Unofficial transcript: Day 3, Session 3
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SESSION 3 MARCH 7, 2001
VADM NATHMAN: The court is now back
in session, counsel for the court.
CAPT MACDONALD: The record will
reflect that all members parties and counsel are
present.
Adm Griffiths, I remind you that you are still
under oath, sir.
VADM NATHMAN: I think we are ready
for cross-examination. Counsel for Cmdr Waddle.
MR. GITTINS: Good morning, sir.
THE WITNESS: Good morning.
EXAMINATION BY MR. GITTINS:
Q Sir, how many people did you actually
personally interview for the preliminary inquiry?
A Approximately six.
Q Would those people have been the fire
technician of the watch, sir -- have included the
technician of the watch?
A It did.
Q And also the Senior Technician Under
Instruction who was not qualified?
A It did.
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Q And Lieutenant Commander Meyer (phon.)?
A Yes.
Q And Lieutenant Pritchett (phon.)?
A Yes.
Q Quinn?
A Yes.
Q LMT Brown?
A Yes.
Q Lt Sloan?
A Yes.
Q And the Chief Officer, correct, sir?
A Yes, and I count eight now.
Q You did not personally interview the commanding
officer of the USS Greenville, correct?
A That's correct.
Q And you did not personally interview the
executive officer of the USS Greenville, correct?
A Also correct.
Q And you also did not interview the Officer of
the Deck of the USS Greenville at the time of the
accident; is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q What you reviewed from the CO, the XO on the
Officer of the Deck were results of interviews
conducted by other persons that had been reduced to
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writing and that had been then again edited and
typed, correct?
A Correct.
Q So there was at least two people between you
and the actual interviews with those witnesses,
correct?
A At least one. I don't know at what point
Commodore Bias gave up trying to personally type the
interview notes and delegated that to his
administrative staff, and whether or not that
occurred with Cmdr Waddle's testimony or occurred
with either of the other two parties, or occurred
later than with the other interviews subsequent to
those, because I know he focused on those three -- I
don't know, but at least one and possibly two
intervening people.
Q The people you personally, interviewed, sir, of
the three, Brown was not on watch at the time of the
accident, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Lt Pritchett (phon.) was not on watch at the
time of the accident, correct, sir?
A Correct.
Q Lt Cmdr Maydor (phon.) was not on watch at the
time of the accident, correct, sir?
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A Correct.
Q The chief of staff was not on watch, but he was
on control, is that correct?
A Correct.
Q Quinn -- was he on watch at the time of the
accident?
A He was not on watch per se, he was assigned to
help with the tour.
Q And the sonarmen and the under-instruction, was
on watch at the time of the accident, correct?
A Yes, that's fair to say, he was on an
under-instruction watch.
Q Under-instruction watch. And he was performing
the role of the workload share -- he had the workload
share duty, correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q He was not the primary sonar operator at the
time, correct, sir?
A The other consult, the the Primary Passive
Broadband Operator, and he was the properly qualified
watchstander, a third-class sonar-man.
Q The Passive Broadband Sonar, sir, that is the
sonar that is primarily responsible for the safety of
the vessel, correct?
A That's the most reliable sensor the ship would
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routinely use to determine the contact situation.
Q So the individual who was operating and
evaluating the information coming from the passive
broadband sonar was a fully qualified sonar
technician; is that correct, sir?
A That is correct.
Q And he was supervised by a fully qualified
sonar supervisor; is that correct, sir?
A That is correct.
Q You indicated earlier, sir, that the Greenville
-- I'll try to get your words -- was manned by a
professional and competent crew, is that accurate?
A Yes.
Q And that the Commanding Officer Waddle was an
aggressive, engaged, and knowledgeable CO, correct?
A Yes.
Q The selection process for a commanding officer
of a nuclear submarine is rather extensive, isn't it,
sir?
A Very extensive.
Q Would you please describe for the members the
process by which a commanding officer is selected for
duty on board a new submarine?
