Unofficial transcript: Day 2, Session 2
Choose a session: Day 1, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 2, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
Day 3, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 4, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
Day 5, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
SECOND SESSION, MARCH 6, 2001 1:45 o'clock p.m.
BY CAPT. MACDONALD:
Q As part of your investigation did you have an
opportunity to examine appropriateness of the out area
assigned to Greeneville on the 9th of February?
A I did.
Q I'd like to have this chart marked as Court Exhibit 17.
Admiral, do you recognize Exhibit 17?
A Yes, I do.
Q And Commander Harrison, if you would put it up on the
ledge.
Sir, can you describe for the Court what this is?
A This is a chart, nautical chart of the Hawaiian island
environment that shows several of the islands, including the
island of Oahu on the upper left here. And in the red border
here you see an outline of a portion of the area assigned to
the USS Greeneville for the 9th of February, surface to test
depth submerged for her use in a manner that she would not
have to worry about sharing those waters with other submerged
submarines.
Q Why was she assigned such a large area?
A She was generally assigned this area because of
convenience. The -- certainly she did not need such a large
area, but nor did any other submarine. So it's a common
practice to just give a general large blocks of area to
submarines and not encumber them with having to worry about
close boundaries, when no other submarines have any legitimate
use for that water. So it's somewhat administrative facility
to do this.
BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q Admiral Griffiths, how would other mariners,
particularly the Captain of the Ehime-Maru know about the
operation, or would it be a concern to him that there was a
submarine operating area designated by SUBPAC?
A Admiral, we do not promulgate to the common body public
national or international the operating locations of our
submarines in general.
First of all, it's the bound and duty of the submarines
as the burdened vessel to remain clear of the surface shipping
and to operate safely; and secondly, we have in addition to
the rest of the Navy a vested interest in having freedom of
the seas and not being restricted to areas that would cause
our military capabilities to be curtailed.
Basically the surface ships should not have to worry
about our submarines, because we should always operate in a
way that does not in any way endanger the safety of those
surface ships, including their pendages such as fishing trolls
and nets and anything they may put in the water for commercial
use.
So, because we have this burden of remaining clear, and
we have this need to be able to freely operate on the high
seas, we have chosen not to come under a regime as a Navy
policy where we promulgate our operating positions.
Q Do you know how long the operating area has been there
described by that box?
A Well, that box is actually part of a much larger grid
system that completely surrounds the Hawaiian islands. It's
just a subset of that grid system, and it would have been
assigned for the very specific time the ship was underway, a
day or less.
Q Let's look at the perimeter of that area that's to the
north, that approaches the islands themselves. Has that been
there for some existence of time? You described earlier
typically you had no other conflicts with another submarine,
typically the submarine would be given the leeway to use most
of that operating area, so did typically were submarines given
perimeters to the north and to the -- surrounding the northern
part of that operating area?
A Let me see if I'm following you, Admiral.
This is a daily assignment, and this particular day and
each day is different. This water was not needed for any
other submarine. So this just happened to be a convenient way
to set the grid up such that it ended very close to Oahu for
the convenience of a short trip. That particular day other
submarines may well have had waters contiguous to this
boundary and been operating in their own assigned submerged
areas and each day is different as they rotate through their
missions.
Q When you build that operating area, does it consider the
density of surface traffic, or changes in the density of
surface traffic? In other words, over a period of years I
assume it's been there for some time, and if you can tell me
how long it's been there it would be great, but is there ever
modifications made to this knowing that you will conduct some
operations, including going to periscope depth so are there
considerations made in assignment of the area or the shape of
the area based on any traffic density studies?
A Admiral, I can't honestly answer that directly. I can
give you my best guess, because I tried to answer those
questions myself in my investigation, but I ran out of time.
I can tell you that in general major shipping lanes are
all north of the northern most portion of this boundary so
that there are no major shipping lanes that would come through
this boundary.
