Unofficial transcript: Day 2, Session 4
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3:45 p.m.
Q Recognize that type of drift rate, this is based on the
demonstrations we saw today, so it would have been in order
the sonar operator would have been the first -- the -- in
parallel the fire control technician of the watch should have
also have sensed that same piece, and now --
A Yes.
Q The problem then is you have the visual line of sight
issues that maybe the Officer of the Deck or the Commanding
Officer had, but it goes back to those two operators primarily
recognizing that drift rate and making a report based on that
drift rate.
A And recognizing that it was different than the dynamics
that they just experienced for several minutes. And so as the
data settled down is the signal now reliable, are we getting a
reliable bearing rate as compared to when the ship was at high
speed and making that transition and recognizing we're now
stable and it counts.
So, there's some -- there's going to be some period of
time as the human eye recognizes that and the human mind
recognizes we're now in a different mode of viewing this data,
and to give the ship credit, that takes a finite amount of
time, and they were on this leg very, very briefly. So,
obviously in hindsight it wasn't enough time for them to
recognize that bearing rate because they would have all cued
to that. That's something they're trained to do.
I just want to remind you, sir, the Officer of the Deck
and the Captain have a handicap of not having that as due
display on the CON working.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Excuse me just for a minute,
if I could ask you just to slow down a little bit in your
answers with the translation.
VADM. NATHMAN: This is fairly intense
questioning here, so we'll try and be more deliberate in our
questions and not interrupt each other. I apologize. Go
ahead, Captain.
BY RDML STONE:
Q I'd like to just look at the condition of the sonar
suite. We talked quite a bit yesterday about the lack of the
as a due or (inaudible).. the CON's remote sonar display
that's on the CON, and with that out of commission which
occasionally occurs on a submarine, what types of things would
you have expected the ship to do to compensate for the loss of
that vital piece of display equipment, or in your opinion what
types of things did you see them do to compensate for the lack
of having that sensor presentation?
A To answer that question in the reverse order that you
asked it, Admiral, what I did see the ship do through my
interview process is that both the Captain and the Executive
Officer spent more time in sonar than you would normally
expect them to. Personally looking at the displays that were
in sonar and no longer available to them on the CON. So the
senior leadership was trying to compensate by their personal
observation.
I think after the Captain had done that type of
checking. He then asked the Executive Officer to fulfill that
role, so there was a sharing of that sense of need to see the
sonar data by the two senior officers.
Now, to answer the first part of the question what would
I have expected to have seen, my experience as a Captain of a
submarine similar to this one, a decade ago or more, was that
when that device broke on a deployment, I required a temporary
standing order to be followed by the ship which required
additional care in assessing sonar contacts before tactical
decisions on that assessment were allowed to be made.
Q So you actually -- this evolution to a standard you
described would actually be -- you'd expect it to be slower
versus faster?
A Exactly. I think the most important parameter that
would change would be you would invest more time in your
deliberations on the tactical picture before making decisions
to change the ship's status.
Q Would you expect the fire control displays to become
more important, more moderated by the Officer of the Deck and
other people in control that were overseeing the contact
situation?
A Yes. I would expect them to get even more scrutiny
because you have fewer things to use to provide that tactical
assurance now in control with the as do out of commission and
the fire control system as that main set of sensors that main
set of analysis equipment that can't provide you equivalent
data to what the sonar display would have otherwise shown.
Q So, in other words, in my mind the FTOW fire technician
of watch would probably have more oversight in a situation
than the Greeneville found themselves in?
A Yes, sir. You can really pile on with all kinds of good
ideas in hindsight here on how they should have compensated.
I think the fairest way to say it is, that investing more time
and deliberateness in their tactical decisions in some manner
that they would need to figure out how to execute would have
been warranted.
Q This piece of equipment to clear up my mind was out of
commission prior to them underway, or after the ship was
underway? Do you recall?
A I can't tell you exactly when it was noted to be failed.
