Strategist Zeng Qinghong, political guru

Heir Smooth operator Hu Jintao may be China's next chief

The Road Ahead China's proposed steps towards democracy

The Road Behind China's past democratic ventures have been less than successful

THE PEOPLE'S THIRST FOR KNOWLEDGE BOOKSTORE is an unlikely beacon for a debate that may reshape China. The small, dingy shop is sandwiched between a sleazy billiards parlor and an outlet selling prepared meats in the Chongwen district of central Beijing. Like other commercial establishments in the neighborhood, it touts its wares with posters advertising the new arrivals. Among them are the latest offerings aimed at budding capitalists, such as Winners in Future Business Wars, or, befitting the impending visit of the American president, titles about Bill Clinton, especially Clinton in a Fix.

Yet some of the best sellers these days are not lurid accounts of the U.S. leader's peccadilloes, sex manuals or how-to-get-rich books. A surprising number deal with weighty political subjects that would have been taboo even a year ago. Take the hottest political tract, Crossing Swords. Since its release in March, the People's Thirst Bookstore has sold 60 copies, a mere trickle in a nationwide stream of some 450,000.

Authors Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun, both associated with more liberal segments of Beijing's media establishment, chronicle the major episodes of political freethinking since the death of Mao Zedong. They close with a ringing call for President Jiang Zemin to lead a final charge to full capitalism, Chinese-style. They lampoon the lengthy critiques of economic reform by the hardliner Deng Liqun, a veteran leftist leader. And they have enraged China's propaganda chief, Ding Guangen, by not seeking permission to publish Deng's quotes. Significantly, though, they have not been blocked. Nor have others who have advocated democracy and even an end to one-party rule.

Also popular with book buyers have been writers with a different, yet critical take on society's ills, such as the leftwing theorist Liang Xiaosheng. His latest title, Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society, mimics Mao's works and lambasts current social conditions. "People like Liang's writings because he speaks his mind and talks about real problems affecting ordinary folks," says store clerk Ma Huizhi. Overhearing the remark, a bystander smirks: "Liang thinks too much of himself." Beyond the realm of politics, authors are taking on sacred cows too. The popular Investigation Into Ma's Army details the sometimes ruthless methods of China's most famous sporting coach, Ma Junren.

But it is publications with political themes that have attracted the most attention. Their popularity has spawned copycats (an example: China after Crossing Swords) and a slew of magazines that serve as vehicles for controversial writers. They show that China is in the middle of an intellectual ferment unseen since the heady days before the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, or the Democracy Wall movement of 1978. Some people are calling it a new "Beijing Spring." Intriguingly, signs are growing that the Communist Party leadership is not only allowing the debates and critiques, but may actually be encouraging them. The reason: President Jiang Zemin wants to proceed with political reform and is seeking viable ways to do it.

Indeed, when Clinton arrives later this month, he may be surprised at how China's intellectuals, with their latest flourishes, are fostering an environment conducive to a more open and advanced debate on political change, a topic that has been largely taboo since the Tiananmen trauma. Jiang himself is thought to be an admirer, in private, of not only American culture but also aspects of U.S. democracy. Everything, it seems, is on the table, except a re-evaluation of the June 4 crackdown itself. And a new book on the late party leader Hu Yaobang by a retired Xinhua News Agency reporter suggests that some writers may be inching toward that touchy subject too. It was Hu's death in April 1989 that had triggered the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

Symbolically, on June 4 this year, the popular Beijing Youth Daily published an article titled "What Indonesia Tells Us." Its author is Ma Xiaojun, a professor at the Central Communist Party School, which trains top cadres. Reflecting on the sudden and dramatic downfall of Indonesian President Suharto, Ma concludes that unless "political reforms are coordinated with economic change," the "ancien regime" will be in trouble. The same day Bao Tong, protégé of former liberal party chief Zhao Ziyang, ridiculed the party's obsession with instability in interviews with foreign newspapers. Bao's political rights were recently restored after years of house arrest.

