E STEWART, CONCURRING. 

IN 1963, THIS COURT, IN FERGUSON V. SKRUPA, 372 U.S. 726, PURPORTED TO
SOUND THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, A
DOCTRINE UNDER WHICH MANY STATE LAWS HAD IN THE PAST BEEN HELD TO VIOLATE
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  AS MR. JUSTICE BLACK'S OPINION FOR THE COURT
IN SKRUPA PUT IT:  "WE HAVE RETURNED TO THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPOSITION THAT COURTS DO NOT SUBSTITUTE THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
BELIEFS FOR THE JUDGMENT OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES, WHO ARE ELECTED TO PASS
LAWS."  ID., AT 730.  /1/ 

BARELY TWO YEARS LATER, IN GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, THE
COURT HELD A CONNECTICUT BIRTH CONTROL LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  IN VIEW OF
WHAT HAD BEEN SO RECENTLY SAID IN SKRUPA, THE COURT'S OPINION IN GRISWOLD
UNDERSTANDABLY DID ITS BEST TO AVOID RELIANCE ON THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS THE GROUND FOR DECISION.  YET, THE
CONNECTICUT LAW DID NOT VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, NOR
ANY OTHER SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.  /2/  SO IT WAS CLEAR
TO ME THEN, AND IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR TO ME NOW, THAT THE GRISWOLD DECISION
CAN BE RATIONALLY UNDERSTOOD ONLY AS A HOLDING THAT THE CONNECTICUT
STATUTE SUBSTANTIVELY INVADED THE "LIBERTY" THAT IS PROTECTED BY THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  /3/ AS SO UNDERSTOOD,
GRISWOLD STANDS AS ONE IN A LONG LINE OF PRE-SKRUPA CASES DECIDED UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND I NOW ACCEPT IT AS SUCH. 

"IN A CONSTITUTION FOR A FREE PEOPLE, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE
MEANING OF 'LIBERTY' MUST BE BROAD INDEED."  BOARD OF REGENTS V. ROTH,
408 U.S. 564, 572.  THE CONSTITUTION NOWHERE MENTIONS A SPECIFIC RIGHT OF
PERSONAL CHOICE IN MATTERS OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE, BUT THE "LIBERTY"
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT COVERS
MORE THAN THOSE FREEDOMS EXPLICITLY NAMED IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS.  SEE
SCHWARE V. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 353 U.S. 232, 238 239; PIERCE V.
SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535; MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S.
390, 399-400.  CF. SHAPIRO V. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618, 629-630; UNITED
STATES V. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, 757-758; CARRINGTON V. RASH, 380 U.S. 89,
96; APTHEKER V. SECRETARY OF STATE, 378 U.S. 500, 505; KENT V. DULLES,
357 U.S. 116, 127; BOLLING V. SHARPE, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500; TRUAX V.
RAICH, 239 U.S. 33, 41. 

AS MR. JUSTICE HARLAN ONCE WROTE:  "(THE FULL SCOPE OF THE LIBERTY
GUARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE CANNOT BE FOUND IN OR LIMITED BY THE
PRECISE TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC GUARANTEES ELSEWHERE PROVIDED IN THE
CONSTITUTION.  THIS 'LIBERTY' IS NOT A SERIES OF ISOLATED POINTS PRICKED
OUT IN TERMS OF THE TAKING OF PROPERTY; THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND
RELIGION; THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS; THE FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; AND SO ON.  IT IS A RATIONAL CONTINUUM WHICH,
BROADLY SPEAKING, INCLUDES A FREEDOM FROM ALL SUBSTANTIAL ARBITRARY
IMPOSITIONS AND PURPOSELESS RESTRAINTS . . . AND WHICH ALSO RECOGNIZES,
WHAT A REASONABLE AND SENSITIVE JUDGMENT MUST, THAT CERTAIN INTERESTS
REQUIRE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF THE STATE NEEDS ASSERTED TO
JUSTIFY THEIR ABRIDGMENT."  POE V. ULLMAN, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (OPINION
DISSENTING FROM DISMISSAL OF APPEAL) (CITATIONS OMITTED).  IN THE WORDS
OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTHER, "GREAT CONCEPTS LIKE . . . 'LIBERTY'  . . .
WERE PURPOSELY LEFT TO GATHER MEANING FROM EXPERIENCE.  FOR THEY RELATE
TO THE WHOLE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACT, AND THE STATESMEN WHO
FOUNDED THIS NATION KNEW TOO WELL THAT ONLY A STAGNANT SOCIETY REMAINS
UNCHANGED."  NATIONAL MUTUAL INS. CO. V. TIDEWATER TRANSFER CO., 337 U.S.
582, 646 (DISSENTING OPINION).   

SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THIS COURT MAKE CLEAR THAT FREEDOM OF PERSONAL
CHOICE IN MATTERS OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE IS ONE OF THE LIBERTIES
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  LOVING
V. VIRGINIA, 388 U.S. 1, 12; GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, SUPRA; PIERCE V.
SOCIETY OF SISTERS, SUPRA; MEYER V. NEBRASKA, SUPRA.  SEE ALSO PRINCE V.
MASSACHUSETTS, 321 U.S. 158, 166; SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA, 316 U.S. 535, 541. 
AS RECENTLY AS LAST TERM, IN EISENSTADT V. BAIRD, 405 U.S. 438, 453, WE
RECOGNIZED "THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL, MARRIED OR SINGLE, TO BE FREE
FROM UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION INTO MATTERS SO FUNDAMENTALLY
AFFECTING A PERSON AS THE DECISION WHETHER TO BEAR OR BEGET A CHILD." 
THAT RIGHT NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF A WOMAN TO DECIDE WHETHER OR
NOT TO TERMINATE HER PREGNANCY.  "CERTAINLY THE INTERESTS OF A WOMAN IN
GIVING OF HER PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL SELF DURING PREGNANCY AND THE
INTERESTS THAT WILL BE AFFECTED THROUGHOUT HER LIFE BY THE BIRTH AND
RAISING OF A CHILD ARE OF A FAR GREATER DEGREE OF SIGNIFICANCE AND
PERSONAL INTIMACY THAN THE RIGHT TO SEND A CHILD TO PRIVATE SCHOOL
PROTECTED IN PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), OR THE
RIGHT TO TEACH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROTECTED IN MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)."  ABELE V. MARKLE, 351 F.SUPP.  224, 227 (CONN. 1972). 

CLEARLY, THEREFORE, THE COURT TODAY IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE RIGHT
ASSERTED BY JANE ROE IS EMBRACED WITHIN THE PERSONAL LIBERTY PROTECTED BY
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE TEXAS ABORTION STATUTE INFRINGES THAT RIGHT
DIRECTLY.  INDEED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE A MORE COMPLETE ABRIDGMENT
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM THAN THAT WORKED BY THE INFLEXIBLE CRIMINAL
STATUTE NOW IN FORCE IN TEXAS.  THE QUESTION THEN BECOMES WHETHER THE
STATE INTERESTS ADVANCED TO JUSTIFY THIS ABRIDGMENT CAN SURVIVE THE
"PARTICULARLY CAREFUL SCRUTINY" THAT THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT HERE
REQUIRES. 

THE ASSERTED STATE INTERESTS ARE PROTECTION OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF
THE PREGNANT WOMAN, AND PROTECTION OF THE POTENTIAL FUTURE HUMAN LIFE
WITHIN HER.  THESE ARE LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVES, AMPLY SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT
A STATE TO REGULATE ABORTIONS MORE STRINGENTLY OR EVEN TO PROHIBIT THEM
IN THE LATE STAGES OF PREGNANCY.  BUT SUCH LEGISLATION IS NOT BEFORE US,
AND I THINK THE COURT TODAY HAS THOROUGHLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THESE STATE
INTERESTS CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY SUPPORT THE BROAD ABRIDGMENT OF
PERSONAL LIBERTY WORKED BY THE EXISTING TEXAS LAW.  ACCORDINGLY, I JOIN
THE COURT'S OPINION HOLDING THAT THAT LAW IS INVALID UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  /1/  ONLY MR. JUSTICE HARLAN
FAILED TO JOIN THE COURT'S OPINION, 372 U.S.,AT 733. 

/2/  THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY, AS SUCH.  "(THE FOURTH)
AMENDMENT PROTECTS INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AGAINST CERTAIN KINDS OF GOVERNMENT
INTRUSION, BUT ITS PROTECTIONS GO FURTHER, AND OFTEN HAVE NOTHING TO DO
WITH PRIVACY AT ALL.  OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT
PERSONAL PRIVACY FROM OTHER FORMS OF GOVERNMENTAL INVASION.  BUT THE
PROTECTION OF A PERSON'S GENERAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY-- HIS RIGHT TO BE LET
ALONE BY OTHER PEOPLE-- IS, LIKE THE PROTECTION OF HIS PROPERTY AND OF
HIS VERY LIFE, LEFT LARGELY TO THE LAW OF THE INDIVIDUAL STATES."  KATZ
V. UNITED STATES, 389 U.S. 347, 350-351 (FOOTNOTES OMITTED). 

/3/  THIS WAS ALSO CLEAR TO MR. JUSTICE BLACK, 381 U.S.,AT 507
(DISSENTING OPINION); TO MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, 381 U.S.,AT 499 (OPINION
CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT); AND TO MR. JUSTICE WHITE, 381 U.S.,AT 502
(OPINION CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT).  SEE ALSO MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S
THOROUGH AND THOUGHTFUL OPINION DISSENTING FROM DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL
IN POE V. ULLMAN, 367 U.S. 497, 522. 

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