Unofficial transcript: Session 2
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March 5, 2001 10 a.m.
Q Do you have any preconceived notions whatsoever
right now about the criminal culpability of Commander
Waddle regarding his --
A No.
Q Sir, do you believe that disciplinary action in
the form of either admiral fast or a court martial is
a necessity in a collision involving loss of life?
A No.
Q Okay, thank you.
A I think the facts -- you've got to find out
what the facts are.
VADM NATHMAN: Commander Pfeifer.
EXAMINATION BY STONE:
Q I have some questions to ask about Commander
Waddle.
You originally said when you first heard of the
collision, one you thought it was a tough day for the
Navy, and that you thought it was also the commanding
officer would probably have to answer some question?
A I actually said it would be a tough day for the
Navy and the tough day for a lot of families, that's
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what I specifically said.
Q Did you include the executive officer in that?
A No.
Q What is your understanding of the executive
officer's role under the watchstand, where does he
fit?
A My experience typically on an aircraft carrier,
they are busy running the administration of the ship
and coordinating that for the captain. And those are
significant duties.
What you are really doing around -- just to
give you an example -- if you are on anchor detail,
you are going to spend a loft time walking around the
ship making sure it's ready so, you are there to
observe and make sure that things are on track, and
if you have to push people to get things done quickly
or to make sure things get done efficiently so you
can support the captain.
Q And do you have ever a CO that you did not
trust to make the right tactical decisions?
A No.
Q Have you ever doubt the decision of one of your
previous commanding officers and then found out that
the commanding officers decision turned out to be
correct?
0
A Yes.
Q In your time as a XO in your career, did you
ever feel you have had to confront your commanding
officer in front of your crew or other officers on
board?
A I think there is a certain sense of openness
when you deal with your officers and executive
officer has a clear role and if he feels like things
aren't going particularly well, his first obligation
I think is to make it known to the crew, that's best
done privately, because you are more effectively as
an XO if you do it privately because you can rue the
day with the commanding officers. Or to make your
point clear, and make sure it's fully considered.
I don't think it's necessarily the right thing
to do, but if you think things aren't going well, I
think you need to make it clear.
A Have you ever -- have you ever recommended the
commanding officer or executive officer to be
relieved of his duty?
A No.
Q Have you ever been a witness to a startling
event, for example, a car accident and then were
pressured to report what happened to a superior?
A Well, you asked two questions.
1
I have been witness to many startling events.
I have never felt pressure to make a statement.
I mean, I have been asked to write a statement
based on what I saw, but no pressure to write it
down.
Q Have you ever been orally questioned?
A Yes.
Q Have you made any recommendations or
endorsements regarding commanding officers or
executive officer's duties or role?
A Yes, I have frequently made endorsements on
accident investigations, aircraft accident
investigations.
Q Have you had to EV civilians?
A Yes.
Q Do you think that that ever interfered with
your operational readiness.
Have you ever taken any under -- I have taken
many in the aircraft carrier. We had many visits, at
this point I didn't see that as an impact. I saw it
as an opportunity to do the right thing on both
sides.
You can demonstrate what you did, convey a very
important message to the public about how
professional your force was, and there was an
2
opportunity there to have the right kind of interface
with civilian members of the community, and to have
an opportunity to make -- answer the questions.
So I didn't see it as an impact to my
readiness, no.
Q Do you feel there is a possible outcome to this
case that will --
A I mean, I haven't thought about an outcome. I
don't think that's our -- I think we will look at the
facts, see where it takes us.
Q Do you believe any higher ranking military
officer or civilian of the US government -- should be
able to -- outcome **
A They haven't discussed it with me.
Q Do you believe that it's an individual's duty
whether it may be the CO or the XO to take blame for
any collision that may happen?
A To take blame, no.
Q Do you feel the presence of Rear Admiral Ozawa
in the deliberation room will have any impact on
deliberations?
A No, I don't see any impact. I think admiral
Ozawa will contribute.
Q What do you feel the role of attending advisor
to be?
3
A He's a qualified submariner, he understands
submarine operations. Along with Admiral Sullivan,
who has a significant amount of experience, and I
think the type of experience will allow us to get to
the facts.
