RecommendationsRecommendations of the Select Committee
to the President* and Congress
page 2
- New Legal Requirements for Executive Branch Reporting on Proliferation
Appropriate congressional committees should report legislation requiring the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant Executive departments and agencies to report in a timely fashion to appropriate congressional committees, including the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on technology transfers that raise a proliferation concern and on the implementation of all the foregoing recommendations for international actions by the United States.
Satellite Launches
- Implementation of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999
The Select Committee expects that the Executive branch will aggressively implement the Satellite Export Control Provisions of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999.
- State Department Should Have Sole Satellite Licensing Authority
To protect the national security, the congressional judgment that the Department of State is the appropriate agency for licensing both exports of satellites and any satellite launch failure investigations must be faithfully and fully implemented.
- State Department Need for Adequate Personnel and Resources for Satellite Export Licensing
To protect the national interest in foreign commerce, the Department of State must ensure, consistent with national security, that satellite export licenses and notices to Congress are acted on in a timely fashion and that exporters are informed about the progress of their applications and have access to appropriate dispute resolution procedures. In order to achieve the foregoing, the Executive branch and the Congress should ensure that the Department of State has adequate personnel and resources devoted to processing export license applications.
- Corrective Tax Legislation for Satellite Exports
To ensure that satellite manufacturers are not disadvantaged in such collateral areas as tax credits by the transfer to the State Department of responsibility to license satellite exports, the appropriate congressional committees should report necessary legislation.
- Heightened Requirements for Defense Department Monitoring of Foreign Launches
The Department of Defense must give high priority to its obligations under the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, including requirements for (i) recruiting, training, and maintaining a staff dedicated to monitoring launches in foreign countries of U.S. satellites; and (ii) establishing and monitoring technology control plans to prevent any transfer of information that could be used by the PRC to improve its missile launch capabilities.
- Defense Department, Not Satellite Firms, Should Be Responsible for Security at Foreign Launches
The Select Committee recommends that the appropriate congressional committees report legislation providing that, in connection with foreign launches of U.S. satellites, the Department of Defense shall contract for security personnel who have undergone background checks to verify their loyalty and reliability. The number of guards shall be sufficient to maintain 24-hour security of the satellite and all related missile and other sensitive technology. The satellite export licensee shall, as a condition of licensure, be required to reimburse the Department of Defense for all associated costs of such security.
- Need for Adequate and Permanent Force of Well Trained Defense Department Monitors
The Department of Defense shall ensure sufficient training for space launch campaign monitors and the assignment of adequate numbers of monitors to space launch campaigns. The Department of Defense also shall ensure continuity of service by monitors for the entire space launch campaign period, from satellite marketing to launch, and, if necessary, completion of a launch failure analysis. In addition, the Department of Defense shall adopt measures to make service as a monitor an attractive career opportunity.
- Need for Full and Timely Reporting of Technology Passed to PRC, and of Foreign Launch Security Violations
The Department of Defense monitors shall maintain logs of all information authorized for transmission to the PRC, including copies of any documents authorized for transmittal, and reports on launch-related activities. Such information shall be transmitted on a current basis to the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and to the Central Intelligence Agency. Such documents shall be retained for at least the period of the statute of limitations for violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In addition, the Department of Defense shall adopt clear written guidelines providing monitors the responsibility and the ability to report serious security violations, problems, and issues at the overseas launch site directly to the headquarters office of the responsible Defense Department agency.
- Application of Export Control Laws to Space Launch Insurers
The Select Committee recommends that relevant Executive departments and agencies ensure that the laws and regulations establishing and implementing export controls are applied in full to communications among satellite manufacturers, purchasers, and the insurance industry, including communications after launch failures.
- Expansion of U.S. Launch Capacity in National Security Interest
In light of the impact on U.S. national security of insufficient domestic, commercial space-launch capacity and competition, the Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees report legislation to encourage and stimulate further the expansion of such capacity and competition.
High Performance Computers
The Select Committee supports the sale of computers to the PRC for commercial but not military purposes. The Select Committee recommends that the appropriate congressional committees report legislation that requires the following:
- Legislation to Require Comprehensive Testing of HPCs, Clustering, and Massive Parallel Processing in National Security Applications
The Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees report legislation directing the Department of Energy, in consultation with the Department of Defense, to conduct a comprehensive review of the national security implications of exporting high-performance computers (HPCs) to the PRC. This review should include empirical testing of the extent to which national security related operations can be performed using clustered, massively-parallel processing or other combinations of computers.
- Annual Threat Assessment of HPC Exports to PRC
The Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees report legislation directing the Intelligence Community to conduct an annual comprehensive threat assessment of the national security implications of the export to the PRC of HPCs and other computers that can be clustered or combined through massively parallel processing.
Back | Forward
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COX REPORT |
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Overview
pages
1 |
2 |
3 |
4
PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology
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1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
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6 |
7 |
8 |
9
PRC Theft of U.S. Nuclear Warhead Design Information
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2 |
3 |
4 |
5
High Performance Computers
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3 |
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6 |
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8 |
9 |
10
PRC Missile and Space Forces
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Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes
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Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral
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Launch Site Security in the PRC
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Commercial Space Insurance
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U.S. Export Policy Toward the PRC
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Manufacturing Processes
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Recommendations
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3
Appendices
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introduction |
A |
B |
C |
D |
E |
F
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