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 TIME on politics Congressional Quarterly CNN/AllPolitics CNN/AllPolitics - Storypage, with TIME and Congressional Quarterly

Transcript: Senate impeachment trial: questions and answers, day two

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE, U.S. SUPREME COURT : The senate will convene as a court of impeachment. The chaplain will offer a prayer.

LLOYD OGILVIE, SENATE CHAPLAIN: Almighty God, you have taught us to seek and maintain unity. You have also taught us that this unity is so precious that we should be willing to sacrifice anything in order to maintain it. Except the truth. Help us to affirm the great undeniable truths that twine the bond of oneness. We are one nation under your sovereignty. Our patriotism binds us together insuperably. Our commitment to the constitution is unswerving.

In these bonds that cannot be broken, the senate has been able to deal with the arguments, issues, and opinions of this impeachment trial. Continue to inspire the senators with civility as they work through answers to the questions raised today. Refresh and rejuvenate those who may be weary or burdened. Dear God, preserve the unity of this senate for its future leadership of our beloved nation. In your holy name. Amen.

REHNQUIST: The deputy sergeant at arms will make the proclamation.

UNKNOWN: Hear ye. Hear ye. Hear ye. All persons are commanded to keep silent on pain of imprisonment while the senate of the United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by the house of representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, president of the United States.

REHNQUIST: If there's no objection, the journal of proceedings of the trial are approved to date. Pursuant to the provisions of senate resolution 16, there are 11 hours and 54 minutes remaining during which senators may submit questions in writing directed to either the managers on the part of the house of representatives or the counsel for the president. The majority leader is recognized.

U.S. SENATOR TRENT LOTT, MAJORITY LEADER : Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. And thank you, Chaplain, for your opening prayer. I know we all listened and appreciated the admonitions that were given in that prayer. I want to say again, I appreciate the participation of all the senators yesterday. Fifty questions were asked. I think a lot of good questions. And obviously good responses. We have a considerable amount of time left for questions. But again, it's our intent to go today as long as the senators feel that they have a need for further questions. It's up to 16 hours. It doesn't require 16 hours. So I think we should go forward and try to ask the needed questions and then get a sense of where we are as we go through the day.

But at any rate, it would be our intent not to go later than 4 p.m. We hope to take a one hour lunch break sometime around 12 to 12:30, but it'll depend on how the question is going. We'll also take a break here in an hour, hour in a half, something like that.

Following today's session, the Senate will re-convene on Monday at 1 p.m. and resume considerations to articles of impeachment. All members will be notified of the details of Monday's schedule and beyond that once we've had an opportunity for a consultation between Senator Daschle and myself and we get a feel of exactly what SRES 16 provides in terms of activities on Monday and Tuesday.

In an continuing effort to make this as bipartisan and fair as possible, you'll note yesterday while we alternated back and forth, some of the questions were directed from this side to the president's counsel and the reverse, and I'm sure that will happen again some today.

We began the first question yesterday and you can concluded, so today we would reverse that and Senator Daschle will ask the first question and then we'll go through the process until we complete those questions with us ending with the last question sometime today.

If that, Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor.

REHNQUIST: This question is directed to the House managers from Senator Reed of Nevada. Would you please tell us whether you provided notice to council for the president or to any official of the United States Senate of the manager's discussion with the office of Independent Counsel regarding an informal interview of Ms. Lewinsky and the intention of the Office of Independent Counsel to file a motion in court to compel Ms. Lewinsky to meet with the managers?

If you provided no such notice to council for the president or the Senate, please tell us why not?

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ED BRYANT (R-TN), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, distinguished colleagues, this has -- no, the answer to your question. I'm not aware of any such notice that was provided as described in the question. I would like to make some clarification on this in terms of the witness, Monica Lewinsky, the potential witness as we have been in an evolving discussion over the last few weeks in terms if we are allowed to call witnessed by the Senate, who those witnesses might be. What our list might look like and obviously the name of Monica Lewinsky comes up as a potentially very important witness to these proceedings.

As many of us in this chamber have had experience in the law, we very much would like to talk to some of these witnesses. The core group that we have considered however, are in essence, in the White House control. They either are employed by the White House or close friends and associates of the White House. And I'm sure the White House through the attorneys would be very willing to cooperate with us in making those people available.

However, Miss Lewinsky presents a very unique situation in that she is geographically some other place. I'm not sure where she is; maybe Los Angeles, maybe New York, maybe Washington. But she has attorneys that we have to deal with and it would be very critical as any attorney on this body knows, that before you actually talk to a witness and a witness of that importance, to this proceeding, that you -- before you produce her for that testimony, that you talk to her. And it was intended to be a conversation to discuss it with her.

We understand, I have personally not seen the immunity agreement that she has, but we understand there is a cooperation proceeding. And that that agreement is between her, her attorneys and the Independent Counsel, the OIC, not Congress, not the managers, not the Senate, so we have no duty -- no legal standing as I understand it to go in and enforce that agreement -- where she not to want to meet with us and cooperate pursuant to the terms to the agreement.

We did contact the OIC to arrange that meeting and once we understood that the attorneys did not want to cooperate and furnish their client to meet with us, then we asked the OIC to pursue further the effort to have Ms. Lewinsky come in and meet with us on an information basis as -- again anyone would do in preparation for calling a witness at a trial.

BRYANT: Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Fitzgerald, Hatch, Smith of Oregon, Thurmond, Senator Thurmond, directed to the House managers.

How do you address the White House's argument that removal is a disproportionate remedy for the alleged acts of perjury and obstruction of justice? And should there be any particular concern about establishing a precedent that a president can commit felonies while in office and remain President of the United States?

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN BUYER (R-IN), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Chief Justice. I think the proportionality question yesterday was very good, in that there is a psychology to be used in judicial decisions.

I think there are different factors that will influence that decision-making process and the ideals that you as a sitting judge and juror we use to strive to attain them. It's important, I think, also to have reasonableness and just solutions if you're going to individualize the case as some may hope to do.

I think as a society, if you take a step back, we're kind of caught in two diverse trends of the moment. You have one trend whereby judges like to seek the individualized solutions to particularized cases and the other trend is will apply the law to individualized cases. So let me give you two best examples of both of those.

With regard to the best example of individualized solutions to particular case would be our juvenile justice system. That's where the court will come in and use a variety of means because reformation is in fact the goal and that's what they would do in the juvenile court system.

As a side note of that, I think in society with regard to -- it could be an act of a firing; it could be an administrative hearing for removal; it could even be a governor who had an employee who had an illicit affair and it was a political appointee and that governor -- maybe he decided applying proportionality that he'd remove his own political appointee for having an affair. So the individualization can occur out there.

The other example I'll comment on is the justice according to law and that other trend out there caught in our society, are legislators not only here in Washington but across all in our state jurisdictions, you have legislators that are beginning to take some of the decision- making process away from judges and they're saying specifically in federal sentencing guidelines, as an example, that if in fact a person is convicted of a particular crime or possession of cocaine, the legislatures are now telling these judges exactly, this is in fact what your sentence will be.

So, we are kind of caught, I want you to know, as you are sitting as judges and jurors in this diverse trend that's occurring in our society. And I know that as you listen to lectures even from the Supreme Court justices, they are well aware of these trends. And so you are sitting and you have to come in your own conscience on how to best make that particular decision.

I will note though that we have stressed the latter. We have stressed that the rule of law and it's importance to our society, not only to serve the public and social interests. But you are the guardian. When in fact there are crimes against the state who is there to serve the public interest, especially if in fact it is the president, the vice president, a judicial officer or other civil officers.

Here, where you have the President of the United States, who's been accused of perjury and obstruction of justice, for which are crimes against the state and as Blackstone said, "are side by side with bribery," who is the guardian then of the public interest?

So in the question of proportionality, it is you. It is you. So when Mr. Craig began by arguing that this trial is not about vindicating the rule of law, that only criminal courts are charged with that duty. I would respectfully submit that the president's council is confusing the punishment of a particular criminal case or controversy in a court with your duty as Congress to ensure that future officers entrusted with power granted by the people may not, while their offices eviscerate the proper administration of justice, which is the cornerstone of our republic.

I now yield to Mr. Graham.

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: I know I've got a minute. Great minds can differ on this one. Can you have a high crime and for the good of the nation, removal is not appropriate? And I was asked that yesterday, and I kind of wanted to make a case about why I think this is not trivial. But it's a great question.

The problem we have here is that you run into the judge cases. When you find that a judge perjured himself, you remove the judge. The president is different than the judge. I'll certainly concede that. But we don't want, I think, in the use of proportionality, create a standard that doesn't make any sense, that confuses people.

The law loves repentance. Baptists love repentance. I'm a Baptist. In my church everybody gets saved about every other week. The idea that if you'll come forward, and you admit you're wrong, should get a different result is loved in the law.

Another thing to consider about proportionality is the impact on society. I think you should consider that. I think very much you should consider even if this is a high crime, the impact on our society if you decided to make the ultimate punishment, the death penalty of political crimes, is removal from office. And I started that train of thought three months ago.

Impeachment is equivalent to the political death penalty and every felony doesn't allow you to have the death penalty.

What I hope you will be able to do as a wise body is not leave this confusion behind. Whether or not it's a crime, ladies and gentleman of the Senate, it can be a high crime and you then have to decide the impact on society, but if you leave us confused about whether or not this is a crime or not, the impact on society is far greater than if you make the decision of it's a crime but proportionately is not what the death penalty would call for. It would not be a political death penalty case. Thank you very much.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senator Leahy to the House managers. Did any of the managers consult with any member of the Senate before seeking aide from Kenneth Starr to speak with Ms. Lewinsky? Did you discuss whether this violated the Senate's 100 to nothing vote on trial procedure?

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL MCCOLLUM (R-FL), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, the question is certainly is a valid question to ask. We did not consult with any Senators about this. We don't think that what we wanted to do to talk to Ms. Lewinsky had anything to do with the rules that you have passed.

We do not want to violate those rules and we don't think that we have.

As anybody who knows if you have a witness that you're going to produce, you have a right to prepare that witness. It's as plain and simple as that. I've practice a lot of trial law before I came to Congress. A number of you have.

If you're going to have a deposition given, it's going to be your witness.

You're going to go down and try to talk to that witness and prepare that witness. You have the right to do that and the obligation to do that. It has nothing to do with the formal proceeding of taking the deposition, which is covered by the rules that you passed, as to how and when depositions will be taken. It has nothing to do with the issue of her testimony actually here.

Where the opposing council would have a right to be present. It has everything to do with the right of everyone to prepare their witness, to get to know their witness, to shake hands, to say hello, to put a face on that, it is normal practice to do this. And we see in no way, how that abbregates (ph) this, and rule it -- or in any way violates what you set forth.

As a matter of fact, we think we would have been incompetent and derelict as presenters of the witnesses, if we get a chance to present them, if we hadn't talked to her. We tried to do this some time ago. We suggested to her attorneys, that it would be appropriate, that to quietly have this discussion and meet her as you normally would. I think they were apprehensive.

They wanted the court order I guess to force this to occur and that's why we have eventually gone to do that. Thank you.

REHNQUIST: A question from Senators Lott and Thurmond to the House managers.

Please give specific examples of conflicting testimony or an incomplete record where the calling of witnesses would prove beneficial to the Senate.

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Thank you Mr. Chief Justice. Good morning to everyone. I want to echo what my colleagues have said that we're trying to be prepared. We're trying to move through this process expeditiously, but we do believe that we need to call witnesses and secondly, that we should be prepared and without any delay to proceed forward in the event we are granted that opportunity.

And one of the reasons that calling of witnesses is important is because there exists conflict in the testimony. The White House counselors, the president of the United States has denied each and every allegation under the two articles that have been submitted to this body.

I have focused on the obstruction of justice and each of the seven elements of the obstruction of justice has been denied by the president. This puts it all an issue.

For example, let's start with the issue of the lying to aides. The president of the United States said he was truthful with his aides, to Mr. John Podesta and Mr. Sidney Blumenthal. And yet if you look at the testimony of Mr. John Podesta where he says the president came in and denied having any sex of any kind with Ms. Lewinsky and goes into the details of that, that is in direct conflict with the testimony of the president of the United States. And the same thing is true with the testimony of Mr. Blumenthal verses the testimony of the president of the United States.

If you go to another conflict in the testimonies when the president and Monica Lewinsky in a number of different areas. First of all, in regard to the gifts, the president said, "and I told her that if they asked for gifts she had to give them."

That's the president's testimony. And yet Ms. Lewinsky says that in that conversation, the president said when asked about the gifts, giving them to Betty, he said "I don't know, or let me think about it." Again, direct conflict between Monica Lewinsky and the president.

In regard to Monica Lewinsky and coaching her testimony, or suggesting to her that "maybe you can sign an affidavit. You can always say you were coming to see to Betty or that you were bringing me letters." This is the testimony of Monica Lewinsky.

What does the president say in regard to that? He said that he never talked to her about a cover story, in a legal context. In other words it's a denial of obstruction of witness tampering on contrast to the testimony of Monica Lewinsky.

Obviously there's a conflict in the details of the relationship.

There is a conflict between the testimony of Monica Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan. In three different areas. Miss Lewinsky said that she shared with Mr. Jordan some details of the relationship. Mr. Jordan said that was not accurate. Miss Lewinsky says in a particular meeting that Mr Jordan -- where they discussed about notes that she had been keeping, and Mr. Jordan said go home and make sure they are not there. Mr. Jordan denies that.

In another area on the affidavit, Miss Lewinsky says that she brought to Mr. Jordan the affidavit and he assisted in making some corrections. Mr. Jordan does not recall that. So there's conflicts between Miss Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan. There's conflicts between Miss Currie and the president. In regards to the coaching incident, Miss Currie said the statements were made and taken in sense that the president wished me to agree with the statement.

The president says, I was trying to get as much information as quickly as I could. And obviously Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, before the president did and there was never any follow-up questions. I would want to ask her what did you say in response. Did you provide any information that the president was soliciting at that particular moment according to the defense that he has asserted. And so there is a conflict there.

There is a conflict between the president and a witness that we would offer from the deposition. The president denies that he focused on what Attorney Bennett was stating in reference to the false affidavit. I believe that we can offer a witness, it could be in the form of an affidavit or a deposition that would testify that he was focusing, he was paying attention. And so there's clear conflicts in the record that only establish through the presenting of additional questions or additional witnesses.

The need for witnesses is so basic and fundamental to our truth seeking system of justice in this country that words fail me in making the case that we should call witnesses and that you should permit it in this proceeding.

We are sympathetic totally with the time frames and the time constraints of the United States Senate and for that reason we will prepare (ph) our witness list, we will accommodate a quick session, the White House counselors said this is going to drag on for months.

Well if drags on for months, it is because they want it to drag on for months. We will do all that we can to end this in a timely fashion and the American people and the United States Senate needs to understand that.

Why are the White House counselors so concerned about witnesses? Many of these witnesses are friendly to them. We're in a truth-seeking endeavor and I would respectfully submit that the calling of witnesses would help resolve the conflicts that I have recited.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Dodd to the counsel for the president.

Do you believe that a fundamental question of fairness and due process has been raised by the failure of the House managers to notify you of the proposed Lewinsky interview, or by your exclusion from that interview? And do you wish also to respond to Mr. Hutchinson's comments?

CHARLES F.C. RUFF, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL: If I may Mr. Chief Justice, I will use most of my time on the first part of that question and try to perhaps squeeze in a few comments on the second part.

I am not going to seek here this morning, to vindicate the interests of this body. That if for others. But I do think it useful to speak for a bit about the interests of the accused, the President of the United States.

It's odd as I think we listened to the managers explain what they were seeking to do, to put that in the context of what we know is actually happening here.

It was suggested that they wanted to just have a conversation. Like any lawyer getting ready for a trial would want to have a conversation with a witness before he or she put the witness into a deposition or on trial.

That it was sort of normal for a trial lawyer to do this. I think one of the managers suggested they just wanted to say hello, put a face on it. And they even suggested that council for Ms. Lewinsky, wanted a court order to force their client to testify. Well, as we'll see once the record is made available to everyone, that last point is sheer nonsense.

But I suggest the earlier suggestions that just a friendly little chat was all they were looking for is belied by the notion that what we have here is the managers using their quote, "institutional role," unquote, to get the independent counsel to join with them and use the authority that he has under the immunity agreement to threaten Miss Lewinsky with jail. To threaten her with violation of her immunity agreement and opening up the prospect of prosecution if they do not meet in a friendly little conversation. Just say hello; just like to meet you, gathering with the managers. Can you imagine what that little conversation is going to look like?

Held in the Independent Counsels Office with the people there who have the capacity to put Ms. Lewinsky in jail, while there is this friendly little conversation. Just say hello, normal, everyday discussion between a trial lawyer and the witness he'd like to get to know.

From the perspective of my client for the moment putting aside the rules which you all agreed on as to how we ought to proceed, can we really say that it's just normal, just O.K. to have one side using the might and majesty of the Independent Counsels Ofly across the country and meet for this friendly little chat. I think not.

Don't know whether I've got a minute or two left, but on the issue of conflicts, this is, of course, something that has been the subject of much discourse over the last few days.

But let me just take a couple of examples put to you by Manager Hutchinson.

The issue of the statements made by the president to Mr. Podesta and Mr. Blumenthal, there is no conflict in testimony here. The president indeed said that he was trying to keep his aides from becoming witnesses. He even said that he didn't even remember his conversation with Mr. Podesta, but he took as true -- this is what he said in the grand jury -- that he accepted as true, if Mr. Blumenthal said this is what that conversation sounded like, Mr. Podesta said that's what the conversation was. There was no conflict. The president indeed adopted in the grand jury what those people would say.

And of course he didn't put them into grand jury in order to repeat some or to mislead the grand jury as to their knowledge. They testified truthfully in the grand jury when they recited their conversations with the prpsident.

But I want to move, just a second, to something you've never heard before in the entire days that we've been sitting here. We heard little hints about how Vernon Jordan might be a liar because of what he said about December 11th. And all of a sudden, just five minutes ago, this body heard for the first time, he's not only maybe a liar about the job search, but he's maybe a liar about destroying evidence.