A Let me just start by saying that by the time
that we have a commanding officer assigned to a
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nuclear submarine in our Navy, you are talking about
a very competent, tested and proven individual, if
you will, an elite member of our force. I can say
that universally, particularly in this day and age
when we've suffered, along with the rest of the Navy
and the armed forces in this country, a significant
down-sizing of -- about in our case 40 percent of our
force structure in the submarine force over the last
decade that has further put pressure on the selection
process to pick only the very best.
So Cmdr Waddle would be among that number who
would be considered very elite.
Q Of the persons who are in the Navy who are
command-eligible, and who are qualified for duty in
submarines, what is the selection rate for a
commanding officer for a nuclear submarine, sir?
A For those who are command-eligible, it would
depend on the year group for Cmdr Waddle's year
group. My estimate is approximately 60 percent.
And that's from -- that's from memory.
But now, I'm talking about 60 percent of the
command-eligible. A much less percentage of -- if
you start with ensigns and work their way up, and if
you look those that serve as XO and so forth, but for
those who actually could go to command, about 60
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percent is my estimate, although I haven't prepared
for that -- an answer on this. That may be off.
Q Would you agree, sir, that it is a highly
competitive selection process?
A Absolutely. Because not only is it just 60
percent of those eligible, but you also have to look
at only a fraction of those eligible to go to XO,
which is a prerequisite job, so when you stack all
those winnowing processes up, you are really talking
about a pretty small fraction who ever really go to
command. It's a very aggressive winnowing process.
You are talking about a very elite cut of officer
when you go to command.
Q During the course of your investigation, did
you inform yourself as to Cmdr Waddle's reputation
among Commander Submarine Pacific's staff?
A I did not have an opportunity to rigorously
address that, but in informal discussions with Adm
Konetzni, and as he was providing me my charter, and
certainly in the interview with Capt Brandhuber, it
was clear that Cmdr Waddle had an excellent
reputation, was considered one of the strongest COs
in the force.
Q Did you uncover any information that Cmdr
Waddle was the type of commander who cut corners when
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safety was involved?
A Prior to this investigation?
Q Yes.
A Absolutely not.
Q Sir, would you agree that it would have
assisted your investigation materially if you had had
the opportunity to examine Cmdr Waddle in depth about
what he did and why he did it during the course of
the day of 9 February 2001?
A I think that's very important to do. That
still should be done if possible.
Q Would you agree that it would be beneficial to
these members of the Court of Inquiry to have the
testimony of Cmdr Waddle regarding what he did and
why he did the regarding 9 February 2001?
A I would certainly agree with that.
Q Sir, you talked a little bit about the command
climate on board the Greenville. Would you agree
that one person who probably would have the pulse on
the command climate on board a submarine would be the
Chief of the Boat?
A Yes.
Q To your knowledge, was the Chief of the Boat
ever questioned about the command climate on board
the USS Greenville?
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A I don't know the answer, not to my knowledge.
Q It would be fair to say that you did not
interview him; is that correct?
A I did not.
Q Any -- any opinion about command climate board
the USS Greenville without seeking input from the
command chief -- the Chief of the Boat -- would be
somewhat deficient, would it not, sir, would you
agree with that?
A I would agree with that.
Q At one point during your testimony, sir, you
indicated that your analysis was conducted from quote
"the laboratory stillness of the postmortem."
Do you remember saying that?
A I sure do.
Q Would you agree that your investigation was a
retrospective of what happened, rather than a
analysis of what the CO did at the time and why he
did it?
A Well, I would agree with the first part of
that. I would certainly agree my retrospective view
is the light that I considered the COs actions, and I
only could surmise in most cases, because I did not
have an interview with Cmdr Waddle, I could only
surmise why he did things and draw that from my own
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experience and judgment, and the other interviews.
If I can comment just a little bit more.
Q Certainly, sir.
A I had the value of hindsight for everything
that I did. That's all I had to work with. Because
I came in after the event.
And that's not as much as I would have liked to
have had because hindsight is imperfect and it's
artificial to some degree because of its lack of the
dynamics of the event, and the distractions that
those dynamics bring. But it is all I had to work
with, and I was charged by the Navy to do my job
after-the-fact, and so I tried to do that with
integrity and honesty and balance, and to the degree
that I could look in the mirror and feel that I had
done my best.