It was either just prior to or just after underway when they
were conducting either pre-underway checks or when they were
trying to use it upon the early part of the underway. There's
some ambiguity in my mind on when it was failed, and when it
was noted to be failed, but it was essentially at the start of
the underway.
Q Were there any efforts that you saw to attempt to
troubleshoot or repair the -- this poor piece of equipment?
A The assessment, as I understand it from interviews, the
assessment by sonar to the chain of command was in order to
effect repairs it would have been very disruptive on the CON
where you're controlling the ship, and that awkwardness would
not have worked with going out and submerging and conducting
the evolutions, so they needed to find some other way than
fixing to compensate, because they needed --
Q You don't feel the large number of sonar men off the
ship contributed to the inability to do technical repairs?
A I don't know the answer to that question, Admiral. I
didn't pursue that.
BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q Admiral, let me ask you a question about compensation.
You mentioned that with this display not being
available, and my understanding was that it apparently failed,
as I gather it, away. I think you're very accurate in your
description of the fact that it was going to be difficult to
repair and do what they had to do in terms of controlling the
ship and actually working on that piece of gear, but the
Commanding Officer you mentioned that you -- one of your
procedural changes would be a temporary change to a standing
order. Was there any temporary change to the Captain's
standing orders that you could detect? Or written -- any
guidance, verbal guidance to the watch standards as a result
of this?
A No, sir, with the exception that there may have been
some direction to the Executive Officer from the Commanding
Officer to assist in providing monitoring of the sonar display
and sonar -- and the testimony may help reveal further on
that.
But, otherwise, there should -- I don't believe there
were any additional standing orders created.
Q But that's a form of compensation, you're taking your
number two, your Executive Officer, you're putting him in
critical control space, I -- that looks like compensation to
me. What were the expectations of Commanding Officer when he
puts -- put the Executive Officer in that space? Why did he
do it and how long was the XO there? I'll be interested to
know that. And what do you think the Commanding Officer's
expectations were when he specifically put his number two into
that space?
A I want to be careful here because I'm hazy on my
recollection of the interview data that pertains. All I can
recall is that the XO was asked when the ship was getting
ready to go to periscope depth, about in that time frame to
position himself in the forward end of control where he could
see in the sonar and provide assistance, I believe it was in
that period of time that -- that he did that.
Q This was after the 150 foot search, sonar search?
A I'm not sure. It might have been during.
Q All right.
Can you answer what the CO's expectations were when you
put your Executive Officer in that space?
A I would be conjecturing.
Q Okay.
Would it be that you expect a very high level of
oversight into that space because you put your number two guy
there specifically?
A Yes, it would be. And I now do have a recollection
because I remember a statement the XO made in an interview
that the displays looked like a lot of disruption. Again, as
I've told the Court, I think this is a firing where the
displays were too dynamic to be useful, and I think the XO
knew that, so this is would be in the period it was going to
periscope depth, so that places it in time. I expect the XO
to be very diligent, professional and helpful.
Q Were there any -- were there any change in the quality
of the reports that came out of sonar? Was there any
noticeable change as a result of the Executive Officer? That
could be for a couple reasons, maybe there was nothing
significant to report, but could you detect in any of your
statements that you took that there was a change in the
quality in the way those reports were made, to control?
A No, sir, I can't make a statement one way or the other
on that. I don't know.
Q Was there any change to the improvement, or was there
improved quality of situational awareness on Greeneville as a
result of putting the XO in sonar?
A I don't know. I can't honestly answer that question. I
don't have enough data. I did not get a chance to pursue that
in interviews.
BY RDML STONE:
Q I was reading through the preliminary report in closure
five a statement by -- -- (inaudible) on page two that in the
summary of his testimony, or his interview it says the ASDVU,
OC reported by Nav at 0715 to 0730 told sonar sup. who came
out to look at it, Petty Officer Holmes or Reyes, also CINC CO
prior to underway. That's Lieutenant Sloan's statement.
