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FOURTH SESSION MARCH 7, 2001 10:10 a.m.
BY MR. GITTINS:
Q And you just answered my next question, was it
reasonable not to repair the "as do" while underway on the 9th
of February?
A Yes.
Q Sir, the policy memo, you discussed the role of the
Chief of Staff on board the Greeneville, and you talked about
policy memorandum, I think it was postured in one of the
members questions that may or may not have been followed on 9
February when Captain Brandhubber embarked on the Greeneville.
Do you recall your testimony about that?
A I recall the Court brought that policy memo up, and I
responded to questions on it.
Q Yes, sir.
On 9 February, sir, are you aware that Admiral
(inaudible) was in Japan and the Chief of Staff would be the
acting commander submarine force Pacific?
A Yes.
Q That would have changed his role on board the
Greeneville, would it not, sir?
A Instead of being the Chief of Staff he was the acting
force commander, in other words.
Q And an acting force commander is an officer who is
eligible in command and who in fact is in command, do you
remember that, sir?
A Yes.
Q Under those circumstances, on 9 February, Captain
Brandhubber was then the senior officer present pursuant to
the United States Navy regulations, correct?
A For submarines, I believe he was. But I'm not sure -- I
think the question needs to be more fully evaluated in terms
of the Pearl Harbor area for SOPA. That's generally an area
connotation, not just on a single vessel. And so when the
vessel Greeneville is in local operations, I don't think the
general Pearl Harbor region would consider Brandhubber SOPA.
Q He would have been the senior officer present though,
correct?
A Yes, on the Greeneville that's the case.
Q Okay.
A My guess is that SOPA translated between the Admiral
Conway -- to Admiral Conway from Admiral Konetzni when Admiral
Konetzni went on travel. But I'm not sure of that.
Q Yes, sir.
As the senior officer present, Captain Brandhubber would
have a duty to monitor the safe operation of the vessel,
correct, sir?
A Certainly.
Q To your knowledge Captain Brandhubber never raised any
issue of safety during the course of this operation, correct?
A Prior to the collision that's correct. After the
collision he was worried about the sar and involved in helping
the ship and that, so safety is part of that and --
Q Yes, sir. My focus is -- as was your direct testimony
on the point to the collision, up to the collision, sir, --
A Correct.
Q Reframing the question to from the time he walked to the
point of the collision would be Ehime-Maru, to your knowledge
Captain Brandhubber raised no issues of safe operation of the
vessel with the Captain or any other member of the boat, is
that correct?
A That's correct. As far as I know he did not. And based
on my interviews with him he never felt that a safety problem
had arisen that he needed to interact with Commander Waddle
before the collision.
Q In fact, in your interviews Captain Brandhubber
indicated he was impressed with the professionalism of the
crew and the way they operated the vessel, correct?
A That's correct.
Q They appeared to have done this before?
A That's correct. I heard that statement from Captain
Brandhubber and others in the crew, that this seemed to be
going as before.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, you indicated during your testimony yesterday that
there was some longkeeping weaknesses on board the
Greeneville?
A Yes.
Q You indicated that there was no acoustic work tape
maintained in the sonar room?
A Yes. I don't know if it was maintained and then later
destroyed or not -- or inadvertently lost. It was not able to
be provided to me, and through our interview process the ship
said that it did not have one.
Q Yes, sir.
The acoustic work tape is a system that is more -- is
usually used for mission related events, correct, sir?
A Well, when you say usually, you mean is that the fleet's
practice?
Q Let me rephrase the question, sir.
The purpose of that acoustic work tape is not -- is
generally for identifying contacts and reconstructing what
sonar observed in a particular situation, is that accurate,
sir?
A That's probably its most important purpose, but not its
only one.
Q Yes, sir.
A For example, the ship may have a transient that's
created by ownership, and you would use this work tape to go
back and try and analyze what caused that transient and how
you can eliminate it so you're not a noisy submarine. So
there are ownership and other contact reasons why you would
always want to operate that tape at sea.
Q Yes, sir.
The non operation of the acoustic work tape had no
impact on this collision, did it, sir?
A That's correct. I think in general I can make a broader
statement than that, that the data collection problems and
challenges I faced, none of them were a cause for this
collision. It just made my ability to reconstruct afterwards
more difficult.
Q Yes, sir. But the day -- that was the point I was
getting at. (Inaudible) you observed cause (inaudible)... you
some difficulties in reconstruct, it did not have any impact
on whether this collision occurred in the first instance, did
it?
A With one exception, the contact evaluations plot is a
good tactical device for the Officer of the Deck and others to
use to manage the contact picture and avoid collision, and
that -- the real useful information on that plot for the last
hour before the collision would have been a contributor to a
ship eventually getting into a collision that it would want to
avoid, but otherwise the answer is yes.
Q The fire control technician of the watch is the
individual who's responsible for maintaining that contact
evaluation plot, sir?
A That's correct. Directly.
Q And you did as part of your evidence gathering process
obtain the CEP, correct, sir?
A Yes.
Q And that plot shows the plot of the own vessel, correct,
sir?
A Correct.
Q So, the CEP was being maintained at least with respect
to the own vessel changes in course, correct, sir?
A Yes. There was some information on the CEP. It was not
a zero piece of -- a blank piece of paper. The quality of the
information on the CEP and the amount of information was the
area of criticism.
Q Yes, sir. The fact that the sonar contacts in specific
were not?
A Yes.
Q Sir, --
CAPT. MACDONALD: This is actually already part
of enclosure one. We'll mark all of these Court exhibit next
in order. We don't have to separate between different kinds
of exhibits. If you want this marked, Mr. Gittins, we'll mark
this next order.
THE CLERK: Court Exhibit 21.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Thank you.
THE CLERK: Can I ask you what this is?
MR. GITTINS: CEP.
Q Sir, I'm going to hand you what's now been marked
investigative Exhibit 21. Court Exhibit 21. Ask you to have
a look at it and tell me what it appears to be.
A It appears to be is the CEP plot, an excerpt.
VADM. NATHMAN: Admiral, this is an important
point for Mr. Gittins and CDR Waddle -- let's just get the
microphones squared away. I think there's some confusion
behind you. When we take a break, bailiff, make sure the
mikes are working right, okay? I apologize. Go ahead.