Q Yes, sir. When a commanding officer placed in
command of a United States naval vessel, whether it
be a submarine or an aircraft carrier or a
minesweeper, the person is placed in the position of
authority and he is trusted to use his best judgment,
would you agree with that?
A Absolutely.
Q Do you have any reason to believe that Cmdr
Waddle did not use his best judgment -- any factual
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judgment to believe that Cmdr Waddle did not exercise
his best judgment on 9 February 2001?
A I have no reason to believe otherwise.
Q Would you agree that much of what a commanding
officer does requires the exercise of judgment,
assessing the conditions that he is faced with, and
the -- the circumstances of the situation he's in?
A Yes, I would agree that that's the way COs
operate.
Q I am going to work backwards through your
testimony, beginning with yesterday and probably
finishing with today after I've gone through your
first two days of testimony.
So I am going to start with -- start with your
testimony beginning on yesterday's testimony.
During the course of your investigation, sir,
did you -- at the end of your testimony yesterday,
you discussed OR and Operational Risk Management.
Do you have a recall of that, sir?
A Yes, I do.
Q During the course of your investigation, did
you ascertain from interviews what Cmdr Waddle's
three themes for his crew were?
A I don't have a recollection of uncovering three
times for his crew, sir.
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Q During the course of your investigation, did
you hear the terms referred to by witnesses that Cmdr
Waddle was concerned with safety, efficiency, and
backup?
A I did not uncover those -- those phrases or
terms in my interviews. But of course, that doesn't
mean that that's what he routinely emphasizes with
his ship.
Q And you had a very limited opportunity, a
window of opportunity, to conduct this investigation
would that be accurate, sir?
A Yes.
Q You had some time constraints placed on you
that made it difficult for you to do the things you
wanted to do to do a thorough and complete
investigation; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Your investigation was a preliminary
investigation, and to the extent that it was
preliminary, you did the best you could within the
time constraints you were provided; is that correct,
sir?
A That's correct.
Q Would you agree that the themes like safety,
efficiency, and backup sound like operational
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(inaudible)?
A Yes, I believe safety and efficiency and
operation are all inherent in an operational risk
management approach to business.
Q Do you believe it would be helpful to the
members of this court to inquire of the crew whether
Cmdr Waddle stressed those three themes?
A Yes.
VADM NATHMAN: Mr. Gittins, I think
just to be helpful here, if we could have LCDR Young
help you with this mike. I think they are having
trouble receiving you. I don't want to interrupt any
more but --
(Adjustments made to mike.)
BY MR. GITTINS:
Q You indicated during your testimony at the end
of yesterday that Cmdr Waddle had a successful ship;
is that accurate?
A Yes.
Q And he ran his ship in a directive kind of way,
would that be accurate, sir?
A Well, that's my impression -- a preliminary
impression, if you will.
Q Let me ask you, is it improper for a commanding
officer to be directive in the operation of his
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vessel?
A No.
Q You would agree that there are many different
types of styles for a commanding officer to adopt; is
that correct?
A I would agree with that.
Q And from all that you have reviewed, would it
be fair to say that Cmdr Waddle demonstrated a good
deal of expertise in commanding his vessel and
operating it?
A Certainly.
Q On the mishap day, there was a senior naval
officer present on board, that would be Capt
Brandhuber, sir?
A Brandhuber.
Q Brandhuber, I'm sorry. And that officer is one
who has previously held command as Commodore of a
Submarine Group; is that correct?
A A submarine squadron.
Q A submarine squadron?
A That's correct.
Q And he also is the Chief of Staff of Commander
Submarine Forces Pacific; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And would have had to hold that position --
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would necessarily have held a submarine command of
one type or another or more, correct?
A That is correct also.
Q A submarine squadron commander, by the very
nature of his duties, is required when he is at sea
to evaluate the performance of ships crews and
commanding officers, correct?
A Correct.
Q He is a person -- a -- I'm sorry -- a submarine
squadron commander is a person who would be
experienced in evaluating crew and commanding
officers; would you agree with that?
A Yes, I would.
Q You indicated in your testimony that Capt
Brandhuber gave you the sense that he thought things
were going too quick.
A Yes.
Q Sir, I have read the summary of the interviews
taken by you and Capt Bias, and the notes reflecting
those interviews.