Q How much experience do you have in operating
with submarines in Hawaiian operating areas?
A As a battle group commander, I had some
experience operating. I had two submarines in my
battle course in my department and we operated in
Hawaii, out here in the Hawaiian operating area.
Q Through this and other -- ocean embarking
conditions at that time **
Have you had the opportunity or to be familiar
with analysis based on the facts --
A No.
Q And would you believe this would be an area you
probably would do questioning?
A I think we will use the technical advisor with
questions, yes.
Q Do you understand the may or may not be
available during real time operations?
A I don't know that.
Q That's all the questions I have.
Do you believe he speaks for himself?
A I would argue with Admiral Ozawa for, I
believe, nine days. I believe he feels the same as
the other members. We are going to ask the right
questions and get to the facts, that is the level in
which we have participated.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel, questions.
Q You had a lot of questions, I understand,
about things had been told and learned, but the
question has been asked about, what is your
understanding at this point about what happened
between Greenville and the Ehime Maru?
A What I know is -- what I think I know is that
they were doing a merge surfacing operation on the
USS Greenville and they collided with the Ehime Maru.
That's what I think I know from the newspaper.
Q So just the basic facts that there was a
collision?
A Yes, and that they were doing way assume was a
emergency surface.
Q Thank you. As part of your duties as air pack,
you were not -- were you briefed on anything
regarding the collision?
A No.
Q I believe all the counsel were provided with a
5
list of witnesses for the court that will be called
for the court.
And you discussed your relationship with
admiral Konetzni and Admiral -- were there any other
witnesses you reviewed?
A I don't think. The only other two members I
recall were admiral Konetzni and Admiral Griffiths.
Q Would the fact that you knew those two officers
affect your ability to impartially evaluate their
testimony?
A No.
Q Were any units of air pack involved in the
rescue efforts?
A I believe -- I don't know specifically, but I
believe some P3S or helicopters supported.
Q Were you briefed on their maneuvers?
A I don't believe I was.
Q Now prior to today, I know that you had
discussions about the procedures which were very
involved, but did you have discussions with other
members about the basic facts of the case?
A No, we haven't discussed any facts.
Q You mentioned earlier, I believe you said while
you were commanding officer, that you were almost
involved in a collision at sea.
6
Was there any kind of investigation done during
that situation?
A No, because we didn't have a collision.
Q Okay.
A I just remembered how close it was, and I
remember there was very little I could do about it.
I felt that there was very little I could do about it
at the time, so I felt lucky.
Q Have you ever been involved in any way in an
investigation of collision of a vessel at sea?
A No.
Q Obviously, you've been involved in aircraft
mishap investigations in many different ways.
Were you ever in a situation were they were --
you had to decide whether there would be disciplinary
on any of the officers involved?
A No.
Q Is it your understanding, sir, that all of the
board members have an equal vote an equal voice in
what the recommendations of the court will be?
A I intend to support them that way.
Q And each one will have?
A Yes.
Q Sir, I know you were asked a lot of questions.
Is there anything that comes to mind or that
you can recall that counsel should know about your
ability to impartially sit on the court here?
A No, I go back to one of the questions I believe
I had earlier from Commander Waddle's counsel, I
think I bring a certain amount of confidence from 31
years of service in the US Navy and understanding of
Navy operations, and I hope that competence to the
court as president.
Q Thank you, sir, I have no further questions.
10
ATTY D: One follow-up.
Q Sir, you mentioned that admiral -- that you had
two substantive conversations in the Bremerton.
Were you ever aboard when it was doing
surfacing procedure?
A No.
Q So you have never been involved in anyone on
any submarine?
A I have -- I did an orientation visit on the
Olympia to understand how that ship worked and how
the ship was outfitted. We did not do a rough sea
surfacing.
Q So you have never been on board any ship for
emergency surfacing?
A No.
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MACDONALD: Counsel for the court
has no questions.
VADM NATHMAN: All right. At this
time, I will ask if there are any other challenges
for the president of the court of inquiry.
MS. YOUNG: Sir, we have no
challenges.
MR. STONE: I don't have any
challenges.
MR. FILBERT: No challenges.
VADM NATHMAN: Let's proceed then.
MACDONALD: No comments. We can
proceed with Admiral Sullivan.