Words fail me.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Abraham to the president's counsel.

Is it your position that Ms. Lewinsky was lying in her grand jury testimony, her grand jury deposition, and her FBI interviews, when she said that the president engaged in conduct with her that constituted sexual relations, even under his narrow interpretation of the term in the Jones deposition?

Is it your position that she was also lying when she gave essentially the same account contemporaneously with the occurrence of the events to her friends and counselors?

GREGORY B. CRAIG, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL : Senator, our position is not that she's lying.

Our position is that there are two different versions of what happened and the discrepancy.

Now in my presentation to the Senate, I acknowledged that there was a disparity between what the president has recounted and what Ms. Lewinsky says happened when it comes to recalling and reporting these specific, rather graphic and intimate details concerning their activity.

I pointed out that with respect to other central elements of the relationship, there was no disagreement, that they acknowledged that there was a reladionship, that they tried to conceal it. But I also suggested and I suggest to you today that not every disagreement, not every discrepancy is the food or the stuff of the subject of a perjury charge.

I also made the observation that perhaps this kind of conflict in testimony as to who touched who, when, where and why, was not the kind of conflict that this institution would want to resolve through testimony on the floor.

And if you want any doubts about that point, I would suggest you do read Ms. Lewinsky's August 20th testimony before the grand jury which is very complete, and entirely and vigorously dedicated to eliciting every single gritty detail of what when on between them.

I said also that I thought that this disagreement, this disparity was of questionable materiality. Let me explain why. On January 29th, Judge Wright ruled that Miss Lewinsky's testimony about her relationship with President Clinton was unnecessary. And maybe even inadmissible; that she had had no information relating to the core issues of the case.

She made that ruling after all the allegations about that relationship had been made public. And the judge knew what had been reported in the newspapers and what was generally understood about it at that point.

She had been there when the president testified about this and she concluded that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony was not required at least for the Paula Jones case. In truth, Ms. Lewinsky was an ancillary, a peripheral witness in the Paula Jones case. She had absolutely no first hand knowledge about what happened in the Excelcior (ph) Hotel, when Ms. Jones claimed that then Governor Clinton made an unwelcomed sexual overture to her.

Ms. Lewinsky had nothing to add or subtract, no ability to testify about that issue. So on the issue of the materiality to the Jones case, as to the truth of what actually happened between them, it's clear, it's a question of no materiality what so ever. She was, peripheral witness on issues not having to do with the core issues of the case in a case that had not legal merit.

Please recall that the Judge concluded that the case had no legal or evidentiary merit. Please also remember that Jones lawyers, when they were asking these questions of President Clinton, presumably knew the answers to these questions about the relationship because they had been fully briefed the night before.

Now as to the question of the materiality of this testimony and this issue, who touched whom, when, where and why to the grand jury, let me just say this. The House managers claim that one or the other must be lying because both cannot be correct. They argue that if you believe Monica Lewinsky on this issue, you must disbelieve Bill Clinton. And if you disbelieve Bill Clinton, you must conclude that he knowingly perjured himself when he denied, under oath, having this kind of contact with Ms. Lewinsky.

Now this direct issue was addressed by the panel of expert prosecutors that we brought to testify before the Judiciary Committee and they all agreed that this kind of issue would never be the subject of a perjury prosecution. And I would urge you to go back and look at some of the testimony that they gave to the Judiciary Committee.

They talked about the oath on oath issue. They talked about what is independent, corroborative evidence and what is not and they concluded that no reasonable, no responsible prosecutor would bring this kind of case based on that kind of an issue.

We're not arguing with the managers' about the law. We're not arguing with the managers' about the disparity. We're talking about prosecutorial practices. What in reality would be a criminal prosecution.

And I submit to you that no reasonable, no responsible prosecutor would bring this kind of a case based on that kind of evidence.

Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This a question from Senator Daschle addressed to counsel for the president.

Do you believe that it is a requirement of due process and fairness that you be allowed to participate in the Lewinsky witness debriefing, sought by the managers? And do believe that the House would have asked for the same right if the White House had attempted to interview Ms. Lewinsky?

RUFF: Mr. Chief Justice, that question raises an interesting mix of issues. Because I think in one respect, the House managers are correct, that once the Senate determines that it's prepared to go forward, I trust it will not, but if it does, determine that it's prepared to go forward in some way with respect to the depositions of witnesses. At that point, with the Senate having made that decision, it would be appropriate for both sides to seek voluntary, consensual, typical opportunity to meet with any witness in a setting that doesn't involve having the prosecutor with life or death authority over that witness during the debriefing or being present while you talk to the witness.

Thus, although I will take the opportunity if offered, to sit in on any meeting between the managers and the independent counsel, and any witnesses because I would certainly like to know what the mood, and the atmosphere and the nature of that process really sounds like.

The issue here I think is not so much whether it would be nice to sit in on that meeting, but whether there can be any hope for due process, fairness, and opportunity for both sides, or certainly my side.

I won't speak for the managers. To have an opportunity for reasonable, fair, and open discussion, voluntarily with any witness who will talk with us. Not -- not to be too rhetorical about this -- with the looming presence of the prosecutors sitting in the room with us.

As everyone who practices in this district knows, indeed it is a matter of law, that a prosecutor may never interfere with the access of any witness to defense counsel. I can't think of much more interference than being required to sit in the room with the prosecutor, and with another prosecutor, while that kind of discussion goes on. So the answer is, fairness no. If its my only opportunity to meet with Miss Lewinsky, I'll take it, but I trust that as matter of due process it will not be.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Dewine, Collins, and Murkowski to the House managers.

With all of the conflicting testimony that exists on the record between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie for example, how are we to resolve the questions of perjury and obstruction of justice without observing the demeanor of witnesses?

HUTCHINSON: I don't think there is anyway to resolve the conflicts in their testimony without calling the witnesses. Now you can read the transcripts and you could look at those and you could try to determine whether there's any corroborating evidence. How you can believe it and make some of those kinds of evaluations, but particularly whenever you're looking at whether it's Monica Lewinsky or Betty Currie, there's the follow up questions, there's the demeanor that allows you to determine who's telling the truth and who you believe.

And in contrast to Mr. Ruff, tries to make the point that somebody is lying here. And maybe somebody is lying but a jury, in this case the Senators, can look at this and say "well someone is not recalling the same way. Someone is more believable because their recollection is better; it's corroborated."

Or you could conclude that someone is lying. But it always doesn't break down that simply. But you have to evaluate that and that's how you resolve it.

But let me just come back. I think what we see here today is that the White House counselors do not want to talk about the facts. They do not want to talk about this case. They do not want to talk about obstruction of justice. Just like in the House, they want to talk about the process.

They want to talk about everything that's going on except for the case of obstruction of justice and it probably will be the news story later on today. The question that they have raised about this, but the fact is that it is very simply that they have access to Betty Currie. Every time the president has talked and tried to coach Betty Currie, I don't think the president invited the Independent Counsel in when that was under investigation or the Paula Jones lawyers.

I don't think that happened. I don't think that -- at least in the news clips when I say Betty Currie hugging the president -- I don't think he invited the House managers in and I didn't necessarily expect him to but, we have to be prepared and I'll just tell you right now so nobody's surprised if we get to call Vernon Jordan, I do not want to delay the United States Senate in order to be prepared for that, so I'll confess today that I called up Bill Huntley (ph), the lawyer for Vernon Jordan and to visit with him.

Now, I hope that if you talk to any witnesses, that if you feel like it's fair that you'll give us a chance with you in that, but obviously this is an adversary process that we're engaged in.

And I think that we today, and this question and answer session, that you all so graciously extended to us, you know, should focus on the obstruction of justice charges, cause that's what you have to determine.

On the perjury allegations, cause that what -- is what we have to determine today.

And I thank the Chief Justice and the senators.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Cole and Edwards. To whom is it addressed?


REHNQUIST: Oh. Oh, it's to the House managers. Throughout this trial, both sides have spoken in absolutes, that is if the president engaged in this conduct, prosecutors claim that he must be convicted and removed from office. While the president's lawyers argue that such conduct does not in any way, rise to an impeachable offense.

It strikes many of us as a closer call, so let me ask you this. Even if the president engaged in the alleged conduct, can reasonable people disagree with the conclusion that as a matter of law he must be convicted and removed from office -- yes or no?

GRAHAM: Absolutely. And this is a hard case in a couple of areas and I think it's an easy case in many areas.

The Constitution reads that upon conviction the person shall be removed. And you've got to put it in context of the judge cases because that's where it gets to be hard for this body. Because the precedents of the body, when you apply the same legal standard of high crimes and misdemeanors to the fact that a judge who was convicted of perjury was removed by the body, and you conclude in your mind that this president committed perjury, you've got a dynamic you have to work through.

Mr. Bumpers says there's perjury, then there's perjury. I would suggest to you that the allegations of perjury and obstruction of justice in this case are not trivial. It's not about a speeding ticket or a trivial matter. It's about the activity of the president when he was defended in a lawsuit, in a sexual harassment lawsuit when it was told by the Supreme Court, you got to play and you got to play fairly.

If you determine that he committed the crime of perjury, and you determined that he committed the crime of obstruction of justice, based on the President of the Senate, I think you would have a hard time saying under the situation in this case, that that's not a high crime.

But I would be the first to admit that the Constitution is silent on this question about whether or not every high crime has to result in removal. And if I was sitting where you're at I would probably get down on my knees before I made that decision because the impact on society is going to be real either way.

If you find this president guilty in your mind from the facts, that he's a perjurer and he obstructed justice, you've got to somehow reconcile continued service in light of that event.

And I think it's important for this body to not have a disposition plan that doesn't take in consideration the good of this nation. I have argued to you that when you found that a judge was a perjurer, you couldn't in good conscience, send him back in a courtroom because everybody that came in that courtroom thereafter would have a real serious doubt. I will argue to you, that when you find this president guilty of perjury, if you do, that he has violated his oath and that by a consequence of that, some public trust has been lost.

And I would show to you the body of evidence from this question. "Do you trust William Jefferson Clinton?" The American people will tell you three out of four say "No."

But the American people will also tell you that I understand what happened here. And some want him removed and some don't. And you got to consider what's best for this nation.

I will yield to Mr. Buyer in a second.

But the point is, that I'm trying to make as not articulately as I can, is that I know how hard that decision is. And it's always been hard for me. And it's never been hard to find out whether Bill Clinton committed perjury or whether he obstructed justice. That ain't a hard one for me. But when you take the good of this nation, the upside and the downside, reasonable people can disagree on what we should do.

BUYER: I'd just like to remind all of you that the impeachment process is intended to cleanse the executive or the judicial office when it's plagued with such a cancer as perjury or obstruction of justice, which violates the oath required to hold those high offices.

Now what may be turning in the gut of some of you is are the precedence of the Senate when in fact you have turned out of office. You have exercised your judgments of proportionality. When these judges violated their oaths and had perjury, you said they shall be removed from office.

Now there are some that are going well I'm uneasy in this case with the president. That's what may create a little problem here. I would suggest to you that you have to actually have findings of fact; that the Senate has findings of fact that the president in fact, he lied or he did not lie or he a committed an obstruction that you actually have findings of fact and then you can move beyond to the questions of application of the law.

But when the Senate has performed such a cleansing and removed Judges Nixon, Claiborne and Hastings, all three of them impeached for perjury in some form, and in Judge Hastings case, even though he had been acquitted of the criminal case, the congress -- in particular the senate, you have a duty to preserve the integrity of public office and that is what his impeachment was precisely designed to do.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Voinovich, Jeffords and Chafee to the House managers'.

In her interview with the Office of the Independent Counsel, Ms. Lewinsky stated that on January 5, 1998, the president told her not to worry about the affidavit because he had seen 15 others.

Did the president mean that he had seen previous drafts of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, or did the president mean that he had seen drafts of other affidavits that were in some way connect to the Paula Jones matter?

MCCOLLUM: Thank you Mr. Chief Justice. You can take that either way, but I believe in the context and I presented this to you the other day, in which the president uttered those words, that the most logical conclusion is that he'd seen 15 other drafts of hers.

If you remember she was discussing with him the issue of whether he wanted to see this particular draft of her affidavit. And at that particular moment he said, "No I don't want to. I've seen 15 others."

Well, you know, technically speaking, he could have seen 15 other affidavits in his life somewhere back in Arkansas. Who knows? But it strikes me that the logical conclusion, the common sense conclusion, in the context of everything else that you see this president was intent on and had in his mind. And the interest that he had already shown from all the conversations that he'd had with Vernon Jordan and others to make sure that this affidavit was track.

And knowing that he was going to testify in a few days himself in the Jones case. And rely on it, and in fact did go in and tell the same cover stories that were in this affidavit to the court, untruthfully, that the probabilities are pretty good that common sense says that he was saying he'd seen 15 other drafts of this version of this affidavit. But that's for you to decide. That's a judgment call for the triers of fact. Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Leahy to counsel for the president.

Could you reply to the statement just made by Manager McCollum?

DAVID KENDALL, ATTORNEY FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON: Mr. Chief Justice. On Thursday afternoon I want over in perhaps tedious detail the facts relating to the affidavits. I pointed out that there was not way in which -- there was no evidence that the president saw any affidavit draft. Mr. Manager McCollum just now, I think, admitted that he has only a speculation. He doesn't have any record evidence the president denied seeing any affidavit draft.

I pointed out in the managers' chart seven that their theory about when Ms. Lewinsky could have gotten an affidavit was simply wrong because their theory was she got it on January 5th, this is a single affidavit draft.

The evidence plainly shows that she could not have gotten it until January 6th. There is simply nothing in the record. And the Independent Counsel interviewed Ms. Lewinsky extensively, both in interviews and before the grand jury. And there is simply no evidence whatsoever that the president saw any drafts, or indeed that there were 15 drafts.

Let me say a word about whether or not we are addressing the facts. I'm not going to frighten you, I'm not going to go back through the obstruction of justice evidence, but I think if you will remember the presentation, first by Mr. Craig, who addressed in detail, the evidence with regard to perjury. Then if you'll recall what Ms. Mills said addressing two of the seven allegations of obstruction of justice, and with what I said to you on Thursday afternoon for almost three hours.

And I think you for your uncommon patience. You were attentive all the way through that exercise.

You know that we have addressed the facts. What we had yesterday, what Mr. Ruff has already addressed is again -- I will use the word remarkable occurrence -- involving the Independent Counsel.

We've addressed the facts, and there is simply nothing to support in all this record, this heavy long record, hate the president had any review of any affidavit or indeed that there was more than one or two drafts of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators DeWine, Santorum and Fitzgerald to the president's counsel.

If we are to assume that the various allegations as to obstruction of justice are in fact true, is it your contention that if the president tampered with witnesses, encouraged the hiding of evidence and corruptly influenced the filing of a false affidavit by a witness, that these acts do not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.

RUFF: Mr. Chief Justice, this is something I won't have an opportunity to say very often, but I believe that Mr. Manager Graham has in fact stated for you the essential of the role that this body must play. We will probably defer as to what the right answer to the question is, but as to the process and as to the question that must be asked, I think he stated it well.

I believe that the facts to not support the conclusions that are embodied in the question. But not only can reasonable differ on the facts but reasonable people may differ on the outcome. And if indeed reasonable people can differ, doesn't that mean by the very statement of that proposition, that this body cannot meet its constitutional heavy mandate which is to determine whether or not -- whatever conduct you believe the president committee as outlined by these managers over the last many days -- can you legitimately determine that he ought to be removed from office?

And all I can do I suppose is to remind you as I have too frequently I'm sure, that if you try to put yourself in the minds and the hearts of the men who created our system of government, they wanted to know only really one answer to one question.

As framed in many different ways, but the essence remains the same: is there a sufficient danger to the State, danger to the State, to warrant what my colleagues across the aisle here have called the political death penalty? And I think the answer to that is no.

REHNQUIST: This is a question for Senator Wellstone to counsel for the president. To what extent should the views of the American people be taken into account in considering whether a president should be removed from office?

RUFF: Mr. Chief Justice, I think that the answer to that question is not the polls that you read in the newspapers or that you see on the evening news, whatever those numbers may be. That's only one clue as to what the American people are thinking. And each of you knows the people in your jurisdiction far better than any poll taker does, and that certainly I do.

But surely one way to test the ultimate question that I just described, in response to the last inquiry from the Republican side of the House, is to ask yourself on the basis of experience over the last year, on the basis of your experience in the political, and by that I mean political in the very best constitutional sense of the term as used by Alexander Hamilton.

As to your sense of the political structure of this country, and what the people are saying to you and what your sense of their needs are, do they need the kind of cleansing that Manager Buyer spoke about? And I think the answer to that if you look within the body are people you are most familiar with must be no.

This isn't to say that it's a popularity contest. That we ought to go out and have a referendum or another poll before you all decide on this, but surely the sense of the people, the will of the people, the belief of the people in this president's ability to govern must educate each of you. Not mandate a result, but surely guide the result that you reach in this proceeding.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Collins to the House managers. The president's counsel has made much of Miss Lewinsky's statement that no one promised her a job for her silence. She did not testify, however, that no one promised a job in return for a false affidavit. Or for that matter, that no one implied that she would get a job for her cooperation. Can you think of any reason why we should not call Miss Lewinsky to help clarify such ambiguous testimony?

HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. That is an excellent question. And really goes to the heart of some of the disputes. And I think that, as you read the testimony of Miss Lewinsky, as you read some of the other areas of testimony, questions come to your mind.

You would like to follow-up. You would like to ask a question and that one comes out and flags you that that's a question that would like to be asked.

No one promised her a job for her silence end that is the testimony that she gave in response to a question in the grand jury. But I believe that this is a case in which actions speak louder than words.

I think that actions and what took place, and the common sense understanding of what is happening here, demonstrates the case that there was a false affidavit that was obtained and that was in conjunction with the obtaining of a job for Monica Lewinsky.

So, I think that is a natural question and I think that also that if you read -- if you look at the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, I think it's clear that the case is made that she was encouraged to lie.

