Top Story: Reno Spurns Demands For Special Prosecutor
Reno's Letter: Text Of Rejection Letter
Reaction: Republicans Denounce Reno's Decision
In Focus: Fund-Raising Flap: Cast of characters, timeline, background
'Toons: Reno Evil.
Voter's Voice: What do you think of Reno's decision? Tell us, we'll post it on the Web.
Take A Stand: Is an independent counsel warranted to probe Democratic fund-raising? You decide.
Counterpoint: A disagreement on an independent counsel.
CQ Special Report: Campaign Finance (4/9/97)
Reno: Independent Counsel Not Needed Yet (2/27/97)
Text Of Janet Reno's Letter
The full text of Attorney General Janet Reno's letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, explaining her office's decision not to appoint an independent counsel to investigate White House and Democratic campaign fund-raising.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On March 13, 1997, you and nine other majority party members of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate wrote to me requesting the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate possible fundraising violations in connection with the 1996 campaign. You made that request pursuant to a provision of the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 592(g)(1), which provides that "a majority of majority party members (of the Committee on the Judiciary) ... may request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel." The act requires me to respond withing 30 days, setting forth the reasons for my decision on each of the matters with respect to which your request is made. 28 U.S.C. Section 592(g)(2).
I am writing to inform you that I have not initiated a "preliminary investigation" (as that term is defined in the Independent Counsel Act) of any of the matters mentioned in your letter. Rather, as your know, matters relating to campaign financing in the 1996 Federal elections have been under active investigation since November by a task force of career Justice Department prosecutors and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents. This task force is pursuing the investigation vigorously and diligently, and it will continue to do so. I can assure you that I have given your views and your arguments careful thought, but at this time, I am unable to agree, based on the facts and the law, that an independent counsel should be appointed to handle this investigation.
1. The Independent Counsel Act
In order to explain my reasons, I would like to outline briefly the relevant provisions of the Independent Counsel Act. The Act can be invoked in two circumstances that are relevant here:
First, if there are sufficient allegations (as further described below) of criminal activity by a covered person, defined as the President and Vice President, cabinet officers, certain other enumerated high Federal officials, or certain specified officers of the President's election campaign (not party officials), see 28 U.S.C. Section 591(b), I must seek appointment of an independent counsel.
Second, if there are sufficient allegations of criminal activity by a person other than a covered person, and I determine that "an investigation or prosecution of (that) person by the Department of Justice may result in a personal, financial or political conflict of interest," see 28 U.S.C. Section 591(c)(1), I may seek appointment of an independent counsel.
In either case, I must follow a two-step process to determine whether the allegations are sufficient. First I must determine whether the allegations are sufficiently specific and credible to constitute grounds to investigate whether an individual may have violated Federal criminal law. 28 U.S.C. Section 591(d). If so, the Department commences a "preliminary investigation" for up to 90 days (which can be extended an additional 60 days upon a showing of good cause). 28 U.S.C. Section 592(a). If, at the conclusion of this "preliminary investigation," I determine further investigation of the matters is warranted, I must seek an independent counsel.
Certain important features of the Act are critical to my decision in this case:
First, the Act sets forth the only circumstances in which I may seek an independent counsel pursuant to its provisions. I may not invoke its procedures unless the statutory requirements are met.
Second, the Act does not permit or require me to commence a preliminary investigation unless there is specific and credible evidence that a crime may have been committed. In your letter, you suggest that it is not the responsibility of the Department of Justice to determine whether a particular set of facts suggests a potential Federal crime, but that such legal determinations should be left to an independent counsel. I do not agree. Under the Independent Counsel Act, it is the Department's obligation to determine in the first instance whether particular conduct potentially falls within the scope of a particular criminal statute such that criminal investigation is warranted. If it is our conclusion that the alleged conduct is not criminal, then there is no basis for appointment of an independent counsel, because there would be no specific and credible allegation of a violation of criminal law. See 28 U.S.C. Section 592(a)(1).
Third, there is an important difference between the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the Act. Once I have received specific and credible allegations of criminal conduct by a covered person, I must commence a preliminary investigation and, if further investigation is warranted at the end of the preliminary investigation, seek appointment of an independent counsel. If, on the other hand, I receive specific and credible evidence that a person not covered by the mandatory provisions of the Act has committed a crime, and I determine that a conflict of interest exists with respect to the investigation of that person, I may but need not commence a preliminary investigation pursuant to the provisions of the Act. This provision gives me the flexibility to decide whether, overall, the national interest would be best served by appointment of an independent counsel in such a case, or whether it would be better for the Department of Justice to continue a vigorous investigation of the matter.