If in fact that is true, would the report to the Commanding
Officer of that system being an OC prior to underway, could
that be viewed as a go, no-go criteria? In other words since
we're still pier side let's go ahead and fix that prior to
getting underway?
A No, sir. I believe that a ship should be able to get
underway and operate safely and come back at the end of that
day without this piece of equipment operating.
However, compensation would be appropriate when it was
out of commission because of its importance to the Officer of
the Deck understanding the ship's contact picture. But
certainly it's not a fail to sail item. The ship can operate
without that piece of gear. Submarines in general have a lot
of gear that you can compensate for, continue to operate
safely without -- and I would put this in that category.
Q Thank you.
BY RDML STONE:
Q Back to the condition of the sensor sweep. I read them
in your investigation here, your report. Were there any other
pieces of equipment that affected the operation of the
Greeneville that day directly, that were out of commission?
A I would say no. And -- basically no. I could give you
some equipment that would be important on a mission to be out
of commission, but for the operations they were going to
conduct that day, the answer is basically no.
Q Shift gears here a little bit. Stay on the same theme
of the ship's operations approaching near periscope depth. I
was struck by reading your report of some of the lack of
formality. For instance the FTOW of the afternoon watch
didn't know the as do was out of commission until half way
through his watch. The fact that a number of the key members
of the control party thought they had different types of
different numbers of contacts as they were getting ready for
periscope depth. Could you comment on your assessment of the
formality of the way Greeneville was operated on the 9th of
February in the watch stations?
A Yes, sir. Well, with the caveat that I have an
incomplete picture because I had to rely on secondhand reports
from interviews and so I don't feel real confident that I have
a complete picture of whether that was formal or not. But I
have varying pictures. I think there were some reports that
were made in a formal manner, and the processes were conducted
formally, and then I have evidence that there were some others
that were not conducted formally.
It would not surprise me to have an after the fact
interview of the key watchstanders a day later and to have
some disparities in the recollection of the contact numbers
and bearings an hour before a collision. And I think that's
to some degree that disparaty in recollecting Sierra numbers
and bearings of those contacts and how many there were in that
hour before the collision is a natural phenomenon of time over
recollection. But there were other indicators such as no
information displayed effectively for an hour before the
collision on the contact evaluation plot that can have no
other explanation than a low standard was applied to
maintaining that plot.
Q Well, back to the formality of going to periscope depth.
As I read your report it was not clear to me that the scenario
you described as -- where the Officer of the Deck makes his
formal reports to the Commanding Officer who gives permission
to proceed necessarily was -- occurred on this day, that the
Officer of the Deck was really in a minor role and not where
he should be in the middle of trying to sort out the contact
picture to present that to the Commanding Officer, rather the
Commanding Officer was in all intents and purposes acting as
the accounting officer or the officer there. Am I wrong in
that assessment?
A Admiral, I think you're partially wrong. I pressed on
this issue because it's a central issue to the back up the CO
was getting in the operation of the ship from his key watch
standard, and I think to some degree the Officer of the Deck
who was relatively junior and relatively inexperienced was
merely a respondenter to the CO's direction. And to some
degree the Captain was directly involved in a lot of these
evolutions, perhaps more so than he would normally be or that
a typical CO normally would be, and therefore the Captain was
presupposing the answers to the normal reports he would get,
and cutting 'em off to save time. And so that's partly what
was operating here.
I think that this is an issue that needs to be pursued
further through testimony, because I was not able to talk to
some of the players and pursue this personally in interviews.
Q Could you comment on the relationship that you were able
to derive, if any, between the Commanding Officer and the
Executive Officer, how they worked together as a team, what
their contact communications were in this scenario?
A Yes, sir. I can -- I wanted to pursue this area through
interviews and was not able to, and I think that's an area of
some frustration to me because I was not able to interview the
parties.