MR. GITTINS: No problem, sir.
Q That appears to be a copy of the CEP from the USS
Greeneville on 9 February (inaudible)?
A It appears to be a copy of the CEP plot from the 9th of
February, correct.
Q And the -- it does indicate that the ship's movements
are plotted through the point of collision, correct, sir? Or
at least very near in time to the collision.
A Bear with me while I study it in some detail.
Q Yes, sir.
A You can see the horizon. There we go. Here's my
problem in looking at the data. The hour in question, I
believe, is this general area where we don't have the data
plotted. We have kind of a -- in other words, there is data
on here, but from the last hour leading up to the collision I
don't see the contact data on here.
Q Right, sir. I'm talking about the ship's data is on --
A Oh, I'm sorry. I've been looking diligently to find the
contacts on here for that last hour. I didn't think they were
there and I still don't see 'em, but certainly the ship's --
the ship's course is on here.
Q I wasn't trying to --
A Okay.
And again I just want to emphasize the plot was being
maintained, but the amount of time put into maintaining it
appears to have not been adequate to keep the continuous
contact picture on there for that hour before the collision.
Q Yes, sir.
A In fact, I have testimony from the FT of the watch that
he gave up at some point maintaining it, because of the number
of people in control.
Q Yes, sir. But it appears that he wasn't able to get to
the plot to plot ownership position for that -- some period of
time, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Sir, what is slogger?
A Slogger is the term used for the automatic digital
recording system of the sonar and fire control on the busy 1
ARCI phase two system that the Greeneville has.
Q The use that was made of slogger in this case, would it
be fair to say that it was like, not exactly like, but similar
to the use made of an aircraft's black box after an aircraft
accident?
A That is sort of the sense of how we used it after this
accident, yes.
Q It provided data points from which you could reconstruct
the accident in some ways, correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q So, in addition to the CEP plot, with the ownership's
data on it, there was also an electronic system that served as
a back up that you were able to use to reconstruct its
movements and contact data, correct, sir?
A Yes, that's correct.
Q To maintain the CEP ownership's plot, the fire
technician of the watch would have had to maneuver himself
from his console to the front of the control room presumably
through the distinguished visitors that you described and
their positions earlier in your testimony, correct, sir?
A Yes, that's correct.
Of course there were alternatives if other people were
to maintain that plot. And, as I mentioned in my testimony
earlier, the ship has the option of stationing additional
watchstanders in order to meet their requirements when the
pace of events or other situations such as the location of
people in control prevent the normal manner of accomplishing
it.
Q Yes, sir.
Well, during the course of your investigation, sir, did
you ascertain why, if the fire technician of the watch was
able to plot ownership's position he did not plot sonar
contact data?
A I think that he felt the pace of events had increased,
plus the people that were between him and the plot had
increased in number to the point where he was not able to do
that when he looked at the other things that he had also to
do. So, I think the FT of the watch made a judgment that he
was going to shut that duty to do higher priority missions in
that period of time.
Q Those higher priority missions would have included
classifying and obtaining solutions for sonar targets;
correct, sir?
A Correct. And I agree, that's a high priority mission.
Q Would you agree that to the extent that the fire
technician officer -- of the watch did not maintain the CEP
but was engaged in working solutions for contacts, that that
was an appropriate use of his time?
A Focusing on that one individual alone, yes. But I
hasten to add, the Officer of the Deck is required to make
sure that plot is maintained. It has a tactical value to him
and to the Captain, and the standard isn't just maintain it
when it's convenient for the FT of the watch to do so. The
standard is maintain it.
And so you add in resources as needed to keep the
standard met is the expectation I would have.
Q Yes, sir.
The information that is displayed on that CEP with
respect to contacts is also available to the Officer of the
Deck and the Commanding Officer by looking at the fire control
panels on the starboard side of the vessel; correct, sir?
A Yes. In general the same basic information perhaps in a
different format of display is available by using fire
control.
Q Given the experience of the Officer of the Deck and the
Commanding Officer, the format of the presentation of data
would not have been an impediment to those officers
understanding what was presented; correct, sir?
A I think that's a reasonable assessment.
Can I add something here?
Q Certainly, sir.
A Some of the submarines in the fleet have the new version
of the CEP plot, which is electronic and computer-aided, and
much more user friendly than the paper CEP plots we've been
laboring under all these years and the Greeneville still has.
And the fleet's experience that has the advantage of
this new electronic version is it's extremely valuable as an
additional display augmenting the displays on fire control.
So I think the submarine force as a whole is looking ahead and
investing in technology to make the plot more user friendly,
to take less of the fire control time up, fire control
technician's time up, but still is a value to the ship of a
safety and tactical mission.
So, we're looking at a plot that's being overtaken by
IT technology and upgraded to be easier to use and less time
consuming to use.
Nevertheless, the point I'm trying to make is there's an
enduring value to this device of displaying the contact
information in the CEP format.
Q Sir, contacts must be reported to the Officer of the
Deck via the 27M C by sonar watch; correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q And the management of those contacts is the primary duty
of the fire technician -- fire control technician of the
watch; correct, sir?
A Let me make sure I understand what you mean by
management. The --
Q I'll define it for you, sir.
A Okay.
Q When I say management, I mean taking the sonar data that
is obtained and obtaining a solution for range and bearing to
the ship. To the Greeneville.
A Range bearing course and speed, that's right.
Q Yes, sir.
A Yes, that's true.
Q That is the primary duty the FTOW, correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q And it would be a reasonable thing for the FTOW to not
maintain that plot while he was working solutions for
contacts, would you agree with that, sir? In managing his
time.
A The CEP paper plot is very distracting to the FT of the
watch's manipulation of the electronic fire control system,
and many ships have found it necessary when contact management
is particularly important, such as going to periscope depth to
augment the person who maintains that CEP plot to be a
different person so that the standards are met while you're
not distracting the FT of the watch from efficient
manipulation of the electronic fire control system.
Q Yes, sir.
But as you previously testified, two or three contacts
would not be considered to be a difficult workload for the
normal run of the mil FT 1 qualified fire technician of the
watch, would you agree with that, sir?
A I would agree that two or three contacts should be able
to be manipulated on the fire control system, and kept up
adequately on the CEP plot by the FT of the watch, yes.
Q Yes, sir.