There are shipping that come through this boundary, not
just Ehime-Maru but others, on a routine basis because of
inter-island traffic, but the vast percentage of merchant
shipping would be on a track north of the line I'm demarcing
here.
For example, from here to about this direction would be
Panama Canal, and then up through Alaska down here, and then
over to say Japan here, so you have a general semi circle of
the shipping that's going to stay north of this line I'm
horizontally drawing here.
I asked this question of the Coast Guard indirectly
through Captain Kyle's office, and their response was as I
just described, that the major shipping lanes are generally
all north of the line I'm drawing here above the northern most
portion of this boundary.
So, to some degree the Navy did assign this water to the
Greeneville knowing that it was doing so conservatively with
regard to merchant shipping.
Q In SUBPAC's operational hat, they assign this area to
the submarines, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know if SUBPAC has ever done a review in the last
five years, 10 years, any review of the traffic density? Have
they asked for any studies? Are they aware of any studies?
A Admiral, I'm not aware, the answer to the question. I
mean, and I think that's probably grounds for good further
testimony.
BY RDML. STONE:
Q Okay.
Admiral, in your investigation was there any indication
that the USS Greeneville operated outside her assigned area?
Q On the 9th of February?
A I determined she never operated outside of her assigned
area, she always stayed within her assigned area, including
the buffers for position uncertainty with your means of fixing
the ship's position.
So, the answer is she stayed well within the confines of
her area throughout the time she was submerged.
Q Is there a, for a defense mapping agency when they go
about making a chart, do they have an area here that's based
on an input from submarine community or Navy on where to put
sub operating boxes, and if so is that currently accurate on
the charts that are promulgated today by defense mapping
agency?
A To the extent that I could determine the entire area
surrounding the Hawaiian islands have grids, and the submarine
force uses all those grids intermittently as the needs of the
force to transit and to operate come up.
The issue of the transit lanes is one that I'm not
particularly aware of the answer. It may be or it may not be
that the assignments of submerged areas are done to
exclusively avoid those transit areas. I think that's
something that further investigation is probably warranted
for.
Q Additionally was the driving factor on why Greeneville
was operating up in this port of the operating box driven by
the time line for the distinguished visitor embark? Is that
in fact what drove them to that location?
A Yes, sir. I would say time and distance, they wanted to
make sure that they didn't go farther than they needed to go
to get the mission accomplished because it would just add
time.
And I might add, I asked the Coast Guard not only more
merchant shipping but also for fishing activity and pleasure
craft activity, and their answer is that if you -- if you
probably can't see it on this chart, but approximately where I
am circling it with my laser there are fishing buoys, FAD in
various nomenclature buoys, they're called FAD and then
additional numbers or letters around the island, and the small
pleasure craft occasionally do go out and fish in the
visibility of those buoys because they tend to attract
fishing.
There was such a fishing buoy about where I'm putting my
laser pointer now down in the lower portions of -- I should
say in the more northern section of the area assigned to the
Greeneville. And I pursued with the National Transportation
Safety Board investigation whether or not the master had any
intention of bothering this buoy in his transit and he did
not. This was not a part of his plan. His course of 166 on
the Ehime-Maru had nothing to do with these buoys, but rather
was aimed at coming well south in order to clear the land mass
by several hundred miles to do international fishing.
But finally, I just want to add that the Coast Guard did
not feel there was a reliable way to determine where pleasure
craft would be in hence to avoid them, that they're very
unpredictable so you may be just as well to be here as here to
avoid them in the opinion of the Coast Guard.
BY RDML STONE:
Q I'd like to follow up on the Papa hotel time.
It's my understanding that this area that Greeneville
was assigned was for the entire day, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So the Papa hotel time which was the time to be near the
entrance to the channel to return to Pearl Harbor at 1400,
that's more of an administrative time than if the ship is late
is not a significant event, it's a matter of just getting 'em
back into the queue for port, that they could have stayed out
as long as they wanted during that day and not been outside
their assigned operating areas?