The issue of the forcible back up to the CO, both from
the Officer of the Deck and the Executive Officer are still
areas that require further examination. And I'm frustrated
that I was not able to do very much in that area in my
investigation.
I have indirect interview reports from other people that
would lend some credence to the theory that the CO was over
directive particularly of this Officer of the Deck, and that
therefore the Officer of the Deck may not have had as
substantial a role in being a forceful back up to the
Commanding Officer for the safety of the ship as naval
regulations and the force commander would like.
But I was not able to get good evidence one way or the
other on that presumption.
I was also not able to get very far in determining
whether or not the XO and the CO had a working relationship
that was one where the CO's counsel was frequently sought and
effective, or not. And I think that's something for the Court
to pursue.
I'm only under the assumption that the XO did frequently
provide the CO forceful back-up because that's the standard in
the fleet.
There were extenuating circumstances in this occasion
where that may have been made even more challenging for the
Exec. to accomplish because of the distinguished visitors, the
compressed time frame, the CO was obviously in charge of the
evolutions and personally directing most of the actions, and
so there were even more of a heightened challenge than normal
for an XO to stand up and interject and I was not able to pull
the string on that very well. And I think that's work undone.
BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q Given for this analysis so far, some sense of that the
ship didn't meet standards in terms of if it weren't for 150
feet or meet standards of periscope depth, so there's a
deterioration of the ability to use sensors where its
periscope, the nonuse of radar, ESM sonar, that would build
situational awareness, and alert members there in that were
responsible for the safe navigation, conducting maneuvers of
that ship, it starts with the Commanding Officer and goes to
the Officer of the Deck and goes to the different watch teams
that are there.
Was there anyone that you sensed, I'll go through some
individuals here, that you felt had a sense of good
situational awareness in terms of -- of seas esteem, 013. Did
you feel the Commanding Officer had a good sense of
situational awareness on Sierra 13?
A I think at the time he felt he did. I'm certainly sure
he did at the time.
Q Okay. Based on fact, though, based on what we know,
that red line that you showed us yesterday.
A Well, in fact, I'm sure he didn't correctly understand
parameters of Sierra 13 at the time, although he thought he
did. I'm sure he wouldn't have gone to periscope depth
otherwise.
Q How about the Officer of the Deck?
A I think the Officer of the Deck had an even lesser
understanding of Sierra 13 because he was not able to
frequently go into sonar.
Q How about the Executive Officer?
A I think the Executive Officer was in a position to
certainly have as much concern as the CO, based on his
location and control and his proximity to displays. I think
that -- I think the XO had a concern about the time frame
things were being executed independent of the data being
displayed, and that's the most conviction I have is that the
XO was concerned about time frame.
Q I think we've been able to determine, to correct
something that the XO got into sonar about the time the ship
was approaching 150 feet for the first time, I think we've
been able to establish that?
A Yes, sir. I think he was in there during the period
they were preparing to go to periscope depth at 150 feet.
Q How about the sonar sup.?
A I think the sonar sup. was making frequent
communications with the Commanding Officer on announcing
circuits, interviews would support that they had a dialogue,
they were discussing the contact picture, so I think the sonar
sup. was involved. He had a very dynamic display and short
legs, and I might also add the sonar sup. is providing raw
data and it's difficult for him to make reverse engineering
criticisms of the Officer of the Deck and the way the ship is
being driven. The sonar supervisor and sonar men generally
have to accept the way the ship's driven from control and they
have to live with whatever legs they get.
So, my assessment --
Q Okay. Let's make sure I understand this. So, he may
not have had good situational awareness of Sierra 13, but he
was aware that he didn't have very good data, is -- so --
A He should have been.
Q Otherwise you can't say if you -- you know, if you
suggest but did he -- did he make sure that the team, the
Officer of the Deck and the Commanding Officer that this data
was insufficient to develop any type of situational awareness?
A Yes, he should have had a sense that he had not had a
chance to provide enough good TMA on the legs that they had
driven.