VADM NATHMAN: Let's proceed then
with questions for Admiral Sullivan.
Q Good morning, admiral.
A Good morning.
ATTORNEY C: I will ask the same
questions I asked of Admiral Nathman, beginning with,
do you have any special training in military justice
or military legal procedures?
A Similar to Admiral Nathman, I certainly had
some during my few years in the Navy, part of the
qualifications are the same, and certainly as
commanding officer of a submarine.
9
Q Have you ever sat on a board or Court of
Inquiry?
A No, I haven't.
Q Have you ever convened one?
A No.
Q Or been a preliminary investigating officer for
one?
A No, I have not.
Q I am sure you have been involved in some way
considering your submarine background in collisions
involving submarines, is that an accurate statement?
A In what sense?
Q Have you ever been involved in an investigation
involving a mishap or a collision with a second
vessel?
A I have never been directly involved.
Q What submarine was that?
A USS Base in 1978 at the Straits of Terrol
(phon.).
Q Can you tell us what happened here?
A At the time, we were coming up periscope depth
for a navigational fix, and we struck a -- had an
acoustics sensor, but struck a large merchant. I was
inbound in the Mediterranean and surfaced and failed
to detect the ship at Delta. At the time of the
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collision, I was asleep in my rec, so I was not
really too much involved.
Q What was your job on board the submarine at the
time?
A At the time, I was the main propulsion system.
Q What happened as a result of that?
A It was a long time ago, but I certainly
remember a very thorough investigation. The
submarine commander -- submarine commander in Naples
-- and I don't remember much beyond that.
Q Do you ever hear the commanding officer was
relieved as a reuslt of that?
A No, I do not.
Q Was there a disciplinary action as a result of
that?
A No, there was -- in fact, he was on the same
ship.
Q I assume no loss of life in that case?
A That's correct.
Q Minor damage to the submarine?
A Fairly minor. It required repair, probably two
to three-week repair.
Q Any other time you were on board when there has
been an accident or collision?
A No, once is enough.
51
Q Have you been an authority for a JAG
investigation when there was an accident like that?
A No.
Q Sir, what is your understanding of your role as
a member on this board of inquiry?
A My role is to listen to the facts, try to
ascertain what happened, and to make recommendations
and so forth to the convening board.
Q And do you recall when exactly you were
informed of the decision that you would sit as a
member?
A Similar to the admiral, I was informed while in
Washington, at Navy's Flag Officer Conference I was
informed by my sink Admiral. He called and told me
that I was going to be appointed to this board --
this court.
Q And do you recall the date of that?
A It was the 16th of February. Friday the 16th.
About fifteen hundred Eastern time.
Q Is that basically the gist of the conversation?
A That's correct.
Q And while you were in DC, sir, did you have any
conversations with anyone else about your sitting as
a member on this coordinating board?
A It happened near the very end of the
52
conference, so the only other individual I talked to
it about was Admiral Stone who happened to be sitting
next to me, and he also received a phone call from I
believe Admiral Nathman.
Q So you knew basically at the same time that you
would both be sitting?
A That's correct.
Q I assume that shortly after that as it was
Friday you returned back to your place of command?
A That's correct. Back to Nebraska.
Q Did you have any discussions with your staff
back in Nebraska about your appointment?
A I did with my executive Assistant Commander
Wright I told him to make the necessary plans for me
to come out here to Hawaii and I informed him that I
was going to bring him with me, so that I would have
another submariner to help assist me in ascertaining
the facts.
Q And I'm sorry -- you said you brought him with
you?
A Yes.
Q And what's his name again, sir?
A Commander Doug Wright.
Q Sir, how is -- what assistance has he provided
you so far?
53
A Well, we've been here for approximately two
weeks, and we have not members -- including myself
have not been privy to -- have not made any effort to
find out the actual facts of the incident, and
Commander Wright has assisted our counsel in
preparing information -- and he's basically been our
technical expert.
He's doing the job that I envisioned I would be
doing, or I will be doing once this court starts.
Q Sir, do you write for this report? **
A Yes, I do.
Q Sir, other than what you just talked about have
you had any other conversations for example with
Admiral Bruder or Admiral Moore about this Court of
Inquiry?