And she was also encouraged to sign a false affidavit and she was also provided a job, coincidentally at the same time.

I would like to take the opportunity if I might Mr. Chief Justice, in further answering a question that was raised earlier.

It was on the false affidavit, and that's related I think, to the question as well.

During Mr. Kendall's presentation a few days ago, he made this statement. "The idea that the telephone call between Lewinsky and Clinton on January 5th about the affidavit, is about the affidavit, is shear, unsupported speculation, and even worse, it is speculation demolished by fact."

This is the statement that Mr. Kendall gave the other day on this floor and sighted in the congressional record, summarizing his presentation. That the idea that Clinton and Lewinsky talked about the affidavit is shear, unsupporteddspeculation and demolished by fact.

Well, the record demonstrates that Monica Lewinsky's testimony is, that she had a conversation with the president on the telephone, in which she asked questions about the affidavit, she was concerned about signing that affidavit. And according to Ms. Lewinsky, the president said, "Well you could always say the people in Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it."

And that is reference to a paragraph in the particular affidavit. Now, my question to Mr. Kendall is, "Would you agree, Mr. Kendall, that your assertion that there is no support for it in the record, is that you are totally rejecting the testimony of Monica Lewinsky as totally unbelievable?"

And once again you have a conflict that is presented in the testimony and that (sic) is only way to resolve it and that is to hear from the key witnesses.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Lautenberg to counsel for the president. Could you reply to the question put by the manager?

KENDALL: Mr. Chief Justice. Let me address the first part of Mr. Manager Hutchinson's response and that is whether the statement by Ms. Lewinsky that nobody every promised me a job for my silence covered other possible promises to her.

And it's quite clear when you read all the interviews that were done of her by the Independent Counsel. All the grand jury testimony. That she unequivocally testified there were no promises made to her. There were no assistances given to her that were in any way conditioned upon her testifying a certain way or giving a certain kind of affidavit. She's unequivocal about that.

Now in the statement that she made that I quoted, she does not say, nobody ever did these other things, but she said that in her previous testimony. She uses the offer of a job as simply a proxy for anything that would connect the assistance she would receive with testifying in a certain way. There's simply no evidence anywhere in the record and the Independent Counsel covered that with her in detail. She felt compelled to volunteer her statement at the end of the process because they had left some innuendo in the record that she had been provided assistance, but her testimony is unequivocal. I've quoted it.

Now, the only testimony in the record about the linking the job to some assistance in the Jones case comes from the Linda Tripp audio tapes.

And that, again, Miss Lewinsky could not be clearer in her grand jury testimony what she told Linda Tripp was false. There was no connection there whatsoever.

Her proffer (ph), which I put up on the board, was quite unconditional. And this you have in your materials. This is in her own handwriting. Neither the president, nor Mr. Jordan, or anyone on their behalf, asked or encouraged her to lie.

So with regard to the first part of Mr. Manager Hutchinson's question, there is simply no evidence, again, that any kind of assistance to Miss Lewinsky was conditioned on her performance in any way in the Jones case.

Now, with regard to the affidavit. I stand on what I said before you on Thursday. And I want to be very clear about what Mr. Hutchinson's presentation was in chart number seven that I was responding to.

And I think that -- I think it's quite important to recall yesterday that a question was addressed to the House Managers whether there were any statements contained in their exhibits which contained misrepresentations or omissions that in the interest of fairness of justice, they would like to correct. And Mr. Manager Hutchinson said "we're not aware of any corrections that need to be made on any of our exhibits offered to the Senate."

I would simply rest on the presentation. I'm not going to take you through again the many errors in the charts. Those were not refuted in any way. They've rested on their charts. I leave that to your judgment.

But with regard to chart seven, what Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you almost a week ago was that chart seven was a summary of what happened on January 5. Ms. Lewinsky meets with her attorney Mr. Carter for an hour. Carter drafts the affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky. She calls the president. The president returns Ms. Lewinsky's call.

And then they had a discussion but this draft affidavit.

The point of my demonstration through Mr. Carter's testimony and through his billing records was in fact that the affidavit had been drafted the next day. They could not have had a discussion about the affidavit on that date. And I think the record is quite clear on that.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Lott to the House Managers.

Do have any comment on the answer given by the president's counsel with regard to the views of the American people?

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished Senators, that's a fascinating question. Edmund Burke was asked that once and he said that a member of Parliament owes the highest degree of fidelity to his constituents, but he doesn't owe his conscience to anybody.

We have or we have not a representative democracy. We're not delegates who are sent here to weigh our mail every day and then to vote accordingly. Our work here is not an on-going plebiscite. We are elected to bring our judgment, our experience and our consciences with us here. I have always believed and I believe more firmly than ever.

And this experience confirms me in that belief. There are issues of transcendent importance that you have to be willing to lose your office over. I can think of several that I'm willing to lose my office over. Abortion is one. National defense is another.

Strengthening, not emasculating the concept of "equal justice under law." My life is devoted as a lawyer, I've been on the Judiciary Committee, this is my 25th year, and equal justice under the law is what moves me and animates me and consumes me. And I'm willing to lose my seat any day in the week rather than sell out on those issues.

Despite all the polls and the hostile editorials, America is hungry for people who believe in something. You may disagree with us, but we believe in something.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, I ask you then, to consent that we recess the proceedings for 15 minutes.

REHNQUIST: In the absence of objection, it's so ordered.


REHNQUIST: (OFF-MIKE) be in order. The majority leader is recognized.

LOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. We will go approximately another hour if questions are still available and I assume they will be, then we would take a break for about an hour for lunch.

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES: This a question from Senator Biden to the House Managers: "If a senator believes that the president may have lied to the American people, his family, and his aides, and that some of his answers before the grand jury were misleading or half-truths, but that he could not be convicted in a court of law, for either perjury or obstruction of justice, is it the opinion of the House managers that his actions still justify removing the president from office?"

REP. BOB BARR (R-GA), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, I've taken two public oaths in my career of service to the country of this great land. One was as a member of Congress. The other is as a United States attorney.

As a United States attorney, it was my job on behalf of the people of the United States to prosecute cases against individuals and other entities that violated the criminal code of the United States of America. That criminal code, as you are well aware, includes the offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice. That criminal code does not include the offenses of lying to one's family. That is not what brings us here today.

What brings us here today is the belief by the House of Representatives in lawful public vote, that this president violated in numerous respects his oath of office, and the criminal code of the United States of America. In particular, that he committed perjury and obstruction of justice. I can tell you as a United States attorney, serving under two presidents, that I would prosecute these cases because I did prosecute such cases.

I prosecuted cases against people including members of the body from which we as managers come, who appeared before grand juries and lied, who appeared before grand juries and misled grand juries, people who obstructed justice, people who tampered with witnesses in precisely the same way that this president has committee perjury, tampered with witnesses and obstructed justice.

We would respectfully submit to the senators of the United States of America assembled here today that these are prosecutable cases. They have been cases that have been prosecuted. And that the question is not before this body, we will respectfully submit from the House of Representatives into articles of impeachment that the president lied to his family.

What is before this body, we respectfully submit as contained in two articles of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives is that this president violated his oath of office and committed the offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice which we firmly believe, on behalf of the people of the United States of America, provide a sufficient basis on which this body, exercising its deliberative power and it's legitimate jurisdiction, may find that this president as people in courts of law similarly but not identically situated, are indeed found guilty and removed from positions of trust, as this president ought to be for committing perjury and obstruction of justice, not lying to his family.

Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Snow, Mack, Chafee, Burns, and Craig to the House managers:

"Before Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed in the Jones case, the president refused on five separate occasions, November 3, November 10, November 12, November 17 and December 6 to produce information about and gifts from Lewinsky. The president's counsel argued the president was unconcerned about these gifts. If that is the case, why didn't he produce his gifts in November and December?"

REP. JAMES ROGAN (R-CA), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: I thank the senators for the question. This case needs to be looked at for the mosaic that it is.

There is a reason why the president never produced gifts. There is a reason why the president continued to give Miss Lewinsky gifts. It's because he believed that she would never produce them.

We know that from her testimony. In my presentation to the Senate a week ago, I quoted from the transcripts where she said, "Nobody ever asked me to lie." But then she also said, "There was never any doubt but that we would deny the relationship if asked."

We see that throughout the entire proceedings. We see that before Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the list on December 5th, on the witness list. And we especially see it after. In fact, Monica Lewinsky went to the president and said, "I've been subpoenaed. They're asking for gifts. What should I do? Maybe I should give them to Betty." And the president said, "Let me think about that."

And we all know by now that within a few hours, Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky and came and retrieved the gifts, not to give them to the Jones' lawyers, pursuant to the subpoena, not to cooperate with the sexual harassment lawsuit. She took the gifts and she hid them under her bed.

Now members of this body, it begs common sense for any interpretation of that conduct to be somehow cooperative with the legal proceedings in the sexual harassment case.

Every piece of this puzzle, when put together, demonstrates a very clear pattern of obstructing justice, not to cover up a personal embarrassment, not to cover up an indiscretion, but to destroy Paula Jones' right under the sexual harassment laws of this country, to have her day in court.

And that is the ultimate question that this body is going to have to address.

Yes, reasonable minds can differ on this case as to whether the president should be removed from office. But reasonable minds can only differ if those reasonable minds come to the conclusion that enforcement of the sexual harassment laws in this country are less important than the preservation of this man in the office of the presidency.

And that is the ultimate question that this body is going to have to answer. What is more important: the survival of Bill Clinton's presidency in the face of perjury and obstruction of justice or the protection of the sexual harassment laws in this country? And I imagine victim in the work place will be waiting for your answer.

REHNQUIST: This is from Senator Daschle to the House managers:

"Will you agree to arrange to have prepared a verbatim, unedited transcript of any debriefing which may occur with Ms. Lewinsky for immediate distribution to the Senate, and will you agree also to provide for the inclusion in any such debriefing of representatives of the Senate, ones selected by the majority and one by the minority?"

REP. BILL MCCOLLUM (R-FL), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice and members of the Senate, it is not our intent to be doing a deposition, a formal presentation, a preparation for the Senate if we talk to Ms. Lewinsky.

It is our intent to do what any good attorney would do in preparing to go to trial or presuming, we don't know that you're going to allow us to have witnesses, but presuming we're going to be able to depose and have witnesses and that is to meet with the witness, talk with the witness and prepare the witness. And any good attorney does that it if it's going to be his or her witness in their own confidences, in their own quiet, respite. We discover things that way, we're not prepared. "No." The answer to your question is "No." we're not prepared to say we're going to give you our work product, which is what that would be.

Work product is a technical term of law, but for anybody who's out in the public, is what lawyers do all the time. And they work on their case, and they prepare what they're going to do and then they present it. And that's the system we have. As somebody said, I think Mr. Hutchinson earlier, this is an adversarial position, the White House counsel have their chance to talk to witnesses that they're going to present, we have our chance to talk to ours.

Then there's the opportunity for the depositions, which is what comes next, which is the formal proceeding when we both have a chance to talk with them. And then of course, if you've let us call them as witnesses here, they'll be here and they'll get cross examined and examined. And all the questions you can imagine will be asked.

That is the traditional American system of justice.

So, no, we wouldn't want to give you our work product notes. We have no idea what would be in them, and we don't think that that's appropriate. And we think that a lot has being made out of this.

We attempted to do this a couple of weeks ago. We would have liked to have talked to her earlier. It has not worked that we've been permitted to for reasons that we're not sure. But the reality is this is a normal process. We would talk to any other witness despite however the White House counsel wants to argue about. They do the same time.

I yield what time I have left to Mr. Graham.

REP. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: I would like to echo the wor product analogy. But let me just say this as directly as I know how to say it.

That is this body as a whole believes that we're going to do anything improper, then whatever rule you need to fashion to make sure we don't, you do it.

Because nobody should ever doubt whether a witness comes into this body, in this case, and gave anything other than testimony that was truthful, and if you want to go down the road of the atmosphere that people were approached and how they were treated about being witnesses, let's go down that road together.

Let's bring in people in this body and let's see how they were approached when they were asked to participate in this trial what the atmosphere and the mood was when it come their time to be identified as witnesses.

So I would just say, as strongly as I know how, that if you've got any doubt about us and what we're up to, you fashion rules so we do not create an unfairness in this body. But please, when we ask for witnesses and we raise doubts about how people may have been treated, that you give us the same opportunity to explore the mood and atmosphere of those witnesses.

REHNQUIST: This question is to the House managers from Senators Murkowski, Gregg, Grams, Thomas, Crapo, Thompson and Hatch:

"The president's counsel rely upon the president's statements in many instances, therefore the president's credibility is an issue. Is the president's credibility affected by the fact that until the DNA evidence surfaced the president denied any improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?"

ROGAN: Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators.

First, I don't think it was a compliment to me from my colleagues that as soon as the issue of DNA came up, they all pointed to me and told me to come answer the question. I will do my best. Obviously, as the triers of the fact, members of this body individually will have to make determinations respecting the credibility of the president as well as the other witnesses.

It is in indisputable however that from January 1998 when he spoke at the deposition until August 17th when he made a quasi admission before the grand jury that there were intervening factors that required him to change his position.

We saw from the moment the story first broke in the press about Monica Lewinsky, the president making denials in the most empathic of ways and not only doing it repeatedly himself, but sending out his cabinet and his aides and his friends to do it on his behalf.

That continued up until the eve of the deposition. Was it because the president suddenly had a change of heart. Was it because his conscience was suddenly baring down upon him, or were there other reasons. Well, let's see. Just before his deposition testimony, Monica Lewinsky decided to cooperate with the Office of Independent Counsel.

Monica Lewinsky suddenly turned over a blue dress. And that's fascinating because as you know from the record and you've heard from the presentations, the president was prepared to take Monica Lewinsky and trash her in a very public way until the dress was turned over to the FBI>

Remember what he said to Sidney Blumenthal? He called her a stalker. He said that she was threatening him, but he no longer could make these representations publicly or privately once he knew that there was potential physical evidence.

So, I think that there are number of factors members of this body can look at with respect to credibility just from the cold record.

But if that is not enough, if members of this body are not satisfied that they are able to resolve these issues of credibility, then the way to handle it is to follow the dictates of the Constitution and our framers who understood the value of a trial in bringing witnesses forward, placing them under oath and giving the triers of fact the opportunity to see the witnesses, to hear their testimony, to gauge their credibility.

That's what the purpose of a trial is for. And the House managers entrust this body to make sure that at the end of the day, this is more than a proceeding, this is an arena where the truth will be determined, not just for our time, but for history.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senator Murray to counsel for the president, "Could you reply to the comments of Manager Rogan?"

CHARLES RUFF, WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL: The existence of DNA or any other events before the president's grand jury testimony, had no bearing whatsoever on his determination, which he carried out on that day, in the middle of August, to answer the grand jury's questions truthfully.

He did so. It may be that the managers can speculate about -- well, there must have been some reason why in the middle of August, after some months of denying to the nation and his family any misconduct, he changed his mind and told the truth. But there is one reason why he did that. Because he went before a grand jury for the United States District Court of the District of Columbia and told the truth.

Now it's been suggested by many of the managers over the last day that the president was somehow anxious to -- or contemplated the prospect of, as they put it, trashing Ms. Lewinsky.

This issue was raised yesterday and it's been raised again by Mr. Manager Rogan, and I think it is time to set that record straight.

Mr. Manager Bryant yesterday, as he was discussing the Dick Morris issue, purported to recite from the independent counsel's referral and purported to describe a conversation between the president and Mr. Morris, in which, to quote from Mr. Manager Bryant, "according to Morris the president warned him," that is Mr. Morris, "he warned the president" -- excuse me, let me start before that, "and later the next day, the president has a follow up conversation with Mr. Morris in the evening and says that he," that is the president, "is considering holding a press conference to, 'blast Monica Lewinsky out of the water,' but Mr. Morris urges caution. He says, 'Be careful.'

"And that he warned the president not to be too hard on her."

Well, 180 degrees off from that description, let me read you what in fact the Independent Counsel's office referral says and I'm sure it was just a slip of the read that you heard yesterday. The president had a follow up conversation with Mr. Morris during the evening of January 22, 1998, this is page 127 of the Independent Counsel's referral, when Mr. Morris was considering holding a press conference to blast Monica Lewinsky out of the water, the president told Mr. Morris to be careful.

According to Mr. Morris, the president warned him not to be too hard on Ms. Lewinsky. Close, close -- 180 degrees off.

Beyond on that, let me very clear about one proposition which has been a sub-theme running through some of the comments of the managers over the last many days.

The White House, the president, the president's agents, the president's spokespersons, no one has ever trashed, threatened, maligned or done anything else to Monica Lewinsky. No one.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Hutchison of Texas, Snowe, Allard, Collins and Hatch to the House Managers:

"The counsel for the president have said that the heart of this case is private, consensual sex. A tenant of sexual harassment law, however, is that the implied power relationship between a supervisor, in this case the president, and a subordinate, in this case an intern, is enough to constitute sexual harassment.

"This is well settled in military law and is developing along this line in the civilian sector. In your view, how might acquittal in this case affect laws regarding sexual harassment?"

ROGAN: Mr. Chief Justice, the law of sexual harassment is a relatively new genre. If somebody wanted to make a case before the Congress had stepped in and improved upon the law, it essentially reduced a woman in the workplace, for instance who had been harassed, into what has been referred to as a he said-she said type of argument.

And so the law has improved upon that. Because the law recognizes today that sometimes there can be evidence of a pattern of conduct and that conduct is relevant to prove how somebody may have behaved. Consider what would happen if victims of the workplace get a message from the Congress of the United States, that what the president did with Paula Jones, or allegedly did with Paula Jones, is of no Constitutional significance here.

It would send a message to every woman in the work place that if they have a complaint against an employer who is attempting to use a position of power and authority to pursue improper advancements, the message would be that you might as well just keep quiet about it because the person can lie in court and suffer no recrimination.