A I think that's a fair statement that they had the
ability to change that time and make it later with very little
cost. That is very little cost with regard to the port
facilities where you have to arrange a change in the support
arrangements.
On the other hand, I'm sure on the Captain's mind was
the desire not to overly inconvenience the guests who probably
had plans based on the promulgated schedule for the rest of
their time on -- that day on the island. So that would be the
other side of the equation you would be considering, but
there's no question that the CO had the ability to prolong the
period of time at sea before they came into buoy Papa hotel if
he chose to make that change.
BY CAPT. MACDONALD:
Q Admiral, in your opinion is the current box that defines
the op. area? Is it in the right spot? Is that op. area in
the right position for submarine operations? And if so, why.
A If I were assigning the Greeneville areas to operate in
today to conduct this type of mission, this would be a very
logical assigned area.
Now, there is land obviously protruding into this
assigned area, there's also shoal water, relatively shoal
water in this region up in here which the ship would not want
to operate at deep submergence, but in general it's good
water, clear shipping lanes and although you don't want to hit
these few buoys that are in there otherwise unencumbered by
obstructions and reasonable to operate them and not too far
from home port.
Q Admiral, you know that the CINC has tasked the Court to
answer the question is the op. area, is it in the appropriate
spot. In your opinion it's in the appropriate spot?
A In my opinion that did not play a role or a factor here.
I think it was an appropriate operating area to assign to the
Greeneville.
Q Thank you, sir.
BY RDML STONE:
Q The local operating areas for submarine, does the
submarine Commanding Officer have a chance to have an input of
where an area is if there's a chance he can move the area or
the submarine operating authority move that area?
A Yes, sir. The submarine operating area will listen to
inputs from the ship and if he can accommodate the ship and
the ship has a logical reason for a request he will try to
accommodate 'em. There will be occasions where he will
accommodate 'em and occasions where he won't based on other
constraints. But the bottom line is they do have an input.
Q Thank you.
RDML STONE: I'd like to ask to see Exhibit 17
closer, if you could have it brought over.
Q There's a box on there that addresses the submarine test
area, and I'd like to have -- could you address if that box
is within the operating area that is the assigned Greeneville
area. You'll see it's on the chart. If you could read what
that box says?
A Submarine test and trial area.
Q And what does that -- its purpose on the chart? What's
that meant to tell mariners?
A I believe that's an (inaudible). I believe that has
served its purpose and we have not got around to removing that
from the chart. I think in general mariners pay no attention
to that indication, and that it has no true role in the way we
operate our submarines today or assign them operating areas.
I think it was a -- as I understand it it was assigned back in
the 1950s, when it was a practice to conduct certain types of
trials there as a matter of routine for diesel submarines that
did not have long legs and there was a reason, you know, to
keep them restricted to their home port area.
And I say they don't have long legs, they didn't have a
lot of endurance on the battery before they had to recharge
their battery with diesel engines. So, unlike nuclear
submarines today, there was an important reason to give them a
very restricted area to operate in.
And it may have also served in those days as a warning
to merchant vessels because these diesel submarines would have
to routinely raise their snorkel above the surface of the
water and recharge their batteries while running diesel
engines, and they were burdened but they were also very
cumbersome and very unmaneuverable in that condition.
So there would have been more of a reason to have that
area in the diesel boater, and less so today.
Q Thank you.
Admiral, have I no further questions.
BY VADM. NATHMAN:
Q I'm going to take you back. I want to go back and look
at the mission for the boat again for Greeneville. I'd like
to look at some of the impact that the DV embark could have
had, whether it was a watch standard issue or the escort
issues.
I'd like to go back and talk specifically about the
senior rider on board, I believe that was the capacities on
board as a chief of staff, specifically in compliance with its
own memo in terms of when he rode a particular boat what he
expected in terms of reports.