Q How about the fire control technician watch?
A A lot of the responsibility for assessing the adequate
amount of knowledge on contacts rests on his shoulder by -- by
the nature of his watch and dispute.
His duties, and he clearly was in a position, and as you
can see from that range versus time was in a direct position
to influence the Captain and the Officer of the Deck's
decisions and --
Q Based on -- based on specifically this data here, this
data here, this straight data and this data here that he
should have had a, in your judgment, a fairly high sense of
the situational awareness that he had a contact that was
fairly close?
A Yes, sir.
Q All right.
How about the chief of staff who was back in the aft
part of control, would he have a sense from any of the reports
being made, would his attention been alerted to Sierra 13, or
a surface contact, of concern?
A I don't think he was in a position to know much about
particular contacts. He was in a position, if nothing else,
to judge that the time lines were too abbreviated for the
technical processes that were going on.
Q Okay.
Is there anyone else in the control in terms of a lock
station duty that you felt had some situational awareness or
should have had some situation wearness on Sierra 13?
A No. I think I've run the gamut of who would be directly
involved in that.
BY RDML STONE:
Q Could I ask the same question, although different,
During your investigation did you get the sense that
anyone mentioned by Admiral Nathman were concerned not
necessarily with a given contact, but the way the ship
executed procedures that they routinely did, that were
executed in the past in the rapid fashion that they did, or
the manner in which they did?
For instance, to go from slowing to periscope depth and
back and do emergency blow in 12 minutes, did that strike
anybody at a bit abnormal -- unusual?
A Yes, sir. The interviewe the Executive Officer
conducted with Commadore Bias before my involvement in the
investigation revealed that the XO felt that the amount of TMA
prior to proceeding to periscope depth was abbreviated, and
that the -- if nothing else the ship's depth that was ordered
for the high look (phonetic) in the time the periscope depth
was not shallow enough.
Now, he was thinking these things himself, to himself
mentally, but not articulating them to the Commanding Officer
or the Officer of the Deck.
Q Any explanation for not expressing his views?
A I believe it is his duty to bring up concerns he has
with the way the ship's operating to the Captain and the OD.
And I would be conjecturing on why he didn't bring them up on
this occasion.
Q He was the lone person that had concerns?
A I also got a sense from Captain Brandhuber (phonetic)
that you felt things were going quick. The implication was
too quick for the complexity of the evolutions and their
importance. But what's less a direct sense of that in his
thought process than what the XO was thinking.
BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q One that -- when the chief of staff in his testimony
mentioned that quick and the implication was to you too quick,
too quick in the sense of the fact the whole evolution was too
quick? Did he want to raise a specific question? I mean, was
there an obligation by the chief of staff in the implication
of it being too quick to ask a question?
A He specifically told me that he did not notice any
action that met the threshold requirement, if you will, to
intercede and advise the CO to make a change.
He had a sense things were going faster than he would
have expected, but he told me he did not see something that
violated the thresholds he had unconsciously set in the way he
would observe the ship operating.
So, again, fruitful to look for further testimony here.
BY RDML STONE:
Q During your investigation, to complete that thought,
this was one given situation, but in any given day in a
submarine's existence at sea there are other times where
important reports must get to the Commanding Officer, even if
the Commanding Officer is wrong. Do you sense there was
anybody in the Greeneville crew that would provide that sort
of forceful back up to the skipper?
A Well, that's the -- that's the issue of trying to
understand the commanding climate and the way the ship
routinely operates. And of course my ability to do that with
the brief and secondhand looks that I got through interviews
is far from perfect way to do that.
I got a sense when I tried to make that assessment that
the ship is a very experienced, competent ship, that is used
to success, that the Commanding Officer is very directive in
the way that significant or complicated operations occur.
He's directly involved and explicit in what he wants and
frequently personally direct what he wants; that the ship is
acclimated to that approach to business, that that is not by
any means good or bad. I'm just stating that's the
characteristics of the -- my sense of how this ship works.
