Unofficial transcript: Day 3, Session 7
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SESSION 7 March 7, 2001 2:50 p.m.
VADM NATHMAN: This court is now
back in session. Let the record reflect that all
members parties and counsel are present.
EXAMINATION BY MR. GITTINS:
Q Sir, I just have a couple more questions.
In the diagram Exhibit 9 on the wall, this is
the expanded depth well PD graph, the indications are
that the ship was raised to -- and it appears to be
about 60 feet, 61 feet, somewhere in there at about
time 13:39.
A By the digital depth dectector, yes.
Q The digital depth dectector?
A Yes.
Q What was the error that you believe that you
learned during the investigation -- the error between
the digital depth gauge and the mechanical depth
gauge?
A Approximately three to four feet.
Q Three to four, sir?
A Three to four. And that's my estimate. I
think by interview, it's three.
Q Are you aware that the crew had performed a
number of empirical evaluations with that difference
and had concluded that the difference was six feet?
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A No.
Q If the difference is six feet, and that is
demonstrated in this hearing, sir, the ship would
have been raised to 55 or 5 six feet, would you agree
with that, sir?
A Yes.
Q Would that be a high look?
A It would be higher than 58 feet.
Q Yes, sir.
A You know, and it was a -- the range of options
are broached to the -- even deeper than the ship
chose.
Q So your working assumption was that the
difference between the digital depth gauge and the
mechanical shallow water depth gauge was three to
four feet?
A Yes.
Q And it would make a difference -- a two foot
difference would make a difference, wouldn't it, sir,
in the distance that would be visible through the
periscope?
A Any additional degree or shallow makes a
difference, any amount. May I add, though, that I
think the ship was controlling on a mechanical depth
indication which they would call the shallow depth
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gauge, and the difference between reality and what
the shallow depth gauge would read would probably be
much closer than three feet or six feet or anything
in between.
The reason for that is each time the ship would
lower the periscope, they would note the depth the
periscope goes under, and compare that to the shallow
depth gauge indication, so they would have a good
feel routinely when operating the ship at sea what
that difference was on a more reliable basis than the
digital, which tends to be more variable.
And I am sure that the ship was using the
shallow depth gauge as their standard when they were
operating at shallow depths like periscope depth
because it's preferable, it's more reliable, it's
what we're used to.
The reason the system recorded digital is
that's the electrical system the only option the
system has to record.
Q Yes, sir.
A So, I didn't use the absolute values of
these -- because I couldn't tell what the error
was -- rather, I used the slopes to help define the
boundaries of time at periscope depth, and to show
that clearly they were at one point shallower than
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the other point which coincided with how the CO
described the sequence and others in interviews.
But I would think that the 58 and the 60 feet
interviews developed are probably close to accurate,
and so, I didn't rely on the absolute value of these
depths.
Q I understand, sir.
But the difference -- the observed difference
derived by the crew empirically by experimentation
over time would make a difference of six feet in the
numbers that you have here, is that correct, sir?
A If the real round truth is that six feet is the
depth there, then we have a record of what the truth
was. Are you saying this is after-the-fact or
before-the-fact.
Q Before the accident, sir.
A Okay. Well, that's something that I didn't
know.
Q Yes, sir. And we'll bring testimony to the
members as to that, sir.
Q So raising the vessel was a reasonable thing
to do under the circumstances, wouldn't you agree,
sir?
A Yes.
Q To get a better look?
185
A Yes.
Q And performing a deliberate search on the
bearings was a reasonable thing to do by Commander
Waddle?
A Yes.
Q And if he used the doubler, that would be a
reasonable thing to do to improve his opportunity to
observe the Ehime Maru, correct, sir?
A Particularly useful to use the doubler when you
are not using the scope in rotation. If it's moving
in rotation, the doubler could actually impede your
to see something.
Q But that is a technique that is known in the
submarine community, correct?
A Yes.