Fourth, even this discretionary provision is not available unless I find a conflict of interest of the sort contemplated by the Act. The Congress has made it very clear that this provision should be invoked only in certain narrow circumstances. Under the Act, I must conclude that there is a potential for an actual conflict of interest, rather than merely an appearance of a conflict of interest. The Congress expressly adopted this higher standard to ensure that the provision would not be invoked unnecessarily. See 128 Cong. Rec. H 9507 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. Hall.) Moreover, I must find that there is a potential for such an actual conflict with respect to the investigation of a particular person, not merely with respect to the overall matter. Indeed, when the Act was reauthorized in 1994, Congress considered a proposal for a more flexible standard for invoking the discretionary clause, which would have permitted its use to refer any "matter" to an Independent Counsel when the purposes of the Act would be served. Congress rejected this suggestion, explaining that such a standard would "substantially lower the threshold for use of the general discretionary provision." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 511, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1994).
2. Covered Persons The Mandatory Provisions of the Act.
Let me now turn to the specific allegations in your letter. You assert that there are "new questions of possible wrongdoing by senior White House officials themselves," and you identify a number of particular types of conduct in support of this claim. While all of the specific issues you mention are under review or active investigation by the task force, at this time we have no specific, credible evidence that any covered White House official may have committed a Federal crime in respect of any of these issues. Nevertheless, I will discuss separately each area that you raise.
a. Fundraising on Federal Property.
First, you suggest that "federal officials may have illegally solicited and/or received contributions on federal property." The conduct you describe could be a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 607. We are aware of a number of allegations of this sort; all are being evaluated, and where appropriate, investigations have been commenced. The Department takes allegations of political fundraising by Federal employees on Federal property seriously, and in appropriate cases would not hesitate to prosecute such matters. Indeed, the Public Integrity Section, which is overseeing the work of the campaign financing task force, recently obtained a number of guilty pleas from individuals who were soliciting and accepting political contributions within the Department of Agriculture.
The analysis of a potential section 607 violation is a fact-specific inquiry. A number of different factors must be considered when reviewing allegations that this law may have been violated:
First, the law specifically applies only to contributions as technically defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) funds commonly referred to as "hard money." The statute originally applied broadly to any political fundraising, but in 1979, over the objection of the Department of Justice, Congress narrowed the scope of section 607 to render it applicable only to FECA contributions. Before concluding that section 607 may have been violated, we must have evidence that a particular solicitation involved a "contribution" within the definition of the FECA.
Second, there are private areas of the White House that, as a general rule, fall outside the scope of the statute, because of the statutory requirement that the particular solicitation occur in an area "occupied in the discharge of official duties." 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 31 (1979). The distinction recognizes that while the Federal Government provides a residence to the president, similar to the housing that it might provide to foreign service officers, this residence is still the personal home of an individual within which restrictions that might validly apply to the Federal workplace should not be imposed. Before we can conclude that section 607 may have been violated, we must have evidence that fundraising took place in locations covered by the provisions of the statute.
With respect to coordinated media advertisements by political parties (an area that has received much attention of late), the proper characterization of a particular expenditure depends not on the degree of coordination, but rather on the content of the message. Indeed, just last year the FEC and the Department of Justice took this position in a brief filed before the Supreme Court, in a case decided on other grounds. See generally, Brief for the Respondent, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, (S. Ct. No. 95-489) at 2-3, 18 n.15, 23-24. In this connection, the FEC has concluded that party media advertisements that focus on "national legislative activity" and that do not contain an "electioneering message" may be financed, in part, using "soft" money, i.e., money that does not comply with FECA's contribution limits. FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25, 2 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) Paragraph 6162, at 12, 109-12,110 (August 24, 1995); FEC Advisory Op. 1985-14, 2 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) Paragraph 5819, at 11,185-11,186 (May 30, 1985). Moreover, such advertisements are not subject to any applicable limitations on coordinated expenditures by the party on behalf of its candidates. AO 1985-14 at 11-185-11,186.
We recognize that there are allegations that both presidential candidates and both national political parties engaged in a concerted effort to take full advantage of every funding option available to them under the law, to craft advertisements that took advantage of the lesser regulation quantities of soft political funding to finance these ventures. However, at the present time, we lack specific and credible evidence suggesting that these activities violated the FECA. Moreover, even assuming that, after a thorough investigation, the FEC were to conclude that regulatory violations occurred, we presently lack specific and credible evidence suggesting that any covered person participated in any such violations.