One of the potential implications of a ship that
operates this way is that the CO doesn't get a lot of
corrective input from subordinates because he's very busy
giving directions, and the ship has experienced a lot of
success when he does.
And so it's -- that's one of the subtleties here that I
tried to sense. I did so very imperfectly and I'm not about
to tell you I'm confident that that's really the way the ship
routinely operated.
I just got a sense of that, kind of a glimpse of that
from some of the interviews. Some more directly than others.
And -- but from more than one source.
I want to stress this was not a command where people
were shocked when they brought things to the Commanding
Officer, kind of the opposite, very positive commanding
climate, very nurturing Commanding Officer, revered by the
crew universally. And so we're not talking a situation where
people were afraid of the Commanding Officer. It's a
different type of respect, it's -- it's more of respect for
his abilities and a willingness to, if he says that that's the
way it is, well then that's okay for me, 'cause it sure worked
well for us in the past. So you become accustomed to
operating that way.
Now, in the case of the second senior officer on board,
the Executive Officer, clearly he's in a position where he's
paid to give the Captain private counsel routinely, and I
think that should be pursued in testimony. My sense is that
most XOs of the fleet do that. They do it in a way,
particularly in this kind of command climate, where only the
CO hears the counsel. So that has to be in private settings.
This was not a private setting leading into this collision,
and the manner in which the XO may provide that advice and
counsel to the Captain would not be delivered well in this
setting.
So, there are those kind of human equations going on
here. And again, I just want to continue to add, I don't feel
confident that I fully understand the true climate and I wish
I could have done more interviews. I wish I had more time to
do interviews in order to pursue this, but I was not able to.
BY RDML STONE:
Q I have a question that relates to both the submarine
culture and the training related. Because it's so inherently
dangerous just operating at sea, our Navy has a program, ORM,
operational risk management, and we're attempting and we've
been training and working hard to view that as part of our
culture of who we are in that when we go to sea and operate
our ships, decisions whether we're going to go alongside with
one engine or two engine, our Commanding Officers, wardrooms,
our crews are very focused on the safety aspects in peace
time, so we train to perform operational risk management.
Does the submarine force endorse that concept, and is there
specific training conducted for ships such as Greeneville with
regard to risk management?
A The submarine force does embrace operational risk
management, it does conduct training. I don't know if USS
Greeneville has done that in the recent past. But that is
kind of the way we have always done business, operational risk
management is something that I think we identify very closely
with, and have for the history of the nuclear power program,
because it's a relentless master for high standards and
avoiding accidents.
So, the answer to your question I think is do we have a
-- do we have a well-documented ORM instruction type of
approach to ORM, perhaps not. Do we live ORM as a way of
doing business routinely, I think very much so.
I think that we're also probably more overt in embracing
it with instructions and training in recent past, and I just
don't know the answer on how Greeneville has specifically
identified that type of training as different from the way
they would routinely approach challenges.
BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q I take it from your answer that the submarine community
it's -- the ORM is actually that description in terms of those
terms are actually timely as to the way you guys have always
done business, that you felt you had a model for ORM in the
way that you operated, the way you do business because that's
what you felt you were in for, that's what you were in terms
of how you operated on a regular basis, whether it was for
matters of tactics or for safe operation of the ship.
A Yes, exactly. You're more articulate than I am.
BY RDML STONE:
Q The reason why I asked that question, as we look through
the various aspects of this incident, we come up with facts
such as the display unit being out, a third of the crew
ashore, under instruction watch standard without supervision,
going through fast procedures for TMA and periscope, all these
added risks to a routine piece operation requires a study very
carefully if we think that really reflects operational risk
management, since all of those indicate increased risk for a
very routine op.. That's all I had.
CAPT. MACDONALD: This Court will recess until
0800 tomorrow morning.
(Proceedings adjourned at 4:25 p.m.)
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