Q So you wouldn't expect an experienced captain
who would be in command two years to be moving the
scope using the doubler, would you?
A I would expect Commander Waddle to be
proficient in periscope use.
Q And that wouldn't be proficient, to use the
doubler while using the scope?
A If you are sweeping slow, even then, you could
use the doubler proficiently.
Q And to turn off the Para-Vis -- that would be a
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reasonable thing to do under the circumstances,
correct?
A Absolutely.
Q And to do a ESM search was a reasonable thing
to do under the circumstances?
A Yes.
MR. GITTINS: That's all I have,
sir.
VADM NATHMAN: I would like to raise
one point for counsel for Cmdr Waddle. The issue was
raised at the beginning I think today about the watch
bill -- the sense that you felt the watch bill -- the
signed watch bill had been passed to Commodore Bias
for record-keeping, and we need to make sure that we
can go back and do the right type of search to find
that signed watch bill. I'm very interested.
What confuses me a little bit though is, it
would seem to me that there would be several watch
bills or copies of watch bills, signed watch bills,
still on Greenville. And so I am going to ask the
counsel of the court to go back to Greenville and ask
them to go find another watch bill.
It seems to me those ought to be there -- I
assume it was the original that was passed to
Commodore Bias, so counsel of the court let's make
187
representation to the USS Greenville on that, and ask
the chief of the boat. Knowing the way the Navy
works, I believe on something like this, those
typically get posted and they are typically get kept
for days -- or I don't know how long -- but I would
hope to find a signed copy.
MR. GITTINS: We asked for the ship
to send us a copy of what we had last night, and I
believe a copy got sent to counsel for the
investigation. But it's an unsigned version, sir.
VADM NATHMAN: Well, that's what
disturbs me.
LCDR STONE: Yes, sir. and we are
running down now the issue of who the -- who had the
watch bill, and who took it where -- basically,
trying to track who had that watch bill in their hand
at what point.
VADM NATHMAN: That's what I am
going to ask counsel of the court to do, because I
assume he would look at the distribution that would
occur on that ship in terms of the number of copies
of the original watch bills, where it would go.
CAPT MACDONALD: Sir, I will contact
them.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for LCDR
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Pfeifer.
EXAMINATION BY LCDR STONE:
Q Good afternoon, sir.
Q In your report you mentioned it was difficult
to gather data such as the CEP log, the sonar tape,
the mylar overlay -- this wasn't hit earlier, but
there is very good reasons why the mylar overlay was
erased, correct, that is not really an issue here.
A I don't know exactly why it was erased.
I don't think there were -- there was malice
aforethought in the reason it was erased. I think it
was erased after the point that it was an available
record to retain, and that was inadvertent.
Q No evidence anywhere to suggest anything was
destroyed intentionally or the ship or any member of
the crew did anything to cover anything up?
A Certainly not.
Q You are aware of JAG Manual Section 1208 which
provides the list of required information to be
turned over after a collision that was part of the
information that you used, correct?
A Yes. That was the basis for what we
requested.
Q Do you realize that initially, the watch bill
is not even one of them -- it's not even listed?
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A No, I didn't realize it's not listed. But I
know that the watch bill was requested.
Q But are you aware that it was requested much
later than the very initial time that it was --
A -- No, I was not aware it was much later it
was requested.
Q Isn't it true, sir, that when you heard the
collision, you began, based on your knowledge as a
submarine officer to speculate late kind of how this
tragedy may have happened?
A In a general sense, I probably did.
Q It's perfectly normal, would you believe
that?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Now, if you did some brainstorming and
speculating when you got your mission, is it
conceivable for others to speculate and brainstorm
about causation when they were tasked as well?
A I think once tasked, they would -- are you
implying, for example, the court?
Q I am -- any submariner that sees a tragedy,
that is tasked with an explanation might come up with
some ideas.
A I think any submariner, once he heard of this
event, started to think about it.
190
Q Okay. And speculation, I guess.