I'd like to spend a little bit of time on the training
value of this particular underway for the Greeneville. There
was a lot of discussion yesterday, I heard we did the
emergency deep -- for training we did emergency blow for
training and I want to ask a couple of questions about that.
What did you think the mission was for Greeneville on
the 9th of February?
A I think her primary mission was to demonstrate the
prowls to the visitors.
Q So it was -- the primary mission not to put words in
your mouth, was a DV embarkation?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay. And that was the only mission that she had that
day, other than the subset of the fact that you get training,
value when you get underway?
A That would be the only mission, other than you always
have that subset present and you're gaining value from it, the
training.
Q To your knowledge are there any rules or regulations or
guidance to -- for DV embarkations when that is the only
mission for the -- for a naval units, whether it be an
aircraft or ship?
A I know that in general the practice is discouraged of
getting underway only for that mission. Higher authority has
promulgated that in general these underways should be
concurrent with other operational requirements where the ship
would need to be underway anyway.
So, this is an exception to the rule that is provided by
higher authority.
Q Maybe you can take me through, at one time the ship had
been scheduled I believe to be underway through this
particular period for operations. You had mentioned that she
had been a a maintenance availability or the past several
months, last couple of months and that she had a scheduled
underway time that had changed and then this DV embark had
been added on the 9th of February, is that accurate?
A I think it's almost accurate. The only change I would
make is that I think the DV embark had been on for a while as
well, but coincident with another underway up until the other
underway went away.
Q So the DV embark had been schedule, but as part of an
ending of an already scheduled underway period?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then that underway period went away, but the DV
embark remained?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know why the DV embark remained? Was it an
oversight?
A I believe it was a conscious decision to not derail the
significant efforts by these civilians from all over the
country to come to the ship and ride.
Q Okay.
A At considerable cost and effort.
Q To your knowledge is there any guidance given to
submarine captains about their DV embark? In other words,
this is what you're expected to demonstrate? If it's got such
high value, and we believe it has value, are the COs given
some sort of guidance or template for demonstrations that
would increase the value of that embarkation? Or is that
dependent upon the CO and the time that he's given to provide
the best type of professional demonstration to the
distinguished visitors?
A There is generally no specific guidance to the CO that
direct the type of evolutions or suggests the type of
evolutions that he should conduct. This is left to his
discretion.
And it of course is tailored to the amount of time
that's available, and to some degree to the audience.
For example, if you were going to take a specific
audience that had a warfare background, a joint group of
Generals, for example, who had broad warfare experience across
the military services, then the Captain may decide to try to
demonstrate a warfare scenario as the focus and thread
throughout the underway, the different types of literal
contingency capabilities of the ship in warfare.
If there were civilians that didn't have that warfare
background, he may want to just more closely show the general
dynamics of the ship and its crew, and as in the case this
time with the Greeneville.
But I think it's fair to say that we give broad latitude
to our Commanding Officers to choose these evolutions because
they have the requisite experience to do that well.
Q But the DV embark is a specific type of embark, it's
different than embarking war fighters, it's different in
inviting certain military visitors, it's different than a
family day or attire crews, there's several types of embarks
that are out there. Go back specifically, was there any
guidance or formulation or suggestions from the squadron, or
from the commander to submarine COs about how they should
tailor DV embarks?
A I think the answer to your question that I can most
truthfully give is they reserved the right, they the senior
flight officers reserved the right to provide that guidance on
the occasion that the specific make up of the ship becomes
particularly DV, if it's for example Delegates from Congress,
primary members of the senate or the House, or senior DOD
representatives from the OSD and so forth. Then generally
flight officers would get involved and give specific guidance.
That's the way I run mine for Washington for example. But
absent that type of unique audience, just talking very well
intended citizens, educators and the like, we would leave that
to the discretion of the CO as the impression that I get here
in Pearl Harbor.