First of all, probably never be discovered because most of the time DNA evidence doesn't suddenly appear, but even if DNA evidence does appear to corroborate the victim, the message is that as long as he is appropriately apologetic and the lie was after all only about sex, it's of no import with respect with respect to removing them from their job or having them suffer any legal consequences.

I think that would be a horrible message. The reason the law allows this pattern of conduct evidence is because sexual harassers operate in a unique way. They get their victims alone.

They typically don't commit these crimes under the glare klieg (ph) lights or in front of television cameras or where witnesses can testify. They get their witnesses -- they get their victims alone for one reason. Because they know through intimidation and fear one of two things will happen. Through intimidation or fear, the victim will submit or through intimidation or fear, the victim will not submit but will keep their mouth shut about it.

What is the message to these victims who do brave losing their job, being destroyed publicly, having their reputations destroyed? What is the message to them if when they come forward, and they want to pursue their case, we take the legal view that somebody can perjure themself, somebody can lie, somebody can obstruct justice. Somebody in the greatest position of power in our country can take whatever steps are necessary to destroy that woman's claim in a court of law where she is entitled to pursue it.

If at the end of all of this, we say, "Well, you know, he was embarrassed, he did lie, but it was only about sex." Lies and sexual harassment cases, members of the Senate, are always, only about sex. The question before this body is, "What type of validity are we going to give these laws and what sort of message are we going to send to victims in the workplace?"

I pray that we can put personal relationships aside, with respect to how people individually feel about this president personally and how they feel about his administration. And focus on what is the ultimate conclusion legally and what is the precedent that will be set if we turn a blind eye to this sort of conduct.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Boxer, Feinstein, Landrieu, Mikulski and Murray to counsel for the president: "Has Ms. Lewinsky ever claimed the relationship was other than consensual? And was not Ms. Jones' case dismissed as having no claim recognized by law?"

RUFF: No, and yes. Indeed, as Mr. Manager Rogan has told you, and others before him on the managers side, our sexual harassment laws and our civil rights laws are of critical importance to all of us.

My colleague Ms. Mills, I think, spoke eloquently on that subject a couple of days ago, but it's important to understand I believe with no sense of all that we are in any diminishing the importance of those laws and of the rights of every American citizen to seek justice under those laws.

That we are talking about a case in which the trial judge determined that on all the evidence that had been gathered and all the claims that the plaintiff had made and all the discovery that had been taken, there was no case. That's justice, that's the way the system works. A plaintiff brings the claim, the process moves ahead and a judge ultimately makes a decision.

And this didn't have anything to do with what President Clinton said in his deposition on January 17. What the judge ruled was, first that that evidence was irrelevant to her consideration and then ultimately in April of last year, that there simply was no case.

We accept the results of the justice system whether they go against us or whether they go for us. In either event, it's justice. REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Thompson to the House managers:

"Is there any reason to believe that there's any relationship between the president telling Mr. Blumenthal that Ms. Lewinsky was a stalker and expressing his frustration about not being able to get his story out with the fact that shortly thereafter, negative stories about Ms. Lewinsky, including the allegation that she was a stalker began to appear in news articles quoting sources at the White House?"

REP. ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: I appreciate that question and thank Mr. Chief Justice. Because I made a note of Mr. Ruff's statement that no one, and I believe he specified the president, his aides or no one, has ever trashed or spoken ill -- he used some other words -- of Monica Lewinsky. And I -- really caught me as striking in light of the sworn grand jury testimony of Sidney Blumenthal. And of course he is testifying as to what the president told him and of course in that conversation, the president told Sidney Blumenthal as described by Mr. Blumenthal that I've gone -- "Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me. I rebuffed her." The president said "I've gone that road before. I've caused pain for a lot of people. I'm not going to do that again."

"She," referring to Monica Lewinsky, "threatened the president." this is the president's statement.

Now and it goes on and describes that she was known as a stalker. Now in my understand, that's trashing, that's speaking ill.

That's being very critical and doing everything it can to basically destroy her reputation. Now why was he telling Sydney Blumenthal that? Was he trying to use Sydney Blumenthal to get the message out to the public and to the grand jury who might hear this, that she is not a believable person?

That the whole idea is that she came on to him, that she threatened the president of the United States. I think I don't understand Mr. Ruff's representation to the senators, that no one, including the president or aides, has ever trashed Monica Lewinsky.

Now, I think it's important also at that particular point in time, the president knew that Sydney Blumenthal and John Podesta would be a witness before the grand jury. That was his testimony, that's what the President of the United States admitted to. He says he knew that they were going to be witnesses. And clearly that constitutes obstruction of justice.

When he knows that they're going to be a witness, he gives them false information knowing that they're going to repeat it to the grand jury, and that is an element of one of the pillars of obstruction.

Now, I want to come back to some things that have been said about the Jones case. First of all, it has been characterized as a no-win case that Judge Susan Webber Wright issued that order. Well, if the truth had been known, what we know now about the relationship, about the pattern of conduct, would that have made a difference? And of course, when those facts came out it was right before a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that might have reversed Judge Wright's order. That the president of the United States made a decision he needed to settle this case for $800-some thousand.

Now, what would have happened? Maybe Paula Jones would not have had to gone through that many years of litigation, if the truth had just come out. But there was a pattern of obstruction of justice, of lying, of coaching witnesses, of tampering with witnesses, which ultimately led to a defeat of that case and the truth not coming out.

But when it came out, it made a difference, it made a difference for that plaintiff in that civil rights case.

Senator Hutchinson asked a question about whether the power of the position makes a difference in sexual harassment cases, and let me assure you that there is any chief executive officer of any company, whether it was consensual or not, with a intern or a young person half of the officer's age and whether it was whatever they determined at that point, whenever it was a subordinate employee -- and that's the key language, a subordinate employee -- then yes, Senator, it does make a difference and that is the crux of many cases that are brought in to court to protect women against sexual harassment in the work place.

I think it's a lynch pin of this act that this Congress passed.

And so I think that when you look at the overall picture, that there is that pattern of obstruction of justice.

Senator Biden asked a question. Would any prosecutor bring this case forward? And let me tell you it would be easier -- I say this with great deference to the Senate, but it would be easier to win a conviction beyond any reasonable doubt, and I could win a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. In a court in this country on obstruction of justice because I know that common sense permeates a jury panel whenever they hear this case. In the perjury they're not going to buy, they're not going to accept what is is.

They understand what these words mean and common sense will apply and I know that common sense exists in the Senate of the United States, but let me assure you that this is a case that I would bring forward without any hesitation and I believe that proof would demonstrate a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senator Kennedy to the counsel of the president, "Could you reply to Mr. Hutchinson's allegations?"

RUFF: I think it important because the question put to the House Managers Mr. Chief Justice was whether there was some effort or some relationship between the -- Ms. Lewinsky and a series of articles or stories that supposedly appeared in the early days following the revelation of this investigation and I think it's important to recognize what the real facts are here. This was the point made at the very end of my testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on December 9th. One of the members of that Committee spoke at great length and quite heatedly about what he believed to have been a plan to disseminate unfavorable information in the press and he submitted for the record a number of newspaper articles.

Well, the articles that he submitted which were largely spun off of one Associated Press story did not contain two, at least two, statements that made it very clear that the accusation that there was some effort on the part of the White House to disseminate disparaging information were simply false.

In an Associated Press story of January 31st, which was used by a member of the House Judiciary Committee as one of his examples of how the White House was supposedly coordinating such an attack, there was omitted the following portion.

This is a statement by Ann Lewis, who is the White House communications director: "To anyone who was saying such things about Ms. Lewinsky either reflected a lack of coordination, or thought or adult judgment. We are not going down that road. It is not the issue. A discussion of other people is not appropriate."

That's on January 31.

And retrospectively, when Ms. Lewinsky had already begun to cooperate with the independent counsel, "The Los Angeles Times" wrote the following:

"From the beginning the White House has been careful about what it has said of Ms. Lewinsky."

The week that the Lewinsky story broke in January, Clinton's press secretary Mike McCurry signaled the tone the White House would take by deflecting questions about whether the 24-year-old intern was less than stable.

Quote Mr. McCurry, "I can't imagine anyone in a responsible position at the White House would be making such an assertion. I've heard some expressions of sympathy for what clearly someone who is a young person would be going through at a moment like this." And McCurry quickly signaled that the marching orders had not changed once Lewinsky made a deal with the independent counsel Kenneth Starr for immunity from prosecution."

I think it's important that the record be clear that the stories about which the Managers were asked in their last question simply never reflected any plan coordinated, uncoordinated, to do anything other than treat Ms. Lewinsky with respect.

REHNQUIST: This question doesn't show which senators are submitting it. This is a question from Senator Hatch:

"Isn't it true that Chief Federal District Judge Johnson ruled today, in an order that she authorized to be released to the public, that Ms. Lewinsky's immunity agreement, which requires her to `make herself available for any interviews, upon reasonable request' compels her to submit to an interview with the House? What light does this shed on the earlier debate on this matter?"

Oh, I'm sorry. It's addressed to the House managers.

REP. ED BRYANT (R-TN), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, I think, certainly having come from an experience of practicing law and learned so much over the years in trying cases and putting together cases in an ethical and appropriate fashion, to come into a political proceeding, and as we have dealt with this, and I think the lawyers to my left have had to deal with the same type of situation in a political ram, not just in the Senate, but months and weeks before we came into here, is very difficult.

And what we've seen this morning is a completely innocent standard practice of sitting down with a potential witness before you have to list your witnesses Monday and deciding whether or not you want to use her. And they talked about lawyers committing malpractice by not taking depositions, I submit it would be close to that if you don't talk to a witness, before you call that witness. And certainly while the OIC has had communication with her over some time, we have not. We have not had contact with any of these witnesses.

And I alluded earlier to the White House and the other witnesses that work for the White House that we might be looking at calling. I must presume by this conversation and this area of questioning that they have not had any contact about this case with Ms. Currie and Mr. Podesta and Mr. Blumenthal and even a friend of the White House, Mr. Vernon Jordan.

We're not asking that we be privy to every time they say hello in the hallway to these people or may sit down and talk with them. We understand the realities of life. We simply wanted that crazy idea of maybe we ought to talk to a witness before we decide whether or not we want to list that witness. And I think today, to answer the question, and I'll sit down, is that Judge Johnson clearly vindicated this right to do that, to accomplish that, through the immunity agreement.

And I apologize if we've offended the senators. We certainly didn't intend to do that. We certainly didn't intend to break any rules about this. And we don't think we did. And certainly, if we're going to go down that road, and you if you see it's appropriate that we have a rule that you can agree on. We would be happy to abide by that.

But we would simply like equal treatment with the other witnesses also with the White House and their attorneys. Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This question is to the House managers from Senators Collins and Feingold:

"On the basis of the president's and Betty Currie's testimony concerning their conversation on Sunday, January 18th, 1998, have each of the elements of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C., Section 1503 or witness tampering under 18 U.S.C., Section 1512 been met? We're particularly interested in your analysis of whether the Senate can infer that President Clinton intended to corruptly influence or persuade Ms. Currie to testify falsely and the weight to be given Ms. Currie's testimony in that regard."

HUTCHINSON: The answer is that under 18 USC, Section 1503, there is a case for witness tampering in the conversation between President Clinton and Betty Currie, and I want to cite you -- refer you to a case, United States versus Shannon (ph), which is a Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case, decided October 12, 1987 and for you lawyers here, it has been Shepardized. It is a good law and it really puts this in perspective.

In this case the defendant contended that the evidence did not support a conviction under 18 USC Section 1503 because the government did not prove that the witness in this case, Gray (ph) was ever a witness before the grand jury or that the defendant knew that that person was going to be a witness before the grand jury.

And this is what the court said. This argument is without merit.

A conviction under 1503 for attempting to influence a witness is appropriate so long as there is a possibility that the target of the defendant's activities will be called upon to testify in an official proceeding.

Now, this gentleman, this defendant Mr. Shannon went to jail. He made the defense that, "Well, I didn't -- she, you know, that person was never called as a witness. It was never an official proceeding." And it didn't fly. He was convicted. It was affirmed by the court of the land and presumably he went to jail.

Now that's the law of the land. In the criminal courts of our country, and so there would be a conviction under 18 USC, Section 1503. In this case you have much more, because as I pointed out yesterday, in reference to Betty Currie -- Betty Currie was clearly a witness. They left that deposition knowing she would be a witness.

The Jones attorney went back and immediately worked on issuing a subpoena for here because they had to have to have it because the president asserted her name continually through that. The president knew she as going to be a witness, he came back and he engaged in one conversation where he coached her testimony, he tampered with her testimony, it wasn't enough so two days later he brought her back in again and did the exact same thing.

The legal question is as a perspective witness, is she covered under the obstruction of justice statutes? The answer is yes, because other people go to jail for exactly the same thing, but I think we need to take a breath back for a moment. This United States Senate is not bound by the strictures of the United States Criminal Code.

If I came in here today and said well under the criminal procedures of the land, I'm entitled to bring witnesses and I'm entitled to cross-examine and I'm entitled to do this and we need to follow the criminal procedure code, you'd say no, this is the Senate of the United States and you would rightfully say that. You set your own rules in this and the same thing is true with the criminal law of the land. I think that we make a criminal case for obstruction of justice, could be prosecuted as other people in every courtroom of this land, but that's not the burden here. The issue is, is this an impeachable offense and something that is much higher is at stake, and that is the public trust, the integrity of our government, much more than in the United States versus Shannon, and that's what you're dealing with, so we can debate the criminal code all day and we win on that.

But we have to talk about the public trust, the integrity of our system and that's what our country needs you to win for them.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Thurmond and Bunning to the counsel for the president, "If there was no case and the White House accepted the results of the justice system, why then did the president pay nearly $1 million to Paula Jones?"

RUFF: I say this with all due respect, truly. As I think everyone knows, in this chamber and outside this chamber, who has practiced law, litigated difficult cases. The judgment of a defendant to settle a case, to pay whatever sum may be required to settle it is, in all candor I think for all of us, not reflective of any belief that he was wrong, that the other side was right. It reflects in this case, very candidly, a judgment by the president which he has stated publicly.

That in the midst of the many matters that he is responsible for, including I must say, this matter, as well as all those matters of state on which he spends his time and to which he devotes his energies. He could no longer spend any of that time and any of that energy on the Jones case.

I am so hesitant to say this, but I really believe, and please take it in the spirit that it's meant, that to ask whether the settlement of this case reflects substantively on the merits of Ms. Jones' claim is not fair. The merits of Ms. Jones' claim were decided by Judge Wright, she concluded that there were none.

I really do believe that to ask whether the president's decision to settle is somehow a reflection on the merits contrary to those reached by Judge Wright, is simply not the case.

REHNQUIST: This is a question to the White House counsel from Senator Johnson: "A few minutes ago Manager Hutchinson stated that he would be more confident of obtaining a conviction for obstruction of justice in a court than he is in the Senate. Can that statement be reconciled with the following exchange which occurred on the Sunday program "This Week" on January 17, 1999 in which Manager Hutchinson was asked "on the case that you have against the president on obstruction of justice, not the perjury, would you be confident of a conviction in a criminal court?" And Manager Hutchinson said "no, I would not."

UNIDENTIFIED SENATOR: It's addressed I believe to the...

REHNQUIST: It's addressed to the president's -- is it the president's counsel?

It's addressed to the president's counsel.

LOTT: I believe under the ruling yesterday, I can't object to questions.

REHNQUIST: That is correct.

UNIDENTIFIED SENATOR: Objection. Objection.

LOTT: I'm able to object -- to make an objection in any other form.

REHNQUIST: Go ahead. The parliamentarian advises me that the manager may make an objection to the question being answered. I have second thoughts, frankly. That ruling is based on a very (OFF-MIKE), almost incomprehensible statement that Salmon Chase made during the trial of Andrew Johnson, and I think the correct response is that the managers do not have a right to object to a question by the senator.

So, I rule the objection out of order.

CHERYL MILLS, ASSISTANT WHITE HOUSE SPECIAL COUNSEL: I just wanted to address for a second Manager Hutchinson's comments with regard to 1503 and he cited in 1987 case. And in 1995, I think as we talked a little about it and the House managers had discussed, Aguilar came down. And in that case the issue was was their sufficient nexus between the actual conduct of the person involved and the proceeding? And in particular, I'm just going to read you for one minute from the case law:

"The government asked the response that -- the government argues that the respondent understood that his false statement would be provided to a grand jury and that he made these statements to thwart the grand jury, and thwart the grand jury investigation and not just the FBI investigation. The government supports its argument with the transcript.

"And they go through the discussion that was between the judge and the agent in which the judge specifically asked whether or not he was a target for the grand jury investigation and the agent responded, "There is a grand jury meeting, convening I guess is the right word, evidence will be heard I'm sure on this issue."

So in other words, the person making the statement knew at that point that there was potentially the possibility his testimony would be presented to the grand jury. And the court ruled, as I talked to you a little bit about during my presentation before, that there was insufficient nexus for there to prove a violation of 1503.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Helms and Stevens to the House managers: "Do you have any comment upon the answer just given by the president's counsel?"

HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. And first, I want to make Miss Mills for the courtesy she extended to me just a moment ago and our exchange was. And Mr. Chief Justice, my -- when I started to state my objection was, was really not to the question at that point, but I was just going to make the reference to the anticipated answer that the statement on -- "This Week with Sam and Cokie" was not exactly a part of this record.

We're to be debating the facts of this case and Miss Mills was kind enough not to go into that. And then she, I think, was going to make the point that the answer that I gave was in reference to the need to call witnesses. That, how confident can you be in any case without calling a witness so the jury can hear it.

Now let me go back to what Miss Mills said. She did cite that United States versus Agiular, and I wish the Chief Justice, since he wrote the opinion could give us a lecture on that particular decision.

And I feel like maybe we should not be talking about this.


But I read that opinion as totally consistent with United States versus Shannon and that the law is clear that if this body were to apply 18 USC, Section 1503, that a conviction would obtain. But again is a body of -- gathered for the purpose of considering impeachable offense, and I would also like to yield to Mr. Graham on that point.

GRAHAM: Thank you. This is Saturday morning at 12:30 and a lot of people are probably watching with interest what's going on.