Can you tell me specifically what he said that
indicated that things were going too quickly?
A I cannot. I can only tell you that my
recollection of talking to him perhaps not
transcribed onto paper, is that he had a sense that
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things were moving fast. Now "too quick" may be an
improper way to characterize the way he characterized
it. "Moving fast" would be more accurate.
Q Moving fast?
A Moving fast. And so, in general, Capt
Brandhuber was careful not to criticize Cmdr Waddle
in his interviews. In general, he gave me the
impression that they were being done -- things were
being done on Greenville in ways different than he
would have done them -- he, Capt Brandhuber -- were
he the CO, but that they were not necessarily unsafe
by his assessment on an ongoing basis.
In other words, as I talked about earlier, he
did not sense a threshold was crossed where he felt
it necessary to lend his experience and judgment and
advice form to the CO to change the way things were
happening. He was rather drawing the contrast that
he wouldn't have done them that way, but he didn't
necessarily consider them at the time unsafe.
Q You would agree with me that the fact that a
more senior officer would have done things
differently doesn't necessarily mean that what Cmdr
Waddle did in any given instance was wrong, correct,
sir?
A In generic terms, that is absolutely correct.
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Q What did get transcribed in Capt Brandhuber's
statements was that although -- and I am paraphrasing
partly your testimony here -- you indicated that the
OD may have been pushed by the commanding officer. I
am not sure you used the word "pushed" is that fair
-- that the OD was being managed by the CO?
A Yes. And I integrated several interviews to
state that, not just Brandhuber's. I think it's fair
to say that Capt Brandhuber felt the CO was being
very directive with the OD, but Capt Brandhuber also
said, but on the other hand, the OD did not appear to
have abrogated his responsibilities and just be a
parrot, he was still being the OD.
And so, I think Capt Brandhuber got both those
ideas across to me.
Q Of those people you interviewed, the only
person who has had experience in evaluating the
operation of ship's crews was Capt Brandhuber,
correct?
A And who else was being considered in that
question.
Q In the individuals that you indicated you
interviewed of the interviews that you conducted or
reviewed, the only person who had experience
evaluating commanding officers and their crews was
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Capt Brandhuber, correct?
A That's correct.
Q And it was Capt Brandhuber's opinion that the
OOD did not appear to abrogate his responsibilities
to the commanding officer, is that correct, sir?
A That is what he told me in the interview,
that's correct.
And if I can add, the CO was generally being
directive through that morning, and afternoon prior
to the collision, with the Officer of the Deck, but
the CO was careful to use the Officer of the Deck as
the intermediary with the watch team; in other words,
it was clear the CO was not relieving the Officer of
the Deck of the CON.
Q For example, when the commanding officer had
the vessel raised two feet, he told the Officer of
the Deck, make your depth 58 feet, correct, sir?
A I don't know the exact way that he directed
that, but that's my assumption and my recollection --
that he used the Officer of the Deck for all those
orders. And that's a fairly important distinction
because if the CO wanted to personally direct the
ship without an intermediary, the Officer of the Deck
would have announced that the CO had the CON, and
that never did happen until after the collision when
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the commanding officer took the CON to drive the ship
in the proximity of the rafts search and rescue.
Q And, under those circumstances, you don't take
issue commanding officer assuming the CON?
A The CO can assume the CON whenever he wants to
to drive the ship. They generally don't do that
because disruptive of the training value for the
subordinate officers who were Officers of the Decks.
Q I would like to discuss for a moment the
casualty the "as do" casualty of the vessel.
You indicated that -- that that's an important
piece of gear, would that be fair to say?
A Yes.
Q And the loss of that -- it is just a repeater,
though, is it not, sir?
A Yes.
Q It repeats the same information that is
displayed to the passive sonar operator, correct?
A That's correct.
Q And you thought it would be, in your opinion,
if there needed to be a compensation for the loss of
that important piece of gear?
A That is just my opinion. There is no
requirement for the CO to do that.
Q Well, in a Naval Warfare Publication there is a
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chapter about Sonar Casualties, correct, sir?
A I will assume that is the correct case. I
haven't looked at that.
Q What's the NWP -- generically?