The Officer of the Deck and the Commanding Officer, if
he's in the control room would be aware of contacts reported
because of the announcement over the 27MC; correct, sir?
A Absolutely. I think in general it's fair to say the
Officer of the Deck and the Captain in control would be fully
aware of the sonar contacts and their parameters by frequent
looking at the fire control system and listening to the sonar
reports, and if they're using that as well.
Q During the course of your investigation you did not from
any source determine that the Commanding Officer or the
Officer of the Deck failed to review the contact picture as it
was displayed on the fire control panels; correct, sir?
A I don't know how to answer that because I wasn't able to
interview those people, and the existing interviews did not
fully elaborate in that area.
So, that would be grounds for the Court to consider
under further testimony.
Q That would be a reason to have benefit of the testimony
of the Commanding Officer, the XO and the Officer of the Deck?
A That would be one of many reasons.
Q Yes, sir.
I'm going to come back to the contact picture a little
bit later on, sir. I just wanted to jump in there a little
bit because you talked about it in a several places in your
testimony.
Right now I'd like to turn to the training of the
vessel, and the issue of what training was conducted or might
have been conducted while Greeneville was at sea with DVs
embarked.
During the course of your interviews of ship's
witnesses, sir, and review of those interviews that you did
not conduct, did you determine that approximately 20 members
of the crew went with the sonar and weapons chiefs and the
weapons officer for training at the attack trainer on the 9th
of February?
A No, I did not. I had no investigation into why anybody
was left in.
Q Would you agree that it would be appropriate training
for members of the crew to be taken to the attack trainer
under the supervision of the sonar and weapons chiefs and
weapons officer for training, even if the ship is at sea?
A Taken out of context that could be very reasonable.
Q Well, in the context of this case there was no
overriding mission requirement for the uh USS Greeneville on
the 9th of February, correct, sir?
A There was -- would you repeat the question?
Q On the 9th of February, other than embarking
distinguished visitors and taking them for a demonstration of
the capabilities of the Greeneville, there was no other
mission that would have required a full crew compliment; would
you agree with that, sir?
A Yes. I think it would have been reasonable to leave
crew members in for training, as well as liberty.
Q Yes, sir.
Well, -- liberty would be appropriate, but it would be
even more appropriate and beneficial to the Navy and the crew
to conduct training at the attack trainer; would you agree
with that, sir?
A I -- I think that's a very reasonable thing to do. My
only caution is that those that do go to sea need to be as
efficient flavors and numbers to fully man the watch bill.
Q Yes, sir. And one of the -- one of the judgments that
is reposed in a Commanding Officer of a nuclear submarine is
making those decisions about who would be appropriate to leave
for training and who would be appropriate to take to sea on
any given evolution; would you agree with that, sir?
A Certainly.
Q You testified earlier that even with the members of the
crew who were missing; it was your opinion based on your
investigation that Commander Waddle took a highly qualified
crew to sea on the 9th of February, 2001; correct, sir?
A Absolutely.
Q Did you at any -- during the course of your
investigation, sir, determine whether or not PQS qualification
cards were signed off during the course of this evolution with
distinguished visitors?
A I did not look in that area. I didn't have time, and I
don't know the answer.
Q Would you agree that that would be a valid training --
that would provide valid training to have sailors PQS cards
signed off during the course of this DV embarkation?
A I'm a proponent of using every underway for training and
qualification. I'm sure the Greeneville is adhering to that.
I think that's always going to be a subsidiary reason to go to
sea on a ship, so their primary mission that day was embarking
visitors, but I think they got value out of the training
qualification opportunity and going to sea for their crew. I
grant you that.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, in your discussion about the training of the
vessel, you indicated that the Greeneville had been in a
maintenance period for some period of time prior to going to
sea.
A Yes. And to be honest, I don't know the direct
sequence. For example, they may have had substantive sea time
after that maintenance and before this underway. I just don't
know. I think the maintenance occurred in the end of the
calendar year, preceding -- the end of 2000 for roughly a two
month period, and in a period called selective restricted
availability and they've gone beyond that maintenance period.
Obviously it had some sea time as you would give a ship at the
end of maintenance period to regain proficiency. This is I'm
not implying the first underway.
Q You're not implying that the 9th of February was its
first underway following a two month maintenance period, is
it?
A Absolutely not. I'm assuming it was not.
Q Yes, sir. Did you know, sir, that on January 4th the
Greeneville left Pearl Harbor -- I'm sorry, January 6th
Greeneville left Pearl Harbor for Alaska to conduct acoustic
trials?
A I didn't know that, and I -- I'm not surprised to know
that.
Q Yes, sir.
Were you aware that after those acoustic trials the
Greeneville moved from the Alaska area to the east -- I'm
sorry, the west coast of the United States for an eastern
Pacific training cruise?
A Vaguely was aware that they had some eastern Pacific
time earlier this calendar year. I didn't pursue that in
interviews, but I heard that in peripheral conversations from
the people working with me in the investigation.
Q Sir, the records indicate that the Greeneville was in
port from 22 to 26 January, that would suggest that the
Greeneville was not in port the other days of the month of
January. Would you consider that to be a substantial period
without at sea time?
A Yes.
Q And would that be the type of at sea time that would
enable you to -- enable accrue to come back up to proficiency?
A Yes.
Q And the operations of the vessel on the 9th of February,
at least with respect to high speed, high angle maneuvers
indicate that the ship was proficient and the crew was
proficient in operating the vessel, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q You interviewed Fire Technician Third Class Brown, sir.
Did Fire Technician Third Class Brown indicate to you that he
was the fire technician of the watch during the lunch break?
A I -- it was either a lunch break or a, quote, smoke
break where he allowed the on-watch Petty Officer to get a
cigarette off watch. It was one of those two reasons that he
assumed the watch briefly.
Q When you interviewed Fire Technician Third Class Brown,
I'm sorry, Fire Control Technician Third Class Brown, did he
inform you that when he relieved the fire technician of the
watch, the OOD told him specifically to provide forceful
reports on contact picture?
A My recollection is that that was provided by an
interview I did not conduct, but was the source -- the source
was either the Officer of the Deck or Petty Officer Brown or
somebody. I remember that statement, though, but I don't
think I personally developed it in an interview. But I do
remember that statement.