3. Conflict of Interest The Discretionary Provisions of the Act.
In urging me to conclude that the investigation poses the type of potential conflict of interest contemplated by the Act, you rely heavily on my testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs in 1993 in support of reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act. I stand by those views and continue to support the overall concept underlying the Act. My decisions pursuant to the Act have been, I believe, fully consistent with those views.
The remarks you quote from my testimony should be interpreted within the context of the statutory language I was discussing. When, for example, I referred to the need for the Act to deal with the inherent conflict of interest when the Department of Justice investigates "high-level Executive Branch officials," I was referring to persons covered under the mandatory provisions of the Act. With respect to the conflict of interest provision, my testimony expressed the conviction that the Act "would in no way preempt this Department's authority to investigate public corruption," and that the Department was clearly capable of "vigorous investigation of wrongdoing by public officials, whatever allegiance or stripes they may wear. I will vigorously defend and continue this tradition." While I endorsed the concept of the discretionary clause to deal with unforeseeable situations, I strongly emphasized that "it is part of the Attorney General's job to make difficult decisions in tough cases. I have no intention of abdicating that responsibility." These principles continue to guide my decisionmaking today.
These are times when reliance on the discretionary clause is appropriate, and indeed, as you point out, I have done so myself on a few occasions. However, in each of those cases, I considered the particular factual context in which the allegations against those persons arose and the history of the matter. Moreover, even after finding the existence of a potential conflict, I must consider whether under all the circumstances discretionary appointment of an independent counsel is appropriate. In each case, therefore, the final decision has been an exercise of my discretion, as provided for under the act.
I have undertaken the same examination here. Based on the facts as we know them now, I have not concluded that any conflict of interest would ensue from our vigorous and thorough investigation of the allegations contained in your letter.
Your letter relies upon press reports, certain documents and various public statements which you assert demonstrate that "officials at the highest level of the White House were involved in formulating, coordinating and implementing the (Democratic National Committee's (DNC's)) Fundraising efforts for the 1996 presidential campaign." You suggest that a thorough investigation of "fundraising improprieties" will therefore necessarily include an inquiry into the "knowledge and or complicity of very senior White House officials," and that the Department of Justice would therefore have a conflict of interest investigating these allegations.
To the extent that "improprieties" comprise crimes, they are being thoroughly investigated by the agents and prosecutors assigned to the task force. Should that investigation develop at any time specific and credible evidence that any covered person may have committed a crime, the Act will be triggered, and I will fulfill my responsibilities under the Act. In addition, should that investigation develop specific and credible evidence that a crime may have been committed by a "very senior" White House official who is not covered by the Act, I will decide whether investigation of that person by the Department might result in a conflict of interest, and, if so, whether the discretionary clause should be invoked. Until then, however, the mere fact that employees of the White House and the DNC worked closely together in the course of President Clinton's reelection campaign does not warrant appointment of an independent counsel. As I have stated above, the Department has a long history of investigating allegations of criminal activity by high-ranking Government officials without fear or favor, and will do so in this case.
I also do not accept the suggestion that there will be widespread public distrust of the actions and conclusions of the Department if it continues to investigate this matter, creating a conflict of interest warranting the appointment of an independent counsel. First, unless I find that the investigation of a particular person against whom specific and credible allegations have been made would pose a conflict, I have no authority to utilize the procedures of the Act. Moreover, I have confidence that the career professionals in the Department will investigate this matter in a fashion that will satisfy the American people that justice has been done.
Finally, even were I to determine that a conflict of interest of the sort contemplated by the statute exists in this case and as noted above I do not find such a conflict at this time there would be a number of weighty considerations that I would have to consider in determining whether to exercise my discretion to seek an independent counsel at this time. Because invocation of the conflict of interest provision is discretionary, it would still be my responsibility in that circumstance to weigh all the factors and determine whether appointment of an independent counsel would best serve the national interest. If in the future this investigation reveals evidence indicating that a conflict of interest exists, these factors will continue to weigh heavily in my evaluation of whether or not to invoke the discretionary provisions of the Act.
I assure you, once again, that allegations of violations of Federal criminal law with respect to campaign financing in the course of the 1996 Federal elections will be thoroughly investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted. At this point it appears to me that that task should be performed by the Department of Justice and its career investigators and prosecutors. I want to emphasize, however, that the task force continues to receive new information (much has been discovered even since I received your letter), and I will continue to monitor the investigation closely in light of my responsibilities under the Independent Counsel Act. Should future developments make it appropriate to invoke the procedures of the Act, I will do so without hesitation.
Copyright © 1997 AllPolitics All Rights Reserved.
Terms under which this information is provided to you.