Q Do you know if any of the crew, specifically the tour
guides, were there any specific briefs given to the crew about
what their DV embark would be like, what their duties were as
an escort, what type of -- what were they expected to show the
DVs? Particularly if they saw the -- the crew saw a potential
impact in terms of their duties on watch, were there any
specifics mentioned to the crew in terms of a brief, you know,
just prior to or during the embarkation to remind the crew of
their responsibilities with the DVs on board?
A I cannot answer that question. I did not have time to
develop that information and that's a good question and I just
don't know the answer.
However, I would like to say in my interviews I was able
to determine the ship felt comfortable in this type of
evolution because they had done it before and they considered
it the same as they had done before, and that they knew what
to expect.
So, to some degree experience had brought them to a
level where they were comfortable doing what they were doing,
but I can't answer the question with regard to the types of
specific training they gave the crew before the evolution.
Q Well, again let's go back to the two months or so of a
maintenance availability. What was the last time Greeneville
executed a DV embarkation?
A I don't know the answer to that.
Q Okay.
Did you feel the CO was -- since there was no set agenda
for demonstrations, was the CO, did he feel free to modify?
In other words, in a sense this is what I want to do, this is
what we published, so that's the plan, did the CO feel free
then that he could modify his plan? Did he show evidence of
any modifications to that plan or did he pretty much stick
with the plan for demonstration, or for the embark on the 9th
of February?
A I'm not able to answer that question, except that on one
occasion through interviews I was able to determine that he
considered the leading emergency blow and then decided not to.
That would be an indication that he did feel he had the
latitude to make a change to the plan. And furthermore, my
opinion is that this CO would make any changes he felt
appropriate, and he wasn't shy and timid about being in charge
and making changes to operate the ship as he saw fit.
Q Okay.
I'll go back specifically to -- I'll go back
specifically to the lunch. The lunch was scheduled from 11:00
to 12:00, and you talked about the messing issue, particularly
in the wardroom. What are the values of having a DV embark is
that often the DVs eat with the crew because there's great
value in sitting with the crew members.
I know that you mentioned the mess in terms of how the
food is prepared is shared, but there's a separate wardroom
for the officers and there's an enlisted mess for the crew in
terms of how they do it.
Now, did the crew -- what drove them in terms of their
decisions, so I see that decision to extend the lunch time as
a modification of the embark plan that they had published.
Because I recall the lunch was between 11:00 and noon.
A Yes, sir. I would disagree with you. I feel that the
ship -- the CO intended all along to have two settings in the
wardroom, and that his guests all ate in the wardroom, and
that 11:00 to 12:00 time was really for the crew. And I think
that the ship felt it had that latitude to make that change
within the white lines.
I think that the CO felt he would be distracted in
running the ship for a large part of the day, and that that
lunch was the one time he knew he could count on to really sit
down and talk to these guests on an individual basis, and
personally. And so I really think that although eating in the
crew's mess is certainly appropriate, and we do it a lot on
submarines, particularly for the visitor cruises, when you
have a relatively small group of visitors that were
distinguished like this, that you would target them to eat in
the wardroom. Although that's arbitrary in the ship's call.
Q But my understanding is that this was an unusually large
number of DVs that were embarked, 16 that -- can you give me a
sense of what's an average out there that typically SUBPAC
boats would typically embark?
A Sixteen is about the average.
Q Okay.
A Fifteen or so is the average, as I understand it.
That's what I was able to determine.
Q All right.
A For this class of submarine.
Q Okay.
A In contrast to Trident submarines where I bring in 60 in
a shot, but it's a much much bigger ship.
BY RDML STONE:
Q As a follow-up to the President's question, this was a
unique underway just for a DV embark. During your
investigation did you say signs or the know requirements for a
submarine to get underway such as the sonar search plan, a
navigation plan, all the requisite plans that are normally
approved by the CO prior to going to sea? How to operate, so
that the submarine is basically not operating in an odd
fashion. Did you see any evidence of those sort of
preplanning done prior to the underway?
A Admiral, I did not see them, but I also did not have
time to see them. And I think that might be an area for the
Court to examine further.