Q The OOD making that statement to the oncoming fire
control technician would be an indication of additional
compensation for the as do casualty; would you agree, sir?
A I would give more credit than that from the Officer of
the Deck for making that statement. I would say it would
always be appropriate because it shows an emphasis on concern
for ship's safety, regardless of whether the "as do" is working
or not. I think it's a good type of statement the Officer of
the Deck is making to watchstanders.
Q That would indicate the safety of the ship was a
significant consideration by the OD and possibly the whole
crew, correct?
A I'm sure safety was a significant consideration to the
entire crew. I'm not questioning that.
Q Yes, sir.
During the course of the interviews that were conducted
during your investigation, sir, did you ascertain whether or
not Fire Technician Third Class -- Fire Control Technician
Third Class Brown provided that pass down when he was told by
the OD to his relief following his period on watch?
A I would assume he did, but I do not know personally
whether he did or not. I don't think I developed that in
interview.
Q After a Fire Control Technician Third Class Brown was
relieved by the incident Fire Control Technician, he remained
in the control room area, correct, sir?
A Possibly. I don't remember. Or -- or if I ever knew.
But it is possible.
Q He was one of the people you interviewed and --
A He may have been the individual who then assumed the new
duty of routine correction of charts. If that's my
recollection, there was a person who went to the control and
was conducting chart correction. I may be that I'm
recollecting that was Petty Officer Brown.
Q Correcting charts would not be a normal duty for a Fire
Control Technician, would it, sir?
A No. No.
There was somebody, not on watch, perhaps an off watch
Quarter Master is who I'm thinking of and I may be
inadvertently throwing out a red herring here.
Q Yes, sir.
Your interview would probably reflect better what Fire
Control Technician Third Class Brown told you, would you agree
with that, sir, than your recall at this time?
A Yeah, I don't recall exactly the interview, but
certainly what I transcribed would be accurate to what he told
Q You spent some time discussing distinguished visitor
embarks, sir. Did you ascertain when Greeneville had last
conducted a distinguished visitor embark at sea before 9
February, 2001?
A I don't know when their most recent one was. I know
they did one in the summer of 2000, as I recollect. And there
may have been one more recently than that. I got the
impression that Greeneville is frequently tapped to do this,
when she's available, because she's good at it.
Q On that point, sir, one of the purposes for
distinguished visitor embark is to show off the Navy and
submarines, would you agree with that, sir?
A Yes.
Q And if Greeneville was frequently selected for that
duty, that would suggest that Greeneville had something to
show off; would you agree with that?
A I certainly would.
Q And that would also be indicated by the fact that the
competence of the vessel would also be indicated by the fact
that Admiral Konetzni, prior to 9 February had decided to
whole his change of command on board the USS Greeneville;
would you agree with that, sir?
A No. I would say that he had a lot of confidence in the
competency of Greeneville. The reason he picked the
Greeneville for change of command was probably a little more
incidental to her being available, a modern ship to be a
backdrop. I don't think that when principals pick ships for
change of command to occur it isn't always because they're
elevating that ship to a level of esteem that's made that
choice. You'll have to ask Admiral Konetzni that.
Q Yes, sir. But in your testimony two days ago isn't that
one of the things that you said about the competence of the
Greeneville, it was selected to be the -- the platform, I
think you used the word platform for the change in command for
Admiral Konetzni, Commander Submarine Forces Pacific?
A If I did say that I would like to change that answer,
and I would like to say that first of all you'll need to
really ask Admiral Konetzni why he chose Greeneville, but I
think it's immaterial. I would like to get the point across,
I think Admiral Konetzni thought very highly of Greeneville,
independent of whether they were going to do a change of
command of her.
RADM SULLIVAN: Mr. Gittins, I believe I was the
one during the first day of mentioned the Greeneville
selection as a platform was the change of command. I don't
believe it was Admiral Griffiths. That I mentioned it.
MR. GITTINS: My recollection was that if you
asked the question, sir, he agreed with it. I think that's a
fair characterization of his testimony.
THE WITNESS: I'm trying to say Admiral Konetzni
thought highly of Greeneville.
RADM SULLIVAN: That's what I'm trying to say.
BY MR. GITTINS:
Q You spent a little bit of time, sir, discussing the
submarine test area on the chart. I don't think we need to
pull the chart out. Do you have a recall?
A Yes, I do.
Q Of that little submarine box, test area?
A Yes, I do.
Q You made reference to it as something maybe back from
the '50s. In fact, that was a test area for Thresher class
vessels; were you aware of that, sir?
A No. But I am certainly a believe. I mean, it's -- if
your point is nuclear submarines have also used that area, I'm
not surprised. But I think our emphasize on that type of
approach is diminished now.
Q Yes, sir.
In fact, it's on the chart because it's an area that
allows a submarine to be operated, tested in a place that has
a sandy bottom, that is above crust depth so that the
submarine could be recovered, does that sound like an
appropriate use of that area?
A It does. And, you know, I certainly I am not
comfortable I fully understand why that area was ever created,
I know it's not emphasized in use right now, but that
certainly rings true. That was a general lesson submarine
force took after the loss of the Thresher to choose sea trial
areas wisely so that should she be stricken and go to the
bottom she'd still be intact.
Q Yes, sir. And possibly be able to rescue the crew?
A Right.
Q In that area as well, when you talked about the sea area
in which Greeneville was operating, were you aware that the
Honolulu maritime shipping office has characterized traffic in
the area in which Greeneville was operating as a very height
traffic area?
A That's consistent with the type of information I
obtained from the Coast Guard, although I didn't have it in
that vernacular, but that's very consistent with what I
uncovered.
Q Yes, sir.
Would you agree that commanding officers and crews were
operating submarines in those areas on a day in/day out basis
outside of Pearl Harbor would probably be aware of the likely
shipping that they might encounter in that area?
A Yes, I would.
Q And that would be a -- one of those considerations that
a Commanding Officer would take into consideration when he is
exercising his inherent judgment as a Commanding Officer?
A Absolutely.
As I've stated in testimony, I don't believe that the
area that the ship was operating in, per se, was a contributor
to making the collision more likely. I think it was a
reasonable area to operate in.
Q Yes, sir. Sir, do you know what penguin banks is?
A In general, yes.