Q Now you never interrogated Lieutenant Pfeifer,
did you?
A No.
Q You did try twice, though, true?
A Yes.
Q The first was about two days after the initial
interrogation by LCDR Bias and Capt Harrison?
A Yes.
Q And the second time was a day later, is that
true?
A Yes.
Q Now you previously stated to me that LCDR
Pfeifer was what you believed under impossible
pressure, is that also true?
A Yes.
Q I mean he was -- would you agree with me he was
the XO of a ship in trauma?
A Yes.
Q He had now had a new commanding officer?
A Yes.
Q He was the coordinating the ship's role in the
NTSB investigation?
A Yes.
Q He also had to handle the ship's role in the
191
preliminary inquiry?
A Correct.
Q He was being named a party?
A Correct.
Q His rights read?
A Correct.
Q And probably most importantly, he witnessed the
sinking of the Ehime Maru?
A Certainly, most importantly.
Q Was in -- basically an integral part of the
rescue effort?
A True.
Q And when you talked with him it was very
obvious that he hadn't slept well?
A He looked fatigued to me.
Q Now, in the second attempt at interrogation,
you also stated that you were concerned about the
stress he was under?
A Yes.
Q And isn't it also true that you described his
appearance to be as appearing "shell shocked?"
A Yes.
Q Now, you stated you received some of your
information from NTSB interviews?
A Can I just go further on the reason I was
192
telling you all of those things --
Q Sure.
A -- Was that I worried about him as a person.
This really had nothing to do with wearing a uniform,
it had to do with the fact that if I had been him, I
don't know how I would have been able to accomplish
all those responsibilities that he was simultaneously
tasked to accomplish, and endure, and be effective.
And so, at least for an interim, I suggested to
the force commander that he consider temporarily
relieving the XO some of his duties so that he could
more humanly endure those that he retained.
Q Sir, I don't think anyone is questioning your
belief in that. Okay.
Now, you did state that you had received some
information from NTSB interviews through Captain
Kyle, correct?
A Correct.
Q Now Captain Kyle was the Navy representative to
the NTSB?
A Yes.
Q Okay. So, with regards to this information
that came from NTSB, you don't have any first-hand
knowledge -- you didn't do any --
A I have no first-hand knowledge other than a
193
document provided that showed the schematic of the
ship, a silhouette, and so forth.
Q Now you had almost 72 hours to complete your
preliminary inquiry, is that --
A I actually commenced it 14 hundred on Sunday
and completed it about midnight on Wednesday, so I
had three and-a-half days, if you have long days.
Q In order to accomplish this tasking, you had to
rely on a variety of people to provide you multitudes
of information; is that correct?
A Absolutely.
Q You didn't have time to directly supervise the
work of these participants, could you?
A No.
LCDR STONE: Could I take a minute,
sir, I am getting a note that Lieutenant Harrison may
be called a witness, so may I ask that he leave.
VADM NATHMAN: Lieutenant Harrison,
would you leave the courtroom, please?
CAPT MACDONALD: Let the record
reflect that Commander Harrison has left the room.
BY LCDR STONE:
Q You did not have the time to directly
supervise the work of the participants, did you,
sir?
194
A No, I did not. For the most part, I did not.
There were some brief periods where I was able to
give direct items to them in small numbers for a few
of the cases, but generally, I did not supervise them
directly is accurate.
Q Now your preliminary does contain 39
enclosures, correct?
A Yes.
Q And there were other documents that you
actually looked at that didn't become a part of your
enclosures?
A Yes.
Q Now, because of your deadline, I think you've
stated that you would have liked to be more thorough
but you just didn't have time; that is an accurate
statement?
A That is certainly accurate.
Q And you would agree of course that the
preliminary inquiry is by no stretch of the
imagination complete -- a completed investigation?
A It absolutely is not.
Q Would you also agree with me, then, that the
accuracy of the investigation is contingent on the
accuracy of the work of the people you assigned?
A To some degree, but not completely.