There have, of course, been earlier periods of intellectual ferment and ideological loosening under the Communists. One of the first was the Hundred Flowers movement of 1956, in which Mao Zedong encouraged people to express opposing points of view and criticize government policies. The hundreds of thousands who took him at his word found themselves branded "capitalist roaders" in the Anti-Rightist Campaign that soon began. Among those purged was Zhu Rongji, now premier, who to this day prefers not to talk about the experience.

A few buds have been trampled in the latest version of the hundred flowers too. Bao Tong was quickly told to shut up. The popular muckraking magazine Southern Weekend has been criticized for running too many negative stories, and another publication was shut down after it printed a special issue on Western-style liberalism in May. Prominent intellectual Fan Liqin, an aggressive advocate of reform, had his latest monograph suppressed, even though he specifically rejects the prospect of Western-style, multi-party democracy. Even so, many unorthodox, even uncomfortable, views continue to be published.

In the past, Chinese leaders have encouraged free debate or used intellectuals for their own, often cynical, political ends. Mao allowed a hundred flowers to bloom so he could identify his enemies and mow them down. And in 1978, Deng Xiaoping fostered Democracy Wall's challenge to orthodoxy in order to oust his rival, party chairman Hua Guofeng. Soon after, Deng ended the experiment and locked up the most outspoken activists, including Wei Jingsheng.

This time, however, the dynamics seem different. Jiang Zemin, having consolidated his power, is not engaged in any power struggle. According to insiders in Beijing, he wants to identify ways to reform and modernize China's political system - and deems the current debates useful in this context. The trend would be toward more openness, though change would be gradual, given China's complex realities. "Deng Xiaoping's legacy to China was economic reform," says a businessman with ties to senior Chinese officials. "Jiang wants his own to be successful political change, among other things."

Toward that end, the president recently set up a party task force to oversee the development of political reform. It is headed by Jiang himself, Vice President Hu Jintao and top Jiang adviser Zeng Qinghong. Leading state think-tanks have been instructed to come up with blueprints, including ideas on how aspects of the U.S. presidential system might be adaptable for use in China.

In fact, Jiang signaled early on that political reform was on his agenda. He surprised many observers by mentioning the topic at Deng Xiaoping's funeral in February last year, becoming the first Chinese leader to do so openly since Tiananmen. And in his keynote speech to the 15th Party Congress last September, Jiang said China "must press ahead with reform of the political structure," changes that would be "gradually institutionalized and codified." Specifically, he wanted to focus on the National People's Congress, the central government and on "expanding democratic elections at grassroots levels."

Jiang-watchers cite other signs and hints of the president's intentions. When he visited Peking University in April during the institution's 100th-anniversary celebrations, he wrote an inscription: "Democracy, Science, Patriotism and Progress." He has made references to such liberal Western thinkers as John Locke in some of his speeches. And he is known to have followed closely the unfolding debate within China on political change.

Given the high stakes involved, the shrewd and inherently cautious Jiang is unlikely to declare his hand more openly before firmer paths can be set. A major influence could be the threat of instability as China embarks on wrenching economic changes amid Asia's economic crisis. The breakup of state-owned enterprises has already put millions of people out of work. In coal-rich Shanxi province, hundreds recently took to the streets, brandishing banners saying, "We want to eat, we want to live!" Such demonstrations have become particularly frequent in the country's northeastern "rust-belt" provinces.

The authorities can deal with such unrest in two ways. They can try to suppress it with force, or they can try to channel the discontent in more constructive ways. The evidence suggests that Beijing may be ready to try the latter course. For one thing, it has been working to reduce the military's role in national politics. At the 15th Congress, Jiang significantly declined to appoint a single army representative to the Politburo standing committee, China's highest policy-making body.