And let's talk about the law just for a moment... in a way that we all can understand when this thing is over with.

It's a long time since I've been in law school, but I like the exchange between the professor and the students, because you understood what the law was about at the end of the day.

Witness tampering -- the statute is designed to do what? As Senator Bumpers and I would say, in Arkansas and South Carolina, messing with people.

Well, we can elevate that a little bit and say witness tampering statures that we're talking about here are designed to make sure we get to the truth.

Fifteen-twelve -- is in the conjunctive -- Part B: "Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force."

That's one thing you don't want to happen here. You never want anybody to go up to a potential witness and threaten them to force or intimidation to tell something that's not true, so that's out of bounds. That's illegal.

"Or corruptly persuades" -- now what does that mean? There's some cases that talk about what that means. That means if the person has an intent, an evil intent or an improper purpose to persuade somebody without force of intimidation, that that's their crime. Or, listen to this -- "engages in misleading conduct toward another person with the intent to influence or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding." What are we getting to there ladies and gentlemen?

What the law says that if you go to a person who likes you, who's your friend, who trusts you and you try to get them to tell a story through misleading them, that's not true, that's a crime. The marvelous thing about the law is it is based in common sense.

It's very obvious to us we don't want somebody to be threatened to tell a story that's not true. It's also obvious to us, that we don't want to take personal relationships and misuse them to get false testimony out into a court room.

So if you go back to your secretary, who trusts you, who likes you, who admires you, and you try to mislead them by telling a scenario that's not true and you believe that they may appear in court one day, what you have done is very wrong. Because what you have done is you have planted the seed of a lie, in a way that we say is illegal.

So if you believe the president of the United States was not refreshing his memory when he told Betty Currie "she wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do that. I never touched her, did I, Betty?"

If you believe that's not to refresh his memory, and if you believe that was misleading and you believe that he had reason to believe she was going to be a witness because of his own conduct, then he is guilty.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senator Kerrey of Nebraska to the counsel for the president:

"Could you elaborate on your comments about the settlement of the Jones' case, focusing on the reality for example that corporations in this country routinely settle cases they regard as utterly with merit simply to spare the costs of defense, public embarrassment and for other reasons?"

RUFF: Mr. Chief Justice, I think far better than I did, the senator from Nebraska has already elaborated on my answer. I think all of us who have been involved, either as lawyers or as parties unhappily, in litigation know the burden that it imposes. And one can only imagine, and I am barely able to, the special burden that it places on a president to be immersed in this kind of litigation.

We take, I think, as a basic understanding in our jurisprudence that as a matter of law the settlement of case is not probative of any belief on either side about the strengths or weaknesses.

But what it is, is a matter of law is probably less relevant than what it is to this body or to the public perception. But underlying the law about what one can do in litigation in using a decision to settle is, I think, a common sense judgment that everybody, whether it be a large corporation or an individual or the president of the United States makes a judgment about where his or her resources should be expended and I don't mean simply resources in terms of dollars, although they're certainly important. But resources in terms of energy, time, worry, interference with the day to day business that all of us have to conduct.

And I think it's fair to say it's those factors, those very common sense factors, the ones we would all weigh in different circumstances in different settings if we were caught up in litigation that inform your judgment about what you should or in my judgment should not take from the fact that the president settled this case.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Nickles, Warner, Helms, Inhofe and Thurmond to counsel for the president: "Members of the armed services are presently removed from service for improper sexual conduct and/or for perjury. If the president is acquitted by the Senate, would not it result in a lower standard of conduct for the commander in chief than the other 1.3 million members of the armed services?"

RUFF: Mr. Chief Justice, this, of course, is a question legitimately asked but I also think legitimately answered, no.

We all understand entirely what rules are imposed on members of the Armed Services, indeed every member of the federal civil service, every member of a private company. When they engage in certain conduct they may be sanctioned for it.

And in the military I understand, as do the senators who have much greater personal and institutional experience with our armed forces than I, the importance of maintaining due order and discipline in the armed services.

And also the importance of believing that nothing that the commander in chief does or says could -- should ever undermine the strength of our armed forces, their cohesiveness, or their belief in the rules and the integrity of the rules that govern them.

With that said, A, I do not believe as a matter of what will flow from an acquittal of the president, who is indeed the commander-in- chief, that that will in fact undermine the good order and discipline of the army. But if I am wrong in some fashion about that, if my understanding of the process of flawed, and it may well be, we nonetheless have to ask the question which I think is implicit in the question that was put to me, does it -- because of the rules that apply to members of the armed forces, does it follow that because a sergeant of a lieutenant or a general or an admiral will suffer in his career, that we must go back to framers who wrote the impeachment clause and say "they must have expected that the commander-in-chief, the president would be removed for the same conduct?

They had an armed forces than. Indeed they were probably more intimately involved with that having just come through the Revolution than presidents and leaders of the country have been in the following 210 years. They surely understood that there was a constitutional and societal difference between the president in his role as commander in chief and the president in his role as the leader of the country on the one hand and those to whom rules of discipline had to apply in order to secure the strongest and best armed forces that we could secure.

It is in a sense, I suppose not an easy answer to give because members of the armed forces put their lives on the line and we want them to feel that they're being treated fairly, but at the end of the day it cannot be that the president of the United States is removable for conduct that would adversely affect the career of a member of the military.

There may be occasions on which the president engages in such horrific conduct that he ought to be removed. And the same would happen to an admiral or a general or the head of the chief of staff, Joint Chiefs, or the highest military member that you can contemplate.

But that doesn't mean that this conduct is transposed from the world of the military into the world of the constitution in such a way that the president, even if he is our commander-in-chief, should be removed from office. Because I think that judgment would be inconsistent with the judgment made by the framers.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest that this would be an excellent time to take a one hour break for lunch.

REHNQUIST: In the absence of objection, it's so ordered.


REHNQUIST: The Senate will be in order. The chair recognizes the Majority Leader.

LOTT: Thank you Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Chief Justice, we are ready momentarily to begin with the questioning period again, I believe the first question would come through Senator Daschle. I do want to say to our colleagues that any senator is entitled to propound a question on both sides. I do want to say to our colleagues that any senator is entitled to propound a question on both sides.

Again, it is our intent to go today not later than 4:00 and if additional time is needed for questions, it would have to go over until Monday.

We have some questions that have already been propounded that we would like to put to one side or the other, but at some point I think we would have a sense that maybe the basic questions have been asked. So, if any senator on either side feels strongly about a particular question he or she may want to be thinking about how and when they would insist that that be offered. But I think that a lot of ground has been covered.

I hope that, within a reasonable period of time, the questions that Senators had or have,will be given and we will have a response and then we will make a decision on how to proceed from there.

I yield back to Mr. Chief Justice.

WILLIAM REHNQUIST, SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE: This is a question to Senator Bingaman to counsel for the president: "When Samuel Dash resigned as adviser to the independent counsel, he wrote in a letter of resignation that he was doing so because the independent counsel had become an advocate and had unlawfully intruded on the power of impeachment which the Constitution gives solely to the House. In using his power to assist one party to the pending impeachment trial before the Senate, do you believe he has unlawfully intruded on the power of the Senate to try impeachments?"

CHARLES RUFF, WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL: Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, the independent counsel statute gives the independent counsel in some sense almost unbounded power to investigate the president and other high officials of government.

It does not give him, and has never given him, unbounded power even to the extent that he has become immersed in the impeachment proceedings in the House. For the statute itself says, not "You shall be the 436th member of the House," not, "That impeachment is vested in the independent counsel," but that impeachment is vested in the House and trial in the Senate.

We were obviously dismayed at the role the independent counsel chose to follow. Rather than simply sending information to the House that might bear on possible impeachable offenses, but rather to drive his van up to the building and unload unscreened, undiluted boxes of information which thereafter made their way, at least in part into the public domain.

But surely it was a shock to all of us, at least on this side, to learn yesterday evening that playing a role in the House proceeding had now become a role in this chamber. That the independent counsel was using, not only his powers of coercion, by calling on the United States District Court to assist him and in turn enabling the managers -- not simply as they would have it to do a little work product, to do a little meeting and greeting, to do a little saying hello, and a little chatting with someone who may be a witness before this body -- but rather saying to this witness, "I hold your life in my hands and I'm going to transfer that power to the managers for the House of Representatives."

The managers have said, "We're engaged in a adversary process here," and they themselves have talked long and loud today about letting them play out the process that any lawyer would play out in preparing for trial. Well no other lawyer that I know of gets to have a prosecutor sitting in the room with them and saying to the witness, "Talk to these people or your immunity deal is gone and you may go to the jail."

Now, we've been accused by Manager Hutchinson and others of always talking about process, of always falling back on process. Well I suggest senators that process is what our justice system is all about. Process is what we've always relied on to protect everyone against the vaunted power of the state, in this case, not just the managers, but the state embodied in the independent counsel.

But in this case it's more than just a call for due process, for fairness. Because it's going to have a direct and immediate impact on the facts as we learn them, as they learn them, and most importantly as you learn them.

Can you imagine what it's going to be like for Monica Lewinsky to be sitting in a room with the 13 managers, or however many there are, and the independent counsel and his lawyers, knowing the threat that she's under, knowing how she got into that room, can we have any reason to believe that what comes out of that process will be the fair, unvarnished truth? Or will she of necessity be looking over her shoulder and saying, "I better not put one foot wrong, because the independent counsel is sitting there watching and he's already told me that this deal is gone if I don't cooperate with the House managers?"

Process and truth, they're inextricably linked. But not if the independent counsel moves to that side of the room and becomes the moving force in the development of the truth and the facts as this body is entitled to know.

Accuse us of talking about process if you will. Accuse us, if you will, about falling back on process. We do it proudly because process is what this is all about. Because process leads to truth, but not that way.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Specter, Frist, Smith of New Hampshire, Inhofe, Lugar, Brownback, Roth and Crapo to counsel for the president: "In arguing that impeachable offense involves only a public duty, what is your best argument that a public duty is not involved in the president's constitutional duty to execute the laws? At a minimum, doesn't the president have a duty not to violate the laws under the constitutional responsibility to execute the laws?"

RUFF: It can't be that if the president violates the law, and thus violates his faithfully to carry out the laws, he's removed from office, because that would literally encompass virtually every law, every regulation, every policy, every guideline that you could imagine that's he responsible for carrying out in the executive branch.

If that were so, it would have been very simple for the framers to say, "The president shall be impeached for treason, bribery and failure to carry out his oath faithfully to execute the laws." They wrote that. They could have incorporated it into the impeachment clause if they wished, and they chose not to. So that if, in fact, you suggest that a failure to faithfully execute the laws inevitably leads to a decision that an impeachable and removable is being committed, I suggest with all respect that you simply eliminate it, the impact of the words treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors.

Now you may well judge within that setting, that is within that constitutional standard, other high crimes and misdemeanors, that some particular violation of law warrants removal, but it surely can't be -- just looking back at what the framers did and what the words themselves mean -- that any violation, even if you were to find one, must lead you to conclude that having therefore violated his responsibility to faithfully execute the laws, removal must follow.

The framers knew what the other parts of the Constitution said, and they specifically chose the words they chose intending that they cover only the most egregious violations of the public law and public trust, that they could conceive of.

REHNQUIST: This is -- from question -- from Senator Gramm to counsel for President Clinton: "In the event that the Senate determines the removal of the president is not warranted, are there any constitutional impediments to the following actions?

"One: a formal motion of censure.

"Two: a motion other than censure incorporating the Senate's acknowledgement and disapproval of the president's conduct.

"Three: a motion requiring a formal presidential apology or any other statement accepting the judgment of the Senate.

"Or four: a motion requiring the president to state that he will not accept a pardon for any previous criminal activities.

"Assuming that one or more of the above actions are constitutional, are there any other serious policy concerns about the advisability of the Senate formally adopting a legislative sanction of the president that falls outside the scope of the constitutional sanction of removal from office?"

The senator from Texas.


SEN. PHIL GRAMM (R), TEXAS: I'd like the record to show that Senator (OFF-MIKE)

REHNQUIST: The record may so show.


RUFF: Senator Gramm, my apologies. I had assumed that since Senator Daschle sent it up that it was probably from this side, but I'm glad you clarified the record for me. That question probably requires much more Constitutional learning to answer in great detail that I possess, but let me give it a try and the easiest one for me to answer is the fourth part -- would it be appropriate for in some fashion, for the president formerly to state that he would not accept a pardon.

I have stated formally on behalf of the president in response to a very specific question by the House Judiciary Committee, that he would not. And indeed, we have said in this chamber and we have said in other places, that the president is subject to the rule of law like any other citizen and would continue to be on January 21st, 2001, and that he would submit himself to whatever law, and whatever sanction, or whatever prosecution the law would impose on him.

He's prepared to defend himself in that forum at any time following the end of his tenure, and I committed on his behalf, and I have no doubt that he would so state himself, that he would not seek or accept a pardon.

I will not even begin to tread on the territory that is the Senate's jurisdiction and the issues that it takes on to itself, much less give it advice about what it is possible, or not possible to do, except to venture this.

I see no constitutional barrier, certainly, to the Senate's passing a censure motion, in whatever form it chooses, whether adopting language from the articles or creating language of it's own. We might at the end of the day disagree with you about whether the language is justified or whether it accurately reflects the facts. But there is nothing in the Constitution, I believe, that prevents this body from undertaking that task.

Now with respect for a formal acknowledgement, there I suppose the interplay between the legislative and executive branch becomes more tenuous, but to the extent that whatever the Senate chooses to say in such a document, needs to be acknowledged, recognized by the president. And that can be done without trenching on the separation of powers, and in that special uncertain area between the legislative and executive branches, I have no doubt that some process can be worked out that meets the Senate's needs.

I say this all in the sort of vast limbo of hypothesis because obviously I'm answering both somewhat off the cuff and without knowing what language we're talking about. But the core position as we see it is, that nothing stands in the way of this body when voicing its sentiments. And indeed I have said in the House of Representatives that I thought a censure was an appropriate response. And the president has said he's prepared to accept a censure.

And I have no doubt that all of that was said in the context of the proceedings in the House. It surely is applicable as well to anything that this body chooses to do.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Thompson to the House managers: "Do you have any comment on the answer given by the president's counsel with regard to the Office of Independent Counsel?"

REP. BILL MCCOLLUM (R-FL), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, thank you for that question.

It is our judgment, and I think a fair judgment, that we should be allowed and are permitted under any of the rules normal to all of this, to request of the Office of Independent Counsel the opportunity to talk to Monica Lewinsky, which we otherwise apparently were not going to be had -- able to have, as in normal course of preparation.

It makes me wonder, with all of the complaints that are going on here from the White House attorneys about this and their desire not to have witnesses what they're afraid of. Are they afraid of our talking to Monica Lewinsky? Are they afraid of the deposition of Monica Lewinsky? Are they afraid of what she might say out here? I don't think they should be, but they appear to be.

We are not doing anything abnormal. We're exercising our privileges, our rights. If it were a prosecutor and you had a prosecutorial arm, which you do in the case of the independent counsel office, that had an immunity agreement, as there is in this case, you certainly would not hesitate if you had a recalcitrant witness who you needed to call, to utilize that immunity agreement, and have the opportunity to discuss the matter with that witness and you certainly wouldn't hesitate if you needed to, to use that immunity agreement to assure truthful testimony in any proceeding that was going on. After all, that's the purpose of the immunity agreement.

It means that the witness is probably much more likely to be telling the truth than under any other circumstances, which is why counsels frequently argue immunity agreements as a reason why a particular witness is more credible than they might otherwise be if it were not for that agreement.

So, I think that there's an awful lot being said today about our meeting that we want to have with Ms. Lewinsky to prepare her as a witness. And I want to tell you all it is being done in my judgment with all due respect to those who are doing it, principally because of concerns that they don't want us to have that opportunity or they want to cast some aspersion or doubt or whatever.

We aren't about to do anything improper. We can assure you of that. We would never do that. We're going to follow regular order and do this as good counsels would do in good faith and in no way we wish to do anything otherwise nor have we. Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is question from Senator Baucus to the House managers: "In view of the direct election of the president, his popularity and sure duration of his term and in view of the fact that, as House Manager Graham stated, reasonable people can differ in this case, please explain precisely how acquitting the president will result in an immediate threat to the stability of our government."

REP. HENRY HYDE (R-IL), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate. I don't think anyone contends that if the president is acquitted that suddenly it's apocalypse now or the republic will be threatened from without or from within.

I think erosion can happen very slowly, but very deliberately. The problem that I have is with this office being fulfilled by someone who has a double responsibility.

The first responsibility is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He's the only person in the country and the world that has that compact with the American people.

The other, of course, is his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution. He is the national role model. He is the man. He is the flag bearer in front of our country. He is the person -- his office is the person, every parent says to their little child, I hope you grow up and be president of the United States someday.

We do nothing as important as raising our kids. And the president is the role model for every kid in the country. And when you have a president who lies, and lies, and lies under oath -- and that's the key phrase, "under oath."

I don't care about his private life or his matters that are not public. But when he takes an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth and then lies, and lies, and lies. What kind of a lesson is that for our kids and our grandkids? What does it do to the rule of law?

Injustice is a terrible thing. The longer you live, the more you can encounter it. Injustice, abuse, oppression, and the law is what protects you. The law, having resort to an objective standard of morality in action. And when you are sworn to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, how do you reconcile the conduct of perjury, obstruction of justice, with that obligation?

I have suggestion. Let's just tear it out of that Constitution, tear out that "Take care to see that the laws are faithfully executed." It's wrong. It's an example we're setting for millions of kids, that if the president can do it, you can do it.

What do you say to master sergeants that have their careers destroyed because they hit on a inferior member of the military?

No, it -- we are setting the parameters of permissible presidential conduct for the one office that ought to gleam in the sunlight. And the kids -- that's what moves me -- the kids.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Nickles, Warner, Crapo, Helms, Inhofe and Thurmond to the House managers: "Would you like to comment on the remarks of Counsel Ruff concerning the impact of an acquittal of the president accused of improper sexual conduct and/or perjury and obstruction on the Armed Forces?"