A Generically. "NWP" means Naval Warefare
Publication. I think the publications are being
transitioned to a new name that is less user-friendly
in English, but it's the significant library of
tactical guidance provided to our ships, all our
ships, not just the submarines, although there are
some that are more applicable to submarines -- a
number of volumes.
Q Having been around the Navy for a while, would
you agree that the NWP is similar to the NATPS
(phon.) Manual for aviators?
A It's similar. Although NATPS is not an area
that is familiar to me yet. I am learning about it
as a son (inaudible).
Q The NWPs are a manual or a series of manuals
that talk about operating parameters, operating
procedures on board naval vessels, correct, sir?
A Yes, sir. And in my -- I feel that NATPS are
probably a little more directive to a pilot than NWPs
are to a CO or a Officer of the Deck.
I think the NWPs give you a lot of options to
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choose from. I think the NATPS are a little more, if
you don't do this, you may crash. So I think there
is a difference between the two, although there are
similarities as well.
Q Yes, sir.
Well, in the NWP, there is a chapter that
discusses operations with significant casualties to
sonar. Are you aware that there is no operating
discussion -- discussion of operating with a casualty
of the "as do"?
A I wouldn't be surprised. I wasn't aware of
that. I am not surprised. It doesn't change my
judgment on what I have said earlier in testimony
because I am using my experience in driving ships to
understand the value of that piece of gear. And the
NWPs are not perfect.
Q Yes, sir. Well, you did ascertain that through
the course of the day, with that casualty on board,
that the CO and the XO were conizant of the sonar --
the fact that the "as do" was out of commission and
were visiting sonar and were making visits obviously
for the purposes of ascertaining the sonar picture;
is that fair to say?
A That is fair to say. There is no question both
the CO and the XO were helping to compensate for the
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logs of the "as do" in their actions.
Q And you indicated in your experience and I
think you said if you had been on deployment, you
would issue a temporary standing order -- the term
"deployment" suggests that there is a different
procedure you might have followed for a day sail as
we experienced on the 9th of February, would that be
fair, sir?
A That's fair. Let me elaborate if I can.
A temporary standing order is an administrative
tool. It takes some time to generate and
promulgate. This was a short underway. So I could
understand not -- not addressing the problem with a
written document on that day, because they may have
felt it just wasn't cost worth versus gain -- there
wasn't enough time to generate administrative
approach to promulgating new guidance.
But I believe that certainly once they knew
this piece of gear was out of commission, they had an
opportunity to at least verbally let the watch team
know this was a concern to them, and they required
some adjustments in the routine manner of business
because of that. That's my judgment, that had I been
in their shoes, I would have done that, and it would
have in my own mind as a captain, in my direct
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actions and in my discussions with the Officer of the
Deck, added a layer of necessary conservatism to our
actions where that would normally play.
Q And that appears to have been done by the CO
and XO making frequent visits to the sonar room,
correct, sir?
A I think that was one method they used to
attempt to do that. The question is, was that
adequate.
Q Yes, sir. With the benefit of hindsight.
A Absolutely.
Q After an accident?
A Absolutely.
Q Would you agree that it was reasonable under
the circumstances for Cmdr Waddle not to promulgate a
temporary standing order as a result of the "as do"
being done?
A For the brief underway that they had,
absolutely. That is an administrative way to further
reinforce instructions to the watch team.
Q Would you also agree that it was reasonable for
Cmdr Waddle to direct himself and the XO to make
frequent visits to the sonar room to maintain an
awareness of the sonar picture under the
circumstances you faced that day?
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A That was a very reasonable thing to do as a CO
and a XO, and appropriate.
Q Repair of the "as do" on the 9th of February
while at sea would have required some disruption of
the control room, correct, sir?
A It would have been probably very difficult to
do in general, because in addition to disrupting the
central area of control, I believe they would have
had to, for some period of time, de-energize the rest
of their sonar in the control room and essentially
taken their main sonar out of commission period.
So there are significant reasons why it was
probably reasonable not to repair that "as do" on
that one day underway.
Q And you just answered my next question.
Was it reasonable not to repair the "as do"
while underway on the 9th of February?
Q Yes.
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