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 TIME on politics Congressional Quarterly CNN/AllPolitics CNN/AllPolitics - Storypage, with TIME and Congressional Quarterly

Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes

page 2

Failure Investigation Begins

The failure investigation began immediately, and proceeded as shown below.14




As the debris recovery progressed, Defense Technology Security Administration monitors who were present for the launch continued to monitor the recovery efforts.15 Defense Technology Security Administration monitors were also present during the subsequent failure investigation, both in Beijing and Xichang, whenever Hughes employees had meetings with PRC officials.

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Allen Coates was one of the Defense Technology Security Administration monitors. He was present in Beijing from January 4 to 14, 1993 as a Defense Technology Security Administration monitor for the failure investigation.

Lt. Col. Coates specifically recalls informing Hughes senior management, including Vice President Donald Cromer, Chief Technologist Al Wittmann, Chief Scientist Robert Steinhauer, and Optus B2 Assistant Program Manager Peter Herron of the restrictions in Hughesí export license regarding the transfer of any information related to the design of the satellite or the rocket.16 He additionally advised Hughes personnel there, specifically Herron, and possibly Steinhauer and Wittmann, that Hughes could not discuss modifications to the fairing.17 At that time, Al Wittmann, Chief Technologist at Hughes, reported directly to CEO Steven Dorfman.18

In the early stages of the investigation, the PRC focused its analytic efforts on the rocket, and Hughes examined the satellite. Both the PRC and Hughes were seeking to determine whether their respective hardware was responsible for the failure. Because the first visible sign of an explosion appeared as a flame at the top of the rocket, there was some question as to whether the satellite could have exploded.

As part of the investigation, Wittmann, Hughesí Chief Technologist, and the other engineers first looked into the possibility that the satellite fuel tank structures failed. They later determined the fuel tanks did not fail.19

Upon his return from the PRC, Wittmann had an accident that forced him to recuperate at home. During his recuperation, he was assisted by Spencer Ku, another Hughes engineer. In reviewing some of Kuís analysis, it occurred to Wittmann that statements made to him by PRC personnel regarding the structure and materials strength of the rocketís fairing (that is, the portion of the rocket including the nose cone that surrounds the satellite) were not realistic.20

Wittmann was sure in January 1993, while still in recuperation, that the fairing (below) that surrounds the satellite failed, thus collapsing and crushing the satellite.21








As the investigation progressed, Hughes scientists became more and more certain that the fairing on the Long March 2E rocket had indeed failed, causing the launch failure.

Hughesí Export Administrators Deal with the Licensing Question

Hughesí Technology Export Control Coordinator, Donald Leedle, was the focal point in the company from 1992 until 1996 for technology licensing issues. A program or contracts manager who needed to export a satellite would consult him for information regarding licensing requirements. He was responsible for maintaining current knowledge of governmental regulations related to export licensing.23

Leedle describes himself as one of the most knowledgeable Hughes employees on the subject of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as they relate to communications satellites. He says he was responsible for briefing Hughes program managers on these regulations. He was also responsible for coordinating licensing conditions and requirements for the Hughes programs. He consulted with Hughes Electronicsí corporate International Traffic in Arms Regulations expert, Dar Weston, when necessary.24

Leedle says that the Optus B2 licenses, as many as 18, had been approved before he was involved in the Optus program. Some licenses had expired, however, and he was involved in the renewal by the State Department of the expired licenses.25

In response to a general question about the need for a license for a failure investigation, Leedle says that an accident investigation might be covered by the original license, or it might need a new license, but such a decision would be made by the U.S. Government. He advises that technical data would require different State Department licenses than the satellite hardware. Further, he says that Hughes was not permitted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to make suggestions that would help improve PRC rockets.26

Leedle is aware that rockets are included on the Munitions List and that a fairing is a part of the rocket.27

Sometime after the Optus failure, Leedle met with a group of Hughes employees, among them Hughes attorney Jennifer Smolker28 and Peter Herron, who had been the Assistant Program Manager for the Optus B2 satellite, to determine whether a license was needed for the failure investigation.29 Hughes CEO Dorfman describes Smolker as "the first point of accountability, from my perspective, on the whole licensing process." 30