195
Q With respect to crew interviews and
interrogations of the parties, you relied on LCDR
Harrison and Capt Bias to summarize their impressions
of crew interviews, did you not?
A Except the ones I interviewed, yes.
Q Now you interviewed about eight, and that left
16 or are 17 people that they interviewed?
A That sounds about right.
Q Now, you would agree with me that there are a
number of reasons that may play into whether or not
these summaries are accurate, would you not?
A We made every effort to try to maintain them or
to achieve accurate summaries, but obviously there
are potentials for errors that would detract from
their accuracy.
Q Well, Capt Bias and LCDR Harrison did not
record these interviews, did they?
A No.
Q And SUBPAC and the government does have tape
recorders, do they not?
A Well, we had the option of recording, but we
chose not to on legal advice.
Q Was that LCDR Harrison's advice?
A Yes, it was.
Q Well, yes, sir. If they were potentially not
196
effective note-takers, this could impact it, is that
not right, sir?
A Humans were doing this interview process and
then recreating it on paper. And all the frailties
of humans come into play here for potential errors.
Q And isn't it also true, though, sir, that if
they may have not captured everything in the proper
context or perspective?
A Well, we tried to avoid that potential to the
degree we could by having both LCDR Harrison and
Commodore Bias reach a consensus because they were
both present and then they tried to get the document
edited by the interviewee for accuracy, and they
would make corrections that the interviewee wanted to
make to the degree that time afforded us the option
of allowing the interviewee doing, that except
perhaps the parties did not have a chance to do that
for reasons of -- um -- legal protections.
Q Yes, sir. Now, isn't it also true, sir, that
LCDR Harrison and Commodore Bias did not type most if
not all of the statements themselves -- they were
passed over to a yeoman?
A One or two, I think, were typed by Commodore
Bias. And the others were all eventually typed by a
yeoman.
197
Q Now, isn't it also true that maybe a person's
inability to communicate might impact the accuracy of
this summarized record of what they may have said?
A How do you mean -- "inability to communicate?"
Q Just for whatever reason, can't get across what
they're trying to say.
A Well, that's possible, certainly.
Of course that's why we had them read it
afterwards and edit it, for those that were not
parties or for those who allowed us to.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel, do you have
someone particularly in mind? I am interested when
you ask that question. Is that a general
question or are you going to ask him specific
questions about individuals?
LCDR STONE: I am setting up for a
later argument down the road.
VADM NATHMAN: Okay.
Q (By LCDR Stone) Now, personal biases may fit
into the accurate taking of a statement, isn't that
true?
A Yes.
Q And again, you stated that you had never
interrogated any of the parties?
A That's correct.
198
Q You also never reviewed Commodore Bias and LCDR
Harrison's handwritten notes that they took; is that
correct?
A That's correct. I did not review their
handwritten notes. There may be -- no, there are no
exceptions to that. I did not review handwritten
notes.
Q Now, it is then possible that some of the
information that was passed from LCDR Pfeifer to
these individuals may not have been written down; is
that true?
A Yes.
Q And would you agree with me then that as far
as your preliminary inquiry goes, the accuracy of --
I believe it's enclosures 2 through roughly 24 -- the
personal statements -- are entirely contingent upon
the accuracy of the work of LCDR Harrison and
Commodore Bias, absent the ones you did yourself,
sir?
A And additionally, the administrative
assistant. So yes, I would agree.
Q Now, with regards, sir, to your preliminary
inquiry, you only really find one finding of fact
with regards to the executive officer, and that is
Fact Number 10(d). It basically states, "The XO
199
recognized inaccuracies in some of the key
prerequisite evolutions and then chose not to make
the CO aware." Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Now, would you agree with me that this fact is
premised primarily on two concepts -- the executive
officer knowing of the problems and then also failing
to communicate them?
A Yes.
Q Now, sir, the logical conclusion with regards
to the taking of these statements or results of
interview would be that if the results of this
interrogation were misinterpreted or otherwise
flawed, then the finding that you had based may also
be inaccurate.
