1 The Select Committee believes that nuclear tests related to the development of the PRCís next generation of thermonuclear warheads may be continuing underground at the PRC test site at Lop Nur.
2 "Chinese Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development," Jonathan Medalia, Congressional Research Service, November 14, 1997.
4 Figure 3 - Size Comparison of U.S. Nuclear Warheads Over Time, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 15, 1998.
5 "Presentation on PRC, Nuclear Weapons and High Performance Computing ," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 15,1998.
6 Premier Zhu Rongji recently praised the efforts and progress of PRC and U.S. scientists who attended the 19th Meeting of the Sino-U.S. Joint Committee on High Energy Physics. Reportedly, Zhu expressed pleasure that the "two nations have conducted wide-ranging in-depth exchanges during the meeting and put forward many helpful proposals, which will not only be conducive to the development of high energy physics in PRC and the U.S., but also help expand scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries." An area of concern is the PRC intelligence practice of mining even ostensibly cooperative scientific exchanges for useful information. "Premier Meets U.S. Science Group," China Daily, November 18, 1998.
7 See Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories, Government Accounting Office, October 1988; DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories, Government Accounting Office, September 1997; and, DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors To Its Weapons Laboratories, Government Accounting Office, October 14, 1998.
8 See this reportís high performance computer chapter for additional information about the PRCís interests in this area, and the linkage between modern nuclear development and the importance of high performance computing, especially for stockpile maintenance under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
9 "Presentation on PRC, Nuclear Weapons and High Performance Computing ," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 15, 1998.
10 The Department of Energy conducted a damage assessment of the Peter Lee losses that the Select Committee requested to review but did not receive.
11 Governmentís Response to Defendantís Position With Respect to Sentencing Factors: Declarations of Jonathan Shapiro: Attachments (U.S.D.C. C.D. Calif.) March 24, 1998.
12 Letter from FBI Director Louis Freeh to Chairman Christopher Cox and Ranking Member Norman Dicks, November 10, 1998. Peter Lee refused to cooperate with the Select Committeeís investigation on the advice of his lawyer not to testify before, or provide information to, the Select Committee.
13 "Response to November 12 Letter Seeking Assistance in Providing Briefings Concerning the Presidentís Knowledge of Several Subjects," Letter from Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to Chairman Christopher Cox and Ranking Member Norman Dicks, December 22, 1998. Samuel (Sandy) R. Berger, National Security Advisor, originally told the Select Committee that he briefed President Clinton about the theft of U.S. nuclear information in early 1998. Later, in May 1999, as part of the declassification process to make this report publicly available, Berger advised the Select Committee that the President was briefed in July 1997, although no written record of this meeting exists.