A I have not talked to him personally. I did sit
in on a teleconference, as he described earlier.
Q Discussing --
A Discussing procedures.
Q All right, sir. Have you had any
communications with anyone with SECNAV or anyone in
this office?
A No, I haven't.
Q The CO or anyone in his office?
A No, I haven't.
54
Q Have you personally discussed this case with
Admiral Fargo in any way or met Admiral Fargo?
A I met him in passing last Friday and, said
hello, he is a classmate of mine.
Q No phone conversations with him?
A No, I didn't I have not talked to him about
this case or even the fact that I was appointed to
the board.
Q All right, sir. Why do you think that you were
chosen as a member -- I mean, obviously, you are the
one submariner on board, and there are other
submariners so?
A I thought quite a bit about that. I think I am
fairly good reputation on the submarine waterfront
about being fair. I have had the jobs the three
individuals have had. I understand the submarine,
the complexity, and I believe I can look at this case
and provide sound judgment and support to this
court.
Q I assume in your role as a commanding officer
in the submarines you commanded -- actually, I am not
sure but ** TBF embark done when you were a
commanding officer?
A Yes, they were.
Q Many, a few just started?
55
A On the USS Permand ** operating at Pearl Harbor
and USS Florida, both at the Puget Sound area, and we
would come frequently out here.
Q Would a typical TBF embark involve angles to
angles high speed maneuvers?
A It was up to my judgment what we wanted to do,
and oftentimes, it would be based where we were in
the assigned area, and I would conduct them if I felt
it deemed wafe.
I have had them but not necessarily --
Q Did you ever do a emergency surfacing maneuver
with DVs on board?
A Not with DVs.
Q Were any of the subs that you served on a Los
Angeles Class 688-I submarine?
A No. A Los Angeles, but not a 688 Improved
Class.
Q Sir, when you -- with any of these DV
cruisers, say at the time you did any of these
cruises, did you ever let any of the DVs or
dependents sit at the helm or help drive the ship,
obviously, with the assistance of another crew
member?
A Yes, I did.
Q Sir, when did you first hear of the collision?
56
A I heard about it probably around 21:00 Central
Time. My assistant called me and told me that he had
been watching CNN and there had been a collision on
the water.
Q And what facts were given to you or did you
ascertain at that time?
A Just, again, what I saw.
Of course, as a senior submariner, I was very
interested in trying to ascertain how this happened,
and I watched the various news channels, and read
various stories over that first weekend.
Q Certainly, sir, up until the 16th you didn't
know you would be a member. So I assume you were
very interested you were following the news on this?
A Yes, I was.
Q Was there message traffic?
A I wasn't privy to any message traffic, that I
can recall.
Q E-mail traffic?
A No e-mail traffic.
Q Phone calls about the accident?
A No, I purposely felt -- knowing the amount of
effort and investigation going on here at Pearl
Harbor they certainly didn't need an admiral from
Omaha asking questions, during the process of it
57
being done. I felt that eventually the facts would
come out, and --
Q Sir from the information that you read, I guess
it was exclusively through the news media, what is
your understanding now of what happened?
A My understanding is again based on what I've
read, that a collision did occur, and nine people
lost their lives, and south of Oahu, with a
distinguished visitor embark. And that the chief
staff of SUBPAC was on board.
Q I imagine that as a submariner it must have
gone through your mind how did this happen?
A Yes, I would say the best way I have
characterized it is having done this many times, it's
a -- it's a safe evolution, done correctly, and I
just couldn't -- I was -- I was trying to ascertain
how it could have happened and I was certainly
anxious to eventually learn how it happened.
Q Did you have any preconceived notions from what
you read about how it happened?
A No.
Q Sir, your boss is a four-star submarine
admiral?
A That's correct.
Q Did you have any discussions with him about the
58
collision?
A Yes, we both read the newspapers and in fact,
at the conference that we mentioned, we sat and
talked some -- his view is the same as I mine -- as I
mentioned wait until the facts -- he told me he had
not had any contact with the Greenville's chain of
command to ascertain any more information than was in
the press.
Q Was it after your appointment as a member did
you have conversations with your boss?