A Obviously, that is possible.
Q And I think you stated once, sir, that LCDR
Pfeifer never actually did review his statement?
A I don't believe he did.
I could be in error, but I don't think he did.
Because I think by the time we had it ready for him
for review, we were in a position where we had to
afford him Article 31(b) rights.
Q Do you have Enclosure 3 with you, do you have
the Preliminary Inquiry?
200
A I probably can get it here.
Q Sir, I would like to direct your attention to
Enclosure 3 which is LCDR Pfeifer's statement.
A I'm there.
Q Now, on Monday, sir, I believe that you
testified that at 13:06, the XO went to the
commanding officer and reminded him about Papa Hotel
time, and the CO responded, he had it under control."
Do you remember that?
A I remember making a statement. I didn't
remember the time.
Q If you were to look at the first paragraph of
that statement, I think -- I just need to correct
here -- I think you were referring to the time when
the executive officer approached the commanding
officer at 13:26.
And the response was, "He had it under
control."
A I could -- I agree, that's what this says.
Q Also, sir, within that paragraph, there are two
other times when the executive officer communicated
about a late lunch to the commanding officer, that
would be right after lunch had ended, and then at
13:06, is that also true?
A Um -- based on the statement that I am reading,
201
I can see that it was true at time 13:06 based upon
the statement at 13:06. "XO went to CO and told him
54 minutes to Papa Hotel, we need to get going.
The earlier ended lunch portion does not really
say that. It says that he told the CO that the MS
had prepped the ship, and they were ready for angles,
but it doesn't imply anything about being late, and
so forth.
Q But at least within that first paragraph the
executive officer did mention that he had talked to
and communicated with the CO about the ship's
schedule three times prior to commencement of angles
and dangles?
A Correct.
Q Sir, I would also like to request of you, are
you aware that the original notes from LCDR Harrison
and Commodore Bias actually report instead of saying
the "CO responded he had it under control" one of
those individuals actually says that the quote was,
"I know what I'm doing."
Are you aware of that change or that
difference?
A No, I am not.
Q Are you also aware, sir, that the phrase, "XO
thinks that that is very aggressive" is actually a
202
note written in the notes of one of the persons, and
the executive officer never actually said that?
A I was not aware that the executive officer did
not actually say that. I wonder why the note-taker
would have annotated that, though, if the XO had not
given the note-taker that impression in some way.
Q Are you aware, sir, that one of the notes
contains the statement, "XO may not have been looking
at sonar prior to the 120 leg."
It's not necessarily in this result at all.
A I am not aware of anything that is in the
written notes that isn't in this statement because
this statement is what I based my deliberations on.
Q Sir, this here is the 120 leg, correct?
A Correct.
Q Okay, and do you think it would have been
important to put in that statement that if the
executive officer would have gotten to sonar or was
not looking prior to this leg, do you think that
would have been important, prior to the 120 leg?
A Yes, it's -- if he wasn't in sonar, and if he
also wasn't previously looking at fire control to see
that bearing rate, which you know you can kind of
tell in different ways from both locations, then he
wouldn't know it existed.
203
Q So you would say so that that omission by
Commodore Bias and LCDR Harrison could have been
critical in your decisions to refer LCDR Pfeifer to
this court of inquiry?
A Oh, absolutely not, I wouldn't say that.
Because, if I can elaborate --
Q Yes, sir.
A The XO's statement here talks about looking at
screens, very hard to tell if there was anyone close,
difficult due to maneuvers, ship was turning and so
forth, very quick to go to PD.
Q And had OD did not really feel comfortable with
contacts. There were, to what I can see here, a
feeling on the part of the XO that things were being
hurried, and that's what I take out of that
paragraph.
Q Only if that, sir, would be an accurate
recollection of what may have been said.
A True.
Q And if this statement is not an accurate
reflection, then you would not have referred LCDR
Pfeifer?