REP. STEVE BUYER (R-IN), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, I'd like to thank the senators for the question because I believe it's also insightful.

The question of double standards or establishing lower standards, I believe is extraordinary important. The defense asserted, and it's hard for me to believe, but they're asking you to set higher standard for judges and a lower standard for a president who nominates them to you.

Asking you and they think that we can set a higher standard for law enforcement, yet establish a lower standard for the chief executive or the chief law enforcement officer that has the duty to faithfully see that the laws are executed.

Set a higher standard for military personnel and then a lower standard for the commander in chief who must make the painful decisions to send them into battle.

Now the precedents in impeachment trials here in the Senate, the judgment of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate regarding the standards for promotion have been otherwise than that which Mr. Ruff has asserted. We must confront the fact that the president is the commander-in- chief, and I believe that it is perfectly acceptable of the American people to demand of the military, the highest standard, which also means that those of whom find themselves in positions of responsibility in the Pentagon, of whom are in civilian leadership, must also live by such exemplary conduct and standards.

The high character of military officers is a safeguard of the character of a nation. The Senate, who must ratify the officers' promotion list, has repeatedly found that anything less that exemplary conduct is therefore unworthy of a commission, or further promotion.

I recall when I first came to Congress in 1992, there were many making a big to-do over Tailhook -- remember? -- and it was serious. There are still remnants around of Tailhook because there are still those who are screening the officers' promotion if you are within 100 miles of Tailhook, look out for your career. That needs to be put to bed.

Then I was given a duty to ensure that after Aberdeen broke and the sexual misconduct in the military, whether it was at Fort Jackson, Aberdeen or in other places, I spent 18 months out on the road to ensure that the policies of the military were fair and the treatment equal dignity in the work place among men and women -- we can't forget that.

You see we also must recognize and must be candid with the harsh reality, that the officers and NCOs are human and not without fault, folly, and failings. I believe though, it's the aspirations of high ideals that is important for each of us, but more so for the military in order to keep the trust and the public faith of the military.

You see, it's a soldier, a sailor, an airman, or marine is prepared to lay down his or her life to defend the Constitution and it is the devotion and the fidelity to the oath, without mental reservation, that is the epitome of character.

Now the president is not and should not be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and I concur with Mr. Ruff when he made that point. And the president is not an actual member of the military, but we have a unique system in the world, we have that civilian control of the military and it works. But we also must recognize and be cognizant that the president, however, is at the pinnacle. He is at the top of the chain of command.

And that is what I learned about being on the road for 18 months, and how do we make corrections of -- how do you set the proper dignity in the workplace -- doesn't matter if it's your own office, or in fact if you're the president as commander in chief. Whoever leads, you set the tone and tenor of those of whom must follow.

You see, the message is that the military personnel do look to the commander-in-chief to set the high standard of moral and ethical behavior. The military personnel are required to set a high standard of conduct in order to set the example to those they lead. Adherence to high standards is the fabric of good order and discipline. When military leaders fall short of this ideal then there is confusion and disruption in the ranks. And today, many do see a double standard. There is a double standard because the commander in chief has allegedly conducted himself in a manner that would be a court martial offense for military personnel having been alleged of the very same thing.

The president's actions have had an intangible and cohesive impact upon military personnel. To turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to it would be shame on us. The question soldiers and sailors ask are -- I took an oath to swear to tell the truth, and I also took an oath to uphold the Constitution. How can this president take the same oath and not be truthful and remain in office? If I were to have done what the president did, I'd be court martialed.

You see, we also have to recognize that each of the services are recruiting young people all across the nation. At boot camp, they infuse these young people with moral values of honor, courage and commitment and they're teaching self-restraint, discipline and self- sacrifice.

Military leaders are required to provide a good example to those young recruits, yet when they look up the chain of command all the way to the commander in chief, they see a double standard at the top.

Again, it's the president that sets the tone and tenor for the military just as he does for law enforcement. I believe the president has violated the sacred trust between the leaders and those of whom he was entrusted to lead.

I also spoke in my presentation that it was the president's self- inflicted wounds have caused his own credibility into question, not only in his decision-making process, but with regard to...

REHNQUIST: Mr. Buyer, the chair is of the view that you have answered the question.

BUYER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Torricelli to the President's counsel: "At the outset of the House proceedings, a member of the majority, now a manager, stated the solemn duty that confronts us requires that we attain a heroic level of bipartisanship and that we conduct our deliberations in a fair, full and independent manner.

"The American people deserve a competent, independent, and bipartisan review of the independent counsel's report. They must have confidence in the process. Politics must be checked at the door.

"In evaluating the case against the president, should the Senate take into account, A: the partisan nature of the proceedings in the House; or B: the public's lack of confidence in the proceedings thus far?"

DAVID KENDALL, CLINTON ATTORNEY: Chief Justice. I think that this body has got to take into consideration what brought these articles here. And that's the action both of the independent counsel and the House of Representatives. And I think when fairly considered, when you look at the actions of both, you find an absence of fairness and bipartisanship.

The independent counsel investigated this case for eight months. It developed every bit of evidence it could that was negative, derogatory or prejudicial and it put them into those five volumes.

It did not pursue exculpatory leads. It did not follow-up evidence that might lead to evidence of innocence, and it downplayed when it came to write the referral, significant testimony which was exculpatory or helpful.

I think the independent counsel's process was really epitomized by Ms. Lewinsky's statement that, "Nobody asked her to lie or had promised her a job for silence."

You see, the independent counsel didn't bring out that testimony. In fact, it came out when the independent counsel was through examining Ms. Lewinsky in the grand jury, and I just want to read you a very short part of that.

To page 1,161 of the Appendix. The independent counsel's prosecutor says, "We don't have any further questions," and a grand juror pipes up, "Could I ask one? "

"Monica, is there anything that you would like to add to your prior testimony, either today or the last time you were here, or anything that you think needs to be amplified on or clarified? I just want to give you the fullest opportunity."

And here's what Ms. Lewinsky says: "I would. I think because of the public nature of how this investigation has been and what the charges aired, that I would just like to say that no one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence. And that I'm sorry. I'm really sorry for everything that happened."

Now, we requested the independent counsel, before he sent the referral to the House of Representatives, for an opportunity to review that. We were denied this.

I think if you compare what happened here with what happened in 1974 when special prosecutor Jaworski sent a transmission of evidence to the House Judiciary Committee, the comparison is very revealing. Then Special Prosecutor Jaworski sent only a road map of the evidence, a description of what was in the record.

Judge Sirica reviewed that at a hearing where White House Counsel ware present. Judge Sirica then said it was a fair, impartial summary and transmitted it on to the House Judiciary Committee

Here without review, either by the presiding judge or the grand jury, a referral was sent to the House that was a one-sided, unfair, prosecutorial summary. When the House managers speak of the need for discovery, they have no such need. Everything prejudicial that could be found through an unlimited budget and a seemingly endless investigation has been found and put there. Tied up with a red ribbon for them.

In terms of bipartisanship in the House, I think that speaks for itself. I don't think this was a bipartisan process. I don't think it was a bipartisan result. I think though it rests with this body to try the case. It's clear under the constitution that this body has the power -- the sole power -- to try impeachments.

The chief justice in the Nixon case made that very clear. I'm not going to comment on the independent counsel's assistance to the House manager with Ms. Lewinsky. I think that's for you to decide whether that is consonant with how you decide the case ought to be tried. But I think that the presentation of the articles to this body has been neither fair nor bipartisan.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Lott to the House managers: "Do you have any comment on the answer just given by the president's counsel?"

HYDE: Mr. Chief Justice, members of the Senate. I welcome this opportunity to fill in a considerable gap in the record.

Mr. Kendall said earlier today or perhaps yesterday -- it was yesterday -- "We never had a chance to call witnesses ourselves to examine them, to cross-examine them, to subpoena documentary evidence at no point in this process."

On October 5, 1998, the House Judiciary Committee passed House Res. 581 by voice vote, the impeachment inquiry procedure which included the right to call witnesses for the president.

On October 21, the House Judiciary Committee staff met with Mr. Ruff, Mr. Kendall and Mr. Craig. At that time, the Judiciary Committee staff asked the White House to provide any exculpatory information; provide a list of any witnesses they wanted to call, without result.

On November 9th, the House Judiciary Committee wrote to Messrs. Ruff, Kendall and Craig and again informed them of the president's right to call witnesses.

On November 19th, independent counsel Starr testified 12 hours before the House Committee on the Judiciary. President's counsel was given the opportunity to question the independent counsel. He did not ask a single question relating to the facts of the independent counsel's allegations against the president.

Now the Democrats had Mr. Kendall. They had Abbe Lowell. We had Dave Schippers. That's not an invidious comparison.

On November 25th I wrote a letter to the president asking the president, among other things, to provide any exculpatory information and inform the committee of any witnesses it wanted to call, without success.

On December 4th, two working days before the presentation of the president to the Judiciary Committee, counsel for the president requested to put on 15 witnesses. The White House was allowed to present all 15 witnesses. Not a single one of those was a fact witness.

And lastly I quote from a letter from Mr. Kendall to Mr. Bittman -- it's in volume three, part two of two, page 2,326 -- "That you now request we submit exculpatory evidence is perfectly consonant with the occasionally Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this whole enterprise. I'm not aware of anything the president to exculpate."

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senator Leahy to the White House counsel: "The managers argued in response to a previous question that it would set a bad example for the military to acquit the president.

"Given that argument, how can you reconcile the statement by Manager Hyde after Casper Weinberger was pardoned by President Bush of multiple criminal violations, including perjury, that 'I'm glad the president had the chutzpah to do it. The prosecution of Weinberger was political in nature; an effort to get at Ronald Reagan. I just wish us out of this mess: the six years and this $30 or $40 million that has been spent by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh'?"

RUFF: The question in virtually every respect speaks for itself. But I would make this point because I think it fleshes out a bit my earlier answer and responds in some fashion, to the argument made by the managers on this very issue.

I was probably too lawyerly, as is my wont, in responding to the earlier question on this issue by Senators Warner and Thurmond and others. Because I think the one point that needs to be made in the context of Senator Leahy's question, which goes to the leadership of the Secretary of Defense and the issue of what it means to undertake the removal of the president.

The distinction that I think we all need to hold onto here, that I probably glided over too rapidly in my earlier answer, is that the president of the United States is elected by the people of the United States. He appoints the secretary of defense. He appoints the officers in the military. He appoints the judges, and the Senate plays a role in that process by approving his choices or occasionally not approving his choices.

But there's only one person who's put in his job with the voice of the people and however we may be concerned as rightly as should if that person oversteps the bounds either of his office or his personal conduct to say that there is some one to one or any other number you can think of comparison between the impact of enforcing into the law on those civilian and military personnel who serve their country and the very different question of whether the voice of the people will be stilled by removing the president is the point on which I think this body needs to focus. REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Kyl and Mack to counsel for the president: "Mr. Ruff said President Clinton was never asked in the grand jury whether everything he testified to in the Jones' deposition was true. If he were asked, would he say it was all true? Would the president be willing on interrogatory from the Senate, answering that question?"

GREGORY CRAIG, WHITE HOUSE SPECIAL COUNSEL: Senators, it is true that he testified that he tried to be truthful in the Jones' deposition, that it was his purpose to be accurate in the Jones' deposition. He tried to navigate his way through a minefield without violating the law and he believes that he did. There is no statement in that testimony in the grand jury that reaffirms, ratifies, and confirms all of his testimony in the Jones deposition.

Now we would be happy to take questions and get responses to you, consult with the president and Mr. Ruff, if you'd like to submit them.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Murray to the White House Counsel: "Has Ms. Lewinsky ever claimed that she was sexually harassed by the president?"

KENDALL: (OFF-MIKE) Justice. Ms. Lewinsky has made no such claim. What happened between the president and her was improper, but it was consensual. To say that does not excuse it or sugar-coat it or justify it, but it does I think put it in the proper context. She has never claimed that she has any evidence at all relevant to sexual harassment by the president.

When the president -- and I went through this on Thursday in respect to the obstruction of justice allegation about the president stating that she could file an affidavit.

The president and Ms. Lewinsky reasonably believed that she could have filed a limited, but truthful affidavit and I think you've got to look to the fact that the Jones case was not a class action. It was a suit only about what Ms. Jones claimed happened in May 1991, in a Little Rock hotel room.

The December 11th ruling on discovery was a ruling not on admissibility but discovery. The president believed that an affidavit, a truthful affidavit might be successful, not that it would, but that it might be.

Now in filing such an affidavit, and in preparing it, no particular form was necessary. There was nothing to dictate what had to go in and what had to go out of it.

There were many witnesses on the witness list. The end of discovery was approaching and there was at least some chance they thought that a factual affidavit which was limited, might accomplish the purpose. And I think this is confirmed by the fact that when Judge Wright considered whether to order Ms. Lewinsky's deposition, she issued a ruling on January the 29th, saying the deposition would not go forward because evidence from Ms. Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Paula Jones' trial because it was both irrelevant to the core allegations, and it was inadmissible as extrinsic evidence of other facts.

So, I think that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing whatsoever to offer on the critical issue in the Paula Jones case, which was an issue of sexual harassment.

REHNQUIST: This is a question by Senator Shelby to the House managers: "Would a verdict of not guilty be a stronger message of vindication for the president than a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion to adjourn? What are the constitutional implications if any if a motion to dismiss prevailed short of concluding the trial?"

HYDE: Mr. Chief Justice, members of the Senate. They're are various options. It's really a misdirected question if I may say to ask us to suggest consequences of solutions to this dilemma that we're in.

I think the beauty -- and that's not the word -- I think the advantage of proceeding with the articles of impeachment is it's consonant with the Constitution. It's simple, it's clean. Either guilty or not guilty. The consequences of that verdict of course are up to any individual who cast a vote.

Now if you -- I heard the word censure sometime before. You gentleman and ladies do anything you want to do, it's your power, it's your authority, it's in your yard, but you've got to deal with the Constitution.

No matter what you do, you have a problem of a bill of attainder; you have a problem with the separation of powers; you have a problem of any censure to be meaningful has to at least damage the president's reputation. And that becomes, in my judgment a bill or attainder, but again is up to you.

The consequences, I don't think will harm us, what ever you do. We've done our best. We've lived up to our responsibility under the Constitution, and all we ask is that you live up to your responsibilities under the Constitution and give us a trial. I'm sure you will.

REHNQUIST: This is a question to the president's counsel from Senator Levin: "Monica Lewinsky has explicitly in her handwritten proffer, that no one encouraged her to lie. Yet House Manager Asa Hutchinson claimed to the Senate using inferences, that Ms. Lewinsky was encouraged to lie. Do the House managers argue that such inferences are as credible as Ms. Lewinsky's direct testimony to the contrary?"

RUFF: I think Senator Levin's question, Mr. Chief Justice, goes to the heart of much of what we have been saying for the last few days. If in fact, you look at the five volumes stacked up in front of my colleague, Mr. Kendall, you will see Ms. Lewinsky say, not just once, but many times in essence that, "I was never told to, never encouraged to lie. Never traded an affidavit for a job." Never did any of the things that lie at the very heart of the managers' case. And so, what do we have then? We have the managers trying to snatch a bit of evidence here, or a bit of speculation there, or a bit of extrapolation over there, and say, "Well, she really didn't mean it when she said several times quite directly, 'Nobody ever told me or encouraged me to lie'."

It is possible, of course, whenever one deals with circumstantial evidence, to make reasonable leaps from that evidence to some viable conclusion, but I think most courts that we are familiar with and that those of you who practice law are familiar with would have a great deal of difficulty in concluding that if I take a little bit here and a little there and a little bit over there and pull them all together in some vast speculation about what was really in someone's mind and on the other side I have the person saying what's in her mind and saying the opposite, I don't think that case would ever get to the jury.

And maybe it's one of the things that worries just a little bit about the normal, everyday, we do it all the time conference between the managers sand the independent counsel and Ms. Lewinsky. And maybe in that setting with the independent counsel, gently patting Ms. Lewinsky on the back and telling her it's time to cooperate, maybe the message will be, "Come closer to their side and their speculation. Don't stay where you were, which is what you told the grand jury and the FBI and us under oath, and not under oath on multiple occasions, which is indeed 'Nobody told me to, nobody encouraged me to lie'."

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Bond to the House managers: "When Ms. Mills described the president's testimony before the Jones grand jury, she said the president was surprised by questions about Ms. Lewinsky. What evidence is there of the president's knowledge that Lewinsky questions would be asked? Is there evidence he knew in advance the details of the Lewinsky affidavit which his counsel presented at the Jones deposition?"

REP. ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Thank you, Mr Chief Justice. Well, there's numerous evidences in the record to show that the president was not surprised about the questions pertaining to Monica Lewinsky at the January 17th deposition.

First of all, in regard to the affidavit -- testimony of Monica Lewinsky is that -- I believe it was January 6 -- it was 5th or 6th that she discussed that with the president, the signing of the affidavit and the contents of that affidavit. That's whenever he made his statement, "Don't worry, I don't need to see it. I've seen 15 of them."

Again, we don't know what he's referring in reference to that 15, but clearly, according to Monica Lewinsky's testimony, she went over the contents of that, even though she might not of had it in hand. She went over the contents of that with the president.

Also circumstantially, there's conversations between Mr. Jordan and the president during this time. But in addition, let me just recall something I made in my presentation that a few days before the president's deposition testimony, that it was Michael Isikoff, of a national publication, called Betty Currie and asked about courier records on the gifts.

This startled Betty Currie obviously because the gifts at that point were under her bed. And so she went, as she recalled she probably told the president that and then secondly she went to see Vernon Jordan about that issue. All of that leads you to believe clearly that the president fully knew that when he went into the deposition on January 17, that he would be asked time and time again about the specifics of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. So I think that addresses part of that question.

Let me remark on what Mr. Ruff just said. I'm just constantly amazed about our effort to interview witnesses because yesterday Mr. Ruff -- I believe it was and it might have been Mr. Kendall -- so, excuse if I've got the attribution wrong -- but criticized us saying, "They want to call witnesses, but they have no clue what these witnesses would say."