In April 1993, Leedle most likely contacted Donald E. Majors, Director for International Affairs at Hughesí Washington, D.C. office, regarding Hughes communications with the PRC concerning Long March 2E rocket fairing deficiencies. Although he does not specifically recall the conversation, he says that he talked frequently to Majors during that period.31

On April 9, 1993, Majors wrote a memorandum to Leedle on "License Requirements for Long March Fairing Discussions," in which he summarized informal discussions with the State Department regarding the Optus B2 launch failure investigation.32 The text read:

1. In response to our informal inquiry, the cognizant State Department licensing official expressed the following views:

a. Information or professional opinion on fairing

deficiencies as a potential cause of the Optus B2 launch failure probably constitutes technical data as defined in ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations]. If Hughes decides this is in fact the case, an export license would be required to provide such information or opinion to the PRC. If Hughes decides otherwise, the subject is moot.

b. If a license is required, chances of obtaining it would

be good if Hughes could make an unequivocal case that the technical data to be transferred could not be used for any

purpose other than increasing the safety of the spacecraft

during a new launch.

c. A license request would almost certainly be denied if even the slightest possibility or inference, real or perceived, remained undispelled that the technical data could directly or indirectly impact PRC ballistic missile interests.

2. Should [Hughes] elect to submit a license application on this subject we recommend that (a) all the technical data to be transferred be precisely stated and (b) detailed rationale be included to counter all potential arguments that the data could in some way enhance PRC ballistic missile capabilities.

3. Considering the extreme sensitivity that certain USG agencies attach to technology transfers to the PRC, we should also give some thought to an advance softening up process. This could include advance technical level briefings for friends and adversaries alike, and a degree of precoordination of the data to be released.

Majorsí memorandum to Leedle was also sent to Herron and Smolker. Additionally, copies of the memorandum were forwarded to the following Hughes executives: CEO Steven Dorfman, P. C. Dougherty, M. J. Houterman, W. D. Merritt and J. S. Perkins.

Majorsí office served as the Washington liaison between Hughes corporate offices and the State Department on licensing issues. His primary contact on satellite issues at the State Department licensing office was Kenneth Peoples.33

Peoples had issued State Department export license number 483414 to Hughes for the export of the Aussat B (later Optus B) satellite. He says that the license defined authorized activities, and that any activity not specifically authorized by a license is prohibited.34

Peoples advises that rockets are on the Munitions List and that a fairing, the nosecone that protects the satellite, is a part of a rocket.35 Peoples does not specifically recall speaking to Majors about the fairing, but he describes the recommendation in Majorsí memorandum as "excellent advice." The fact that rocket information was on the Munitions List in 1993 was well-known, he says, and Peoples has difficulty accepting that Hughes officials would not have been aware at that time that a license would be needed to convey to the PRC information related to rockets.36

Mere unlicensed discussion of technical data with foreign nationals is sufficient to constitute a violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, in Peoplesí opinion. In addition to the license restrictions, Hughes was prohibited from transferring technology to the PRC by provisions of the U. S./PRC nation-to-nation agreement on technology transfer.37

Stephen Cunningham, who led the Optus B2 launch failure investigation, had also been the Program Manager for the Optus B1, which was launched in the PRC in August 1992. He is familiar with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Munitions List. Cunningham agrees that Hughes needed prior, separate approval from the State Department to provide any technical assistance that might assist the PRC in enhancing the performance of its Long March rockets.38

Around the time of Majorsí April 9, 1993 memorandum, Cunningham recalls "specific discussions with [Defense Technology Security Administration monitor Lt. Col.] Al Coates regarding whether the fairing we are talking about had any relevance to ballistic missiles, and we did not receive a specific answer from Al Coates, but he said he would go find out from his sources." 39

Cunningham says that Hughes hypothesized that the fairing on a commercial satellite had no relevance to ballistic missiles:

We were all very sensitive to the issue on anything that would help the ballistic missile interest, but ó and there are a lot of things in the commercial satellite business that are irrelevant to weapons use and so the real question was, in our minds, is the fairing that we are talking about in the category of commercial use only or is it in the category of missile technology? 40

On April 19, 1993, ten days after the Majorsí memorandum, a senior level staff meeting took place at Hughes to discuss how to deal with the fairing issue. Officials at the highest levels of Hughes, including possibly Vice President Cromer, attended the meeting, which was held to discuss a planned trip to the PRC regarding both the Optus B2 failure and the future launch by the PRC of Optus B3, the satellite that was to replace the destroyed Optus B2.41

Cunninghamís participation in the trip to the PRC was in connection with his duties to discuss and resolve issues related to the Optus B2 failure. While on the same trip, his colleague Peter Herron was involved in negotiations regarding the Optus B3.42

By April 1993, Cunningham says, "We strongly believed that the fairing caused the problem . . . We believed that the fairing had to be modified in order to get insurance to launch." 43

Herron had prepared view graph slides, outlining the issues and alternatives for senior management to consider at the strategy meeting. One of the slides used in the briefing stated the following:

We are concerned about several aspects of the design [of the Long March 2E fairing]. What do they fix? How do they validate the redesign?

The USG will require a specific license if we want to discuss the design problems. It is unlikely that we could get the license.

We would have to show that there would be no resultant improvement in the Chinese ICBMs.44

A ëPoliticalí Business Solution

Hughesí Director of Launch Service Acquisition, John S. Perkins, was responsible for the negotiation of the Optus B3 launch services contract with the PRC. In that role, he had contact with the team investigating the Optus B2 failure. Although he was not part of the Optus B2 failure investigation team, he was in the PRC conducting Optus B3 negotiations while the failure investigation was proceeding.45

Perkins recalls being aware during the failure investigation that some Hughes engineers thought that the fairing on the Long March 2E rocket may have failed. He recalls that there were discussions within the company that Hughes would require the PRC to improve the fairing, and that without improvements to the fairing, the Optus B3 would not be launched.46 Perkins says that the negotiations for an agreement to announce the conclusion of the Optus B2 failure investigations took several weeks of "wordsmithing to subtly try to imply the other party was at fault, without being at fault, to point the finger at us or to point the finger at the Chinese." 47

The negotiations for Optus B3 were difficult, because the PRC would not acknowledge any fault in the Optus B2 failure. It is Perkinsí belief that the Defense Technology Security Administration eventually approved some discussions with the PRC about fairing improvements.48

Perkins also participated in discussions with the PRC that led to a written agreement that took the following form:


ON 11 TO 12 MAY 1993




1. On December 21, 1992 the Optus B2 satellite was launched on an LM-2E Launch Vehicle from Xichang Satellite Launch Center, China. At approximately 48 seconds into the flight, the Optus B2 spacecraft exploded.

2. Based on analysis of the Launch Vehicle telemetry, inspection of the Launch Vehicle fairing debris and special tests, it was determined by CGWIC/CALT [China Great Wall Industry Corporation/ China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] that there is no design or manufacturing or integration flaw in the Launch Vehicle or the fairing which caused the failure. Hughes accepts this conclusion.

3. Based on analysis of the Launch Vehicle telemetry, inspection of the spacecraft debris, and special tests, it was determined by Hughes that no design or manufacturing flaw can be found in the spacecraft which caused the failure. CGWIC/CALT accepts this conclusion.

4. Both CGWIC/CALT and Hughes agreed to conclude the Optus B2 investigation and use their best effort to launch another Optus satellite by June 94.

5. During the Optus B2 failure investigation, both CGWIC and Hughes observed strictly the requirements of the USA/PRC agreements on technical security.

6. Both parties expressed the same willingness to promote the existing friendly cooperation between them. Hughes expressed the willingness to purchase Long March launch services for other future satellite programs, and CGWIC expressed the willingness to influence its partners to purchase Hughesí satellites.