A If it's not accurate, I would like to reassess
my views based on whatever is more accurate.
Q Well, since you had the preliminary, I think
204
that's what the court will be doing though.
A Right. Obviously, I want to make a judgment
based on the most accurate information available and
I thought this was it.
Q Now I would like to turn your attention to the
bottom of the second paragraph where it says, "XO and
OOD did not really feel comfortable with the
contacts." I think you had just actually repeated
that.
Are you aware, sir, that this statement was
only represented in one of the people's notes, it was
not represented in the other one's?
You are not aware of that, are you, sir?
A No, but I'm not surprised by that.
I mean, you can imagine two people taking
notes, particularly one a layman in the field of
submarining, and one a commodore, would have
different perspectives and would be recording
different things based on what they heard because
they can't record everything with a pencil.
Q Certainly, sir, but if you would turn to
Enclosure 4, which is the officer of the deck's
statement, for results of unwarned interrogation, I
don't think you will find anywhere, sir, where there
is any communication between the executive officer
205
and the OOD regarding contact picture.
A That appears to be the case.
Q Wouldn't that then lend you to the conclusion
that this might have been another note or something
put in by that individual as speculation?
A Um -- I think in general, I should make clear
at this point that I trusted the integrity and the
deliberateness and the professionalism of both
Lieutenant Commander Harrison and Commodore Bias to
be, to the best of their ability, accurate in their
written renditions of the interviews.
And to the degree that there may be disparities
between their two written accounts, I do not
attribute that to malice aforethought. I attribute
that to human processes at work and different
perspectives from a lawyer and a seasoned line
submariner.
So -- but I do expect that Commodore Bias in
conforming the statement that I got would have taken
those differences into account, and not tried to
mislead me with the end result.
And so, I trusted those individuals were
diligent and professional.
Q Certainly, sir.
Now, I'd like to turn your attention, sir, to
206
what would be the fourth paragraph, where this says,
hoped for chance to broach. I think it's the fourth
line down.
A I see it.
Q Okay. Now, you are also not aware, then, that
on one of the statements or one of the notes of this
-- one of those says, XO wanted -- XO broached 50
feet or something -- that could be a substantial
difference in the meaning of -- besides XO wanted the
broached (inaudible) does it not?
A No, I see it identical. Fifty feet is
synonymous with broach. That is the depth it leaves
the water.
Q What does the words "or something else" mean,
sir? Doesn't it denote that it could be something
less than broached?
A Well, if you are trying to do something
similar to the sail leaving the water, less than that
is I guess one subset of the range of possibilities
in the universe you you are implying, but it's not
what I would lead to be -- it's not what I would
assume the speaker was trying to achieve.
"Broached" to me or fifty feet, or something,
means as high as you can get, and/or something would
imply to me, or as high as you can get. It could
207
even be more shallow than fifty feet.
Q Or something less, as well, isn't that true,
sir?
A Yes. Technically.
Q And could it also be that maybe this just
should have been put in the results for you to
consider -- it's kind of hard to have you go back in
hindsight, isn't that true?
A Again, I want to state the Commodore and
Commander Harrison were under no illusion of the
importance of these written statements, and I trust
their judgment on how they ensured that these met to
the best of their ability what they thought they
heard the speaker say.
And the only way to truly find out what the
speaker said is to get testimony from the XO.
And I would suggest that that would be a
wonderful thing to have, to get at what really
happened.
But I trust, absent that type of definitive
correction, that Commodore Bias gave me a good
product.
Q I would also like to call your attention to,
sir, the very next part, where it says, "Very short
time when CO ordered emergency deep."
208
Now, a couple of times in the last couple of
days you stated that the CO called an emergency deep
for training. Do you remember that, sir?
A Yes, I remembered saying that it was an
emergency deep for training, because they didn't have
a collision they were avoiding there at that point,
which would be the reason to do it if it wasn't for
training.