Do you recall that? That was the argument yesterday.

And so if we make an effort to determine what these witnesses would say, then we're criticized for trying out what they would say. And so I think that again, it's more convenient to talk about what the managers are doing, what the process is, rather than the facts of the obstruction.

REHNQUIST: This is a question to the White House counsel from Senator Kennedy: "Would you please respond to Manager Hyde's suggestion that an acquittal would send a bad message to the children of the country and to Manager Hyde's statements regarding the fairness of the process in the House of Representatives?"

CRAIG: Mr. Chief Justice. Thank you for that question, Senator.

The children. What do we tell the children? Well, ladies and gentleman of the Senate, that's not an academic question for me and for my wife and I assume that's the case for many, many families all over this country.

We happen to have quite a few children and they're very young. They're under twelve and we talk about what is going on here and we talk about how important it is to tell the truth. And we talk about how wrong it was for the president of the United States not to tell the truth. And we think that we've learned a lot by going through that process.

We have talked about what President Clinton did and why it was wrong. And, with all due respect to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, I and my wife and I don't think many parents when they raise their children rely every day on messages or resolutions from the Congress of the United States to tell them that it's important to teach children the importance of truth telling.

I'm a little bit disappointed in the inference of the argument that those of us who oppose impeachment for the reasons that you understand somehow are sending a message that it's okay to kids not to tell the truth. I'm a little bit disappointed in that argument. Because I don't think that's the way the parents of this country feel. That's certainly not the way I feel. And I don't believe that impeachment is a question of what you tell your children about truth telling. Of course you tell your children to tell the truth.

Of course, you tell your children the difference between right and wrong. I'm surprised it's an issue here.

Now as to the second part of your question, Senator, I went through that House of Representatives experience and I must say that I was disappointed in it because we had been promised bipartisanship and when the Office of Independent Counsel sent its referral to the House of Representatives, White House counsel did not have access to that document before it was released to the world.

When the Office of Independent Counsel sent its 60,000 pages, 19 boxes of evidence to the House of Representatives, we were not given access the way members of the Judiciary Committee were to all that material. We were given access to a very limited amount of material in the course of that process, in fact much of that material we've never had access to on behalf of the president.

We were disappointed that there was no full discussion of the constitutional standards for impeachment before they went forward to vote for an impeachment inquiry. We thought that was the cart before the horse.

We were disappointed and we regretted that grand jury materials provided with promises of confidentiality were dumped in to the public with salacious material, unfiltered by the House of Representatives of the Judiciary Committee. And we saw party line vote after party line vote after party line over and over and over and over again in the Judiciary committee.

We were disappointed that the depositions went forward without our participation. We were disappointed there was no definition of the scope of the inquiry. We were disappointed that there was no term of time, no limitation on either the scope or the time of this inquiry. And we were disappointed that there was not adequate notice of the charges.

There were two events that happened near the end of this process, that I think were particularly disappointing to us.

One was, that while the debate was under way on the House floor, members of the House of Representatives were taken into that evidence room and shown evidence that was not in this record, that had not been included in the discussion in the House Judiciary Committee, that had never been shown to the lawyers for the counsel for the president, that was not in the referral. And became a factor in the decision making, at least of some members of the House, unfairly so, I think.

And finally, we were disappointed that the members of the House of Representatives were denied the right and the opportunity to vote for censure. They were promised the right to vote their conscience. They were told they could vote their conscience. And if they'd been given that right to vote their conscience we may not be here today. We might have had the resolution of censure and this thing might have been resolved. And that was the greatest disappointment of all. Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Bennett, Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Roth, Specter and McConnell to the House managers: "Would each of the managers who have been prosecutors prior to being elected to the House of Representatives please state briefly whether he believes he would have sought an indictment and obtained a conviction of an individual who had engaged in the conduct of which the president is accused?"

REP. ED BRYANT (R-TN), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, I know there are several probably not only at our table but all across this Senate who have had some experience in somewhere in prosecution of cases.

I would just briefly say that -- and I think it's probably been said very well today, more eloquently than I will say it not only from some of the people on our side, but even some of the people on the president's side -- have talked about this same concept of justice and the rule of law.

It is so important in our system of justice that the American people have confidence in that. And one of the ways that I found in my experience that confidence sometimes suffered where phone calls that occasional you would receive where there had been all allegation that someone in an elected office, or some public official in particular had allegedly again -- committed a crime or perhaps been charged with a crime -- and allegations of cover-up because of who that person was.

There was not equal justice out there. People were being treated differently and specially and that happens. That comes with our territory. We're very visible people, certainly the president of the United States is the most visible of us.

As I said in my opening remarks, he's a role model for many people and certainly when these kinds of allegations come up against the president, people raise these kinds of thoughts and complaints.

As a prosecutor, I would find this kind of charge particularly of concern not only because of the perjury which is so important, because as I said earlier too, truth under pins our whole system, but I find it equally compelling as a prosecutor that a person of this visibility, of this responsibility not only commits a crime himself, but he brings someone else into that. He ensnares another person, actually other people into this -- the cover up, the obstruction part. Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, Vernon Jordan, all the White House people that we've talked about.

He brings other people into this and causes other people to commit crimes. I would view that even more seriously, because of the fact that he had made other people commit types of crimes. And because of that, I think as a prosecutor, were this another person, a John Doe, of some visibility, a local district attorney, a local mayor of something like that, there would be no doubt that the allegations would have to go to court.

And I might add in line with this, that we've heard this selecting the president out of this process by saying, "Well, you know we should not consider him like we would a federal judge, or like a general that we're talking about maybe promoting to head the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a captain for promotion to major, or any -- really anyone else here." And it almost seems like that, yes he is different.

But it almost seems like we want to treat him like a king because he is the only person we've got here and because he's the only one we can't look at him like we look at 1,000 judges or 200 generals, and other public officials.

And just -- I think that's a fallacious argument. If the facts are there, no matter if this man is the president -- to me that's what the Constitution is about. I think they set up this process to avoid a king in a kingdom.

And I would yield time to Mr. McCollum.

MCCOLLUM: I will be much briefer in answering that question Mr. Chief Justice.

I served as a military judge advocate for four years on active duty; 20 more years in the reserves. I was a prosecutor, defense attorney and military judge. I think this is a compelling case on the evidence. I would never hesitate to take this trial if I were prosecuting in the crimes of perjury, obstruction of justice or any of the military offenses that might be included in here.

But just on the criminal charges, which are under the UCMJ, I would certainly do so given the opportunity for all the reasons and then some that Mr. Bryant gave.

REP. BOB BARR (R-GA), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, to me this is not a hypothetical question in any sense of the word. As a United States attorney under two presidents, I had the opportunity, not only to contemplate bringing such cases based on the evidence of law, but actually having the responsibility of carrying those cases out, prosecuting them. Including a case that probably cost me a primary election in the republican party for prosecuting a member of Congress for precisely the activity which brings us here today. That is perjury, misleading a grand jury. So the answer to the question, Mr. Majority Leader, is not only yes, but absolutely yes.

REHNQUIST: Mr. Hutchinson.

HUTCHINSON: Well, I know we've run out of time. So the answer is the facts and the law support it, and the answer is yes. And may I add that Mr. Rogan has certainly prosecuted. Mr. Lindsey Graham and Mr. Gekas that all would, if you would like to join in that. Otherwise we all would affirm that the answer is yes.

REHNQUIST: This is a question to the president's counsel from Senators Boxer and Johnson: "The managers repeatedly assert that if the Senate acquits President Clinton, the Senate will be making the statement that the President of the United States should be held above the law.

"If, as the managers concede, President Clinton may be held accountable in court for the charges alleged in the House articles, regardless of the outcome of his Senate trial, how could a Senate vote to acquit the president be fairly characterized as a vote to place him above the law?"

RUFF: I suppose the one quote that has been heard most often throughout these proceedings in the House and in this body is Theodore Roosevelt's and I won't repeat it, except to go to the heart of this question.

The fact that we are having this trial in this chamber, the fact that we had an impeachment proceeding in the House, is itself part of our rule of law. The president is immersed in the application of the rule of law at this very moment.

And the rule of law, as I think my colleague Ms. Mills said, is neither a sword nor a shield, depending on your perspective. We're all subject to it and we live with its outcome if it is fair and is consistent with the system of justice that we've developed in the last 210 years.

And so, the verdict here, if it is not guilty, as I trust it will be, or if this trial is ended appropriately through some other legal motion or mechanism, as long as it's done within the rule of law, will have met all of our obligations. And most importantly, it will have ensured that the president is treated neither above nor below.

But certainly, the one issue that is raised in this question is important to focus on because this is not a situation in which the president walks away scot-free, no matter what happens. Not to mention, the personal pain, and the pain that has been suffered in going through this process. The president has said, and I've said on his behalf, that he will not use his powers, or ask anyone else to use their powers, to protect him against the application of the rule of law.

Moreover, just in case it has slipped anyone's mind, and it's occasionally been misstated in other forums, the statute that has allowed the independent counsel to pursue the president for the last four plus years, specifically provides that he retains jurisdiction over the president for a year after the president has left office. So there can be no argument that, "Oh, this will just fall into the cracks or this will disappear in to the ether somewhere."

The president is -- will be at risk. We trust that reasonable judgments will be made and a determination will be reached that it is not appropriate to pursue him. But that too will be pursued under the rule of law to which he is subject.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Campbell, Hagel and Specter to the House managers: "White House counsel has several times asserted that the grand jury perjury charge is just a he-says/she-says case and that we cannot consider corroborating witnesses you cite. What is it about the president's grand jury testimony that convinces you he should be removed from office?"

MCCOLLUM: Mr. Chief Justice, that question goes to the heart of what we're here about today. We've had a great deal of discussion about a lot of peripheral questions and issues, but the fact of the matter is, the simplest portion of this deals with grand jury perjury.

And I assume the question principally is directed to the first of the four points under the grand jury perjury article because, for example, the second point, with respect to the president having the goal or the intent of being truthful, which he said he did in the grand jury in the Jones deposition, there isn't a he-says/she-says question. That's just very simple. The president lied multiple times in that civil deposition, and if he said in the grand jury to the grand jurors, "My goal was to be truthful" is pretty self-evident that that was a lie, and he perjured himself. So, that's not a he- says/she-says.

But the question that the counsel over here have tried to bring up several times is saying the part with respect particularly to Monica Lewinsky saying that the president certain parts of her of her body, which would have been covered by the Jones' definition of sexual relations, and the president who said explicitly in his grand jury testimony, "I didn't touch those parts, and yes I agree that would have been and is part of the definition of sexual relations in the Jones' case." That is where you believe her or him. And that say that's a he-says/she-says and it's not.

But even if it were, you could listen to it and accept it. I think there is some confusion about the law. The law of perjury does not require two witnesses nor does it require the corroborating testimony of anybody else. It does not. That's why in 1970, it was changed.

And most prosecutions today for perjury, including people who are in federal prison today for perjury in civil cases, for lying about matters related to sex, and there are several -- a couple of whom testified before us in the judiciary committee during our process and hearings -- are based upon that 1970 law that does not require any corroboration.

In this case you have Monica Lewinsky who is a very credible witness by other reasons. That you don't even have to get to those corroborating witnesses on these points. Number one, she was under immunity. Under the threat of prosecution when she testified that way. Number two, she has consistent statements throughout, many times over. She didn't say she'd had sexual intercourse with him. She could have made that up, but she didn't. Everything she says is believable about that portion of it.

And third, and not last in all of this, is that she did make very contemporaneous statements to at least six other people who were her friends and counselors describing in detail exactly the same thing she testified to under oath before the grand jury in this respect. Now, they say -- the counselors here -- "You can't consider that under the federal rules of evidence because that's presumably hearsay." Well, there are at least three exceptions to that hearsay rule which could be brought out in a courtroom. They've gone about trying to carefully say, "We never said that Monica Lewinsky lied."

I remember -- I think it was Mr. Kendall, or maybe it was Mr. Craig up here a little earlier -- saying, "When asked that question, did she lie in this instance or in any other?" and they said, "Well, it's just different version of the truth." Well, if she's saying it as explicitly as she is about this nine times, or four times and whatever, and the president's saying, "I never did that," I don't see how they can fudge around challenging her truthfulness and credibility. That's what they've been doing.

And in any courtroom I've ever been in, once that's occurred you could certainly bring in her prior consistent statements, and you don't even have to go with the rules of evidence on this. You're not bound by those rules of evidence. And common sense says she had no motive to be lying to her friends in those numerous telephone conversations, or her meetings with her counselors when she described in detail these things the president says he didn't do, because all of those statements occurred -- all of those discussions occurred -- before she ever was knowingly on a witness list, or likely to have to testify in any other way.

She's very credible. Those prior consistent statements are very believable and I submit to you they would be admissible in a court, in the kind of contest that would be involved in the situation like this. And it goes to the very heart of what we're here about: grand jury perjury, the simplest, clearest one.

The president lied, Monica Lewinsky told the truth about it and it's profound -- then it is important, and it's critical to this case. And that's the principle. One of the perjuries that we've been directing our attention to because it is so clear.

Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Dorgan to counsel for the president: "How can the House claim that its function is accusatory only, when the articles it voted for -- voted call for the president's removal?"

RUFF: This of course, takes us back to the very heart of the argument that raged fro a small time here yesterday and in previous days. The notion that the House of Representatives viewed itself during the month of December, as merely -- I won't even say that it rose in their mind to the level of accusatory body that we would think of when we think of the grand jury, but to a body who's job it was, as one of the managers said at one point, simply to find probable cause to believe that the president had committed these acts.

Perhaps there has been some extraordinary transposition from the mood and the tenor of the comments made during those days when the Judiciary Committee was doing its work to the days when these managers have appeared in the well of the Senate, something that has transformed the mere probable cause screening finding that they allegedly viewed as the role of the House and of the Judiciary Committee into the certainty that you hear today.

It is a good question as to how then given the role they saw for themselves, they could go so far not only to seek the removal of the president, but indeed in all their prosecutorial vigor, something that has never been sought before, a bar against holding any future office at the level of certainty that must have achieved given the standard that they held themselves to.

What happened between December 19th and today that allows these managers to come before you not saying, "Well, we were certain then and we're more certain now," or, "We only found probably cause back in 1998 but in 1999 we are sufficiently certain that we ought to shut down the public will as expressed in the elections of 1996"?

I haven't yet found an answer to that question.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Bond, Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Luger, Hutchison of Texas, Roth and Stevens. It's directed to the House managers: "After everything you've heard over the last several weeks from the president's counsel, do you still believe that the facts support the charges of obstruction of justice alleged in the articles of impeachment, specifically, what allegations of improper conduct has the president's counsel failed to undermine? "

The question's also from Senators Specter and McConnell.

HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. First of all, why is obstruction of justice important to begin with? I think back on a opportunity I had at a hearing once to question a member of the Colombian drug cartel and I asked him, "What is the greatest weapon that law enforcement has that you fear? "

And his answer was, very quickly, "Extradition." And I said, "Well, explain, what do you mean by -- why is extradition feared? " And he said, "Because in Colombia you can fix the system, but in America, you can't."

And that's why I think the obstruction of justice charge is so important to the administration of justice. Money, position, power, does not corrupt, should not corrupt the administration of justice. And the question is, is "Where has the president attacked, the counselors attacked credibly, the allegations of obstruction? "

The first one is that the president personally encouraged a witness, Monica Lewinsky, to lie. This was on December 17th at 2:00 a.m. in the morning when the president calls Monica to tell her that she is a witness on the list, 2:00 a.m. in the morning.

And at that time, of course she's nervous, she's a witness, and asks about "Well, what am I going to say?" And the president offers, according to Monica Lewinsky, "You can always say you came to see Betty or you came to deliver papers." Now, the president's counselor attacked this by saying, "Well, remember what Monica said, 'I was never told to lie'." Well, I would refer you to a 10th Circuit case in which United States versus Tranicos (ph), 10th Circuit 1990, and the law is that the request to lie need not be a direct statement. As the court held quote, "The statute prohibits elliptical suggestions as much as it does direct commands," end quote.

Now that's common sense. That is logic. That's what a jury applies, common sense. And here of course, in this case, Monica Lewinsky testified that she was told, in essence, to lie. Now she wasn't -- the president didn't say "Monica, I need you go in and lie for me." He told her the cover story in a legal context that she could use, that would cover for him, that in essence would be a lie. We all know that is what it is.

And of course says, well -- he denies that. And of course he said, "I never told her to use cover stories in a legal context" -- direct in conflict but clearly the president's counselors have not attacked that obstruction of justice.

The second one is the jobs and the false affidavit. And they say there is absolutely no connection in these two, none whatsoever. And, of course, I pointed out the testimony of Vernon Jordan, who testified, it doesn't take an Einstein to know that whenever he found out she was a witness, she was under subpoena, that the subpoena changed the circumstances. That's the testimony of Vernon Jordan. So, they say there's no connection, Vernon Jordan, the president's friend, says the circumstances change whenever you're talking about getting a job with somebody who is also under subpoena in a case that is very important to the president of the United States.

And, of course, the president -- Vernon Jordan also indicated the president's personal involvement when he testified before the grand jury in June. He said, "He was interested in this matter. He," referring to the president, "was the source of it coming to my attention in the first place."

He further testified: "The president asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job."

The president was personally involved in the obtaining of a job. He was personally concerned about the false affidavit. And Vernon Jordan acknowledges that when those are combined, the circumstances are different.

The third area of obstruction is the tampering with the witness, Betty Currie. On January 18th and January 20th, where the questions were posed after the deposition. The president's counselor challenged this and says, "Well, she wasn't a witness. We hadn't -- even the Jones lawyers never had any clue that she was going to be a witness in this case. The president couldn't know that she was going to be a witness."

Well, they hoped that we would never find the subpoena. Because he, Mr. Ruff made that statement early on, which he very professionally expressed regret that he made that misrepresentation. But we found the subpoena, we found the subpoena that was actually issued a few days after the deposition for Betty Currie, she was a witness, she was not just a prospective witness. She was there, she was -- had to be ready to go.