At the same time, Beijing is actively working to expand village democracy. On June 10, it drafted a revised village election law, committing itself to extending polls to every one of China's million-plus villages. The gradual expansion of elections to the township level is already party policy, as decided at the 15th Congress. Other proposals for various kinds of local elections, including for Communist Party positions, are being tried or discussed. "There is great resistance at the lower levels of the party, but the upper echelon is committed," says Bai Gang, deputy director of the Political Science Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Other observers note that Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms had begun in the countryside too.

Given the Communists' traditional preoccupation with ideology, Jiang is seeking a theoretical basis for political reforms. CASS, China's top think-tank, has been assigned a leading role. Its new director is party stalwart Li Tieying, the first time that the academy has ever been headed by a member of the Politburo. Li, formerly known as a conservative, has recently been calling for "liberation of thinking" and "the deepening of reform." His influential deputy, Liu Ji, is even more outspoken. Last week, at a conference to mark the 20th anniversary of Deng's reforms, he argued that democracy was the logical step beyond the move to a market economy. "As living standards improve, people will expect to have a greater say in their lives," Liu said. "Inevitably, democracy will become a topic on China's agenda." The authors of Crossing Swords are close confidants of Liu.

The continuing political debate in fact spans a wide spectrum of opinion, sometimes overlapping. Theorists clustered around Fan Liqin see themselves mainly as defenders of freer markets from the attacks of Stalinist left; they have little interest in political reform. Those grouped around Liu Ji urge economic privatization, coupled with political liberalization. On the left are such writers as Liang Xiaosheng, who fret over what a headlong rush to a market economy and rampant materialism may do to the fabric of society.

Then there remain the true guardians of communism, such as Deng Liqun and, to a lesser extent, party propaganda boss Ding Guangen. Sometimes the infighting gets nasty. Ding has been after Liu Ji ever since the latter's supporters tried to maneuver Ding out of office during the 15th Party Congress. They fight back by dropping hints that Ding was a member of Shanghai triad gangs in pre-revolutionary years. Liberal intellectuals expect the leftists to launch a strong counter-offensive in the months leading up to the tenth anniversary of Tiananmen next year.

Political change in China is unlikely to happen quickly, not least because of the tough economic times ahead and the attendant specter of social instability. Most insiders see a decades-long process. Meanwhile, proponents and opponents will continue to press their positions. But the reforms are likely to go forward, however incrementally. These days, orthodox hardliners are a rare breed within China's top leadership. And the changing times and circumstances make political reform essential. Increasingly, it seems, the hierarchy under Jiang Zemin knows this.

Elections of local officials to take place in every one of China's million or so villages. At present, less than half of the country's villages are holding polls according to the law.

TIMETABLE: 1-3 Yrs

PROPOSAL:

Extension of the current village elections to the township level.

TIMETABLE: 5-10 Yrs

PROPOSAL:

An experiment to introduce elections for Communist Party posts, such as local secretary. Candidates must first run in a non-party poll and gain a plurality to qualify for the final balloting within the party.

TIMETABLE: 2-3 Yrs

PROPOSAL:

Gradual overhaul of the National People's Congress by introducing elections to county-level assemblies. Elected deputies would then choose the national delegates.

TIMETABLE: 10-30 Yrs

1966-76 The Cultural Revolution. Worried about "revisionism" in the Chinese leadership, Mao orchestrated a mass movement, directed partly at the party itself. It branded almost anything outside Mao's Thought "counter-revolutionary." Prominent victims: Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

1978-79 Deng Xiaoping challenged Chairman Hua Guofeng and Maoist orthodoxy by encouraging public criticism of official policy. Led to the "Democracy Wall" movement, which Deng quickly demolished after Hua's ouster.

1989 Tiananmen. In April, students commemorating the death of liberal party leader Hu Yaobang gathered in Tiananmen Square. As the crowds grew and criticism became ever bolder, Beijing declared martial law. On the night of June 3-4, the army effectively shot its way into the square, crushing the student movement.