Signed on the 12th day of May 1993

Donald L. Cromer Wang Dechen

John S. Perkins Chen Shouchun

Perkins describes this agreement as an agreement not to publicly blame the fairing as the cause of the failure. Perkins says of the agreement:

Politically we could not write down on paper that the fairing had failed and that they were at fault. It was a non-starter in China. They were very concerned that we would say that. This document was trying to say we are not going to say that. Now, go fix the fairing.49

Hughesí intermediary in the PRC was Bansang "Bill" W. Lee, who worked in the Hughes Beijing office from 1991 until around October 1994 as a salaried employee.50 As Hughesí chief representative in Beijing, he had three duties: marketing Hughes satellites in the PRC; serving as a liaison between various Hughes organizations and the PRC; and providing logistics support for all Hughes visitors to the PRC.51

Although Bansang Lee was not actually a member of the Optus B2 failure investigation team, he was present at meetings in the PRC and was involved in the negotiations that led to the May 12 agreement between Hughes and China Great Wall Industry Corporation not to blame each other for the launch failure. He was also involved in negotiations for the Optus B3 launch.52

Leeís major involvement in the failure investigation was crafting an acceptable public explanation as to the cause of the failure. The PRC would not accept that the Long March 2E rocket was at fault, and Hughes was almost certain that the satellite had not caused the failure. Lee says that in the May 12, 1993 agreement each side stated: "I have no objection to your position . . . and you have no objection to my position. Basically, the conclusion is no conclusion." 53

Lee says that his involvement in efforts between April and October 1993 was generally along the lines of persuading each side not to point fingers at the other. He says that he was not directly involved in attempts by Hughes to convince the PRC that the fairing was the problem, although he was aware that a number of people within Hughes believed that. He was also aware of at least one, Harold Rosen, who did not hold that belief.54

Lee further says that in the negotiations, during which Lee served as Hughes CEO Dorfmanís liaison to PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan,55 Minister Liu confirmed Hughesí understanding that once a suitable agreement had been signed, the PRC would be willing to consider making modifications to the Long March 2E rocket before the next launch.56

In addition, Lee says that Hughes "is not saying how to fix it, but wording [sic] requirement that they have to finally fix it." Lee says he was aware that a number of Hughes engineers, particularly Al Wittmann, believed that the fairing had indeed failed.57

In June 1993, Hughes Chief Technologist Al Wittmann wrote a paper analyzing how he thought the fairing had failed, and how the fairing could be improved to prevent a similar failure in the forthcoming Optus B3 launch. The paper sought permission within Hughes to communicate the results of his analysis to the PRC. Wittmann says he discussed the recommendations in his paper with Peter Herron, who was coordinating the launch failure investigation with the PRC; Hughes Vice President Donald Cromer; and Stephen Cunningham, who was heading up the launch failure investigation.58

Wittmann recommended that Hughes not launch the Optus B3 on the Long March 2E rocket unless the PRC made improvements to the fairing. He says that 70 to 80 percent of the Hughes team members agreed with him, and that Cromer, Cunningham, and Herron supported his view that the Optus B3 should not be launched without changes to the fairing.59

When Wittmann discussed his paper with Herron, Herron responded by telling Wittmann that, unless the fairing recommendations in the paper were simplified considerably, he was not willing to ask the U.S. Government for approval to share it with the PRC. Wittmann says Cunningham had also asked him to revise the paper for the same reason. 60

Hughes CEO Dorfman also recalls discussions with Wittmann about the fairing:

Q: Would you describe the changes that . . .Wittmann may have brought to your attention as changes which would improve the fairing?

A: Well, the only thing I can remember is that Mr. Wittmann . . . felt that the fairing . . . had an overlap problem, and that there would be a gap that could be caused during ascent between the two halves of the fairing, and that that gap might cause a pressure differential which would separate the fairing.

Q: Would that suggestion constitute, in your view, an improvement to the fairing?

A: I donít know.

Q: Is it a modification to the fairing?

A: If they made a change, it would have been a modification.

Q: So Mr. Wittmann recommended something which, if it had been accomplished, would have been a modification to the fairing?