And the president knew this, the Jones lawyer knew it. So that stands. The pillar of obstruction stands.

The false statements to the grand jury. That has been covered. There's been never any holes that have been poked into that. But it was to continue the cover-up of the false statements that were made in a civil rights case.

Another area of obstruction was the December 28th when the gifts were retrieved, and this has been challenged, and I will admit, as I always have, that there is a dispute in the testimony. But I believe the case is made through the circumstances, the motivation, the testimony of Monica Lewinsky as to what Betty Currie said when she called, and the corroborating evidence.

I don't believe they have poked a hole in that. I believe it stands. We would like to hear the witnesses to make you more comfortable in resolving that conflict and to determine the credibility of those witnesses. But the gifts that were subpoenaed were evidence in a trial. They were needed in a civil rights case. The president knew they were under subpoena. He had the most to gain. And they were retrieved, and I believe the testimony indicates that it was based upon the actions of Betty Currie that would have been directed by the president.

There are other areas of obstruction including the president allowing his attorney Robert Bennett to make false representation to the federal district judge in the deposition. The president's defense is that there's no proof whatsoever that he was paying any attention. Now we offered the videotape that shows that he is I believe looking at the attorney. But we offer a witness in that regard to show that he was attentive. That's simply something that can be substantiated and we believe that you can evaluate that, that he was paying attention.

But that is an element of obstruction, because he was allowing his attorney to make a false representation to the court that was totally untrue, that would aid in the cover-up and that was presented.

REHNQUIST: Mr. Hutchinson, I think you have answered the question.

HUTCHINSON: I thank the Chief Justice.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Levin to counsel for the White House: "In their brief to the Senate, the House managers said that there was quote. 'no urgency,' close quote, to help Ms. Lewinsky until December 11th, 1997 and that on that date, quote, 'sudden interest was inspired,' close quote, by a court order which the House Managers had represented was issued on the morning of December 11th before the Vernon Jordan - Monica Lewinsky meeting that afternoon.

"It took doing yesterday to get the House Managers to finally acknowledge that the court order was not issued in the morning, but in the afternoon of December 11th. Why were the House Managers so reluctant to make that acknowledgment?"

KENDALL: Mr. Chief Justice. Well, I think they were reluctant to make the acknowledgement because they were in cement (ph) due to their trial brief, which at page 20, as the question indicates, said as to this particular time period, after the December 6th meeting.

There was obviously still no urgency to help Miss Lewinsky. They thought that they had a chronology that was consistent with the inference of causation. But when you look at the true time of the events, that dissolves.

Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson used a word -- a phrase I'd like to call your attention to. Repeatedly, as he was summarizing the evidence, he used the phrase "in essence." Now that's another phrase that's kind of a weasel word. When you hear that it means that the evidence isn't really quite there but if you look at the big picture maybe you can see what's there in essence. It doesn't work here. It doesn't work because of the evidence.

Just a week ago Mr. Manager Hutchinson, on this obstruction of justice question was asked very clearly, "On the case that you have against the president on obstruction of justice, not the perjury, would you be confident of a conviction in a criminal court?" and he said, "No, I would not."

Now, he -- I'm not going to walk through each and every elements that he identified -- I think we've repeatedly dealt with them, and I'm not going to step on your patience to do that again each time.

I would like to make two points, and that was: In terms of encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to lie, were these cover stories an attempt to encourage her to lie?

As I tried to indicate there is testimony in the record that, at a certain time in the relation these cover stories were discussed. There is not any evidence, however, for Ms. Lewinsky, the president or anyone else, that these were discussed in connection with the testimony, in connection with the affidavit. You remember Ms. Lewinsky, when asked if she could exclude that possibility said, "I pretty much can."

Now the testimony that Mr. Hutchinson mentioned with Mr. Jordan on December 19th -- you'll remember he quoted Mr. Jordan. He said, "The discovery of the subpoena at that point changed the circumstances." Well it did, but just in the opposite way that Mr. Manager Hutchinson would have you infer, because when Mr. Jordan discovered, on December 19th, that Ms. Lewinsky had a subpoena, was going to testify in the Jones case as a witness unless she could get it quashed, he went to her and went to the president to seek assurance that the job assistance he was engaging in could not, at any time, be said to be improper because of the presence of an improper relationship. Both parties assured him that there was no such relationship.

This observation by Mr. Jordan, cuts just the opposite way. Thank you.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice.

REHNQUIST: The chair recognizes the majority leader.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, I do have another question I will send to the desk momentarily, but I would like for the senators to know that we've had some 104 or 105 questions now that have been asked. I believe that's correct; 104. Senator Daschle and I conferred. We want to thank the Senators for their participation and their questions. We do want to make it clear we're not seeking questions.


So, don't feel like you need to help us by sending any down.


But under your rights as senators under the Senate Resolution 16 and the rules we're proceeding under, every and each senator is entitled to submit a question if he or she feels that it's important. But I hope it would be one that you think really is essential, that has not been touched on some where already in the answers to the questions.

And I also would hope, and the record may be made clear, that we in a bipartisan way have tried very hard to make sure that this proceeding here, and the questions here, and all that we've done has been fair, both to the president's counsel and the House managers. And we will continue to work in that vein.

With that observation, and if we do need to continue going forward with questions we would have to give some consideration to taking a break and going longer. Although I'd indicated I'd hoped we could quit at 4:00, maybe after this question, and if necessary, one or two more, we could end for the day and then get together and see if we need more time on Monday for additional questions. I send the next question to the desk.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Cochran, Roth, Campbell, and Frist to the House managers: "The president's counsel has suggested that the Senate considered a good behavior standard in impeachment cases involving federal judges. The removal of judges seems to have been based by the Senate on the impeachment power whose standard for removal is the same for both federal judges and executive branch officials.

"Is the counsel for the president asking us to use a different test for removal of this president than we did in the case of Judge Walter Nixon? Please explain."

REP. CHARLES CANADY (R-FL), IMPEACHMENT TRIAL MANAGER: Mr. Chief Justice, members of the Senate, I appreciate the opportunity to ask this question, it is an important question. And it is true that counsel for the president are asking that you use a different standard in this case, than the standard you have already established, not in just one case, but, in fact, in a series of cases involving federal judges that were before the Senate in the 1980s, there was a succession of three cases in the Senate, all dealing with the question of whether a federal judge who had lied under oath should be removed from office because the federal judge had lied under oath. In all three cases, the Senate decided that the federal judge should be convicted and removed.

Now the president's counsel have the burden of establishing that those recent, and very clear precedents of the Senate, should not apply to this case where the president is charged with lying under oath. And they attempt to do that in a number of ways.

What I would suggest is you evaluate their attempt to distinguish away those precedents. That you look first and last to the Constitution. The Constitution should be your guide. And I would suggest to you that there is nothing in the Constitution which establishes a different standard for the president, for any reason. There's not something in the Constitution that says he is subject to a different standard because he is elected. That argument has been advanced. If you look in the Constitution, you simply won't find that.

And to argue for a different standard because the president is elected, I would submit to you is to impose something on the Constitution that is entirely alien to the document itself.

The Constitution contains a single standard for the application of the impeachment and removal power. And I've read it before, but I read it again. Article II, Section 4 provides: "The president, vice president and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

Now reference was made in the question and reference has been made by the president's counsel to the good behavior clause. That's found in Article III, Section 1. That clause does not alter the standard I have just read to you however. Rather than creating a altered standard for removal of federal judges, the good behavior clause merely establishes that the term of office for judicial officers is a lie.

Now, I wouldn't ask you to take my word for this, let me refer, again, to the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. There they said, they asked the question: "Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, limit the relevance of the impeachments of judges with respect to presidential impeachment standard, as has been argued by some?" That is, essentially, the question before the Senate now.

Their answer was: "It does not. It does not. The only impeachment provision," they go on to say, "discussed in the Constitutional Convention, and indeed, in the Constitution, is Article II, Section 4, which, by its express terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges."

Now, I would go on to note that it's very interesting, that at the Constitutional Convention, on August the 27th, 1787, an attempt was made to amend the good behavior clause by adding a provision for the removal of judges by the executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representative.

Now, this proposal, which was offered by John Dickinson, was based on the English parliamentary practice of removal of judges by address. A practice also utilized by several American states. And under this process judges could be removed for misconduct falling short of the level of seriousness that would justify impeachment. Now the proposal offered by Dickinson was overwhelmingly rejected. It was overwhelmingly rejected by the convention. Thus, the sole provision for removal and the sole standard for removal is that, which I have referred to in Article II, Section 4.

Now mention has been made -- and I want to respond to this, because mention has been made of efforts in Congress to establish a separate procedure for the removal of federal judges, a procedure separate and apart from the impeachment and removal process.

A specific mention has also been made of testimony given in 1970 by the Chief Justice, who was then an assistant attorney general, regarding a proposal to establish a separate removal procedure. The testimony given by the Chief Justice at that time, related to the constitutionality of the provisions of the bill relating to the removal of judges by methods "other than," methods "other than" impeachment.

Now my own view, quite candidly, is that such a separate removal procedure raises serious constitutional questions, serious questions about maintaining the independence of the judiciary. But putting that question aside, and regardless of the standards that might be applied in such a separate removal procedure.

It is clear that the single constitutional standard for impeachment and removal would remain the same. That is what is in the Constitution. That can't be changed by any statute or anything that is set up apart from the constitutional procedures.

Now, one thing I make as I move toward concluding my response, it should be recognized that some specific acts might be a breach of duty if done by a judge, but not a breach of duty if done by the president of the United States, and that's an important distinction that we all should bear in mind.

For example, it would be serious misconduct for a judge to engage in repeated ex parte meetings with parties who have an interest in a matter pending before that judge. But it is typical for the president to engage in such ex parte meetings with persons who have an interest in matters on which he will decide. For a judge, such conduct constitutes a breach of duty. For the president, it does not constitute a breach of duty.

REHNQUIST: Mr. Canady, I think you've answered the question. CANADY: Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This question from Senator Harkin is to counsel for the president: "There are three contradictions in the record. One, who touched who on what parts of the body. Two, when the relationship began. Three, who called whom to get the gifts, Ms. Curry, or Ms. Lewinsky. How would these witnesses clear up the contradictions?"

CRAIG: Mr. Chief Justice, Senator Harkin, it's difficult for me to explain how after you've gotten 19 interviews, two grand jury appearances, one deposition, to cover that precise territory, that any further kind of inquiry along those lines would be of any help.

The House managers have argued that they need to call witnesses for the purposes of resolving inconsistencies, conflicts and discrepancies in testimony. And they have, in fact, identified Monica Lewinsky, in particular, as having given testimony in conflict with the testimony of the president, with Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan.

But it would be well to remember that the lawyers for the Office of Independent Counsel, certainly not seeking elicit testimony that's favorable to the president, that those lawyers have already done a great deal of this precise kind of inquiry at some great length. Those lawyers, no friends of the president, have already explored inconsistencies, they've already tested memories, they've already laboriously and at great length subjected these witnesses to searching scrutiny. And their work is available for all to see in the record of this case before the Senate today.

Let me be very specific and very concrete. Monica Lewinsky was interviewed by the lawyers for the Office of Independent Counsel, or testified before the grand jury on 20 different occasions, after Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan had given their testimony before the grand jury. And contrary to the assertions of the House Managers, Monica Lewinsky was interviewed six times and testified twice -- one time before the grand jury and once at a sworn deposition -- after the president had given his testimony before the grand jury on August 17th.

On August 19th, she was interviewed by the FBI and by lawyers for the special counsel.

She testified before the grand jury -- Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury on August 20th.

She was interviewed by lawyers and FBI agents for the independent counsel on August 24th.

She was interviewed on August 26th.

She appeared for a deposition held in the conference room of the Office of the Independent Counsel on August 26th.

She was interviewed pursuant to her immunity agreement with independent counsel and FBI agents on September 5th.

She was also interviewed -- excuse me that was September 3rd.

She appeared and listened to tapes with the FBI present on many occasions on many period during the period September 3rd through September 6th.

She appeared and was interviewed by special counsel, independent counsel on September 7th, on September 5th and on September 6th.

So it raises a question as to whether or not the desire to interview Monica Lewinsky stems from a desire to resolve conflicts that she has with other people. Because certainly these occasions gave the lawyers for the independent counsel, an opportunity to do so. And I would simply submit that within the bounds of ethical behavior I'm sure, because I respect the professionalism of the House managers, but I would suspect that one of the reasons they want to inquire of Ms. Lewinsky is not to resolve discrepancies and disputes. It is to perhaps, challenge her testimony when it's helpful to the president, and perhaps bolster her testimony when it's not helpful to the president.

The House managers are not neutral investigators or neutral interrogators, and it raises questions about what the managers' true purpose in calling Vernon Jordan and Betty Currie forward as witnesses; what they want to inquire about if they conduct an interview with them. And I suggest that this is also a bit of a fishing expedition, looking for evidence that will be damaging to the president.

We're not afraid of witnesses, but we do want fairness, and we don't think it's fair in this process -- if you're going to have a real trial, then we want a real defense. And to have a real defense, requires real discovery, and real opportunity to have access to documents, and witnesses, and evidence that has been in the custody and the control of the House of Representatives, that has not been made available to us. That is in the custody and control of the Office of Independent Counsel that has not been made available to us.

And I would suggest, as we have seen from the statements made by the managers to this body yesterday and today about Vernon Jordan suggesting -- actually suggesting that he did not tell the truth when he testified numerous times before the grand jury, which is an outrageous suggestion.

And suggesting, which happened today -- implying that he destroyed evidence, which not even the independent counsel has suggested, they seek to do nothing more than to attack, attack, attack. The best friend of the president of the United States and his personal secretary. That's the reason they want to talk to these people, and I think it's an improper reason. It's wanting to win too much, and I don't think the United States Senate should be part of it.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Hagel, Abraham, and Hatch to the House managers: "White House counsel has indicated their opposition to calling witnesses, asserting that calling witnesses would not shed light on the facts and would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings. But it is the responsibility of this Senate to find the truth, and if any senators reasonably believe that hearing witnesses would assist in finding the truth, why shouldn't they be called?"

MCCOLLUM: Mr. Chief Justice, me thinks thou dost protest too much,, and I think that's what White House Counsel's been doing. I don't know why, but they frankly don't want witnesses. They don't want what you normally have in a trial.

We can paint this with any kind of colors that you want to have, but a trial without witnesses, when it involves a criminal accusation, a criminal matter, is not a true trial. It really isn't. I mean it's -- it is not what I think of and I guarantee it's not what any of my friends who sit over here, who've been counsels and prosecutors and defense lawyers think of.

It is remotely conceivable, but certainly not where you have had the inferences and the conclusions that we draw logically from the entire sequence of events that are painted from the very day when the president got word of Monica Lewinsky being on the witness list. And all the way through his testimony in the Jones case, all the way through his grand jury testimony, when they challenge every inference that we think you should logically draw from the record.

And then suggest that "Oh, but we shouldn't have anybody in here," so you who are going to judge ultimately whether our representations are persuasive or not about those inferences, whether you should be able to judge -- and I think you should-- what the witnesses actually are saying.

Let's give you one illustration and yield any of my other counsels on this -- I don't know how many times -- I think two or three times I've put up here on a board, or I've said to you, and I know a couple of my colleagues have said to you, that during the discussion with regard to the affidavit that Monica Lewinsky in front of the grand jury, she explicitly said, "No, the president didn't tell me to lie, but he didn't discourage me either. He didn't encourage me nor discourage me."

But you need to have her say that to you. I mean they've been up here whacking away at that. They've confusing everything they can, talking about the job search at the same time they 're talking about the affidavit, what she said here, what she said there, what she there, what she said anywhere else.

Witnesses are a logical thing. There are a lot of conflicts that here. When we get to the point which we presume we'll that opportunity to do, to argue on our case on why we should have witnesses -- maybe Monday or perhaps Tuesday, I think under your rules, even though you have a motion to dismiss -- we will get that chance.

We'll lay out a lot of these things. There are a lot of them out there. But the point is, overall, you need to have the witnesses to judge what any trier of fact judges about any one of these, and I'll be happy to yield to Mr. Graham or Mr. Rogan if you'd like to come up here.

Neither one? That's fair enough. But that's why you need witnesses.

REHNQUIST: The chair recognizes the majority leader.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, it now approaches the hour that we'd indicated that we would conclude our work on Saturday. There may still be some questions that senators would like to have offered. I've talked to Senator Daschle; one suggestion that's been made is maybe we would, on Monday, ask that questions could be submitted for the record in writing.

I think that's a common practice, but we don't want to cut it off and, at this point, I wouldn't be prepared to do that, but I would like to suggest that we go ahead and conclude our business today, and if there is a need by a senator on either side to have another question, or two, or three, we would certainly consult with each other and see how we could handle that, perhaps, on Monday and even see if it would be appropriate to prepare a motion with regard to being able to submit questions for the record, which would be answered. We wouldn't want to abuse that and cause that to be a protracted process.

But, and here are the times that have been spent here, in fact, we've had around 106 questions, and we got about 10 hours in this now. I think we should conclude for this Saturday. We will resume at 1:00 p.m. on Monday, and continue in concordance with provisions of SRES- 16. I will update all members as to the specific questions, or schedule when it becomes clear.

I now ask unanimous consent that, in the record following today's proceedings, there appear a period of morning business to accommodate bills and statements that have been submitted during the day by senators. I plead for attentiveness during the proceedings, and ask the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

UNIDENTIFIED SENATOR: I object, Mr. Chief Justice. (OFF-MIKE)

REHNQUIST: Objection is...

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

UNIDENTIFIED SENATOR: Mr. Chief Justice, (OFF-MIKE) recognition.

REHNQUIST: This is a motion to adjourn. The motion -- the question on the motion to adjourn. All in favor say "aye."


REHNQUIST: Those opposed, "no."


REHNQUIST: The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it. Senate is adjourned. <

Investigating the President


Saturday, January 23, 1999

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