Q During your interviews with the individuals, were there
any interpretation by you, by yourself that they had any
qualms about someone move or get out of their way if they're
interfering with their watch stations? Did the crew
understand that?
A Because I'm so perplexed that that did not happen with
the FT of the watch, I can only ponder that that -- that
question because it's a very disturbing thing that that did
not happen in that one case which could have made such a
difference.
However, to be honest, I just don't know how I could
assess answering that question. Through my interview process
I was not able to determine that this crew was any more
reticent or any more capable of interjecting their opinions
when needed than another crew. I just found some subtle
indicators that the way this ship ran was very much a ship
that was run under the direct control of the Captain. And the
impact of that may have been that he would get less advice
than on a ship where the Captain was delegated more of the
operational decisions to subordinates.
Q One other question. I was struck by the number of crew
that was left behind for the day. It seemed to me more than I
was used to seeing, 51 enlisted sailors and six officers, and
looking at the sailing list it looked to me like there was
seven sonar minute, including the chief left behind, as well
as the senior FT of the watch -- or FT, the chief. Did that
seem excessive to you in your review of some of the embark
programs?
A Admiral, I had a sense that there may have been some
missing ingredients in the shear numbers that they took to
sea. They had a highly qualified crew and those are the ones
they took to sea, and the numbers they took would have been
enough.
But if the piece parts were lacking as you examined who
those individuals were, and that left them with a shortage of
some of their key watch stations like in sonar, then that
would be a problem. I did not have the opportunity to fully
bring out those questions, but there may be some meat there.
VADM. NATHMAN:
Q Admiral, follow up on the DV participation.
You've already testified about the three, they were
actually manning the controls and you felt it had no impact on
what actually happened in terms of the control of the ship.
Now, did you see any other events or instances where you
felt, and maybe the reports from the fire technician might be
one of them, I'm only suggesting that, did you see any
instances where DV participation may have impacted the way the
ship was maneuvered or controlled, or the way reports were
made to the chain of command, particularly in the control
room?
A That was the central question I tried to evaluate in my
brief investigation, and I'm not sure how much I was able to
uncover to truly answer it. I only had indicators.
For example, in several of my interviews I had people
who were in control make statements that they weren't able to
see this indication or they weren't able to see that
indication because of the people that were there, and so that
led me to a sense that the ability, the shear ability to back
up your fellow watchstanders by helping them look at their
indications, providing them recommendations would be impeded
in a passive sort of way by having more people in control than
normal.
I think that the other part of the question, what have
the decorum of the guests. My own experience, which is pretty
extensive in seeing guests underway on ships, and the
interviews that I conducted for the Greeneville issue would
indicate that these were very typical guests. They were
polite, they had a very quiet demeanor, they knew not to
disrupt these busy watchstanders and this nerve center of the
ship, the control room. They tended to be still and observe
and not be disruptive in their mannerisms.
And so if they intruded, if they impeded, it would be
merely from their presence, and the fact that they took up
some of the visual and standing space in the control room, and
not anything beyond that.
And so to the degree that they disrupted the crew, it
would only be in a very passive sort of way where they were
causing more people to be in control than normal, and hence
less ability for the normal watchstanders to operate and back
each other up, than what they could see and say to others.
Q You made a very important point. You said that 16 was a
fairly average, 15, 16 was a fairly average number of DV
embarks in terms of individuals, and yet you just said the
control room was too crowded, that there were too many DVs in
there. That seems like a disconnect to me.
Why do you say there was too many in control when the
average number of visitors was about right?
A I don't remember saying too many. I'll grant you I may
have led that -- led you to that conclusion by what I was
saying. I think that the number of people in the
Greeneville's control room was actually a little less than she
would purposely put in there in certain evolutions like battle
stations.
Now, I'll grant you that the people in the control room
for battle stations are all crew members, who have assigned
duties and fully understand their role and their decorum and
how it applies to the mission, but nevertheless it's even more
people than the ship had on this occasion by a handful.