A Yes, I did. Of course, he told me I was coming
out here and basically we discussed my role and some
things that -- we touched things to make sure that we
looked at.
Q For example?
A The reconstruction of the track, make sure it
was done with quality -- in a quality manner, command
-- those type of issues. But nothing more -- more
process and nothing that will pertain to the details
of the actual collision.
Q Could you elaborate more on the reconstruction
and making sure that it was done in a qualified
manner -- how exactly would that be done?
A I don't know how it was done yet, but I want to
make sure that it was done by fox that do
59
reconstruction on submarine traction on a routine
basis that their credibility and their qualification
is considered excellent.
Q Did you discuss the role of Captain Conlen in
the reconstruction?
A I didn't know he was involved in the
reconstruction until I was here on island.
Q And did you discuss with your boss the fact
that Captain Hall was doing the reconstruction?
A I had no idea who was doing the reconstruction
when I talked to him.
It was again an overall discussion to ensure
that it was done correctly.
Q Other than the -- his suggestions regarding the
reconstruction did he make any other suggestions or
recommend any other things that should be done with
regard to the investigation -- things that you should
look at during the board of inquiry?
A No, other than I would say ensure that -- that
-- of course being a submarine admiral -- you have a
lot of guidance on how to look at the situation but
sure we examined all the facts, all the individuals
that were on watch, those type of things.
Q Sir, did you discuss with him the impact on the
submarine community?
60
A No, we did not.
Q Our amongst personnel?
A No, we did not.
Q Sir, other than the procedural conversations
that you had with the counsel for the court and the
other members have you had any substantive
conversations about the actual facts of the
accident?
A No, I have not.
Q Other than what you two talked about with
regard to your --
A I have not had any conversations with any of
the SUBPAC'S staff or any other members that have --
that have knowledge right now of the situation.
Q And you may have answered my last question, but
no other conversation of any other member of come
stat with regard to this collision?
A Again, prior to my being appointed to the
board. Certainly, some of the junior submariners
asked me what I thought happened it was all
speculation, I would always preference my discussions
with hey let's wait for the facts of the matter. I
certainly know Commander Waddle has a very good
reputation as a commanding officer, let the facts
speak and let's not jump to any conclusions.
61
Q Did you ever discuss this might have happened?
A Certainly.
Q What was your response, what did you think on
that?
A That I would have to see what happened because
it's a -- just for this to happen, it's a very --
very unusual situation.
Q Were there theories discussed amongst you in
these junior officers as to how the accident happened?
A Not really. Other than speculation.
Q Sir, when you had sub group 9 was Admiral Fargo
sub cap fleet?
A No he was 5th fleet, I believe.
Q Sir you mentioned you had read a number of news
articles prior to your appointment. Washington times
articles?
A No, I -- I mean -- I read news mostly the Early
Bird. And -- and the Washington Post. I pretty
much.
Q New York times
A No, I don't read the New York Times.
Q Again, on advice of counsel, we have made every
effort last two weeks being on island here not to
read the articles.
Q I am speaking prior to that.
62
Sir, do you have a relationship or a previous
relationship with either -- any of the three counsel
to the Court of Inquiry?
A I know the captain.
Q I'm sorry -- captain MacDonald or Commander
Flynn?
A No, I met them for the first time.
I arrived here on actually it was the 19th of
February.
Q All right. So did you know captain Hinckley or
commander finding admiral Fargo's JAG's?
A No.
Q Do you have a JAG?
A Yes we do.
Q A Navy JAG?
A No, well there is a junior Navy commander --
for the --
Q Obviously you have seen this witness list and
you stated that you know Commander Scott Waddle can
you tell us about the nature of your relationship
with him, how exactly you have known him how long you
have known him?
A Submarine force is a small community and
certainly we know folks -- his seniority, I have
known him on a professional basis, he wrote my ship
63
once as an inspector back in probably 1993 or so.
Q How did you do on that instruction?
A We passed. I knew him then and met him a
couple of times. I had to come out here on business
again in a social form. He's called me trying to
encourage a selection of one of his squadrons mass
chiefs to come out to STRATCOM ** for a key position
for lead official. That's the basis.
Q What is his reputation in the submarine
community?
A Greenville's reputation, along with the
commander is excellent.
Q Reputation for taking care of his people?
