I
THE TEXAS STATUTES THAT CONCERN US HERE ARE ARTS. 1191-1194 AND 1196 OF
THE STATE'S PENAL CODE. /1/ THESE MAKE IT A CRIME TO "PROCURE AN
ABORTION," AS THEREIN DEFINED, OR TO ATTEMPT ONE, EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO
"AN ABORTION PROCURED OR ATTEMPTED BY MEDICAL ADVICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SAVING THE LIFE OF THE: MOTHER." SIMILAR STATUTES ARE IN EXISTENCE IN A
MAJORITY OF THE STATES. /2/
TEXAS FIRST ENACTED A CRIMINAL ABORTION STATUTE IN 1854. TEXAS LAWS
1854, C. 49, SEC. 1, SET FORTH IN 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1502
(1898). THIS WAS SOON MODIFIED INTO LANGUAGE THAT HAS REMAINED
SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHANGED TO THE PRESENT TIME. SEE TEXAS PENAL CODE OF
1857, C. 7, ARTS. 531-536; G. PASCHAL, LAWS OF TEXAS, ARTS. 2192-2197
(1866); TEXAS REV. STAT., C. 8, ARTS. 536-541 (1879); TEXAS REV. CRIM.
STAT., ARTS. 1071-1076 (1911). THE FINAL ARTICLE IN EACH OF THESE
COMPILATIONS PROVIDED THE SAME EXCEPTION, AS DOES THE PRESENT ARTICLE
1196, FOR AN ABORTION BY "MEDICAL ADVICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAVING THE
LIFE OF THE MOTHER." /3/
II
JANE ROE, /4/ A SINGLE WOMAN WHO WAS RESIDING IN DALLAS COUNTY,
TEXAS, INSTITUTED THIS FEDERAL ACTION IN MARCH 1970 AGAINST THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY. SHE SOUGHT A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT
THE TEXAS CRIMINAL ABORTION STATUTES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR FACE,
AND AN INJUNCTION RESTRAINING THE DEFENDANT FROM ENFORCING THE STATUTES.
ROE ALLEGED THAT SHE WAS UNMARRIED AND PREGNANT; THAT SHE WISHED TO
TERMINATE HER PREGNANCY BY AN ABORTION "PERFORMED BY A COMPETENT,
LICENSED PHYSICIAN, UNDER SAFE, CLINICAL CONDITIONS"; THAT SHE WAS UNABLE
TO GET A "LEGAL" ABORTION IN TEXAS BECAUSE HER LIFE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE
THREATENED BY THE CONTINUATION OF HER PREGNANCY; AND THAT SHE COULD NOT
AFFORD TO TRAVEL TO ANOTHER JURISDICTION IN ORDER TO SECURE A LEGAL
ABORTION UNDER SAFE CONDITIONS. SHE CLAIMED THAT THE
TEXAS STATUTES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND THAT THEY ABRIDGED HER
RIGHT OF PERSONAL PRIVACY, PROTECTED BY THE FIRST, FOURTH, FIFTH, NINTH,
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. BY AN AMENDMENT TO HER COMPLAINT ROE
PURPORTED TO SUE "ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHER WOMEN" SIMILARLY
SITUATED.