Q I'm sorry, penguin bank. What is penguin bank?
A It is a shoaled area, which means it's shallower than
for example the test depth of the submarine to operate in,
that's in the upper right-hand corner, if you look at the
chart of the area assigned to Greeneville, it did intrude into
some of the area and Greeneville needed to operate prudently
to avoid inadvertently going into those shallow areas.
Q From the point of the collision, or from the point where
Greeneville began its left-hand turn, a left-hand turn at the
time Greeneville made it would avoid penguin bank, would you
agree with that?
A I would go farther. I would say that all of her
operations submerged were deliberate to avoid penguin bank.
Q Yes, sir.
In your testimony you indicated that the left-hand turn
the Greeneville made just prior to the collision was to get
back to Pearl Harbor. Is it -- do you think it's also likely
that that left-hand turn may have been made to avoid the
shallow water of penguin bank. That could have been added
beyond reasons than just getting back to Pearl Harbor. I
think she could have turned right as well as left, but perhaps
there was more conservatives in turning left from a safety
standpoint. I would certainly be willing to grant the skipper
that. I didn't know that was a consideration at the time, but
I could see that as a reasonable one now.
Q Yes, sir.
The considerations that as to why Commander Waddle may
have made the decision to turn left rather than right, or to
continue straight ahead would be matters that would be of
benefit to your investigation; would you agree with that, sir?
Or would have been?
A Actually, I was never suspicious of why left and not
right. Obviously left resulted in a collision, but that's
hindsight. The ship didn't think it was in the proximity of
any other vessels, so because of that I was not suspicious of
whether left was a bad decision or not. I looked at that as
an incidental decision influenced by the direction they were
turned towards home port.
In fact, the course was more significant to me than the
turning left versus turning right to get to that course. It
would have been a longer turn to turn right to steady up from
that course, but these ships turn pretty quickly, so I looked
at it as almost an incidental decision in the way I viewed the
investigation. There may be more to it than that, but the
Court can examine the testimony.
Q I believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, the suggestion
was that Commander Waddle may have been in a hurry to get back
to Pearl Harbor, and you suggested that he turned left because
that was the quickest way to get back to Pearl Harbor. Would
you agree that there may have been other reasons why he turned
at that time?
A For of all to answer the second part of that question,
the real question is yes. But I want to elaborate, I was
never critical of his assuming the course ordered 340, I
thought that was a reasonable course, and I thought it was a
reasonable thing to want to get heading back towards Pearl
Harbor. I don't look at that decision as related to the
urgency issue. I look at that as a reasonable decision.
The urgency issue has to do with some of the duration of
the steps preparatory to the emergency blow that allow you to
develop a contact picture.
Q Yes, sir.
A So actually I am not critical at all of the decision to
go to course 340, I think that's what I would probably have
done.
Q With respect to the positions of distinguished visitors
in the control room in the moments, in the time before the
collision, other than your statement, your earlier testimony
that they were passive barriers, that distinguished visitors
in no way contributed to this accident. Would you agree with
that, sir?
A Yes.
Well, let me add one thing, though. They're just one
more factor to the crew, XO on down, to consider when
determining whether to provide advice to the Commanding
Officer in that public forum. And does it make an
infinitesimal amount of difference to the XO for example to
advise the CO of a recommendation, or does it make a large
amount of difference to the XO that the distinguished visitors
are there, I don't know. Maybe there's no difference, maybe
it's some. So they may have had a factor in the decision that
the crew went through routinely on whether they should provide
advice to the Captain.
Q Yes, sir.
A So that might be the other role in play and that's hard
to judge.
Q And because you had not had the opportunity to
personally interview the XO, Officer of the Deck and
Commanding Officer, you were not able to fully explore that
issue; correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q And it would -- would you agree that it would be
beneficial to -- it would have been beneficial to your
investigation, and probably would be beneficial to this
investigation to have the Commanding Officer, Executive
Officers and Officer of the Deck's testimony about those
issues?
A I think that would be very helpful.
Q I want to go back two days now, sir. Although I haven't
covered everything in your testimony yesterday, I'm going to
try to incorporate all of the issues about the contact
management, periscope depth, those issues all at one time so
we don't have to go back and forth, sir.
The Papa hotel time, you indicated that that was a time
when, for administrative purposes, related to the operation of
the harbor, a ship should be at the entrance of the harbor so
the assets of the harbor can be utilized appropriately. Is
that fair?
A Yes.
Q It's not a time written in stone, correct?
A It can be changed through effort, so it is not written
in stone.
Q In -- on the 9th of February, 2001, how many other
vessels were at sea at the time Greeneville was? If you know,
in the local operating area.
A I have honestly no idea.
Q The flexibility of the Papa hotel time would be
dependent in a large measure as to the expected shipping and
traffic at Pearl Harbor on that day, around that time?
A That's a reasonable assessment.
Q If there was no other significant shipping or vessels at
sea, it would have been reasonable for Commander Waddle to
believe he could slide his Papa hotel time to make best use of
his time at sea; would you agree?
A I'm -- not necessarily. Let me answer the way I truly
feel about this.
Q Yes, sir.
A That when you're talking about issues, fundamental to
ship's safety, Papa hotel time is way down in the grass. No
matter how many ships are at sea that day and no matter how
much effort is required to change it. Obviously there may be
a longer delay for the ship if there are a lot of ships at sea
and it's disruptive to find a slot for Greeneville to come in,
but I'm sure the skipper would not be deterred changing it if
he felt he needed to, for safety.
Q I think you answered my next question too, sir. Thank
you.
A I know the skipper and all skippers have an ability to
change their ship's schedule when they need to.
Q Yes, sir.
The conversations about time that you uncovered during
your investigation, the XO bringing to the attention of the
Captain that -- that they weren't going to make Papa hotel
time, that suggested --
A I didn't say they weren't going to make it. I said that
they need to get on with things in order to be able to make
it.
Q Yes, sir.
Well, at the time of the collision could they have made
their Papa hotel time, sir?
A No.
Q So, even if they had surfaced without incident, they
would not have made Papa hotel time?
A That's true.
Q About how much would they have missed it by, sir?
A I'm estimating about 45 minutes. But that's a rough
order of magnitude because that's about how far behind their
schedule they were.