Q But isn't it true that throughout the course of
your entire investigation the only place where it
says the exact words that were said -- emergency deep
for training -- are in the commanding officer's
unsworn or unwarned interrogation?
A I think we may have a failure to communicate
here.
An emergency deep is what would have been
stated. And that would have been the command that
the crew would all execute to. The fact that it was
for training is a parenthetical addition by me, and
that means they weren't avoiding a collision at that
moment in time.
Q That's what I wanted to get at sir.
A Okay.
Q Thank you. Now, if someone calls emergency
deep in a submarine, emergency deep is a -- well, you
209
testified that emergency deep, people begin their
automatic actions; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Emergency deep as casualty procedure, is it
not?
A Yes.
Q And you would expect at the time someone calls
emergency deep, that they react. Is that right?
A One would hope. And the crew should, you know,
consider it as real until told otherwise.
So they don't know it's for training and they
should execute it as if there is about to be a
collision until they are told this is for training on
the way down.
Q Now, if you were an executive officer and you
heard this, would you then -- you are somewhere right
near the control room and you heard the term
emergency deep, wouldn't you also immediately turn
your attention to the control room?
A Yes.
Q And you would watch and make sure that all of
the watchstanders were following their required steps
in terms of emergency deep?
A Absolutely.
Q Sir, would you please look at the absolute next
210
sentence, where it says, XO's attention was now in
the control room.
A I see it.
Q That conforms to what you are stating, does it
not?
A That's right. He's doing exactly what I would
expect him to do.
Q So this XO's attention was now in the control
room should not in any way be --
A -- That's a good thing.
Q And isn't it an idea of forceful backup that
you talked about yesterday -- he's backing up the
command to make sure that they are doing the actions
that they need to do.
A Absolutely.
Q Now, you also testified yesterday, sir, that
one of the -- that when you do an emergency deep, and
then the emergency blow, that one of the things that
you want to do is you want to get down and right back
up before the contact picture changes, is that
correct?
A Yes, that's correct.
Q Sir, could you then look at the next sentence,
and what does that say?
A It says, XO remembered thinking, we need to get
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right backup.
Q Isn't that also consistent with what you
testified to, sir?
A Yes. So I think he's thinking very clearly at
that point and doing the right thing.
Q And isn't that also an example of forceful
backup? That if these distinguished visitors who are
now being put into the chairs to pull the handles or
to sound a horn -- if they get in the way, and they
delay this emergency blow, this submarine could have
a problem, correct?
A Yes.
Q I mean, aside from the tragedy?
A Yes, yes.
Q So it's then important for people in the
control room to be making sure that these evolutions
take place?
A Yes.
Q And so by saying this, isn't this another
example of the forceful backup that you said the
executive officer may have lacked?
A Yes, of course when I say he may have lacked
it, I wasn't talking about this portion of the
evolution I was talking in very specific terms on
different aspects of the evolution.
212
Q And that was in part the TMA lag, the 120
right? Is that right, sir?
A The TMA period. Not just the 340 leg.
Q Which we've stated that he's at least told them
that he wasn't there for, correct? The 340 leg?
A Let me stop you here.
I think you're developing a misconception.
He may not have seen the bearing rate generated
from that short leg, but he knew it was a short leg
and probably not a good leg.
So he knew that with regard to the legs, that
you do want to have before you go to PD. He had a
very good -- an awareness of what had not happened
yet, regardless of the bearing rate or not being
discovered.
So there is the bearing rate issue, but then
there is a broader issue of, okay, what kind of TMA
do we get credit to the ship for having conducted in
here, and he was aware of that because he can
interpret the screen displays to know when the ship
was turned and so forth.
So I was referring in general to the execution
of that TMA, and the manner in which the ship did the
searches at periscope depth when I talked about the
forceful backup criticism of the exec, and not any of
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the other evolutions, which I think he probably did
very well on.