A I can't comment on that part of it. I just
know professionally he has a great reputation, I
believe he was selected to be the flag man for the
ship flag change.
Q Any other witnesses that you personally know?
A I know Admiral Griffiths.
Q And how do you know him, sir?
A We served together at STRACOM for about --
about a year.
Q Did you relieve him?
A No he was the deputy J 5. And I was at the
time the director of operations statistics. And I
64
know admiral Konetzni he's a close personal friend of
mine for many years
Q Any conversations with Admiral Konetzni about
this?
A I have had no conversations with Admiral
Konetzni.
Q Sir did you know Admiral Stone -- did you know
him well before this Court of Inquiry?
A No, I didn't.
Q You just met at the flag conference in DC?
A That's correct. Excuse me, but I also know
captain Ranger, both when he was a squadron
commander, squadron 7, and as chief of staff of
SUBPAC.
Q How many years?
A Probably on the order of 8 to 10 years.
Q Do you have an impression of his reputation?
A Superior.
Q Sir, do you know why Admiral Konetzni chose the
Greenville?
A No I didn't.
Q Who did you hear that from?
A I heard from --
Q And he didn't indicate why?
A No. He just said that they've done a good job,
65
and I believe the captain asked for the honor -- and
Admiral Konetzni accepted, that's my understanding.
Q Sir, have you ever met Rear Admiral Ozawa
before?
A I have not met him.
He did say he remembers me when we both were
operating submarines in 1992, I was on Florida and he
was here in his submarine, in RIMPAC
Sir, are you familiar with any of the
information from the NTSB investigation? And again,
this would be prior to your being appointed.
A Yes, in the news conferences that they
conducted that first week, I know, since then that it
was somewhat of a preliminary board or some sort of
press release yesterday but I didn't read it.
Q Sir, have you ever been assigned in Japan?
A No, I have not.
Q I assume -- have you done a WESPAC?
A Yes, I have.
Q How many would you say?
A The WESPACs?
Q Yes, sir?
A One, I believe.
Q Were you commanding officer?
A No, I was a junior officer.
66
Q Do you have any close Japanese family or
friends?
A No.
Q And sir, do you know what your next assignment
will be yet?
A Yes, I do.
Q And what would that be?
A I am going to return to Washington and be the
Navy's Director of Submarine motor affair. **
Q And when will that be, sir?
A Probably in April.
Q Sir, can you talk a little bit about DV
programs that operated when you were commanding
officer -- your view of them, good opportunities.
A Certainly. I think the distinguished visiting
program was what I considered a win-win situation we
were able to expose our Navy to our fellow civilians,
we would take someone with captain Nathman described
various groups congressmen, their staffs, political
employees, leaders, various sundry groups to expose
them to what their tax money buys, and I felt they
were always a very important part both in port -- not
just the embarks at sea, but a majority of the
visitors actually visited the ships at pierside.
I certainly encouraged it. It was clear that
67
when I was commanding officer and certainly the
guidance I would give my commanding officers is
always give things.
Q Sir, I ask this question of Admiral Nathman I
will ask it of you as well. What is your view of
the --
A Certainly the commanding officers authority is
absolute. But having not been privy to the facts I
have to see what the facts are. That's a part of our
Navy tradition but certainly there could be
extenuating circumstances, I mentioned the one
collision I experienced as junior officer the
commanding officer was actually found in the sense he
prevented a war situation to occur. But I don't know
the facts of this case, and I am interested to
finding them out.
Q Can you elaborate a little bit more how exactly
did the commanding officer recover the situation?
A He was at the periscope stand when he noticed
the junior officer or junior officer who was the
officer hesitate during the periscope sweep, as we
just broke the surface, and as soon as he saw him
hesitate he ordered the ship to go down quickly and
do a ** deep. And it wasn't until seconds after that
that acoustic detection of the surface ship was
68
heard, and so he was able to get the ship down as
fast as he could.
Q Sir, I noticed in your bio, that you were the
anti submarine warfare officer in USS Greenville --
sorry, that was Admiral Stone?
A I don't remember that one.
Q Other than normal submarine operations, do you
have any special expertise in sonar operations other
than what the normal submarine officer would know?