So, we should recognize the ship can function, and
function safely with this number of people in the control
room, although it's more difficult.
It requires more effort. So, generically, I'm not sure
it was too many to briefly demonstrate what the ship was
doing. In hindsight perhaps it was too many, but I think the
routine submarine out there today, or prior to today
conducting these types of evolutions would probably tend to
bring most of their guests into control as well.
Q Okay.
Put the exhibit up that shows the control room, please?
Let me ask a couple follow up questions there, Admiral
Griffiths.
Yesterday there was a comment made, I believe you made
the comment about the fire control technician of the watch
felt like there was a barrier between his station and his
ability to make his report, I think rightfully so to the
Officer of the Deck on what he had -- what his sensors, what
his displays were showing. And you described earlier the, as
I recall, that the DVs were positioned from here into this L.
When you said physical barrier, were you talking about
specifically distinguished visitors standing in the way? Was
that the barrier?
A Yes, sir. I was just using the barrier perhaps in the
sense that there were people there that wouldn't normally be
there for routine operations. That would impede his sight
line to the CON, and vice versa, and would be people who would
have to stand up and perhaps move beyond in order to have a
face-to-face conversation, or he would have to project his
voice over their presence to be heard by the Officer of the
Deck.
Q Did that impression come from your interviews with the
fire control technician?
A Yes, sir.
Q That he felt the DV was a barrier that he couldn't speak
around?
A Yes, sir. Not only a verbal impediment, I'm not saying
it could not have been overcome but it was an impediment. But
also his access to this watch station chart, which is called a
contact evaluation quad was also impeded by a number of people
that were standing between him seated here in this location
several steps away.
Q Okay.
Does it make sense to have -- to say the person standing
here, I can see how it interferes visually with the sight
line, but how does that interfere when we're talking basically
10 feet or so, I assume, between the Officer of the Deck and
the fire control technician of the watch, how is that a verbal
barrier for the watchstander?
A To you and I I don't think it is. It was in his mind
and he stated so.
Q Let's go back to the sonar watch then, again.
Do you see with the same placement of the DVs, did they
become barriers for the sonarwatch's performance of his duties
in terms of either passing reports or allowing the Commanding
Officer or the Officer of the Deck, or the Exec. officer or
whoever is present to control that vote from getting into the
sonar room?
A No, sir. I don't believe it acted as a barrier in the
case of the effective operation of sonar. For one thing
you're talking the CO and the XO and their mobility in and out
of sonar. They don't tend to let the mere presence of
strangers get in their way. Their presence is enough that
they go and do what they have to do, even if it means asking
people to step aside.
There's also a forward door in the sonar that may have
been used on occasions particularly by the XO or the CO that
were in control. I think there are routine communication
circuits that don't require physical presence for the people
in sonar and the people in control to talk effectively to each
other.
Q Okay. I'd like to move on to some questions about
training.
The ship got underway -- (inaudible) embarkation and to
support training. I find it odd that the ship left a number
of her crew, I'm not sure what their status of qualifications
were, but did the ship demonstrate any ability to conduct
training, i.e. when they -- besides normal evolutions of
getting underaway, angles and dangles, emergency deep,
emergency surface, were there any indications on watchstander
sign-offs by the crew as a result of this embarkation? In
other words, was there any qualitative or quantitative way in
measuring the training that the ship conducted?
A Admiral, there probably is. I have no idea what the
answer to that is. I can only conjecture. I didn't have time
to pursue that.
Q If a ship is going to get underway for training after a
significant amount of time, I'll say those are my words, in a
maintenance availability, why would she choose to leave so
many of her crew at home when it was a training opportunity?
A I think like in all decisions it was a trade-off, and
I'm only conjecturing. The ship that day were only going to
be underway six to eight hours, and we've had certain number
of people who had been busting their butt in maintenance and
other ways helping the ship and we want to give them the
opportunity to have a one day break, which is a privilege that
we like to grant the people who have been working very hard.