Q With regards, sir, to the forceful backup at
periscope depth, didn't you just testify that the
minute somebody called an emergency deep that you are
to react?
A Yes, I did.
Q And isn't it also true that you do not override
a person that calls emergency deep on the scope?
A Yes, and I know where you're going, and you
make a good point, that once the CO said emergency
deep, it's nigh impossible for the XO to say you
didn't really mean that, captain, we need to look
longer and more shallow and so forth. His
opportunity and his job was prior to that emergency
deep. It was an opportunity that was there, though.
Perhaps he didn't anticipate the moment the emergency
deep command would come out, and that is a handicap
he was suffering under in not anticipating that, and
I agree with that.
Nevertheless, there was a finite period he
could have influenced how the ship was operated
before the emergency deep was announced, but you make
a good point, he couldn't necessarily anticipate when
-
the CO would say that, and therefore, maybe his plans
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to say something about the depth were precluded by
that, coming sooner than he expected.
Q And that's assuming that the executive officer
is focused on the control room and watching the
commanding officer conduct periscope operations,
correct, sir?
A Yes.
Q And isn't it true in his statement that his
attention didn't go into the control room until after
the emergency deep was called?
A Well, I -- I have to disagree with you there.
The statement leads me to believe by this point
he was either in control or looking through the sonar
door in the control, because he's observing the
manner in which the periscope is being operated
first-hand so he's looking in control.
When he makes the statement his attention was
now in control room, I think that's where he's saying
"exclusively" as opposed to sharing his attention
between sonar and control.
Q Okay, so you would agree then that at least as
far as from the time the emergency deep is called --
at least what we can kind of glean out of this --
A Mm-hmm.
Q -- from the time the emergency deep is called
215
through that, he's doing what he needs to be doing --
the forceful backup -- everything that a good
executive officer -- he's right on the money?
A Right, absolutely.
A Now, may I just add, though.
Q Yes, sir.
A He knows how long they were at PD. He knows
what their depth was. They are on their way down.
They haven't done the emergency blow yet. Another
opportunity has just arisen for him to quietly tell
the CO, how do you feel about the things, are you
really sure we got a good look?
So he knows the TMA by this point, that is past
tense, and there is an opportunity while going down a
few minutes. So just to make the point, the world
didn't stop **
Q But with regards to the periscope search, you
said the XO was roughly in this area.
Isn't it true, though, that there were other
officers here right next to the scope, and the chief
of staff of SUBPAC was in this area here in equal
distance -- actually, even closer to the Number 2
scope which was being used?
A I would say approximately the same distance,
yes.
216
Q And they didn't choose to stop the commanding
officer for this look either, did they?
A No. Now, the response regarding the TMA legs
on the executive officer's -- on the second page is
written course on 120 was probably long enough if we
had a good first leg.
Are you aware that in the notes the other
person wrote, if the first leg was good, then XO
thinks the second leg was good.
Does that tend to change the meaning of the
XO's knowledge, with regard to the 340 leg to you?
A No. I think they both mean about the same to
me, and that is the 120 leg was a good leg, taken in
isolation, and would have been sufficient if the
earlier leg was also a good leg to make a better
judgment than -- than was made.
So I -- you know, but again, even though he
wasn't observing that first leg, he knows the
duration of it and the dynamic nature of it from
looking at the display, you know, that's not
information that he couldn't tell at a glance.
He could, even after the fact.
Q Sir, I have one more question with regards to
statements and taking statements.
Are you aware, sir, that within your
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investigation, the enclosures that were submitted --
that two of these statements are the uncorrected
copies of individuals that were given the opportunity
to correct them -- they corrected them, but then
those documents were not provided to you for
enclosure into the final document -- the final
document?
A That's -- I certainly would believe that's
possible with the pace we were working, which
individuals are you talking about?
A One of them, sir, that I know is petty officer
Reyes, sir., the alternate sonar individual that --
A First class man qualified?
Q Yes.
(Session 7 concluded at 3:40 p.m.)
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