A By the time you are a officer of one of my
submarines you are fairly competent at operating
sonar systems and certainly I fall into that
particular category.
I have worked in submarine development Squadron
12, in the Tactical Development Group, and I also
conducted tactical development exercises, but
certainly I don't consider my qualifications any more
or any less than any other commanders that have the
privilege to command a submarine.
Q How about the attack control center?
A The same thing.
Q Sir I am not sure if you know the answer to
this but about the collision that you were involved
in -- the submarine you were on -- did you ever learn
what caused the CO to take action? I mean, was it
69
simply the hesitation of the OOD on the periscope or
was there a acoustic contact across his visual or
simply as hesitation?
A My reading on it looking back on it was knowing
his boat and knowing his crew, and in submarine
operations are operations that have to be done with
care. They are not simple they are not easy.
Q Thank you very much, sir.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for commander
Pfeifer.
Q Sir, you mentioned that the commanding
officer in this collision was not disciplined. Was
anyone else on the ship disciplined?
A Not that I recall.
Q You said that you had read stories or were very
interested before you were appointed to the court.
What went through your mind regarding the ship or the
crew of the Greenville. You mentioned something
about the commanding officer, any ** as to
responsibility on the other members of the ship?
A I certainly didn't assess responsibilities.
I was more interested in what the facts were
how this could have happened.
0
The placing of responsibility that should be
done after the fact. I was more concerned with the
health and safety -- certainly having experienced
something similar to that it's a very traumatic
experience to the ship and the crew.
Q You had stated that you speculated before your
term about what happened. And since you have
received a copy of the Appointing order. You known
that a executive officer is named as a party. Did
you ever put the two together and speculate as to why
a executive officer has been made a party to this
inquiry
A No other than he's the executive officer. He's
the Number 2 on the ship.
Q You had also stated that you were aware of the
reputation the Greenville as being excellent or the
reputation of Commander Waddle as being excellent.
Did you attribute that to anyone else besides
Commander Waddle?
A I certainly do. I fully recognize that a
submarine is not one person, it's the crew. But?
The submarine course you tend to associate the ship
with the commanding officer in one sentence but
certainly he -- the crew behind him would earn that
reputation.
1
Q Do you have any ideas or feelings with regards
to the potential culpability of an executive officer
during a under way collision?
A I didn't have any previous notions on what his
role was.
Q Things that you have stated -- that the
commanding officer was ultimately responsible. Do
you hold that same position with regards to the
executive officer?
A Not necessarily I don't know what his role is.
Q So if it's not based on the fact that he is
purely an executive officer. Some actions that he
may or may not have taken during the course?
A .
Q Sir did you ever have a commanding officer that
you did not trust to make the right tactical
decisions?
A In what role.
Q As a junior officer. Whether it be an
executive officer or a junior officer?
A No.
Q Have you ever doubted the decision of a
commanding officer and then later found that that
decision turned out to be correct?
A Again as a crew member as one much his
2
officers.
Q As one of his officers as an executive officer?
A Certainly I couldn't recall but certainly you
always as a junior you are always questioning how
things are done that is a part of business, you are
always trying to understand.
Q What is your understanding of the term trip
wire?
A In what sense?
Q As with regards to understanding or the term
forcible back up of trip wires is that a term you are
familiar with?
A Under trip wires in my experience at sea is
certain parameters you set out with range or size or
contact or bears that if it occurs, for instance the
sounding of the ocean floor gets to a certain level
it will cause the ship to have certain reactions.
Q Do you have any belief that there is a
possible outcome in this case that will appease the
international outcry?
A No.
Q Do you believe that the CO or the Navy desires
a particular outcome in this case?
A No. Ill restate that.
Yes, they would like to have us investigate
3
this and have the facts laid out in a logical
fashion, but no preconceived direction.
Q You do have a personal knowledge of -- personal
relationship with the technical adviser, what do you
anticipate his role being in this case?
A Well he was very helpful the last two weeks
because I could not -- none of the three of us could
be exposed or given the preliminary investigation or
any other facts that were gathered by our
predecessors. So he was the facilitator that helped
the lawyers, I looked at it that I lost an officer,
the president of the board gained a technical
advisor.