Q Yes, sir. The Commanding Officer's conversation with
the XO indicated that Commanding Officer had it under control,
he wasn't -- that that was not a concern to him. Would you
agree with that, sir?
A I -- you know, it's very hard for me to know what the CO
really meant when he said that. But my -- my true feeling is
that the CO was saying I am aware of the influence of time on
what we're doing with our ship, and I'm not trying to say he
was going to make it all catch up. I think he was just saying
I appreciate the input that we're behind our schedule, and
I'll take that into account with my subsequent actions. And
that's my assessment of what he meant.
Q Okay.
And that's based on the fact that you've not had the
opportunity to question the Captain?
A He could very well have already decided he was going to
come in later and make the subsequent arrangements to come in
later.
On the other hand, I see this kind of hurriedness on
some of these key steps, and so my logical connection to being
generally behind schedule and trying to catch up was my
assumption. Maybe that's not the case and interviews would be
helpful to find out further.
Q Yes, sir. If your assumption is wrong, that that places
the Commanding Officer's action in a different light, doesn't
it?
A Perhaps a less understandable light, because I still
feel some of these steps were abbreviated, and I thought I
understood the reason, and if that reason has gone away then I
understand even less why he would have done that.
Q Yes, sir.
A But yes, it would place them in a new light.
Q Thank you, sir.
And sir, you would agree that because there may be other
considerations it would be beneficial for this inquiry to have
the benefit of the Commanding Officer's testimony, would you
agree?
A As I've said before, yes.
Q Yes, sir.
You indicated that the schedule may have been delayed in
part while they were at sea with the distinguished visitors,
that they got behind schedule?
A Yes.
Q You would agree that the Commanding Officer's personal
touch was important with these DVs?
A I think that was the most important thing of the whole
trip.
Q Yes, sir.
So, not making -- not keeping to a schedule is a less
important consideration than the overall view that the
civilians would have of the operation of the vessel and the
hospitality of the crew and their competence in operating the
vessel, would you agree with that, sir?
A Yes, absolutely.
Q And based on your knowledge of Commander Waddle through
your investigation, do you have a sense of why Commander
Waddle would have been aware that that was the primary goal
for this distinguished visitors embarkation?
A I would have made that assumption before I ever arrived
on the island. I still feel that way. He knows how to
prioritize. That's why he's a Captain. He would never be
where he is if he didn't understand how to prioritize.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, do you know if -- I'm going to start discussing the
reconstruction a little, starting with the Ehime-Maru, sir.
The Ehime-Maru, do you know if it was actually radiating
radar missions?
A The master said that they were radiating at a 12 mile
scale which is their maximum scale on their radar. And this
was in an interview with the master through the NTSB, so
that's how I know it. I know it by no other means. But I
assume the master was very knowledgeable of that issue.
Q Are you aware if the master was on the bridge at the
time?
A I believe he was on the bridge is my understanding, yes,
from his interactions with the NTSB.
Q Are you aware whether or not the Ehime-Maru was -- had
its fish finder operating?
A The master reported it was not operating.
Q Did he say why?
A No.
Q What's the --
A I mean, I'm not aware of whether he said why or not. I
don't know if he said why.
Q I understand.
What would the significance of operating a fish finder
be on detection of an if you are says vessel by a nuclear
submarine of the Greeneville class?
A Well, it's a fedometer, its dual purpose finding fish
and acting to determine the water depth, and its a source of
energy that would aid the Greeneville in detecting the
Ehime-Maru and would also aid in classifying the Ehime-Maru if
it -- the characteristics that are unique to fish finding son
arrest as opposed to generic fedometers, it would aid in
classifying it as a commercial fishing vessel as well as a
surface vessel.
Q Isn't it a fact, sir, that if the Greeneville had
intercepted, I guess would be the word, detected --
A Detected.
Q Detected a fish finder an alarm would go off in the
control room?
A Well, there would be no -- well, actually there might
have been the alarm literally in the -- WLRI system. But even
if the alarm had not gone off, the sonar system and operators
would have reported it as a significant tactical input of
value to the OOD and the CO. So, whether the alarm occurred
or not, I think it would have been an important team event in
the minds of the operators of the ship.
Q Yes, sir.
The FAA radar that you indicated was used in part to
reconstruct the Ehime-Maru's track, that didn't have any time
or bearing data on it, did it?
A I don't have a lot of facts and understanding of how the
FAA radar played into the current status of the reconstructed
track. My general understanding is that it came into the game
after I completed my investigation and tended to confirm our
other sources of data on the last three miles of the track of
the Ehime-Maru.
Q Okay, sir.
A I'm not sure it changed the track, just confirmed it is
my understanding.
Q Use is made to back up the data you have from other
sources?
A That's my understanding. Although further testimony may
bring more clarification in that area.
Q Yes, sir.
With respect to the operation of the USS Greeneville, a
watch bill was -- would have been in the normal course
produced for an at sea evolution, would you agree with that,
sir?
A Yes.
Q That would be pretty much standard throughout the fleet?
A Yes.
Q And that watch bill was not included in your preliminary
inquiry?
A No.
Q Were you aware that the USS Greeneville sent the watch
bill over to Captain buys's office?
A No. I was under the opposite impression, and I didn't
know that. It may be it got lost, but my understanding was
that of all the records that Captain buys had requested from
the ship, that was one that had not been provided. That's my
understanding. It may be an error.
Q Yes, sir.
You --
A I might add, if that exists it would be important for
the Court to know that and to review it in testimony.
Q Yes, sir.
A I was not able to.
Q Understand, sir. And I think we'll provide it to the
Court, at least in the unsigned version. The problem is we've
been unable to locate a signed version after the ship sent it
to Captain buys's office.
A Well, it might -- I just hope that the Court can use its
influence with the staff at the squadron to have them
reinvigorate their search.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, what's a modified piloting party? Does that term
ring a bell?
A Yes, it does. It's a subset of a full piloting party, a
full piloting party adds several resources to the normal watch
bill to provide more assistance in the navigation of the ship
when you're in proximity to shore water or piloting in and out
of port. You modify that but keep some of those resources in
place, such as a fedometer watch and a navigation supervisors
overseeing the Quarter Master of the watch, when you're
operating within a certain distance from shore water.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, this is the key watchstanders Exhibit that you
prepared, or was prepared -- (inaudible) testimony.