A: Yes.61

Additionally, Hughes Vice President Cromer recalls the following discussion with Wittmann about the fairing:

Q: When Mr. Wittmann first approached you about his concerns regarding the fairing, do you recall some of the technical aspects that he mentioned . . . ?

A: Yes.

Q: Can you tell us what some of those were?

A: He was concerned about two aspects particularly. One is the strength of the rivets that held the fairing together and this was an issue of having adequate strength to withstand the launch loads but still having sufficient ability to open the fairing when you needed to. So itís a balance of strength versus separating the fairing under the right conditions. Also the nose cap and its design and how it might be affected by the loads during the ascent.62

Hughes launch failure investigators Herron and Cunningham subsequently prepared a group of viewgraph slides that simplified the contents of Wittmannís paper. Herron, who was responsible for coordinating with the PRC, then submitted these to Defense Technology Security Administration monitor Al Coates for approval. Coatesí signature approving the transfer of this information to the PRC appears on a facsimile transmittal sheet, dated June 25, 1993.

Lt. Col. Coates says he does not recall approving this transfer, and he doubts that he would have ever approved the disclosure of such prohibited information. He further says he did not have the authority to approve the disclosure of information that could have improved the PRC rocket. He also says that it was always clear to Hughes that no data that could improve the rocket could be transferred to the PRC.63

Generally, Coates recalls that the Defense Technology Security Administration always emphasized in briefings for Hughes employees the prohibition against improving the rocket. He says that Hughes personnel were very knowledgeable about the export control process, and that Herron undoubtedly knew of the restrictions regarding rocket improvements.64

Coates specifically recalls telling Herron that he could not discuss the design of the fairing with the PRC.65

Coates says he maintained a program file at the Defense Technology Security Administration that contained all his approvals related to the Optus B2.66 Such a file could not be found among the materials provided to the Committee by the Defense Technology Security Administration.

Hughes failed to respond to the Committeeís interrogatories (which included a request for documents) regarding these approvals.

Donald Leedle, who was responsible for Hughesí technology export control, says Herron contacted him to inform him that Coates had approved communicating the information on improving the fairing to the PRC. In Leedleís deposition, the following exchange regarding improvements to the Long March 2E rocket occurred:

Q: Does this document suggest specific changes to the Long March 2E fairing for the Hughes satellite that would improve the fairing?

A: At the bottom of the page it says. ëAdd a bracket or block to prevent any possibility of overlap of the two fairing halves.í

Q: What about on page 2?

A: ëIncrease the strength of the rivets along the separation line.í

Q: So, in your view, does this document propose specific technical improvements to the fairing?

A: I think they are fairly generic. Add a bracket and strengthen a rivet is not very specific.

Q: Are those improvements to the fairing?

A: They may be.

Q: Is Mr. Herron suggesting in his letter that they are?

A: He certainly feels that if these things are accomplished, that there is less likelihood of it failing.

Q: So would you view this letter as Mr. Herronís statement that these changes would improve the fairing?

A: Well, Iím not sure ñ ëimproveí is a difficult word. It would prevent failure ñ It might prevent a failure.

Q: Mr. Wittmann suggested improvements to the fairing in his letter, correct?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Mr. Herron in a letter to Mr. Lee is now suggesting changes need to be made to the fairing. Those changes presumably would improve the fairing, would they not?

A: I donít know the answer to that.

Q: Iím asking you to look at Mr. Herronís letter ñ you had discussions with Mr. Herron ñ and tell me whether you think he is suggesting things that would improve the fairing?

A: He is making recommendations to prevent a failure.

Q: By ëprevent a failure,í would you say that improving the fairing would help prevent a failure?

A: Something would have to be done to the fairing to prevent a failure.

Q: Improving the fairing is what this letter is about; is that correct?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: And youíve already told us that the fairing is a part of the launch vehicle; is that correct?

A: Thatís correct.

Q: So the improvements to this fairing, it logically follows, would result in improvements to the launch vehicle. Do you agree?

A: If they were actually improvements.67

In Cunninghamís deposition, the following exchange about improvements to the fairing took place:

Q: So, in your view, that doesnít constitute an improvement in the fairing?