And so that the people that -- and the evolutions that
were going to be conducting at sea will be relatively limited.
For example, only some of the sonar systems were used this day
because it was a local operation, they didn't stream and use
the total raise, so the reduced tactical value for sonar
training, that's only one example.
So, I think the ship balanced what she could gain at sea
for those people she left in with what she was trying to do
for them in their day ashore on liberty, and take care of
their families and so forth and tried to make a balance.
That's my conjecture.
Q How would you describe the training value of angles and
dangles for the crew? Specifically we have the maneuvering
watch, and the chief of the boat, chief of the watch rather,
that section, is there great training value for the crew? I
think you commented that the chief of staff in your interviews
that everyone was impressed of the ability of the ship to
conduct those operations.
A I think there's significant training value. I think
it's a very positive event, and routinely conducting it has a
lot of -- makes a lot of sense to me. Particularly if you're
rotating additional people through the ship control party who
experience it, either as an under instruction watch or the
primary, because the -- the main training value, in addition
to the whole ship having that --
(Electricity went out.....)
Commencing again at 2:50 p.m.
CAPT. MACDONALD: Let the record reflect that
all parties, counsel for the parties, members of the court and
the court reporter are again present.
VADM. NATHMAN: Let's call Admiral Griffiths
back to the stand, please.
Admiral Griffiths would you please take a seat in the
witness box and I remind you, sir, that you're still under
oath.
Admiral.
BY RDML STONE:
Q Admiral, I had a couple follow up questions on our
recent discussion on the DV and embark and administration of
the crews.
Did you see any indication that the guests themselves
were indoctrinated into any submarine safety, or their roles
in the protocol of being around watchstanders, staying out of
their way and so forth, being quiet in control.
A I didn't have any specific evidence that I could review
one way or the other to determine that. It is my assumption
that that occurred, at least orally, prior to the ship getting
underway by their monitors on the ship, members of the crew.
However, I don't know.
Q So your experience that's normally or typically done for
one of these embarks?
A Yes, sir. They were orally briefed in the process of
getting on the ship by their assigned tour guides, that's how
I new of the banger, they actually completed that brief before
they even get on board the ship. But I don't know how
Greeneville did it in this case.
Q I understand.
Next question I had was we were talking about the number
of individuals, people that were in the control room as shown
here on Exhibit 6. And you alluded to or discussed that
during the ship's battle station, approximately the same
number of people would be in the control. Could you describe
for the Court the distribution differences, if there are any
differences between what you would see during a bow station
scenario versus a scenario that was conducted during this
emergency surface?
A There would be some slight differences, in particular
the areas that I'm circling on the after part of control here
would be filled in by crew members in addition to those other
areas that we've already talked about. Additionally, there
would be someone seated at each of these locations, a
watchstander in each of these five seats in a row here. There
would certainly be more than four seats filled here in sonar,
plus the -- in other words, there would be up to seven or more
operators in sonar.
Over here, in addition to navigation you would also be
conducting tactical plotting on one of the two tables here,
and this installation right here in the corner would be very
tactically significant, so you would see basically all the
light space filled in with watchstanders in the battle
stations area.
And I think actually it would be up to five people more
than were present during the collision.
Q So in your opinion the approach officer or the Officer
of the Deck would have the same, if you will, challenges to
see the fire stations, screens in a battle station scenario?
A It would actually be almost a bigger challenge, because
there would be a few more people and all of these displays
throughout the entire control room, where ever they would be,
would be coming in to play, have tactical significance in a
battle station scenario, so there would be an effort needed to
be able to get to see all of them, whereas only some of them
were in use in the daily operations such as they were on the
night of February.
(See next Court Reporter's transcript.)
Choose a session: Day 1, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 2, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
Day 3, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
Day 4, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
Day 5, Session 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
|