A Yes.
Q That does not reflect the manning of a modified piloting
party, does it, sir?
A No, it doesn't.
Q Were you aware that at the time of the collision a
modified piloting party was in use on board the Greeneville?
A Yes, I was.
Q There's no indication there, sir, for a fedometer watch.
Why is that, sir?
A Oversight. Just did not consider that, I guess,
relevant to the contact picture, but it certainly deserves to
be on there for completeness.
Q Do you know for how long they had been at a modified
piloting ---
A I can only hazard it was their entire underway. That's
a guess.
Q Yes. Do you know or are you aware that the fedometer
watch, the person sustaining by the fedometer was a qualified
sonar?
A I would assume that to be the case. That's a
prerequisite to stand out watch.
Q A prerequisite?
A To be qualified on the fedometer which is part of the
qualification in sonars, not radar.
Q Where is the fedometer located in the control room, sir?
A It's located in the generally towards the aft port
corner of control. It's just aft -- it's basically directly
outboard to port of the port plotting table, approximately.
Q Okay.
There was, then, available another qualified sonar
operator on board Greeneville, but he was otherwise occupied
with the prerequisite job of fedometer operator, would that be
fair, sir?
A Yes, sir. And if I can just say. I have not had the
opportunity to fully evaluate all the sonarmen who were on the
Greeneville and whether or not there were any available who
didn't have an additional watch somewhere else to go in and be
the watch on sonar. I don't know the answer to that, and
that's something the Court should examine further.
But, if the fedometer watch was the only other sonar man
on board who could have been the qualified second operator in
control, sonar control, then I would say we didn't have the
right people on board.
Q Yes, sir.
I have some more questions for you about that, sir.
A That's --
Q It would be fair to say at least with respect to the
fedometer watch, this is a -- in part inaccurate?
A Before you put it away we might as well bring out the
other inaccurate part which would be the supervisor for the
Quarter Master, or assistant navigator which would be an
additional person to put in the right-hand portion there under
navigation operations.
So, I would add both the fedometer operator and the
navigation supervisor as boxes under navigation operations
that are on the right.
Q And navigation supervisor would not be responsible for
contact management or detection, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q But a sonarman, a qualified sonarman could be used in
that capacity, correct, sir?
A If he weren't on the fedometer.
Q And it is a prerequisite that the individual be a
qualified sonarman to operate the fedometer or to stand
fedometer watch?
A That's my recollection. I think that would prove to be
true, but should be evaluated further through testimony.
Q Yes, sir.
A I think the fedometer watch is a very important watch
and must be stood by a qualified operator, just as the
operators in sonar are also important watches.
Q Yes, sir.
A And should be stood by qualified operators.
Q The fedometer watch is a safety of ship watch, would you
agree with that, sir?
A Yes.
Q His duty is to report the vessel's depth to ensure that
the vessel does not run aground.
A It's more than that, but it does include that. It's
more than that in that he should be correlating the charted
departments with the depth that they are actually seeing
corrected by their ownership's depth from the surface so that
you gain a sense of your expected results still being
displayed so that you have a sense of where your chart says
you are, you really are. So it's not just don't hit the
bottom, it's also is your navigation accurate.
Q Yes, sir.
So that's an important job?
A Absolutely.
Q And the sonar -- the broad band sonar operator, that's
also a safety of ship position, wouldn't you agree?
A Yes. Actually, I -- it's hard to say any of the watch
stations on the ship aren't safety of ship if they're not
properly stood.
Q If they're not properly stood?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
The individual, the unqualified sonar operator who was
at the second console in sonar on the 9th of February, what
did you ascertain about his qualifications, other than he was
not a qualified sonar operator? Sonar technician I should
say.
A Well, he received extensive pipeline training before
ever reporting to the ship, so he had had the best training
that the submarine Navy can provide to prepare him to become a
sonar operator in classroom sessions before he arrived at the
ship.
And he had, I think he reported a total of about 10 days
of underway time prior to that with the Greeneville, and so he
had some underway time on the ship.
And --
Q Sir, were you aware that he had stood 40 underway
watches at the -- as a, approximately 40 watches as the -- as
a sonarman?
A That would be logical for about 10 days. I can buy
that.
Q Yes, sir.
What does a workload share mean? What's that position?
A Workload share means that you take some of the not only
burden off the primary broad band operator by getting some
common displays and looking at them in different -- with
emphasis on perhaps different elevation angles and the primary
operators using to try and get a broader in depth look at the
same data. He also can be used to evaluate the classification
of some of the contacts that the broad band operator has
found, to try to gain further tactical information by
classification of those contacts.
So, he can shift modes while not distracting the primary
broad banded operator from searching diligently for contacts
and providing that to fire control. So he has kind of a
variable function there, but I think it's in general true to
say he keeps the primary broad band operator from being
distracted. And sometimes can look at additional data that
the primary broad band operator doesn't have displayed to help
him find contacts.
Q Did you undercover any information that suggested that
the individual who was manning the workload share station did
not perform his duties in an appropriate manner as required by
his -- his rate?
A I was not able to assess his proficiency as a trainee,
and that's an area for the Court to consider further.
He related to me, however, the main emphasis of what he
was trying to do on that instructional ops was learn how to
keep logs. And of course that is an administrative function
that first you have to find the contact and then you can start
logging his presence, but if you don't find the contact to
begin with then logging it doesn't ever happen 'cause he isn't
known to be there. So, the sequence of priorities there would
be first find and provide information on the contact, and then
do the administration of logging it.
Q And that would be the broad band sonar operator's duty
to find the contacts, wouldn't you agree with that, sir?
A Yes. And the workload share operator should be helping
him do that.
Q Yes, sir. Any indication that he did not do that?
A No. In fact, he was being supervised some of the time
by a qualified operator, in addition to the sonar supervisor.
Q He was being supervised by the sonar supervisor all of
the time while he's on watch, correct?
A That's correct.
Q And that's a pretty small space, wouldn't you agree?
A Yes.
Q In fact, sonar supervisor would be standing behind the
two stations could put his hands on both shoulders of the
individuals who are manning those two stations, correct?
A He could if he moves to that location, he could do that
easily.
Q And his job is to supervise their performance of their
duties, correct, sir?