A: If they do these correctly, and they have to define correctly, this would improve the fairing. But if they do ñ but without further analysis, this would not improve the fairing. This in itself does not improve the fairing.

Q: Is it a modification of the fairing?

A: Yes.

Q: I want to go back just briefly to Exhibit 1, paragraph 120.9, defense service; itís on the second page of Exhibit 1.

ë120.9 (a), Defense service means: the furnishing of assistance to foreign persons,í skip a little bit,ëwhether in the United States or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operations, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles.í

Is ó would these suggested improvements constitute a modification of the fairing?

A: Yes, they would.

Q: To modify a fairing or to modify a defense article, do you need a license ó according to what you read in ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] earlier?

A: Yes, we do.

Q: And did you obtain a license to provide this information to the Chinese?

A: No.68

Leedle says he was surprised that Herron, Hughesí Assistant Program Manager for the Optus B2 and the person responsible for coordinating the failure investigation with both the U.S. Government and the PRC, bypassed him and approached the Defense Departmentís Coates directly. Leedle acknowledges that the purpose of Wittmannís fairing recommendations was to prevent the rocket from failing in future launches. Leedle and Cunningham acknowledge that improvements to the rocket required a State Department license, and that, to the best of their knowledge, no such license was ever applied for.69

On July 15, 1993, Hughes CEO Dorfman wrote expressing his concerns about the cause of the Optus B2 launch failure to PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan, President of China Aerospace Corporation, in care of Hughesí Bansang Lee, stating in part:

After listening to Wang Dechenís [the PRC designer of the Long March 2E rocket] presentation last week, Iíve become very concerned that we will not convince our customer and insurers that it is safe to launch Optus B3.

I emphasize that you must 1) demonstrate a thorough and objective evaluation of potential causes for the accident, and 2) make appropriate design and process changes to prevent recurrence, even if a definitive cause cannot be identified.

Our people have made some specific suggestions which I urge you to consider.70

On July 18, 1993, Bansang Lee reported to Dorfman the results of the meeting with Minister Liu at which he delivered Dorfmanís letter. Lee wrote about the PRCís strong negative reaction to Hughesí statements that appeared to blame the PRC rocket for the Optus B2 failure, in violation of the May 12 agreement:

Mr. John Perkins letter of July 9, 1993 clearly pointed out the [Long March 2E rocketís] fairing was the cause of the launch failure . . .

It is true that it looks like the whole world appears to believe the trouble was caused by the rocket . . . CGWIC [China Great Wall Industry Corporation] has reasons to believe that Hughes is making a trap to get them . . . If they agree to make any change to the fairing now, they are walking into the trap themselves.71

As Bansang Lee continued to negotiate, he says he thought that Hughes Chief Scientist Robert Steinhauer, who had worked closely with the PRC for almost ten years, might be able to help allay the PRCís concerns.

On August 5, 1993, Bansang Lee wrote to Hughes CEO Dorfman suggesting that Steinhauer bring the Optus B2 failure report to the PRC and meet with the chief designer of the Long March 2E rocket, Wang Dechen, to go over the findings.72

On August 15, 1993, Hughes and China Great Wall Industry Corporation issued a joint news release, reported in Space News, stating that although no design flaws were found, both companies would make improvements to their products. Space News quotes an insurance broker as saying that, "evidence points to a structural flaw in the rocketís fairing which probably imploded during launch." It also quotes a U.S. satellite underwriter as saying the companies

had narrowed the cause of the launch failure to a few possibilities, but struck a compromise on the announcement because they are still doing business together.

Hughes also wants to support the Long March because the company is concerned about becoming overdependent on the Arianespace launch consortium of Evry, France.73

Back  |  Forward


pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4

PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

PRC Theft of U.S. Nuclear Warhead Design Information
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5

High Performance Computers
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10

PRC Missile and Space Forces
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6

Launch Site Security in the PRC
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 5 | 6

Commercial Space Insurance
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4

U.S. Export Policy Toward the PRC
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

Manufacturing Processes
pages 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10

pages 1 | 2 | 3

pages introduction | A | B | C | D | E | F

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