple more questions.  Did you have 
LCDR Harrison or Captain Byus question anybody regarding the 
professional competency of LCDR Pfeifer?  

A     No.  Not that I'm aware of.  

Q     Did you happen --  

A     I don't -- I'm not aware of anybody doing that.   

Q     Did you happen to review his fitness reports?  

A     Certainly not.  

Q     Would it surprise you that LCDR Pfeifer was the top rank 
Executive Officer in squadron one last year?  

A     Certainly would not surprise me.   

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Could I ask a question on that?  
I want to make sure I understand.  What I'm saying is that 
does the squadron rank XOs?   

              THE WITNESS:  For administrative boards, 
      Admiral, it's common practice in the submarine 
waterfront to formally rank and then provide that to the COs 
to put in the fitness reports of the officers so that admin 
boards see that and it's --  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  So it's reflected in their 
fitness report.  

              THE WITNESS:  Sure.  I have absolutely no reason 
to be surprised by that.   

BY MR. STONE:  

Q     Did you consider, or were you aware that the Executive 
Officer actually pushed lunch up 15 minutes to account for 
time?  Was that discovered?   

A     Not by me.   

              MR. STONE:  Sir, I have no further questions.  
Thank you, sir.   

              VADM. NATHMAN:  All right.  Well, it's 12 after 
4:00, and I'm not sure, counsel for Mr. Coen, what you feel -- 
I don't mind proceeding here.  I'd like to conclude exactly at 
1630.  I don't know how that would help you in terms of 
maintaining your coherency of where you want to go on 
cross-examination.  So I'll give you the opportunity to make a 
recommendation to me whether or not you want to proceed right 
into your cross, or do you want to now go ahead and recess the 
Court and wait until tomorrow morning?  What would you like to 
do?  
              MR. STONE:  I think it would be best if we 
recessed at this point and started again tomorrow morning.  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Okay.  Counsel for the Court, 
any comments? 

              CAPT. MACDONALD:  Yes, sir.  Bailiff -- if you 
would mark the following exhibits as next Court exhibits in 
order, the first exhibit is COMSUB (inaudible) thousand slash 
201 and (inaudible) public affairs, five pages.   
      What exhibit number is that?   
      
              THE CLERK:  That would be Exhibit 48.  
              
              CAPT. MACDONALD:  Next exhibit is 5720 dated 30 
May, 1997, entitled duties of squadron public affairs 
officers, six pages.   

              THE CLERK:  That would be 49.   
              
              CAPT. MACDONALD:  The next exhibit is CINCPAC 
Fleet, and COM SUBPAC embark reports for 1999 and 2000.  
Fifty-two pages.  

              THE CLERK:  That will be marked as (inaudible).  
              
              CAPT. MACDONALD:  The next exhibit is 
information prepared by come SUBPAC PAO relating to USS 
Greeneville tours and embarks for 1999 and 2000, seven pages.   

              THE CLERK:  That will be marked as (inaudible).   
              
              CAPT. MACDONALD:  The final exhibits, 
information prepared by COMSUBPAC PAO related to USS 
Greeneville (inaudible) of 9 February, 2001, 41 pages.  

              THE CLERK:  (Inaudible).  
              
              CAPT. MACDONALD:  Mr. President, that's all we 
have.  

              VADM. NATHMAN:  I want to make a comment here.  
I will make the bailiff available to counsels for your 
exhibits to move stuff around, to provide for your 
efficiencies.  Now, that's true for all the counsels, 
including the counsel for the Court, so don't hesitate to use 
the bailiff to do that for you, to make this so we do this 
with a certain amount of efficiency.

      I understand, certainly understand this is important to 
the parties, so you need to make sure that your questions are 
well-developed.  I think there's been sufficient preparation 
time for some of that, and so those are my expectations.

      So, let's make sure that we are trying -- we're trying 
to use the court and the assistance of the court to get 
through these type of matters in a manner that seems 
organized.  That's not a criticism, but I'm just pointing out 
to everyone those opportunities are available to you.  

              CAPT. MACDONALD:  I think it came up a little 
bit earlier about the resources of the government not being 
available to all parties.  As we've said from the outset, when 
all of us were assigned, if the parties have anything that 
they want blown up, made charts, any supplies, I think you got 
your first group of supplies about two weeks ago.  You tell us 
what you need to have done and we'll get it done, okay?  We 
want this to be an absolutely fair process for everybody, and 
CINCPAC Fleet has made those resources available to all 
parties.  Okay.   

              VADM. NATHMAN:  Thank you.  This Court is 
recessed until 0800 tomorrow morning.  

      (Proceedings adjourned at 4:20 p.m.)

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