A His job is broader than that. But among other things
it's to supervise their duties.
Q Well, it wouldn't be appropriate for the sonar
supervisor to be sitting in the corner having a smoke,
correct, sir?
A No, he should be diligent in his supervision of their
performance and the other aspects of his watch.
Q Any reason to believe he wasn't diligent in the
performance of those duties and supervising the two
individuals who were on watch, sir?
A No, but let me just state that on the other hand the
ship was in a better posture when it has a qualified operator
at both consoles than it is when it has a qualified operator
at one console and a trainee at the other who is not being
supervised directly.
Q Yes, sir.
Sir, during the course of your investigation did you
ascertain whether or not there was a practice on 688 I class
ships with the same configuration as the Greeneville to man
the workload share station with an under instruction sonar
operator rather than fully qualified sonar operator due to the
lack -- the differ -- the difference in the configuration of
those -- that class of submarine?
A Let me see if I understand your question. Are you
saying that they are given compensation to not have two
qualified operators on those consoles because of their unique
configuration?
Q Sir, my question is, were you aware that there is a
practice on 688 I class vessels in this area where, because of
the configuration there's been removed -- there's been some
consoles removed from that sonar room to man the workload
chair station with an under instruction sonar technician?
A Well, if you're telling me that the practice is that he
does not have to have a qualified operator supervising him,
other than the supervisor, I was not aware of that.
If that is the practice it is not in accordance with
what I believe the fleet -- the type commander wants being
done on a submarine.
Q Sir --
A First of all, you should realize that other classes of
submarines that have difference sonar modifications have many
more people in sonar than the two operators and the supervisor
that this class has, and to some extent that makes this class,
with this type of sonar closer to being under manned in times
of high tempo and stress where passive sonar is providing
important information, than when you have those other
operators and sonar at the other consoles with mother
versatility to move functions between consoles and with more
people to provide constant back up.
So, I would think it would be incumbent on this class of
submarine, with this configuration, to be especially religious
about maintaining two qualified stack operators, if you have
an under instruction watch, fine, but he needs to be
supervised by a qualified operator and even the other variance
of this class of submarine.
Q My question was, though, sir -- I understand that that's
your feeling about it. My question was, are you aware that
there is a practice in this area on 688 I class subs is
subject to man the workload share station with an under
instruction sonar technician?
A I think we need to work this question a little more
finally before I answer it, because the implication of your
question is am I aware we have trainees out there and of
course I expect that, I expect that on every class of
submarine on these consoles. But the issue is, is that
trainee being also directly supervised by a qualified operator
who could move him aside, sit down and be the person
thereafter on a continuous basis.
And if you're saying it's the local practice that that
person does not exist on these ships routinely, then I'd say
that's a real shock to me.
Q Yes, sir.
VADM. NATHMAN: Counsel, I just want you to know
it's 11:22 on my watch. We're probably going to try to recess
right on time, 11:30, you can continue whatever road you want
to go down and --
MR. GITTINS: I'll finish this area.
VADM. NATHMAN: There might be a logical time
that you might want to stop, so please go ahead.
BY MR. GITTINS:
Q So, the NWP that talks about manning -- I'm sorry, the
Busy 1 manual that speaks to the issue of sonar manning is
written for a configuration other than the ARCI configuration
that is found on the 688 I class submarine, are you aware of
that, sir?
A I accept that. I wasn't necessarily aware of that. I
think there are guidelines out there that are specific to this
class of submarine with this configuration. It may not be the
Busy 1 guidelines. Because this is in an interim stage
OF COTS, computer off the shelf phase of equipment that's
fairly small and subset to this ship, and some others.
But, -- so there is guidance for this actual
configuration. It may not be in that manual.
Q Yes, sir. Do you know what that guidance is?
A No. I don't recall the name. I did review it in my
investigations, and I don't remember the name of it.
Q Yes, sir.
A It had one of those standard Navy names, you know, that
kind of blends into -- fades into, they all sound the same.
Q Sir, the fact that a UI workload share sonar technician
was on the panel on a full-time basis during this watch did
not contribute to this accident, did it?
A I don't know. Maybe not.
Q Let me ask you appointed question, sir. Isn't it a fact
that Sierra 13 was identified by the sonar -- the Busy 1 broad
band sonar operator for at least an hour prior to the
collision?
A Intermittently, yes.
Not a continuous contact, but yes, intermittent contact
for over an hour before the collision. Go ahead, I'll let you
continue.
Q What I was going to ask you, sir, is there's nothing
more than the workload share operator could have done to
manage the contact beyond what the primary broad band sonar
operator did, is there?
A That I can't answer and that's what gives me pause for
concern and that's why I brought it up in investigation.
Because the amount of time the two and only two operators have
to manipulate their displays and gain information is a
function of their attention span to move to the different
tasks they have. Two people are better than one at that
mission.
So, the recognition for example of that right six
bearing rate just after the high speed evolution when we're
now into the phase of starting to focus on target motion
analysis before going to periscope depth, there were a couple
of minutes there of a right six bearing rate and I know in my
heart that if the Captain knew he had a right six on a surface
contact he would have had a bells and whistles going off in
his mind saying I got a guy who's pretty close.
And two people are better able to see that than one.
Two qualified people are better able to see that than one
qualified person and a trainee.
I understand there's variations in the degree of
qualification or proficiency of an unqualified trainee from 0
to 99 percent qualified. I don't know where on that scale
this trainee was, but I can tell you that if there were two
qualified operators it would have been just that much more
chance that that ship would have called out a right six
bearing rate on the Sierra 13, the OD and the Captain know
what to do with right 6 bearing rates and they would have been
better off.
Q In point of fact that is entirely speculation because
you don't know whether or not -- or whether a qualified
operator would have identified the right six bearing rate, is
that accurate?
A Yes, it is. Let me also say that the force says have
two qualified operators for a reason, and it isn't a
capricious reason. They're trying to put that ship in a
position where it can optimize the use of its sensors and that
was not done here.
So, I don't know if it led to contribution to the
collision or not. But, it is a factor that I have concern
about.
Q Yes, sir.
This is an appropriate place to break, counselor.
VADM. NATHMAN: This Court will be in recess
until 1300.
(Recess taken.)
Choose a session: Day 1, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 2, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
Day 3, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 4, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
Day 5, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
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