Q So Commander Wright, to your knowledge, has
been exposed to basically all of the -- a wide number
of information --
A I believe he does.
Q But has he discussed any of that information
with you at all?
A No, none of the particulars.
Q What do you perceive Rear Admiral Ozawa's role
to be?
A Rear Admiral Ozawa's is another fellow
submariner who has had extensive experience at sea,
and I expect him to be -- he has to date been very
4
helpful trying to sort out when we get into the
particulars of this collision, and I found -- I see
him as a colleague.
Q Do you anticipate yourself and eventually Rear
Admiral Ozawa becoming a quasi- technical expert with
6 the non submarine members of the board?
A I would say -- I wouldn't say the lines are
that bright that clear, we always speak together as a
group. All of us are free to speak up or add
information that we see appropriate.
Clearly, with our backgrounds, both of us as
submariners, will have more knowledge and more
previous experience in the area of submarine
operations.
ATTY D: No further questions.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for Mr.
Coen.
Q Admiral Sullivan, I want to ask you about --
you made some comments about the reconstruction, have
you been given any information since you've been
appointed to the court about if there was a
reconstruction going on and how it was going?
A No. I certainly knew from my experience of
submarine operations that there would be a
5
reconstruction, we do that not just for collision
grade untoward incident at sea or any close encounter
at sea, so I knew -- at least I assumed the mechanics
of what would be happening out here in Hawaii.
Q In your position as commanding officer and in
your other positions of command have you ever been in
a situation where you had to assess whether or not a
officer who was a subordinate had been derelict at
his duties?
A I would say not -- what do you mean by derelict
in his duties.
Q I mean derelict to something at ship board to
something he was doing on board the submarine?
A I have had a lot of officers work for me that
certainly I have provided I have had counsel. As a
group commander, I have had an officer relieved for
cause on one of my submarines, but nobody I have ever
questioned thoroughly.
Q I should have made that clear, looking it from
the point of disciplinary action or relieved for
cause -- anybody else as a commanding officer you
have had to do that?
A I have had to review some of the cases that my
commanding officers recommended maybe one or two
individuals be relieved of their duties or
6
Department heads typically.
Q You said the commanding officer or a commanding
officer had to be -- you recommended they be
relieved. Did it involve his operation of the
submarine?
A It involved the operation of the submarine and
his demeanor, the way he was able to deal with his
crew, I felt what I was -- the indications I was
receiving and my investigation revealed to me that he
was not taking feedback from his crew. That he
basically was not getting that force of back up that
every commanding officer at sea.
Q Did this happen when you were at SUBPAC nine I
believe?
A Yes I was with submarine group nine.
Q And how long ago was that?
A 1997.
Q Now, you mentioned earlier that you are
familiar with captain Waddle and some of the senior
officers who may be testifying in this Court of
Inquiry of inquiry, do you see any problems in
assessing their testimony with your understanding
vis-a-vis here reputation or your personal knowledge
of them?
A None at all.
7
Q You will be able to look at what they have to
say and see if it's credible in relation to what they
say of the facts?
A That's correct.
Q Sir, your next assignment I believe is to be a
director of submarine warfare back at DC. Are any of
the witnesses including the senior officers scheduled
to report to you there at the Pentagon?
A No. Not that I am aware of.
Q Is there anything that you can think of that
hasn't been asked about that would be important to
know about your ability to sit as a court member
here?
A No, I think you all asked good questions. I
certainly have actually a vast amount of experience
at sea in a submarine and I guess I mentioned before
I have had all three of their jobs and I feel I can
add a lot to this court of inquiry to be able to
understand what happened on the 9th of February.
Q Thank you.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel for the court
any questions
MACDONALD: No questions, sir.
VADM NATHMAN: With respect to
Admiral Sullivan are there any challenges from any of
8
the counsel for the parties
ATTORNEY C: Sir, we have no
challenges
ATTY D: No challenges.
ATTY E: Sir, no challenges.
VADM NATHMAN: We've gone on here
for a while folks, I think what we'll do is recess
for approximately ten to fifteen minutes and then
proceed with questions for Admiral Stone. This court
is in recess.
(10:00 o'clock recess)
Choose a session: Day 1, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 2, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
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Day 4, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
Day 5, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
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