JAMES HUBERT HALLFORD, A LICENSED PHYSICIAN, SOUGHT AND WAS GRANTED LEAVE
TO INTERVENE IN ROE'S ACTION. IN HIS COMPLAINT HE ALLEGED THAT HE HAD
BEEN ARRESTED PREVIOUSLY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS ABORTION STATUTES
AND THAT TWO SUCH PROSECUTIONS WERE PENDING AGAINST HIM. HE DESCRIBED
CONDITIONS OF PATIENTS WHO CAME TO HIM SEEKING ABORTIONS, AND HE CLAIMED
THAT FOR MANY CASES HE, AS A PHYSICIAN, WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THEY FELL WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE EXCEPTION RECOGNIZED
BY ARTICLE 1196. HE ALLEGED THAT, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE STATUTES WERE
VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THAT
THEY VIOLATED HIS OWN AND HIS PATIENTS' RIGHTS TO PRIVACY IN THE DOCTOR
PATIENT RELATIONSHIP AND HIS OWN RIGHT TO PRACTICE MEDICINE, RIGHTS HE
CLAIMED WERE GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST, FOURTH, FIFTH, NINTH, AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
JOHN AND MARY DOE, /5/ A MARRIED COUPLE, FILED A COMPANION
COMPLAINT TO THAT OF ROE. THEY ALSO NAMED THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AS
DEFENDANT, CLAIMED LIKE CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS, AND SOUGHT
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE DOES ALLEGED THAT THEY WERE A
CHILDLESS COUPLE; THAT MRS. DOE WAS SUFFERING FROM A "NEURAL-CHEMICAL"
DISORDER; THAT HER PHYSICIAN HAD "ADVISED HER TO AVOID PREGNANCY UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS HER CONDITION HAS MATERIALLY IMPROVED" (ALTHOUGH A PREGNANCY
AT THE PRESENT TIME WOULD NOT PRESENT "A SERIOUS RISK" TO HER
LIFE); THAT, PURSUANT TO MEDICAL ADVICE, SHE HAD DISCONTINUED USE OF
BIRTH CONTROL PILLS; AND THAT IF SHE SHOULD BECOME PREGNANT, SHE WOULD
WANT TO TERMINATE THE PREGNANCY BY AN ABORTION PERFORMED BY A COMPETENT,
LICENSED PHYSICIAN UNDER SAFE, CLINICAL CONDITIONS. BY AN AMENDMENT TO
THEIR COMPLAINT, THE DOES PURPORTED TO SUE "ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND
ALL COUPLES SIMILARLY SITUATED."
THE TWO ACTIONS WERE CONSOLIDATED AND HEARD TOGETHER BY A DULY CONVENED
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT. THE SUITS THUS PRESENTED THE SITUATIONS OF
THE PREGNANT SINGLE WOMAN, THE CHILDLESS COUPLE, WITH THE WIFE NOT
PREGNANT, AND THE LICENSED PRACTICING PHYSICIAN, ALL JOINING IN THE
ATTACK ON THE TEXAS CRIMINAL ABORTION STATUTES. UPON THE FILING OF
AFFIDAVITS, MOTIONS WERE MADE FOR DISMISSAL AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
THE COURT HELD THAT ROE AND MEMBERS OF HER CLASS, AND DR.
HALLFORD, HAD STANDING TO SUE AND PRESENTED JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES,
BUT THAT THE DOES HAD FAILED TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A
PRESENT CONTROVERSY AND DID NOT HAVE STANDING. IT CONCLUDED THAT, WITH
RESPECT TO THE REQUESTS FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, ABSTENTION WAS NOT
WARRANTED. ON THE MERITS, THE DISTRICT COURT HELD THAT THE "FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT OF SINGLE WOMEN AND MARRIED PERSONS TO CHOOSE WHETHER TO HAVE
CHILDREN IS PROTECTED BY THE NINTH AMENDMENT, THROUGH
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT," AND THAT THE TEXAS CRIMINAL ABORTION STATUTES
WERE VOID ON THEIR FACE BECAUSE THEY WERE BOTH UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
AND CONSTITUTED AN OVERBROAD INFRINGEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' NINTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS. THE COURT THEN HELD THAT ABSTENTION WAS WARRANTED WITH
RESPECT TO THE REQUESTS FOR AN INJUNCTION. IT THEREFORE DISMISSED THE
DOES' COMPLAINT, DECLARED THE ABORTION STATUTES VOID, AND DISMISSED THE
APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 314 F.SUPP. 1217, 1225 (ND TEX.
1970).
THE PLAINTIFFS ROE AND DOE AND THE INTERVENOR HALLFORD, PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. 1253, HAVE APPEALED TO THIS COURT FROM THAT PART OF THE DISTRICT
COURT'S JUDGMENT DENYING THE INJUNCTION. THE DEFENDANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
HAD PURPORTED TO CROSS-APPEAL, PURSUANT TO THE SAME STATUTE, FROM THE
COURT'S GRANT OF DECLARATORY RELIEF TO ROE AND HALLFORD. BOTH SIDES ALSO
HAVE TAKEN PROTECTIVE APPEALS TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. THAT COURT ORDERED THE APPEALS HELD IN ABEYANCE
PENDING DECISION HERE. WE POSTPONED DECISION ON JURISDICTION TO THE
HEARING ON THE MERITS. 402 U.S. 941 (1971).
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